

On Being and Time
The Section on Heidegger
in Charles Malik's
1937 Harvard Thesis

Introduced and Edited with Notes by
Nader El-Bizri

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On Being and Time
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in Charles Malik's
1937 Harvard Thesis

Introduced and Edited with Notes by
Nader El-Bizri

With a Prologue by
Fred R. Dallmayr
and an Epilogue by
Laurence Paul Hemming

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To my sons

Moubib El-Bizri and Magdi El-Bizri

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Prologue

‘Ways not Works’ (*Wege - nicht Werke*) – this was Heidegger’s motto for his Collected Writings, though in a strange way, it also applies to their fate. Since his death in 1976, his writings have found their ‘way’ into the world, securing for themselves a home in diverse cultures, from the Americas to the Near East, and the South and Far East. Thus, although nearly silenced, if not forgotten, in his home country, today Heidegger’s voice speaks to us poignantly in many different languages and idioms. One place where his voice is heard is the Near East, and especially Lebanon.

I am very grateful to my friend Nader El-Bizri for asking me to write this Prologue. El-Bizri teaches at the American University of Beirut where I have repeatedly visited him (while also visiting our sister institution Notre Dame University–Louaizé, in the northern outskirts of Beirut). Without fear of contradiction, I can say that El-Bizri is a genuine scholar whose work brings together the major traditions of the Levant – Greek and Roman culture, Arabic sciences and philosophy, and European scholasticism and Renaissance – while also seeking to add new impulses to these traditions. One legacy in which he is firmly steeped is Arabic philosophy, especially the work of Avicenna whose ontology put him on the way toward Heidegger’s ‘fundamental ontology’. Two major texts reflecting this confluence are *The Phenomenological Quest between Avicenna and Heidegger* (2000) and his chapter in the volume of studies entitled *Heidegger and the Islamicate World* (2019), besides his other articles on Heidegger’s conception of space and dwelling. These texts are surrounded by numerous other writings on Aristotle, Alhazen, the Brethren of Purity, Shia onto-theology, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and many other thinkers reflecting El-Bizri’s own ways and byways.

The present book contains the first annotated edition of the work of one of El-Bizri’s predecessor’s at the American University of Beirut: Charles Malik. More precisely, it is the first annotated edition of part of the doctoral thesis that Malik completed at Harvard University in 1937 (under the supervision of Alfred North Whitehead) – the part which offers his commentary on Heidegger’s *Being and Time* (*Sein und Zeit*) and especially on Heidegger’s ontology of time. The present edition includes an introduction and commentaries as running footnotes by El-Bizri on Malik’s reception of Heidegger’s *Being and Time*.

One should note that during the preparation of his thesis, Malik studied with Heidegger in Freiburg in 1935–1936, attending the philosopher’s lectures and seminars, before returning to Harvard. It may be assumed that his sojourn in Freiburg brought him into reasonably close contact with the philosopher and also with the prevailing intellectual and social climate at the time. What is readily apparent from Malik’s commentary is that he was attracted to Heidegger because of the latter’s

presumed 'existentialism', that is, his tendency to approach all philosophical questions from a human-centered perspective (a tendency which did not prevail for long). Malik's more biographical essays, especially 'Fourteen Months in Germany' (of 1936) and 'A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger' (of 1974) contain intriguing remarks on 'Heidegger's relation to the Nazi party', which was commonly described as 'not being cordial', mainly because Heidegger was 'rather withdrawn into his work and duties instead of being a public figure'. Malik also mentions that out of eighteen students in Heidegger's Kant seminar, all but one were not members of the Nazi student organization and that the party itself 'tolerated Heidegger's negative attitude toward its ideology and praxis' for a purely utilitarian reason, namely that 'he was perceived as being a *great man*'. At the same time, the grip of the Nazi regime on society was formidable and nearly totalitarian: 'Swastika flags sticking out of every window on official occasions ... Nazi papers the same everywhere, the same controlled news'. Still, the regime at the time was not yet in total control. For someone like Malik, it was still possible to 'pick and choose', to 'like Heidegger and dislike Hitler – because Heidegger in no way means Hitler'. Malik also pays tribute to the 'Confessing Church', noting that this church was 'putting up the most heroic fight' to counter the regime, especially in Lutheran services, but adding that confessional Christians were serving a nearly 'hopeless cause'. As for himself, he stated: 'If it were not for Heidegger I doubt very much whether I would have stayed long in Germany last year'.

Malik's essay, 'A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger', which was delivered on the occasion of Heidegger's eighty-fifth birthday, is offered as a sincere tribute to his former teacher with a tendency to 're-theologize Heidegger'. While in the 1930s Malik still saw a strict gulf separating Heidegger's ontology from Christian theology, in his later years he promoted a distinctive rapprochement between the two perspectives (thereby supporting a trend which became prominent a few decades after his teacher's death). The essay credits Heidegger for displaying in his teaching the 'highest integrity and seriousness' through which philosophy can elevate itself beyond partisan enmities and petty squabbles. Going beyond the 'existentialist' pathos of *Being and Time*, Malik finds that Heidegger's later writings (after the *Kebr*) open pathways toward mysticism, *apophaticism* and negative theology in the manner of John of the Cross and Jalāl al-Dīn al-Rūmī. Apart from treasuring the legacy of Heidegger, Malik in this context entered into conversation with George Grant and others. As his essay states: 'Faith is a matter of believing others. Believing only your own thought, even the most sublime thought, leaves you entirely within yourself'. Heidegger, at this point, becomes a companion of St Augustine.

I will limit myself here to a few words about the two 'fathers' of Malik's doctoral thesis at Harvard, Whitehead and Heidegger. Given Malik's interpretation of Heidegger as an existentialist humanist, he was bound to see Whitehead's 'process

ontology' as a quasi-positivist objectivism. As he wrote in his thesis: 'There is "process" so long as we are overwhelmed by our world; process thus means the state of self-forgetful indecision in which we seek "our salvation" in external *things*'. When we are fully existentially decisive, 'process ceases to exist for us'. In line with this basic assessment, Malik added: 'I find myself more truly in Professor Heidegger's than in Professor Whitehead's philosophy'; but with the postscript: 'I do not find myself in either philosophy'. With this qualifying statement, it seems to me, Malik placed himself in good company. The dialogue between Whitehead and Heidegger has hardly begun and still hovers in the future.

Since Whitehead is justifiably marginal in the present book, I want to conclude by stressing again the importance of Malik's reading of Heidegger. Encountering this early engagement with Heidegger on the part of a thinker from Lebanon is surely a welcome and exciting experience. Present-day readers owe a debt of gratitude to El-Bizri for making this encounter available in such a lucid, scholarly, and responsible way.

Fred R. Dallmayr

Packey J. Dee Professor in Political Science and Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, USA.

Introduction

... δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ὑμεῖς μὲν ταῦτα (τί ποτε βούλεσθε σημαίνειν ὅποταν ὄν φθέγγησθε) πάλαι γινώσκετε, ἡμεῖς δὲ πρό τοῦ μὲν ᾧόμεθα, νῦν δ' ἠπορήκαμεν ... (*Denn offenbar seid ihr doch schon lange mit dem vertraut, was ihr eigentlich meint, wenn ihr den Ausdruck „seiend“ gebraucht, wir jedoch glaubten es einst zwar zu verstehen, jetzt aber sind wir in Verlegenheit gekommen* [‘For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression “being”. We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed’])
– Plato’s *Sophist* 244a; Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit*, frontispiece.

Philosophical Contextualization

The Lebanese philosopher, educator, and diplomat Charles Habib Malik (1906–1987) completed his doctoral thesis in philosophy at Harvard University in 1937 after studying in Germany with Martin Heidegger at the University of Freiburg in 1935–1936.¹ Malik’s doctoral thesis was submitted to the Department of Philosophy and Psychology at Harvard University on 3 April 1937, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It was entitled *The Metaphysics of Time in the Philosophies of A. N. Whitehead and M. Heidegger*,² and it was co-supervised by Ernest Hocking and John D. Wild, under the mentorship of Alfred North Whitehead.

Even though in philosophical circles in Britain and the United States, Heidegger’s thought had been known since the 1920s, the section from Malik’s doctoral thesis that deals with the Heideggerian *Fundamentalontologie* (fundamental ontology) constitutes one of the earliest anglophone analytic and hermeneutic interpretations of *Sein und Zeit* (of 1927; *Being and Time*; it is published and commented upon for the first time in the present edition).³ In ‘Heidegger studies’, Malik’s text is therefore of historical significance, and as part of a larger thesis that included an earlier longer section on Alfred North Whitehead’s *Process and Reality*

¹ Malik had the privilege of studying with Heidegger as did notable thinkers such as Hannah Arendt, Herbert Marcuse, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Günther Anders, Hans Jonas, Jacob Klein, Paul Oskar Kristeller, Hans Loewald, Karl Löwith, Leo Strauss, Karl Rahner, and Ernst Nolte from Germany, or Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, Sidney Hook, and Marjorie Glicksman Grene from the United States, or Emmanuel Levinas from France, Michael Oakeshott from Britain, Jan Patočka from former Czechoslovakia, or Alberto Wagner de Reyna from Peru.

² Drafts of Malik’s doctoral thesis are preserved in boxes 254–256 in the archived collection entitled ‘Charles Habib Malik papers’ (1888–1994), which is preserved at the Repository of the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C., ID No. MSS58339.

³ Malik’s notes from Heidegger’s lectures are contained in box 257 in the Library of Congress ‘Charles Habib Malik papers’ collection. This box also contains notes from courses that Malik took with philosophers Walter Bröcker and Martin Honecker.

(of 1929), it has *a fortiori* a broader scholarly value.⁴ It constituted a pioneering step in the unfolding of an early twentieth-century Lebanese philosophical oeuvre as embodied in Malik's own Christian onto-theology, with a penchant to theologize Heidegger's *Fundamentalontologie*, which resonated with Heideggerian commentators who derived existential theological notions from *Sein und Zeit*.

Malik clearly is a key figure in the history of the global reception of Heidegger. This is so not simply because he provided one of the earliest anglophone engagements with, and partial translations with commentaries on, *Sein und Zeit*. He also anticipated many subsequent developments both in Heidegger's thought and of the theological orientations of John Macquarrie, Paul Tillich, Karl Rahner, Dominique Janicaud, and Jean-Luc Marion, while doing so at a very early stage in interpreting the Heideggerian thinking beyond Heidegger's debates with Rudolf Bultmann.⁵ Furthermore, there are indications in his doctoral thesis that anticipated the latent ethical elements in the existential analytic of *Dasein*, which much later were critically engaged with by Emmanuel Levinas, in addition to detecting the beginnings of seeing *Dasein*'s free and authentic resoluteness as being *heroic* from an existentialist perspective as figured later in the thought of Jean-Paul Sartre. It is extraordinary indeed to see so much potential blossoming in the philosophical

⁴ Charles Malik, *The Systems of Whitehead's Metaphysics*, eds. Habib Malik, Tony E. Nasrallah (Zouk Mosbeh, Lebanon: Notre Dame University, Louaizé, 2016). This volume is part of a series dedicated to publishing Malik's manuscripts and letters through the Institute of Lebanese Thought at Notre Dame University. Its publication corresponded with a joint international conference that we co-organized at the American University of Beirut in partnership with Notre Dame University on 30/31 March 2016 under the title 'Charles Malik the Philosopher: Reflections on Process and Impact'.

⁵ The theological facets to be derived from Heidegger's thinking were spotted early-on by Rudolf Bultmann in his existential approach to the hermeneutics of the New Testament and dialectical theology, despite the fact that he recognized the limits of the Heideggerian categories with respect to reading scripture. The rapprochement between their different modes of thinking took place in Marburg in the 1920s. Similar characteristics appeared in the existential theologies of John Macquarrie, Paul Tillich, Karl Rahner, Heinrich Ott, Dominique Janicaud, and Jean-Luc Marion. This was the case despite the unfolding of Heidegger's account concerning philosophy as being a methodological atheism. Nonetheless, the *Kehre* (Turn) in his thought, along with his understanding of *das Ereignis* (Event), point to the possibilities of enacting meaningful relationships between theology and philosophy as mediated by his critique of the tradition of metaphysics, from Plato and Aristotle through to Hegel and Nietzsche, by tracking the self-understanding of human existence. For discussions of these aspects, see Laurence Paul Hemming, *Heidegger's Atheism: The Refusal of a Theological Voice*, (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002); Hue Woodson, *Heideggerian Theologies: The Pathmarks of John Macquarrie, Rudolf Bultmann, Paul Tillich, and Karl Rahner* (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 2018); Jean-Yves Lacoste, 'Préface à l'édition "*Quadriges*,"' in *Heidegger et la question de Dieu*, ed. Jean Beaufret et al. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2009), pp. 7–28; John D. Caputo, *The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986); Didier Franck, *Heidegger et le christianisme. L'explication silencieuse* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004); Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, *Das Verhältnis von Philosophie und Theologie im Denken Martin Heideggers* (Freiburg im Breisgau, Munich: Karl Alber Verlag, 1974).

oeuvre of a pioneering young Lebanese thinker at Freiburg and Harvard in the middle of the 1930s.

The present annotated edition of the section on Heidegger in Malik's 1937 Harvard doctoral thesis focuses on the analytic and hermeneutic parameters of understanding Malik's philosophical reception of Heidegger's thought in the context of ontological thinking by way of one of the earliest anglophone commentaries on *Sein und Zeit*. It contributes to understanding the history of the conceptual reception of Heidegger's thinking within anglophone philosophical circles in academia, while taking into account the context of its enriching implications in modern Lebanese thought, particularly by way of investigating Malik's oeuvre.⁶

What is telling about the sensitive approach of Malik to Heidegger's thought is the manner in which his interpretation of *Sein und Zeit* follows non-linear trajectories. Such non-arborescent pathways in hermeneutics already signal to the reader an early interpretive penchant in accounting for Heidegger's parlance via the English language, which resonates with the labyrinthine nature of subsequent commentaries in Heideggerian studies.⁷ Malik anticipates not only the content of later commentaries in Heidegger studies, or simply their grappling with its anglophone lexicon, but he captures early on the attributes of the style of writing that generally characterizes the exegesis of *Sein und Zeit* by Heideggerians. A plethora of Heidegger's novel terms and sentence constructions wrestled with the use of the German language itself, not to mention how it might be translated afterwards, and this was undertaken on the grounds that the *grammar of fundamental ontology* needed to be based on new foundations of thinking and through unusual ways of stating philosophical propositions.

John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, the translators of *Sein und Zeit* in 1962 which they entitled *Being and Time*, affirmed in their 'Preface' to the English version

⁶ It is these factors that underpin my interest in Malik's legacy as they intertwine philosophical leitmotifs with biographical elements. I was attracted philosophically to his 1937 Harvard doctoral thesis, and especially to its vanguard anglophone reception of *Sein und Zeit*, while taking into account the captivating fact that he studied with Heidegger at a pivotal period in Freiburg. This resonated philosophically with my own research in Heidegger Studies and revealed academic trajectories that took me to study at Harvard University and eventually assume a professorship in Civilization Studies and Philosophy at AUB within departmental settings that had been founded by Malik and that benefited in their development from his groundbreaking discernment as an educator, including my service as director of the university-wide General Education in the liberal arts that embodied his vision and gave distinctiveness to AUB's mission. All of these combined the philosophical with the biographical and motivated me further in my endeavour to publish the present volume.

⁷ I am characterizing such pathways in thinking as being 'labyrinthine' and 'non-arborescent' following the post-structuralist parlance of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in their conception of what they called the 'rhizome', which designates the subterranean roots and non-hierarchical forms of thinking as opposed to the modes of binary reasoning and linear demonstration. See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Mille Plateaux: Capitalisme et Schizophrénie 2* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1980).

of 1962 that it was a very difficult book even for the German reader and consequently highly resistant to translation, so much so that it has often been called 'untranslatable'. Moreover, they emphasized that Heidegger was constantly using words in ways that were by no means ordinary and that he tended to discard traditional philosophical terminology, while occasionally coining new expressions and compounds.⁸ Similar difficulties were witnessed by Ralph Manheim in the English translation (Yale University Press and Oxford University Press, 1959), and they were confirmed by Joan Stambaugh in her notes to her English translation of 1996 (State University of New York Press, revised edition of 2010). Malik's English renderings and his paraphrasing of Heidegger's German phrases and terms from *Sein und Zeit* predate the anglophone translators of *Being and Time* and the Francophone renderings of *Être et Temps*. Any awkwardness in Malik's use of the English language in accounting for Heidegger's thought is principally due to the Heideggerian modes of thinking, speaking, and writing, as experienced by whoever delves deeply into studying *Sein und Zeit* or undertakes the fraught journey of translating it. Malik struggled in terms of the anglophone renderings of Heidegger's terms and phraseology much earlier than all these translators; moreover, he was Lebanese and not a native speaker of the English language. Without a doubt, any pioneer at the forefront of transposing Heidegger's thought into the English language would have faced such difficulties. Malik's interpretation of *Sein und Zeit* is therefore of historical significance within Heidegger Studies, and his text stands as a testimony to the early anglophone philosophical reception of, and introduction to, that work as a foundational masterpiece rooted in existentialism, phenomenological hermeneutics, deconstruction, and proto-environmentalism.

In this regard, it is worth noting that Heidegger's thinking during the 1920s has been meticulously researched. This is especially true of the development of his thought as it emerged with the so-called 'außerordentliches Kriegsnotsemester' hermeneutic breakthrough in Freiburg in 1919,⁹ during his appointment at Marburg, and in his engagement with the eminent German Lutheran theologian Rudolf Karl Bultmann up to the time of the publication of *Sein und Zeit*. However, an examination of the Heideggerian oeuvre of the 1930s, and particularly the period that

⁸ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 20th reprint of the 1962 translation, p. 13.

⁹ This refers to what was officially known as 'the out-of-the-ordinary wartime emergency semester' (*außerordentliches Kriegsnotsemester*) in February to April 1919. This semester is seen as a principal period in the unfolding of the hermeneutic phenomenology in Heidegger's early thought. According to this turn in his thinking, the lifeworld of quotidian experiences is portrayed as being saturated with meanings that are disseminated tacitly and are not traceable in their meaningfulness explicitly; hence, they require hermeneutic interpretation. See Theodore Kisiel, 'Das Kriegsnotsemester 1919: Heideggers Durchbruch zur hermeneutischen Phänomenologie', *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 99 (1992): 105–122; Theodore Kisiel, 'Kriegsnotsemester 1919: Heidegger's Hermeneutic Breakthrough', *The Question of Hermeneutics: Contributions to Phenomenology*, Vol. 17, ed. T. J. Stapleton (Dordrecht: Springer, 1994), pp. 155–208.

lasts up to the end of the Second World War, is much scarcer and more contested due to strife and antipathy, not the least because of Heidegger's political commitment in 1933. The scarcity of solid interpretations from this period is partly due to how Heidegger's thought was archived from that time on, and partly due to the fact that only a fraction of records from that period has been made available in print in German or has been translated into English or French. The reception of Heidegger's thought of the 1930s has been fraught with interpretative difficulty and a scarcity of documentation. In light of this, Malik's anglophone reception of Heidegger in the mid-1930s is not an incidental part of this story but a crucial component of it. Moreover, Malik's interpretation of *Sein und Zeit* diverges from the familiar accounts in the contemporary context of Heidegger Studies. It is both a Lebanese and a Christian interpretation that is composed in English and consequently, it is less burdened by the overhangs that American and British hermeneutics tended to entail. Moreover, this aspect is connected with how Heidegger continuously commented on his own thinking through self-critical orientations in moving about within the landscape of philosophy and by opening up new pathways of thought. A significant aspect of this emerged with the recent publication in 2018 of Heidegger's own evaluation of *Sein und Zeit* in the context of the self-assessment of his own publications (*Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen*).¹⁰

Heidegger had a complicated relationship with this work, and his critical re-evaluation of his *magnum opus* was presented as a running commentary that opened up new pathways for his own thinking. Heidegger began his philosophical self-confrontation with *Sein und Zeit* in the summer of 1936, at the same time as he started his work on his *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Contributions to Philosophy)*.¹¹ All these philosophical developments in Heidegger's ontological thinking were unfolding during the period in which Malik was studying with him. Having said that, the philosophical milieu at Harvard at the time would have been more inclined to a preference for pursuing logical analytics and American pragmatism,¹² with a tacit aversion

¹⁰ Martin Heidegger, *Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2018), *Gesamtausgabe* 82. This volume provides insights into Heidegger's self-assessment of his own *Sein und Zeit* (1927), *Was ist Metaphysik?* (1929), *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* (1935/36), *Άγγιβασιή* (1944/45), and *Brief über den Humanismus* (1946). For an informative review of Heidegger's collected self-reflections, see: Christopher D. Merwin, 'Heidegger's Confrontation with His Own Writings', *Research in Phenomenology* 49, Vol. 2 (2019): 255–263.

¹¹ Martin Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie: Vom Ereignis, 1936–1939* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989), *Gesamtausgabe* 65.

¹² In that period, Malik developed an interest in the pragmatism of the polymathic American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. He wrote a review of Volume 5 of the *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, which was co-edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss and published by Harvard University Press in 1934. Malik's review was published in 1935 in volume 23 of *Isis*, the eminent history of science under the editorship of the prominent historian of science George Sarton. See: Charles Malik, 'Review: Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce', *Isis* 23, Vol. 1 (1935): 477–483. Also refer to box 235 in the Library of Congress 'Charles Habib Malik papers' collection.

towards Heidegger's thought.¹³ Such a philosophical mood would have resonated with Rudolf Carnap's outright rejection of Heidegger's ontology in his study of 1932, '*Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache*' ('The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language').¹⁴ This fierce attack was directly aimed at '*Was ist Metaphysik?*',¹⁵ Heidegger's Freiburg inaugural lecture of 1929, which, by association, also expressed an antipathy towards *Sein und Zeit* that had started to emerge in Anglo-American analytic philosophy.¹⁶ It underlines one of the principal rifts in contemporary philosophy over truth and meaningfulness in the endeavour to eliminate ontology through the analysis of idealized and logically-determined linguistic algorithms with a dominating tendency towards coding and technicity. Malik's interest in metaphysics was not curbed by such developments within the logical analytic school in philosophy, which became a dominant movement within anglophone philosophizing circles in the 1930s and established a bastion at Harvard University. Malik was interested not only in the metaphysics of Whitehead, but more explicitly in Heidegger's ontology, to the point of wishing to study with the latter in Germany during a precarious epoch in German socio-political history.

Malik's interest in Heidegger can also be understood in terms of his own subsequent reflections on phenomenology by way of the coined Arabic expression '*al-zuhūriyya*'. This inclination can be detected in a treatise he composed in Arabic under the title *al-Muqaddima (The Introduction)*.¹⁷ In it, Malik notes that 'to be or not to be' is indicative of the workings of the uncanniness (*gharāba*) of the *otherness of the other* within the self, which is characteristic of the human being and not

¹³ We would think that this would have been the case with Whitehead's own logicism as embodied in publishing the *Principia Mathematica* with Bertrand Russell (Vols. 1–3 published by Cambridge University Press in 1910 to 1913; then in a 2nd edition in 1925 and 1927). This was a seminal work of modern logicism that aimed at developing a formal logic as a foundation for mathematics, wherein the mathematical theorems would be taken as a subset of logical theorems.

¹⁴ Rudolf Carnap, 'The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language' ('*Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache*') translated into English by Arthur Pap, and published in the journal *Erkenntnis*, Vol. II (1932): 60–81.

¹⁵ Martin Heidegger, '*Was ist Metaphysik?*', in *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006); Martin Heidegger, *Was ist Metaphysik?* (Bonn: Verlag Friedrich Cohen, 1929).

¹⁶ For some key references concerning the philosophical mood and institutional settings of that epoch (which touch upon Heidegger, Carnap, Whitehead, Cassirer, Quine, etc.), the reader may consult the following main sources: Bruce Kuklick, *A History of Philosophy in America, 1720–2000* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001); Bruce Kuklick, *The Rise of American Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Joel Isaac, *Working Knowledge* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012); Michael Friedman, *A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger* (Chicago: Open Court Press, 2000); Peter E. Gordon, *Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010).

¹⁷ Charles Malik, *al-Muqaddima* (Beirut: *Dār al-Nabār*, 2000), 2nd ed. This book was intended as a survey of philosophical trends, and to serve as a voluminous *introduction* to a series of several subsequent volumes of studies in philosophy that were not completed.

simply of how humans are equipped with rationality.¹⁸ The phenomenological leitmotifs left a mark on Malik's thinking in his meditations on the maxim *Zu den Sachen selbst* (*ilā al-ashyā' dhātiha*; to things themselves),¹⁹ from the viewpoint of addressing the question of being (*kayān/kaynūna*) as a *Seinsart des Daseins* (*ḥāl insāniyya*).²⁰ Malik appreciated as such the conceptual entailments of Heidegger's reflections on death in *Sein und Zeit*,²¹ and the existential analytics of everydayness as well,²² which he judged to be more profound in this context than Edmund Husserl's treatment of the *Lebenswelt* (lifeworld).²³ As Malik conceded in this regard, Heidegger's thought was not alien to his own sensibilities, as if he was indeed meant to receive it in grace even before he had come across it.²⁴

Onto-Theology

Malik's enduring interest in the Heideggerian legacy was confirmed in his testimonial keynote at a symposium at the Goethe-Institute in Beirut in 1974 on the occasion of Heidegger's eighty-fifth birthday. At this stage in the development of his own thought, Malik described himself as a *Christian thinker* who seeks to 'Heideggerize theology' or 'theologize Heidegger'.²⁵ Malik reaffirmed later that his experience in Heidegger's seminars and lectures was singularly rewarding²⁶ and that he had not forgotten these sessions, whether in terms of their content or their mode of delivery, with Heidegger's voice still clearly audible in his memory. Malik felt on such occasions that he was 'in the presence of the highest integrity and seriousness', and that he took from Heidegger's lessons what was akin to 'seeds which take a lifetime to germinate and bloom' and for which he remained thankful.²⁷ Malik admired Heidegger's reflections on *Eigentlichkeit* and *Uneigentlichkeit* in uncovering that which can lurk within thinking as a form of falsehood; namely the sort we curb in how we feel about quotidian distractions and business and yet, when disclosing this to ourselves, we experience catharsis. Malik notes that Heidegger's seminars were more intimate than the lectures, and that they gathered students from all over the world, who had been handpicked by Heidegger himself, and who were asked to reflect on

¹⁸ Malik, *al-Muqaddima*, *op. cit.*, pp. 16–17.

¹⁹ Malik, *al-Muqaddima*, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

²⁰ Malik, *al-Muqaddima*, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

²¹ Malik, *al-Muqaddima*, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

²² Malik, *al-Muqaddima*, *op. cit.*, pp. 162–163.

²³ Malik, *al-Muqaddima*, *op. cit.*, pp. 170–171.

²⁴ Malik, *al-Muqaddima*, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

²⁵ Charles Habib Malik, 'A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger', *The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review*, Volume 41, No.1 (January 1977): 1–61.

²⁶ For example, these dealt with Leibniz's *monadology*, Schelling's philosophy of freedom, Kant's critique of judgement; see: Malik, 'A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger', *art. cit.*, p. 5.

²⁷ Malik, 'A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger', *art. cit.*, pp. 6–7.

the modes of interpreting the specific themes that were thoroughly scrutinized. Single propositions were reflected upon, with the whole history of philosophy transposed to bear upon them, and tracing them back to their Greek genetic roots. These occasions constituted for Malik 'the most valuable experience' he had with Heidegger; they were 'moments of sheer joy'. Malik describes such levels of profundity, passion, and erudition as being indicative of a wholly unaffected and unconscious 'love of men and subject matter that possessed Heidegger'.²⁸

Malik asserts that he has spent more time studying *Sein und Zeit* than any other book, with the exception of the New Testament, the Book of Psalms, the principal works of Whitehead, and the key dialogues of Plato. Moreover, the phenomenological maxim, *Zu den Sachen selbst* (To the things themselves), opened Malik's eyes as no other method had done, and he asserted that henceforth, he would never accept a doctrine without authentic certification of how it was integrally based on human existence.²⁹ Moreover, Malik expands his meditations on the thinking of the later Heidegger, after the *Kehre* (or turning) from the existential analytic of *Dasein* in *Sein und Zeit*. However, he also points out that *Sein und Zeit* was a preparatory enkindling of the problematic of ontology, and in the *Kehre*, a trajectory along the same pathway followed it rather than departed from it.³⁰ The quest for the meaning, truth, and place of being, wherein *Dasein* gives way to *Sein* (being) and *Denken* (thinking), becomes *what is called for* rather than relying solely on the phenomenological method. Moreover, the notions of dwelling (*Wohnen*) and the quadruple/fourfold (*Geviert*) become principal themes of meditation in Heidegger's thinking.³¹

Malik likens the more typically Heideggerian passages in the later oeuvres to that which he encounters in the mystical language of Jalāl al-Dīn al-Rūmī and John of the Cross. He adds that Heidegger's themes coincide with those of theology; though he transforms the theological notions into meaning concerning human beingness and self-revealed being. Malik even suggests that the fable used by

²⁸ Malik, 'A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger', *art. cit.*, pp. 7–9.

²⁹ Malik, 'A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger', *art. cit.*, pp. 9–11.

³⁰ Malik, 'A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger', *art. cit.*, p. 12. For a recent radical turn in interpreting Heidegger's thinking away from a dominant focus on *being* (*Sein*) in fundamental ontology to a consideration of the centrality of the question of *sense* (*Sinn*) and *meaning* (*Bedeutung*), see: Thomas Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift* (London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2015).

³¹ Malik, 'A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger', *art. cit.*, pp. 13–14. This figures, for instance, in the meditations on dwelling in the letter *Bauen Wohnen Denken* (Building Dwelling Thinking) in Martin Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen: Günther Neske Verlag, 1954), pp. 145–162; Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 145–161; Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, 2nd edition, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), pp. 347–363. This is specifically set in the context of accounting for the gathering of the fourfold (*das Geviert*) *earth-sky-divinities-mortals* (*Erde und Himmel, die Göttlichen und die Sterblichen*) into their essential oneness in dwelling. Such aspects are further elucidated in Heidegger's *Das Ding* (The Thing) and *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* (The Origin of the Work of Art).

Heidegger to account for *cura/Sorge* (care) could have been replaced by *Genesis 3* on the consequences of disobedience and the fall.³² However, phenomenological description and meditative thinking replace theology in Heidegger's ontology, which de-theologizes theology by ontologizing and immanentizing it. A negative theology emerges as such, which is without a God or revelation; as if it salvaged the truth of theologizing without theological praxis or mythologized ontology. Malik affirms herein that he 'love[s] Heidegger for what and who he is, and to find in him, and in Nietzsche, the greatest untheological reminders of true theology',³³ encountering here a non-Semitic, non-monotheistic, non-Abrahamic form of heathenism, by way of an atavistic reversion to mediaeval German mysticism, through Heidegger's phenomenology.³⁴ This is the case, even though to Malik's mind, Heidegger is more strongly indebted to the Judeo-Christian tradition than he acknowledges, and to the ontological-transcendental references to the Graeco-Roman and German roots of intellectual mysticism.³⁵ Malik has doubts about the transformation of theology into a strict untheological ontology,³⁶ with the specific take on reflections on God and the nothing in *Was ist Metaphysik?* (as also analysed by Karl Barth) and the manner Malik also evokes Jean-Paul Sartre in this regard.³⁷ The *nothing* is herein the pseudonym that conceals the naming of the Godhead. It is clear that Malik recognizes that he judges the solemn effect Heidegger produces in this regard to be 'immeasurably more serious than that of Sartre',³⁸ though the *Godhead* in question is not that of the Church or the Bible.³⁹ Malik notes that there is in Heidegger's thought no preferential theory of value, except the formal injunction about resolute authentic existence; even though Heidegger owes more to a valuation of conscience more than he explicitly admits.⁴⁰ Ethics is not assumed in the call of conscience or in the guilt of falling prey to the idle curiosity and gossiping talk of *Das Man* (the neuter *They* self of everydayness). For Malik, Heidegger's thought is not able to answer many of the theological and ethical questions in the manner that the Christian tradition is, even when yearning to metamorphose thinking from being calculatively scientific to becoming medita-

³² Malik, 'A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger', *art. cit.*, pp. 15–18.

³³ Malik, 'A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger', *art. cit.*, pp. 18–20.

³⁴ For recent reflections on related themes, see: George Pattison, 'The role of mysticism in the formation of Heidegger's phenomenology', in *Mystical Theology and Continental Philosophy: Interchange in the Wake of God*, eds. D. Lewin, S. D. Podmore, and D. Williams (London: Taylor & Francis, 2017), pp. 131–146.

³⁵ Malik, 'A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger', *art. cit.*, p. 21.

³⁶ Malik, 'A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger', *art. cit.*, pp. 22–24.

³⁷ Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, trans. G. W. Bromiley and R. J. Ehrlich, eds. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (London: Continuum T&T Clark Ltd., 2006), 3rd rep.; Vol. III, Part 3, Chap. XI, Art. 50, Sec. 3.

³⁸ Malik, 'A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger', *art. cit.*, p. 24.

³⁹ Malik, 'A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger', *art. cit.*, p. 26.

⁴⁰ Malik, 'A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger', *art. cit.*, p. 29.

tively sapiential. Notwithstanding, that bifurcation of the calculative and the meditative is nothing compared to what Malik takes to be the calamitous divorce between faith and reason, which to his mind afflicts the very soul of Europe. The aim is to identify a voice, a rule, a value from outside of the beingness of *Dasein* in attending to its own possibilities, such as that which calls for it to summon the *courage to be* rather than *not to be*, even by way of Stoic self-sufficient aloneness. In this, Malik comes very close to what Emmanuel Levinas discovers to be the loneliness (*esseulé*) that characterizes *Dasein*. This means that the *existential analytic* of *Dasein* (*existenzialen Analytik des Daseins*) by Heidegger does not account authentically for society, companionship, fellowship, friendship, belonging together, the *ecclesia*, community, love, etc. Despite this, the Heideggerian outlook still values poetics, beauty, quietude, pensive moods, nostalgia; albeit that they are marked by a saddened solitude and a heart-rending loneliness, though without this invalidating the profound truths that such states may yield.⁴¹ Without mentioning Levinas, Malik evokes herein the *face-to-face* relationship in seeking companionship, fellowship, and love.⁴² Malik's Christian faith entices him to affirm that *philosophers* are not like *saints* who even in their loneliest loneliness are still in communion with Christ.⁴³ As Malik puts it, there is in Heidegger a harking-back to pre-Christian, German, Nordic, Greek, and Roman theosophies, which manifests itself in de-theologizing theology. Nevertheless, Malik still considers Heidegger's thinking as more profound than religious thought and more originary (*ursprünglich*).⁴⁴

The entwining of ethics with faith is revealed by Malik in his meditations on the consequences of de-theologizing theology by way of Heidegger's ontological-existential thought, and the way this applies to the case of German philosophers such as Kant and Hegel. Malik believes that Heidegger replaces the transcendent

⁴¹ Malik, 'A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger', *art. cit.*, pp. 31–34.

⁴² The ethical-moral tone is not found in Heidegger's fundamental ontology, and it is in this context that Levinas critiqued the existential analytic as being conducted from the standpoint of affirming an impersonal lonely *Dasein* (*esseulé*) that stands *side-to-side* (*côte à côte*) with others, around a common project, theme, goal, but not *face-to-face*. According to Levinas, this constitutes the meaning of Heidegger's *Miteinandersein*; namely of being reciprocally with one another (*être réciproquement l'un avec l'autre*). See Emmanuel Levinas, *Le temps et l'autre* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991), pp. 18–19, 69, 88–89. I also treated related questions in: Nader El-Bizri, 'Uneasy Meditations following Levinas', *Studia Phaenomenologica*, Vol. VI (2006): 293–315; Nader El-Bizri, 'Variations ontologiques autour du concept d'angoisse chez Kierkegaard', in *Kierkegaard, notre contemporain*, ed. Nicole Hatem *et al.* (Beirut-Copenhagen: Presses de l'Université Saint-Joseph – Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, 2013), pp. 83–95; Nader El-Bizri, 'Ontological Meditations on Tillich and Heidegger', *Iris: Annales de Philosophie*, Vol. 36 (2015): 109–114; Nader El-Bizri, 'Being at Home in Solitary Quarantine: Phenomenological Analytics and Existential Meditations', *Studia UBB. Philosophia*, Vol. 65, Issue 2 (2020): 7–32.

⁴³ Malik, 'A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger', *art. cit.*, p. 36.

⁴⁴ Malik, 'A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger', *art. cit.*, pp. 39–40.

and revealed, as traditional grounds, with what is all along a nullity in the immanence of darkness; hence *a ground that is no ground at all*.⁴⁵ Faith and piety assume through the agency of belief that *a distinct personal being wholly other than the self* is addressed. Unlike Heidegger's *Dasein*, which addresses itself in self-absorption, the faithful address God in prayer. If divinity exists, it is ontologically equiprimordial with the *being* of the being who attends to the meaning, truth, and place of its being (namely, '*Dasein*'), or *being* as *Ereignis* of the '*there is*' rather than *not*.

'We are too late for the gods and too early for Being. Being's poem, just begun, is *man*'!⁴⁶ Such a declaration, however, may also point to the moral-personal-intellectual-existential *rottenness* of the human being rather than the world; it is as if humanity had grown out of everything that once embraced it, without the need to break the shackles that have fallen away unforeseen (echoing in this the last utterances in Nietzsche's *Antichrist*). The Nietzschean 'eternal recurrence of the same' is the monotonous meaningless sameness of existence as moved by a spirit of resentment and renegefulness against the world.⁴⁷ Malik notes that:

'Plato and Aristotle wrote very great literature; so did Heidegger and Nietzsche; but we never cry when we read them, nor do I think people cried in the sense I mean here in the Academy or the Lyceum. I believe when we thus cry we are closer to Being – in every sense of the term – than when we only wonder, ask questions, analyze and reflect, and think meditatively'.

This picture brings to mind the predicament of Augustine of Hippo in the *Confessions*, wherein as he closed his eyes, there flowed a great sadness into his heart and passed into tears, like a fountain sucked; and he came to be in that struggle; to be the strife itself, the tribulation.⁴⁸ Waiting for a power that saves from the afflictions that devastate by way of de-humanizing, calculating, objectifying, de-thinging, and en-framing, may be in *vain*. Malik is eschewing the quest for salvation by going 'a-whoring after other gods'.⁴⁹ Thus, he evokes the way thanking and thinking are mutually entangled in Heidegger's thought in attending to the gratefulness that is owed for being, and in gratitude for its gifting; *es gibt Sein, it is, there is* [being] (*il y a*); and more specifically in the sense of how *it gives being*. Thanks are due to the gifted endowment and dowry that is most thought-provoking; thanklessness is thoughtlessness, while thanking is thinking.

⁴⁵ Malik, 'A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger', *art. cit.*, pp. 40–42.

⁴⁶ Martin Heidegger, '*Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*', *GA 13* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1954), p. 4; Malik, 'A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger', *art. cit.*, p. 47.

⁴⁷ Malik, 'A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger', *art. cit.*, pp. 51–52.

⁴⁸ *Premebam oculos eius; et confluebat in praecordia mea maestitudo ingens et transflebat in lacrimas; ibidemque oculi mei violento animi imperio resorbent fontem suum usque ad siccitatem, et in tali luctamine valde male mihi erat.* Augustine, *Confessions: Volume II, Books 9–13*, ed. trans. Carolyn J.-B. Hammond, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2016), *Liber IX, Caput XII*.

⁴⁹ Malik, 'A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger', *art. cit.*, pp. 53–55.

Dasein is lonely and has no one to thank but itself for thinking about its own being and heeding its own call of conscience in care. Malik tends to understand love herein to be more fundamental than thinking or thanking; and for him, it is not for nothing that in the Christian tradition, God is taken to be Love and most worthy of gratitude.⁵⁰ ‘*Die Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins*’ (the question about the meaning of being) remains at stake here. This is understood by Malik to be the hidden melody and nostalgia for God, for the ground, mystery, transcendence, and the beyond in Heidegger’s thought;⁵¹ it remains a vague longing for paganism and heathenism that is not marked by a profound personal tragedy. Thought cannot be simply equated with *being*. According to Malik, Heidegger was on the way back to the ‘full-blooded faith of his fathers’; almost in a metaphorical image of an Augustine crying in the garden. This explicitly reveals the Christian onto-theological convictions of Malik and the manner they impacted on his reading of Heidegger.⁵² They make Malik’s view in approaching Heidegger rather unique in its 1930s context, and they do so in anticipation of later modes of investigating the Heideggerian tradition following onto-theological pathways (one thinks of Rudolf Bultmann, John Macquarrie, Karl Rahner, Paul Tillich, Reiner Schürmann, Dominique Janicaud, Jean-Luc Marion, George Pattison, etc.). It is as if *die Kehre* as a *turn* had turned into *die Umkehr* as *return*.⁵³ This is why thinking holds to the coming of what has been and is remembrance.

Heidegger has been described as a highly proactive and skilled mystifier; namely a negative theologian trying to destroy the pretensions of human reason so as to open up a space for a form of life that is more primordial.⁵⁴ Starting with a penchant for Catholicism and Thomism and later leaning towards Lutheranism, Heidegger sought a return to lived experience.⁵⁵ He initially aimed at disentangling the Christian faith from the pagan Greek metaphysical categories, with an affinity

⁵⁰ Malik, ‘A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger’, *art. cit.*, pp. 56–57.

⁵¹ Malik, ‘A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger’, *art. cit.*, p. 58.

⁵² This Christianized leaning in approaching philosophy also underpinned his engaging dialogue with the Canadian Philosopher George Parkin Grant (1918–1988), who was known for his traditionalist conservatism. Their encounter was presented via the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation as a sequel to the 1969 Massey Lectures, *Time as History*. See: George Grant, *Time as History*, ed. with introduction William Christian (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), and mainly in the Appendix: ‘Dialogue on the Death of God with Charles Malik’, pp. 71–81. Malik’s reflections on onto-theological notions through Christian leitmotifs became clearer in his later publications, such as *The Wonder of Being* (Waco, Texas: Word Books Publishers, 1974).

⁵³ Malik, ‘A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger’, *art. cit.*, pp. 60–61.

⁵⁴ For a perspective from within the anglophone analytic school in its British context, see: Raymond Geuss, *Changing the Subject: Philosophy from Socrates to Adorno* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2017), pp. 226–249, esp. p. 227.

⁵⁵ This at least is the way Geuss reflects on Heidegger from an analytic perspective in *Changing the Subject*, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

attuned to negative theology.⁵⁶ Nietzsche's proposition 'God is dead!', which is not an assertion of ordinary atheism, means that the super-sensible world, especially that of the Christian God, has lost its effective force in history.⁵⁷ Understanding how to live one's own life as well as conceptualizing it were seen by him as being mutually dependent in a dynamic hermeneutic circle, whereby a false conceptualization could inhibit pre-theoretical tacit understanding.⁵⁸ Nonetheless, Malik, who was well attuned to religious thinking, was correct in believing that Heidegger was not a theologian, since the latter took theology to be a 'Christianization of philosophy' (*Verchristlichung der Philosophie*).⁵⁹ However, philosophizing for Heidegger was closely connected with onto-theology as an inquiry into *being* and the highest form of being (*Seiendes im Ganzen und Seiendes als Seiendes*).⁶⁰

Reflections on divinity in Heidegger's thought figure, for instance, in his meditations on dwelling in the letter *Bauen, Wohnen, Denken*, and specifically in the consideration of the gathering of the fourfold (*das Geviert*) earth-sky-divinities-mortals (*Erde und Himmel, die Göttlichen und die Sterblichen*) into their essential oneness in dwelling.⁶¹ This also resonates with what he noted in his *Beiträge zur Philosophie* (*Contributions to Philosophy*), namely that a people are only a people when they receive their history as apportioned to them by finding their God; whereby the distress from the 'abandonment by being' (*Seinsverlassenheit*) due to the flight of the gods (*Flucht der Götter*) points to remembering-expecting (*erinnernd-erwartend*) without flight or arrival of the divinities (*das ist weder Flucht noch Ankunft der Götter*). Ultimately, he argues that what belongs to the essence of a people is grounded in the historicity of those who belong to themselves out of belonging to a god (*das Wesen des Volkes gründet in der Geschichtlichkeit der Sichgehörenden aus der Zugehörigkeit zu dem Gott*).⁶² This also echoes his reflections on Rainer Maria Rilke's call 'Jetzt

⁵⁶ Geuss, *Changing the Subject*, *op. cit.*, p. 229. For a nuanced perspective on Heidegger from the viewpoint of philosophy of religion, see: Laurence Paul Hemming, 'Heidegger', *A History of Western Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. 4, eds. Graham Robert Oppy and Nick Trakakis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 175–186. A broader consideration of this matter in phenomenology is articulated within the French tradition in: Dominique Janicaud, *La phénoménologie dans tous ses états* (Paris: Gallimard, 2009); this also contains re-editions of Janicaud's *Le tournant théologique de la phénoménologie française* (1991) and *La phénoménologie éclatée* (1997).

⁵⁷ Heidegger's 1943 lecture on Nietzsche's proposition that 'God is dead' is set in *Holzwege, Gesamtausgabe 5* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977); 'The Word of Nietzsche: "God is dead"', trans. William Lovitt, *The Question Concerning Technology and other Essays* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977).

⁵⁸ Geuss, *Changing the Subject*, *op. cit.*, pp. 234–237.

⁵⁹ Charles Malik, 'Fourteen months in Germany' (an unpublished text, dated 29 October 1936, at Harvard University; see p. 7). The text of this lecture has been electronically reproduced from the archived collection: 'Charles Habib Malik papers', Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C.

⁶⁰ Malik, 'Fourteen months in Germany', *art. cit.*, p. 7.

⁶¹ Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, *op. cit.*, pp. 145–162; Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, *op. cit.*, pp. 145–161; Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, 2nd edition, *op. cit.*, pp. 347–363.

⁶² Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, *op. cit.*, §§251–254.

wär es Zeit, daß Götter träten aus bewohnten Dingen ('now it is time that gods emerge from things by which we dwell').⁶³

Malik commented on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by evoking the Heideggerian aphorism⁶⁴ *Wir sind zu spät für die Götter, zu früh für das Sein* ('we are too late for the gods, too early for being').⁶⁵ This inclination in thinking may have been mediated through a subaltern perspective on onto-theology that is 'provincialized' in its existential analytics of *Dasein*, or of the human person.⁶⁶ Malik here appeals to Heidegger's suspicion towards abstraction, hyper-rationalism, and historicism by way of an anti-historicist understanding of the history of metaphysics as a prerequisite for modern theorizing. This resonates with Malik's own Christian conceptualization of human dignity, which gives a sharper relief to the Heideggerian leitmotifs:

Although Malik may have followed a distinctly Heideggerian path in his own thought, he was also a committed Christian. In this sense he was closer to Personalism and Neo-Thomism ... There is little to distinguish him from Heidegger except for his more humanistic tenor. Perhaps the more explicit dependence upon Christian teaching in later years was an attempt to rein in some of the dangerous tendencies in Heidegger's thought.⁶⁷

⁶³ Rainer Maria Rilke, *Gesammelte Werke, Band II* (Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1930), p. 185.

⁶⁴ This is a reference to Malik's Diary (December 1948, no. 2635). For a discussion surrounding the ideological, cultural diversity, religion, value-systems, legalistic factors, and neo-colonial dynamics that underpinned the setting of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the service of Charles Malik as a diplomat representing Lebanon within the eighteen-member U.N. Human Rights Commission after the second World War chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, see: Mary Ann Glendon, 'Foundations of Human Rights: The Unfinished Business', *American Journal of Jurisprudence*, Vol. 44, Issue 1 (1999): 1–14. Also see: Mary Ann Glendon, *A World Made New. Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (New York: Random House, 2001), p. 170; fn. 7, Chapter 9.

⁶⁵ The actual words of Heidegger were: *Die Verdüsterung der Welt erreicht nie das Licht des Seyns. Wir kommen für die Götter zu spät und zu früh für das Seyn. Dessen angefangenes Gedicht ist der Mensch. Auf einen Stern zugehen, nur dieses. Denken ist die Einschränkung auf einen Gedanken, der einst wie ein Stern am Himmel der Welt stehen bleibt.* ('The world's darkening never reaches to the light of Being. We are too late for the gods and too early for Being. Being's poem, just begun, is man. To head toward a star, this only. To think is to confine yourself to a single thought that one day stands still like a star in the world's sky.'). See: Martin Heidegger, *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens* (Pfullingen: Günther Neske Verlag, 1954), p. 7; Martin Heidegger, 'The Thinker as Poet', in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), p. 4. Such an image longs for the premodern aim of thinking about particulars by way of the eidetic universals that determine their quiddities. This points to a circular motion (κύκλω κίνησις) in thought, which evokes the onto-theological puzzle (ἀπορίᾳ) of an Aristotelian πρῶτον κινῶν ἀκίνητον (prime unmoved mover; *Metaphysics* Λ 1072a).

⁶⁶ See the engaging analysis that is offered in: Martin Woessner, 'Provincializing Human Rights? The Heideggerian Legacy from Charles Malik to Dipesh Chakrabarty', in *Human Rights from a Third World Perspective: Critique, History, and International Law*, ed. José-Manuel Barreto (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), Chapter 2, pp. 65–101; especially pp. 70–77 in which he focuses on Malik.

⁶⁷ Woessner, 'Provincializing Human Rights?', *art. cit.*, p. 76, 79, 80. Parallels may be drawn in what is a Heideggerian-inspired pondering over human rights in the intellectual trajectory of Heidegger's other pupil in Freiburg, the Czech philosopher Jan Patočka.

If for Malik philosophy was *the philosophers themselves* in the manifestation of their thought, in what opens up through their mode of being-in-the-world, he notes towards the end of his doctoral thesis that he finds himself in Heidegger's philosophy more so than in Whitehead's, and yet, by way of demarcating his own philosophical voice, he adds afterwards that he does not quite find himself in either. In his doctoral philosophical formation, Malik was grounded in these two streams of thought while being also fundamentally influenced by Christian thinking, including that of Augustine of Hippo and Blaise Pascal.⁶⁸

Harvard and Freiburg

Charles Malik began his studies at Harvard University in September 1932 prior to travelling to Germany.⁶⁹ He took courses at Harvard in classical and early modern philosophy, and in metaphysics, epistemology, logic, cosmology, philosophy of science, aesthetics, and psychology.⁷⁰ In a series of letters (mainly from the years 1935–1937) which mark the beginning of his academic endeavours as a doctoral candidate, we sense various aspects of his affective restlessness and anguish prior to going to Germany and while being there.

Malik sensed since 1933 that the time ahead was that of days of moral trial in Europe; yet he believed that the essence of humanity was to be found in hope as manifesting its highest expression in the love of God. He meditated on the tribulations that befall a person while also referring to the Christian hope of being granted God's mercy, as well as the relief available through faithful companionship that is attuned to a person's visions concerning what constitutes the good. Moreover, Malik affirmed with religious overtones that a 'half-a-dozen true worshippers can remake the earth', and that 'a single supreme worshipper like Jesus has already remade it'.⁷¹ He also highlighted his disillusionment with contemporary philosophy as being a 'formal affair', wherein the old Athenian glow, enthusiasm, and cosmic seriousness seemed to be lost sight of completely, and that the student of

⁶⁸ George Sabra, "In Awe before Being": The Philosophy of Charles Malik (1906-1987), *Al-Abhāth* 64, Special Issue (2016): 43–74; esp. pp. 47, 48, 49-51; see also: Charles Malik, *The Wonder of Being* (Waco: Word Books, 1974), pp. 30–32.

⁶⁹ In a letter dated 6 July 1933, Malik confirms that he received the Thayer Fellowship from Harvard University. As noted earlier, a series of Malik's unpublished letters had been electronically reproduced from the archived collection: 'Charles Habib Malik papers', Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, with the key letters dating back to 1935–1937 kept in boxes 53–54.

⁷⁰ In a letter dated 5 July 1933, Malik mentions that he was interviewed by Whitehead for the thesis supervision, and he adds in a letter of 17 February 1933 that he took an 'A+' for the cosmology course with Whitehead (with the term paper entitled: 'The Metaphysical Status of Space and Time in the Philosophies of Plato and Professor Whitehead'), adding that he is also taking a course with Whitehead on 'Philosophy and the Method of Science'.

⁷¹ Malik's letter of 2 March 1933.

philosophy at a university like Harvard led ‘half-a-dozen different lives, without harmony or unity’. He even added that not a few *prostitute* philosophy for unworthy ends, such as securing a ‘job’. Malik’s mood at the time was meditative. He wrote that ‘you can give me the possibility of enjoying the free, honest, serious company of Socrates, and I will give you in return the entire modern world. But the true problem is not to withdraw from this modern world, but to redeem it’. To his mind, ‘philosophy, as Plato realized it, is the supreme integration of the totality of the impulses that beat on one’s heart. It is therefore the convergence of the entire movement of history onto a solitary moment of it’. Thus, the philosopher would survey the history of ideas with the deepest sense of restlessness through a transcendental clarification of its significance as it bears on the individual soul. For him, this is the destiny of the philosopher which requires self-honesty and an initiation into the rites of self-purification as classically embodied in the mystery cults of the ancient Greeks. Malik believed that ‘in this modern world there seems to be a universal conspiracy of distractions and cares and allurements against this absolute singleness of purpose’.⁷² At Harvard University, Malik was exposed to the works of Aristotle, Leibniz, Descartes, and Hegel. He reminisces that the topic of his thesis during that early phase of his doctorate could have been on ‘some important historical interpretation of God, perhaps that of Whitehead’.⁷³ However, he notes that at the time, there ‘were several other metaphysical themes competing with this topic’.

During that period Malik was spending a good deal of his time at the Widener Library at Harvard, and it is interesting to note that the daughter of Whitehead, Jessie Marie, was in charge of the Arabic division there. The young Malik also developed a friendship with George Sarton, the eminent historian of science, by helping the latter improve his knowledge of classical Arabic through weekly meetings at the Widener Library room 189 over four years from 1932 onwards. Malik later referred to this in a brief *in memoriam* note as an editorial tribute to Sarton, which was published in *Isis*, the premier journal of the history of science, which Sarton had founded in Belgium in 1912 and had later moved to the United States after the First World War.⁷⁴

⁷² Malik’s letter of 30 September 1933 was addressed to Professor Laurens Hickok Seelye at the Philosophy Department of the American University of Beirut.

⁷³ Malik had sent an early letter to Whitehead before the latter facilitated his admission to the philosophy graduate program at Harvard University, and Malik spent more time between 1932 and 1937 at Harvard with Whitehead than in Heidegger’s courses in Freiburg between 1935 and 1936. See, for example, the contents on Whitehead that date back to 1932 and 1933 in box 251 from the Library of Congress ‘Charles Habib Malik papers’ collection. A tribute to Whitehead may be found in Malik’s later paper: ‘An Appreciation of Professor Whitehead with Special Reference to his Metaphysics and to his Ethical and Educational Significance’, *Journal of Philosophy* 45, No. 21 (1948): 572–582.

⁷⁴ Charles Malik, ‘Dr. Sarton’s Study of Arabic’, *Isis* 48, No. 3 (1957): 335. As noted earlier, Malik published a review of the *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Pierce* in *Isis* under the editorship of Sarton; Malik, ‘Review: Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Pierce’, *art. cit.*

On 16 March 1935, Malik wrote letters to Afif I. Tannous and Shukri Hanna Shammas, confirming that Harvard University had granted him a Sheldon Traveling Fellowship for 1935–1936 to study abroad, and that from the summer of 1935, he expected to be in Germany, and possibly going to Heidelberg.⁷⁵

On 23 September 1935, he wrote to Laurens Hickok Seelye at the Philosophy Department of the American University of Beirut⁷⁶ to report that his knowledge of the German language had ‘perceptibly improved’, but that he still did not believe the improvement was sufficient to enable him to understand philosophy lectures, or to continue his academic activities within the philosophical circles at the university. At the time, Malik had already begun to write his doctoral thesis, albeit without knowing as yet how it was coming along; he described the progress of his research as a slow and painful endeavour, and that writing the thesis was dreary and uncheerful, since so far it contained ‘dry metaphysics’. During that phase, two months had passed since he had arrived in Germany. He mentioned that he was slowly coming to believe that Anglo-Saxon philosophy was deeper than German absolutism. Already he noted that Europe was gloomy and uncertain and indicated that there was going to be a war; adding that he was more lonely, confused, and unsettled in Germany than he had ever been anywhere else.⁷⁷ He pondered the burdens of solitude, especially while being in a foreign land, and how everything challenged him and threw him back on himself, thus individuating him.⁷⁸ The way he described the feeling of individuated loneliness would carry resonances later with how he reflected on Heidegger’s existential analytic of *Dasein*. As time progressed, Malik’s German steadily improved, and he began practicing it orally,⁷⁹ though he also confirmed that his thesis was absorbing most of his energy. He wrote at the time with a religious overtone, pondering the attainment of wisdom and inspired by the Living God and the cooperation of fellow companions in thought, rather than being immersed in solitary meditation.⁸⁰ In a letter to his friend Afif I. Tannous dated 7 June 1936, he openly expressed his wish to return to Cambridge/Massachusetts in the Fall of 1936, despite his desire to have a second year of philosophy in Germany.

⁷⁵ Studying the German language must already have been part of the curriculum undertaken by Malik since 1933. In a letter dated 27 July 1933 and addressed to Afif I. Tannous, Malik mentions that he is being mentored by Whitehead and that he was beginning to study German. In another letter of 16 July 1933, sent to Shukri Hanna Shammas, he affirms that his German is improving by way of reading St John’s Gospel in the German language.

⁷⁶ As an aside regarding Levantine affairs in the 1930s, it is telling that the formal letterheads of the American University of Beirut in the 1930s were still indicating the address ‘Beirut, Syria’, without any mention of ‘Lebanon’ despite the fact that the modern Lebanese State had been established under the French mandate in 1920.

⁷⁷ Malik’s letter of 30 September 1935 to Shukri Hanna Shammas.

⁷⁸ Malik’s letter of 17 September 1935 to Afif I. Tannous.

⁷⁹ He composed a letter in German dated 22 June 1936, and he was also aware of the work of the Norwegian philosopher Harald K. Schjelderup in Oslo through the latter’s publications on the history of philosophy in Berlin, and as an alumnus from Freiburg.

⁸⁰ Malik’s letter of 28 September 1935 to Afif I. Tannous.

After returning to Harvard University from his sojourn in Germany, Malik affirmed in a letter dated 14 April 1937 that he endeavoured to finish his thesis by June 1937, aiming to be back to the Near East to spend the rest of his life there and intending to bring the fruits of his philosophical education and research to the Arabic-speaking world.⁸¹ While working consistently on his thesis, Malik described this episode as being under the influence of ‘two of the finest minds in the West’; he was freeing himself from what he depicted as ‘the stresses and tensions of living in the East’. He proclaimed that at that time, he had ‘absorbed of Western thought and philosophy’ more than ‘anybody in the East has done ... or is likely to do in this generation’.⁸²

Instead of the full two years of the doctoral fellowship, Malik remained in Germany for fourteen months. He shortened his stay due to what he described as an intolerable situation in terms of the unsustainable living conditions for a foreigner and an Arab ‘Semite’ like himself.⁸³ Malik later presented a paper about his fourteen months in Germany at the Harvard University Faculty Club, addressing it to the Philosophy Department and its Graduate Students on 29 October 1936.⁸⁴ He started by reflecting on his endeavour to learn the German language in a relatively short time and by placing himself in the surroundings best suited to acquire it. Malik resided with a German family in Upper Bavaria in an old house dating back to 1524. He experienced first-hand what the rise of Nazism meant for average Germans; noting even that ‘the faith now prevalent in Germany [is] that Hitler is necessarily a God’.⁸⁵ In October 1935 he moved to Freiburg im Breisgau, the capital of the Black Forest, where he remained at the university for ten months. Malik mentioned the thirteenth-century Freiburg cathedral as having had ‘a peculiar effect on Heidegger’, who apparently referred to it in his seminars to illustrate the *Vorstellungskraft* (power of the imagination) in architecture. He affirmed that some of the locations in the Black Forest left him with a deep sense of the ‘aesthetic

⁸¹ On 6 June 1937, Malik confirms that he is getting a small temporary job at the American University of Beirut for the academic year 1937–1938; then, in a letter dated 18 June 1937 and addressed to Afif I. Tannous, he notes that he was thinking of publishing part of his doctoral thesis and that he was making some revisions to that end.

⁸² In contrast to the views held in the 1930s, the confluence of oriental wisdom with occidental philosophy is becoming more visible in recent scholarship. It has even been argued that Heidegger’s thinking had been influenced by East-Asian thought; see: Reinhard May, *Heidegger’s Hidden Sources: East Asian Influences on his Work*, trans. Graham Parkes (London: Routledge, 1996); esp. pp. XV, 7. See also Graham Parkes, *Heidegger and Asian Thought* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), and taking into consideration the interest in Heidegger on the part of the notable Japanese philosopher Shūzō Kuki, who composed a book on Heidegger in the Japanese language that was published in 1933 (*Haideggā no tetsugaku* [*The Philosophy of Heidegger*]); a study that gave a remarkable insight into the priority of spatiality in accentuating communal life versus how an emphasis on temporality entails a more solitary experience as is the case with the analytic of *Dasein*.

⁸³ Sabra, ‘“In Awe before Being”’: The Philosophy of Charles Malik (1906–1987), *art. cit.*, p. 45.

⁸⁴ Malik, ‘Fourteen months in Germany’, *art. cit.*

⁸⁵ Malik, ‘Fourteen months in Germany’, *art. cit.*, p. 1.

experiences of beauty and of peace', and he was sure that he would 'look back at them with the happiest retrospective joy'. However, he also noted after his fourteen-month stay in Germany that it was not nature and its harmonies that left him with the most lasting impressions, but rather 'the character of two men, Heidegger and Hitler'. As he tellingly put it, 'it is perfectly possible in the simple order of things for one to be enthusiastic for one of these two men and at the same time thoroughly disgusted with the other'.⁸⁶ Malik added:

Although the whole tendency of national-socialism is to bring about the complete identification of Germany with every individual German, so as to make it impossible for anyone to pick and choose from among Germans, liking this person and disliking that other person, yet at least last year it was still possible to do this picking and choosing and to like Heidegger and dislike Hitler. Heidegger in no way means Hitler, except if you want to be unfair and dislike everything German on principle,⁸⁷ thereby strengthening and justifying Hitler in his endeavor to bring about the absolute identity between the individual and the state. If it were not for Heidegger I doubt very much whether I would have stayed long in Germany last year.⁸⁸

Malik offers a description of Heidegger, who at the time was nearly forty-seven years old; depicting him as [being] quiet, leading an unobtrusive life, small in stature, with a strong physique, very penetrating eyes, and appearing dressed in the attire of a southern German peasant. He added that Heidegger's original training was focused mainly on the ancient Greek philosophers and the mediaeval scholastics, and that his postdoctoral thesis was on Duns Scotus; he even affirmed that Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* grew out of the latter's studies on St Augustine. Malik adds that methodologically, Heidegger was a phenomenologist who had been brought up in the school of Edmund Husserl. As for the ancients, Aristotle and Augustine were 'his masters'; from Aristotle, Heidegger derived his analytical powers of penetration, and from Augustine the free and 'almost nonhuman discernment of the supremely concrete elements involved in the tragic life of man'. It is unclear, however, whether Malik was here referring to Heidegger's Freiburg seminars of 1920–1921 that were devoted to the *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens* (*Phenomenology of Religious Life*)⁸⁹ and which underpinned some of the latent Christian resonances within *Sein und Zeit* in understanding the concreteness of religious phenomena and existential self-becoming in Augustine's *Confessions*.

As for the early-moderns, Malik noted that Kant was Heidegger's 'chief master' and added that Heidegger said in his lectures in 1935 that 'as long as philosophy remains a pursuit of man, the *Critique of Pure Reason* will again and again be rediscovered anew'. Malik further indicated that in the case of Hegel, 'it is plain that

⁸⁶ Malik, 'Fourteen months in Germany', *art. cit.*, pp. 2–3.

⁸⁷ The underlined terms reflect the emphasis in the original source.

⁸⁸ Malik, 'Fourteen months in Germany', *art. cit.*, p. 3.

⁸⁹ Martin Heidegger, *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2011), *Gesamtausgabe* 60.

Heidegger forms a kind of a reaction against him', even though Heidegger said that 'every philosophic truth must be dialectical'. Malik also thought that while the Heideggerian 'method [was] a blend of phenomenology and dialectic', Heidegger's ontology was a distinct 'reaction against Hegel'. Moreover, among the nineteenth-century philosophers, Heidegger seemed to turn to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche for inspiration; even though as Malik recalled from what Heidegger taught in 1935, the popularly entertained similarity between the two was more superficial than real. In addition, Malik stated that Heidegger may also have been influenced by his immediate predecessors and colleagues, mainly by Edmund Husserl and Wilhelm Dilthey, but also by Franz Brentano, Alexius Meinong, and Max Scheler as well.⁹⁰

Malik attended two seminars with Heidegger and two lecture courses.⁹¹ One seminar was devoted to Leibniz's *Monadology* as studied against the unfurling of Aristotle's cosmology and by foreshadowing Kant and the post-Kantians,⁹² while the second seminar was on Kant's *Critique of Judgement* (*Kritik der Urteilskraft*). The first lecture course focused on the 'Fundamental Questions of Metaphysics', with an emphasis on Kant's determination of the essence of *thing-hood*, while the second lecture course was concerned with Schelling's essay on human freedom as situated in post-Kantian German idealism. Other courses taught by Heidegger that year were on Nietzsche's will to power; the truth and necessity of science; Schiller's aesthetics; and on Book *Theta* of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Malik also noted that at the time, it was rumoured that Heidegger was working on Hölderlin and aesthetics, which was confirmed by the subsequent direction of Heideggerian thought.

Malik described Heidegger's lectures as very popular, with 'more than 200 people attending', and including students from all faculties, 'boys, girls, older men and women; monks, nuns, priests, professors, doctors, lawyers; Germans and foreigners'. He added that

(...) it was really one of the finest experiences in life to sit in his lecture-room and hear him philosophize on the history of philosophy, on the philosophic enterprise itself, on the nature of man and on the general spiritual situation in Europe at present. For in Heidegger's mind all these things hang together and elucidate each other.⁹³

Heidegger's seminars were a more or less a private affair, difficult to get into, and they required personal permission for registration. His method was to subordinate himself entirely to the person he was interpreting by planning to bring out what he

⁹⁰ Malik, 'Fourteen months in Germany', *art. cit.*, pp. 3–4.

⁹¹ In his notes from Heidegger's classes, which are kept in box 257, folder 3, of his collected papers at the Library of Congress, Malik makes a list of Kantian keywords with their English translations from Kant's *Critique of Judgement* (*Kritik der Urteilskraft*). His notes are mainly in German, but with some long passages in English, along with translations and additional reflections as well as occasional remarks in Arabic and bibliographical details in French, making reference to Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, Leibniz, Descartes, Plato, etc.

⁹² Malik, 'Fourteen months in Germany', *art. cit.*, pp. 4–5.

⁹³ Malik, 'Fourteen months in Germany', *art. cit.*, p. 5.

wanted from the textual teachings of the philosopher he was expounding and drawing it out in a masterly manner from the students themselves. Malik added that Heidegger took A158 in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*) to be the first and most important sentence, dealing with the conditions of the possibility of experience and the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience.⁹⁴ He understood that sentence to be not only the nerve of the first *Critique*, but also the meaning of one of the most important moments in the development of the human spirit in general, and of German thought in particular.⁹⁵ Malik noted that Heidegger was an 'Existenz-philosopher' whose primary interest was 'the existential constitution of man'; even though he rightly affirmed that Heidegger 'hardly ever uses the word "man"', rather making use of the designation '*Dasein*' instead. Malik was faced with the difficult task of explaining this distinction, and he fell again into oscillating between the use of '*Dasein*' and the use of 'man', taking it from a Heideggerian viewpoint to be an appellation that referred to *a being who takes in its being its own being always and in every case as an issue* ('*ein Seiendes, [dem es] in seinem Sein um dieses Sein selbst geht*'). In Malik's view, this pertained to working out phenomenally the structure of the existential issues that revolved around the very existence of life; hence seeing that this connected with what he took to be Heidegger's 'interest in the Christian philosophers'. However, Malik believed that Heidegger was 'no theologian' but rather someone who did not take philosophy to be a 'humanization of theology' (*Vermenschlichung der Theologie*) but instead took theology to be a 'Christianization of philosophy' (*Verchristlichung der Philosophie*). It seems that in this context, Malik was keen to see that the definition of philosophy from Heidegger's perspective was framed as 'onto-theology'; namely as an inquiry into *being* that concerned the highest form of being (*Seiendes im Ganzen und Seiendes als Seiendes*).⁹⁶ Malik saw Heidegger's thought as being set around a fearless discussion on an ancient Greek basis of concrete phenomena that Christians were engaged in interpreting such as human life, God, the world, fear, anxiety, the soul, conscience, guilt, and death. Consequently, these were not to be interpreted by reference to a transcendent divinity but rather that such phenomena and transcendence together have to be thought of from the standpoint of what belongs to human existence essentially, namely by addressing the question of being.

⁹⁴ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 28; where 'B197/A158' (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*) reads as follows: '... The supreme principle of all synthetic judgments is, therefore: Every object stands under the necessary conditions of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience. In this way synthetic *a priori* judgments are possible, if we relate the formal conditions of *a priori* intuition, the synthesis of the imagination, and its necessary unity in a transcendental apperception to a possible cognition of experience in general, and say: The conditions of the *possibility of experience* in general are at the same time the conditions of the *possibility of the objects of experience*, and on this account have objective validity in a synthetic judgment *a priori*'.

⁹⁵ Malik, 'Fourteen months in Germany', *art. cit.*, p. 6.

⁹⁶ Malik, 'Fourteen months in Germany', *art. cit.*, p. 7.

Malik also pondered the nature of Heidegger's relations with the Nazi party, which he described as not being cordial, and that Heidegger, rather than being a public political figure, had withdrawn into his work and duties. Malik added that all but one of the eighteen German students in Heidegger's Kant seminar were not members of the National Socialist *Studentenschaft* organization at the university, and that the party tolerated Heidegger's negative attitude towards its ideology and praxis only because he was perceived to be *a great man* and thought if only he could exercise his criticalness within the party, he would be *a constructively stimulating force*. As Malik indicated, Heidegger apparently tried to transform his dissatisfaction with the party into a force of change, but his experiment was unsuccessful due to his inability to cooperate with Nazi officials. Reflecting on the lonesomeness of creative thinkers in a story that could never be written, Malik stated that Heidegger himself was 'where a true philosopher should be – completely and absolutely alone'.⁹⁷

Describing what he was experiencing during in his sojourn in Germany, Malik wrote:

Swastika flags sticking out of every window on official occasions. Columns of uniformed men – strong, healthy, hopeful, confident – marching ... singing. National-socialist papers the same everywhere; the same controlled news, the same terrible hatred against the communists, the French, the Jews and what they called the colored races. The Professors at the

⁹⁷ Malik, 'Fourteen months in Germany', *art. cit.*, p. 9. Heidegger joined the Nazi party on 1 May 1933, ten days after he was elected Rector of the University of Freiburg. He resigned from the Rectorate in April 1934 and refrained from attending any party meetings. He was banned after World War II from teaching under the denazification (*Entnazifizierung*) purge of the *épuration légale*, and then judged by a French court to have been a *Mitläufer* sympathizer of the Nazis. The ban was lifted in 1951, and he received an Emeritus status that allowed him to teach till 1958 in Freiburg, but not as a chair of philosophy. He continued occasionally to deliver talks by invitation until 1967. His oeuvre was rejected with disdain in the Soviet Union. The question of his association with Nazism is deeply polemical, and it became more problematic with the publication of his *Schwarze Hefte* (*Black Notebooks; Cahiers noirs*) in the volumes GA 94–102 of the *Gesamtausgabe* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2014–2021). Polemics also surround Malik's co-founding of the right-wing paramilitary 'Lebanese Front' during the civil war in Lebanon in 1976, and how this is connected to the evolution of modern Christian paramilitarism in Lebanon, which dates back to the founding of the 'Phalanges Party' by Pierre Gemayel, after the latter's visit to the Berlin Olympics in the summer of 1936, and how he was impressed at the time by the 'discipline and order' of *Nationalsozialismus*; see: Robert Fisk, *Pity the Nation* (New York: Nation Books, 1990), p. 65. Having noted this, it is not, however, within the scope of our ontological commentary in the present volume to focus on the vagaries of Malik's later politicized praxis or Heidegger's. However, it remains the case that these critical and sensitive aspects continue to merit close studies of their own, and that it is also important to reflect on how philosophers become seduced by publicness and how they risk exposing themselves to the political dangers of *falling prey to the public They-self* (*Verfallen in das Man*). Indeed, a sequel to the present volume could be dedicated to reconsidering critically the politics of Malik and Heidegger from philosophical standpoints. For a recent discussion of the ideological roots of the Lebanese Phalanges refer to: Christian Thuselt, 'Lebanese Phalangism and Fascism: History of a Symbolic Appropriation', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 58 (2022): <https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2022.2065263>.

University beginning their lectures with the Nazi salute to which the students respond. On the southern side of the University inscribed lately ‘*Dem ewigen Deutschtum*’ – to the eternal German race –, to counter-balance what had been for a long time inscribed on the western side, ‘*Die Wahrheit wird euch freimachen*’ – the truth shall make you free.⁹⁸

Malik asserted that some of the finest Germans were deeply dissatisfied with this, if they did not feel disgraced by it all; but, apologetically, he also wondered what they could have done. He noted that the Church was putting up a truly heroic fight to counter this, such as what he witnessed during Lutheran services; and he added that he could not possibly convey ‘the depth of loyalty and courage’ with which some of these confessional Christians were serving a hopeless cause. Malik ended by reflecting on the frame of mind that was intensely controlling the German soul, and the mental picture that dominated the imagination of official Germany, wherein the injustice, suffering, humiliation, and material helplessness of Germany resulting from losing the First World War, could have been avoided. In his opinion, the moral lens with which Germany was judged would have been different if it had won the (First) War. Thus, he noted that at the time, the Germans believed that if Germany won a ‘coming war’ (already sensing it to be imminent as per his earlier letters), all present judgements on National Socialism would change and that as such, and to his mind, Germany was determined to win the (coming Second) War.⁹⁹

The questions of war and peace would continue to leave a mark on Malik’s thinking and praxis in the postdoctoral trajectories of his career both as a diplomat and political figure as well as in his role as an academician and educator. He ultimately believed that ‘the life of action is superior to and more complete than the life of thinking. A general or a prophet is superior to a poet or a philosopher. The combination of the two has not yet really occurred in history’.¹⁰⁰ In part, this resonates with his reflections on Platonism, for this idea evokes Plato’s dialogue in the *Republic* (Πολιτεία; *politeia*) in that it is articulated around the conception of justice (δικαιοσύνη; *dikaiousunê* [*justitia per se*]), and that culminates in imagining the hypothetical city-state (πόλις), Kallipolis (Καλλίπολις), which is ruled by a philosopher-king (φιλόσοφος τε καί ἡγεμονικός). However, there are also grave risks facing a philosopher immersed in the realms of publicness, as lessons are drawn from the *Apology of Socrates* (Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους, *Apologia Sokratous*), the *Phaedo* (Φαίδων; *Phaidôn*), and the *Crito* (Κρίτων; *Kritôn*). There, like a φάρμακον (*phármakon*) that is both a remedy and a poison, Socrates, the philosopher, is put on trial and forced to commit voluntary suicide by the *polis*, rather than being accorded a place within the city, let alone allowed to govern it. This is the case even if Socrates believed that it was *nobler* to endure any penalty that the city may inflict upon him rather than escaping or running away in shame. Taken metaphorically and in less

⁹⁸ Malik, ‘Fourteen months in Germany’, *art. cit.*, p. 10.

⁹⁹ Malik, ‘Fourteen months in Germany’, *art. cit.*, pp. 11–12.

¹⁰⁰ Malik’s letter of 6 August 1935 to Afif I. Tannous.

extreme situations of perdition, is it reckless for certain philosophers to throw themselves into the vexing arena of political praxis? In a Heideggerian thrust of thought, a philosopher's *Dasein* becomes seduced to the point of *falling prey to the They* (*Verfallen in das Man*) into publicness and politics, wherein λόγος (*logos*) and πολιτικά (*politika*) seem to converge and appear synonymous (καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικόν ζῷον; 'and that man is by nature a political animal'; Aristotle, Πολιτικά 1253a 2–3).¹⁰¹ The λέγειν (*legein*) that comes from being-with-others can also turn into the *idle talk* (*das Gerede*)¹⁰² of sophistry at the mercy of a collective will to power, even though solitude is a form of self-preoccupied withdrawal and detachment from others, and runs against the grain of taking philosophizing as being a vocation in παιδεία (*paideia*) with the aim of educating the citizens of a πόλις (*polis*). The meaning of *humanitatem* resonates here with φιλανθρωπία (*philanthrōpia*) as well as παιδεία (*paideia*) in terms of being an *eruditionem institutionemque in bonas artes*; namely, an edification in the liberal arts.¹⁰³

Technical Notes on the Annotated Edition

This edition presents the text of the section on Martin Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* from Charles Malik's 1937 Harvard doctoral thesis, supplemented with my own philosophical commentary in footnotes that make direct reference to the German edition of *Sein und Zeit*.¹⁰⁴ Malik in his doctoral thesis refers to the following German edition of *Sein und Zeit*: Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Halle an der Saale: Max Niemeyer, 1935); whereas in my analytical comments, I refer to Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1953). I have further consulted Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), [14th reprint of the Niemeyer edition in the *Gesamtausgabe Band 2*, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann]. Of the English translations, I have checked the following two: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by John

¹⁰¹ Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. Cames Lord (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 1253a 2–3. For an engaging discussion of the critical take on politics in Heidegger's thought, and as specifically mediated through his reflections on Nietzsche and nihilism, see: Laurence Paul Hemming, 'Heidegger's "Movement of Nihilism" as Political and Metaphysical Critique', in *The Movement of Nihilism: Heidegger's Thinking After Nietzsche*, eds. Laurence Paul Hemming, Bogdan Costea, and Kostas Amiridis (London: Bloomsbury, 2011).

¹⁰² Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, *op. cit.*, §35, pp. 167–170.

¹⁰³ This antique outlook is articulated in Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae: Attic Nights* (Hastings, East Sussex: Delphi Classics, 2016), Book XIII, Chapter 17.

¹⁰⁴ Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Halle an der Saale: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1935), based on the *editio princeps* of 1927 in the *Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Forschung VIII*; Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1953); Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), 14th reprint of the Niemeyer edition in the *Gesamtausgabe Band 2* (herausgegeben von Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann).

Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001; 20th reprint of the 1962 translation); and Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York, 1996). I moreover took into account the following three French translations: Martin Heidegger, *L'Être et le Temps*, translated by Rudolf Boehm and Alphonse De Waelhens (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), and the translations by Emmanuel Martineau (Richelieu, 1985; *hors commerce* edition) and François Vezin (Paris: Gallimard, 2007).

In his doctoral thesis, Malik's direct hermeneutic interpretation of Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* reached its conclusion on typescript page [333]. His treatment of the conception of time in the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, which constituted the larger part of his thesis, was published separately entitled [Charles Malik,] *The Systems of Whitehead's Metaphysics*, edited by Habib C. Malik and Tony E. Nasrallah (Zouk Mosbeh, Lebanon: Notre Dame University, Louaizé, 2016).

I added the final chapter of Malik's thesis, Chapter IX ('The Existential Basis of the Cosmology of Process'), in an 'Appendix'. I did so because it does not focus on Heidegger *per se* but rather comes as a set of insights concluding the whole doctoral thesis, rather than only the section that focuses on *Sein und Zeit*.¹⁰⁵ It was meant as a compromise between either leaving it out altogether or forcing its content into the thematic focus of *Sein und Zeit*, which was covered in pages [256] to [333] in Chapters VII–VIII of the typescript of Malik's thesis.

In editing the text, I retained Malik's style of writing as in the original thesis in terms of referring to Whitehead and to Heidegger as 'Professors', and reflecting the fact that the edited text is actually a part of a doctoral thesis that displays reverence in line with the academic honorific etiquette of the epoch in which it was composed. The *italicizations* in the original typed text of Malik's thesis, whether as terms or phrases, were underlined, but they were meant to be read as *italics*; therefore, I have shown them in *italicized* form within the body of the edited text. Any minor additions introduced to the text for reasons of grammatical or syntactical clarity, I have indicated by square brackets in the body of the edited text. The pagination of Malik's typed thesis is noted for reference in square brackets.

The endnotes that Malik originally included in the section of his thesis on Heidegger were gathered on pages 353 to 384 of the typed text. I retained these as 'Endnotes', thus following the original format. The numbering of the 'Endnotes' of Malik's thesis is highlighted in parentheses in the body of the edited version. The abbreviations that he used in his 'Endnotes' correspond with the following bibliographical sources: Z = Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Halle an der Saale: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1935), while all others refer to the works of Alfred North Whitehead: AI = *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933);

¹⁰⁵ Chapter VI from Malik's doctoral thesis, which is entitled 'From Cosmology to *Existenz*', was not included in the published volume on Whitehead, nor is it contained in the part that we are publishing in the present volume, given that it does not deal with Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*.

FR = *The Function of Reason* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1929); NL = *Nature and Life* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934); PR = *Process and Reality* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930); RM = *Religion in the Making* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927; 1st ed. 1926); S = *Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927); SMW = *Science and the Modern World* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931; 1st ed. 1925). Each abbreviated code (for example Z) is followed by numbers that designate the pagination in the corresponding source; moreover, the letters t, m, b after the pagination of a given abbreviated source designate the top, middle, and bottom of the page of reference respectively. The footnotes that accompany the body of the edited text are all mine, and they constitute a running analytical and conceptual commentary on Malik's text as supported by direct references to *Sein und Zeit* and additional bibliographical sources.

In order to highlight the main thematic content of the section that focuses on Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*, the present volume is entitled *On Being and Time: The Section on Heidegger in Charles Malik's 1937 Harvard Thesis*.

Hopefully, the present volume will be of interest to diverse subfields of research, such as 'Heidegger Studies', phenomenology and Continental European philosophy, 'Malik Studies' and twentieth-century Lebanese and Levantine philosophical thought, also when viewed from the perspective of modern Arab and Middle Eastern Studies. The text sheds light on the pioneering role Malik played in the global reception of Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* which in European and North American philosophical circles is still overlooked. Such pathways in research offer new perspectives on the status of philosophy and the history of ideas, while addressing some aspects of Heidegger's and Malik's political forms of praxis, which stirred debates that are still relevant today. However, in the present volume I will bypass their political implications so as to focus the thematic philosophical issues on ontology. This endeavour broadens the scope of analytic and continental philosophy by incorporating philosophical texts and thinkers from other multicultural traditions,¹⁰⁶ specifically through an approach focused on Lebanese thought. It is notable that publishing the first edition of the section on Heidegger in Malik's 1937 Harvard doctoral thesis is of historical and philosophical significance for studies of *Sein und Zeit*, as Malik's work represents one of the earliest anglophone receptions of that opus in the unfolding Heideggerian legacy during the pivotal 1930s.

¹⁰⁶ The focus on global philosophies is mediated through my engagement with debates in this new field of inquiry in philosophy. This is also concretely set out in my contributions as regional and founding editor of the *Bloomsbury Introductions to World Philosophies* book series, and as editorial board member of the *Journal of World Philosophies*, Indiana University Press. For recent publications on global and multicultural world philosophies, see: Julian Baggini, *How the World Thinks: A Global History of Philosophy* (London: Granta Books, 2018); Bryan W. Van Norden, *Taking Back Philosophy: A Multicultural Manifesto* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017).

Biographical Note on Charles Malik (1906–1987)

Charles Habib Malik was born on 11 February 1906 in Bitirram in the Koura district of Mount Lebanon. He obtained his BA from the American University of Beirut (AUB) in 1927 and worked there as an instructor in mathematics and physics between 1927–1929. From 1929 to 1930, Malik was employed at the *Hilal* Publishing House in Cairo, and between 1930 and 1932, he worked as a laboratory technician at the Rockefeller Foundation in Cairo. In 1934 he obtained an MA from Harvard University and received a Sheldon Travelling Fellowship in Philosophy to study at the Universität Freiburg from 1935 to 1936. Malik received his PhD from Harvard University in 1937, and then taught at the Philosophy Department of the American University of Beirut until 1945.¹⁰⁷ That same year he was elected as a Delegate of Lebanon to the United Nations conference in San Francisco and appointed a Cabinet Minister in Lebanon until 1953. Between 1946 and 1959 Malik served as a Delegate of Lebanon to the United Nations, and in 1947/1948 was elected as a Member of the United Nations Human Rights Commission that was tasked with drafting the Human Rights Declaration. In 1951 he chaired the Lebanese delegation to the conference in San Francisco for the conclusion and signing of the Treaty of Peace with Japan. Malik subsequently became Ambassador of Lebanon to the United States from 1953 to 1955, a Delegate of Lebanon to the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, and a Lebanese representative at the tenth anniversary of the signing of the United Nations charter in San Francisco. From 1955 to 1956 he returned to academia as Dean of Graduate Studies and Professor of Philosophy at the American University of Beirut. Malik was appointed Minister of National Education and Fine Arts in Lebanon in 1956/1957 and from 1956 to 1958 served as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lebanon. In 1957 he was also elected as a Member of the Lebanese Parliament, standing as a Deputy for the Koura district in Lebanon. Between 1958 and 1959 he served as President of the thirteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. In 1960 Malik was first

¹⁰⁷ Charles Malik married Eva Badr in 1941, and their son Habib was born in 1954. The Palestinian-American public intellectual and theorist Edward Said and his sister, the writer Jean Said Makdisi, were Malik's younger cousins-in-law. Moreover, one of Malik's main philosophy disciples from the early period of teaching at AUB in the 1940s was the Lebanese-American philosopher Majid Fakhry (refer to box 16 of the Library of Congress collection of the 'Charles Habib Malik papers' for material related to Majid Fakhry from 1946 to 1956). Another of Malik's notable students from that period was the eminent Lebanese journalist and editor of the *an-Nahar* newspaper, the public figure Ghassan Tuani. In the commencement ceremony at AUB on 25 June 2005, and in the context of the acceptance speech he delivered on the occasion of the honorary doctorate that was bestowed on him, Tuani praised Malik and paid homage to the impact he had on him in a 'communion' between student and teacher; a privilege that to Tuani's mind is no longer likely to arise in the contemporary impersonal atmosphere of universities. Tuani in his tribute to Malik reflected moreover on how the latter's credentials guided him in his coursework for the MA he completed at Harvard University in 1947.

a Visiting Professor at Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, then a Visiting Professor at the Harvard Summer School. In 1961/1962 he was a Visiting Professor at the American University in Washington D.C., and in 1962 was promoted to the rank of Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the American University of Beirut. From 1967 to 1972 Malik acted as the President of the World Council of Christian Education. In 1969 he was a Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies at the University of Notre Dame in the USA, and he became a Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the American University of Beirut in 1976. That same year, and in the early stages of the Lebanese Civil War, he co-founded with Camille Chamoun, Pierre Gemayel, and others, the paramilitary Lebanese Front (originally known as: 'The Front of Freedom and Man in Lebanon'). Malik assumed his last academic appointment during 1981 and 1983 as a Jacques Maritain Distinguished Professor of Moral and Political Philosophy at the Catholic University of America in Washington D.C. Charles Habib Malik passed away on 28 December 1987.¹⁰⁸

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Professor Fred R. Dallmayr (University of Notre Dame) for endorsing this annotated edition of the section on Heidegger in Charles Malik's 1937 Harvard University doctoral thesis and for writing the Prologue to the present volume. Special thanks are also due to Professor Laurence Paul Hemming (Lancaster University) for composing the Epilogue. I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Richard Polt (Xavier University) and Professor Gregory Fried (Boston College). I further extend my special thanks to Dr Ameen A. Rihani and Mr Tony Nasrallah at the Institute of Lebanese Thought, Notre Dame University (Louaizé), for their helpful insights regarding the editorial logistics of publishing this volume, and for having facilitated my direct access to Charles Malik's doctoral thesis, letters, and miscellaneous papers, which are archived in the public domain via various open sources. I am also indebted to Professor Birgit Schäbler, the Director of the Orient-Institut Beirut (OIB) and Chair of History of West Asia (Near and Middle East) at the University of Erfurt, for endorsing this publication. Likewise, my thanks are due to Dr Christian Thuselt and Dr Abdallah Soufan, the consecutive editors of the OIB's *Beiruter Texte und Studien* book series for their editorial care, and to Dr Christine O'Neill for her attentive copy-editing. I am grateful to Charles Malik's son Dr Habib C. Malik at the Lebanese American University for his support of this project. Thanks, moreover, are due to Dr George Sabra, the President

¹⁰⁸ This biographical note has been composed based on published material and online sources. It has also been read by the son of Charles Malik, Dr Habib C. Malik, and by colleagues at the Institute of Lebanese Thought, Notre Dame University (Louaizé). For some of the sources, refer to: Glenn Mitoma, 'Charles H. Malik and Human Rights: Notes on a Biography', *Biography* Vol. 33, No. 1 (2010): 222–241; Rafiq Ma'lūf, *Charles Malik: Dawr Lubnān fi šin' al-īlān al-ālamī li-ḥuqūq al-insān* (Beirut: Mu'assasat Nawfal, 1998).

of the Near East School of Theology in Beirut, and to Professor Edward Alam, the Benedict XVI Endowed Chair at Notre Dame University (Louaizé), both for having encouraged me to undertake this task and for their fruitful remarks on its particulars. I am also thankful to Ms Yara Mrad at Notre Dame University (Louaizé) for having typed a preliminarily draft of the original text of Malik's section on Heidegger. Finally, I would like to express my thankfulness to Professor Arthur Bradley (Lancaster University), Professor Nassif Nassar (Université Libanaise), Professor Jad Hatem (Université Saint-Joseph), Dr Jalal Toufic (Hong Kong Baptist University), and Mr Peter Shebaya (American University of Beirut) for the various insightful conversations I had with each of them about this publication and for their discerning comments on its contents.

The philosophical merits of undertaking this publication project were reinforced by related public talks I delivered at international philosophical congresses (such as the *Heidegger and the Global Age* international conference at the Philosophy Department of the University of Sussex in October 2015, the *Heidegger in the Islamicate World* international symposium at the Faculty of Philosophical and Historical Studies of the University of Bern in November 2016, and the *Philosophical Hermeneutics in the Islamicate Context* international colloquium at the Centre for Phenomenological Studies of the Higher Institute of Philosophy of the Université Catholique de Louvain in May 2018). I also presented an aperçu on this project at the '*Nuit de la Philosophie*' at the UNESCO in Paris in association with the Collège de France, along with a radio broadcast on France Culture in November 2018. My gratitude goes to my hosts for these various initiatives.

Nader El-Bizri

Professor of Civilization Studies and Philosophy, American University of Beirut, Lebanon.

Leverhulme Trust Visiting Professor of Intellectual History, Durham University, UK.

Affiliated Scholar in History & Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, and Associate of the Senior Combination Room, King's College, Cambridge, UK.

[The Annotated Edition]

Edited with Notes by
Nader El-Bizri

On Being and Time

*The Section on Heidegger
in Charles Malik's
1937 Harvard Thesis*

Chapter VII

Heidegger's Analysis of Man

Section I *Introductory Observations*

I aim in this thesis for the most part to understand the philosophies of time of Professors Whitehead and Heidegger.² The motive of this aim is nothing more complex than the fact that I am deeply interested in, and have for some time carefully studied, both these two distinguished contemporary philosophies.

Because both of limitations of space and of the much more important fact that actually I have thus far spent more thought and time on Professor Whitehead's philosophy,³ the portion of this work dealing with Professor Heidegger's philosophy will be comparatively small. Nevertheless, I shall endeavor to do it full justice.⁴

¹ All the *footnotes* that accompany this section on Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* in Charles Malik's doctoral thesis have been added by me in the process of editing and interpreting Malik's text. As for Malik's own *notes*, which were originally included in the typed version of his doctoral thesis, they are highlighted in the present edition by numbered references between parentheses in the body of the text, and they are grouped at the end of the text as *endnotes* thus retaining how they appeared in his original typescript, and using the abbreviated annotations of the primary sources exactly as they were presented at the end of his text. I aimed at retaining the text of Malik's original typescript as faithfully as possible while modifying minor elements of punctuation where necessary, or correcting the grammar minimally. Additions introduced by me are indicated by square brackets. The pagination of the original typescript of Malik's thesis is indicated in the body of the edited text in square brackets, starting from page [256], Chapter VII, of his original text.

² This section of Malik's thesis deals with the first edition of *Sein und Zeit* of 1926. Its aim is to offer an exegetical interpretation of time through fundamental ontology and the existential analytic of *Dasein*. The section of Malik's thesis that dealt with the philosophy of time in the *oeuvre* of Alfred North Whitehead, with an emphasis on the latter's *Process and Reality* (first edition of 1929), has already been published in: Charles Malik, *The Systems of Whitehead's Metaphysics*, eds. Habib Malik and Tony E. Nasrallah (Zouk Mosbeh, Lebanon: Notre Dame University, Louaizé, 2016). Chapter VI (entitled 'From Cosmology to *Existenz*') of Malik's thesis was not included in that volume, even though it deals more directly with Whitehead's process philosophy rather than touching upon Heidegger's ontology. Neither is it contained in the text that I present here.

³ I retained Malik's writing style from his original thesis in terms of referring to Whitehead and Heidegger by the title 'Professor' in line with the academic honorific etiquettes of the 1930s.

⁴ It is this *section on Heidegger* from Malik's thesis that I am presenting here in an edited format, while recognizing that Malik did give it the attention it deserved.

Because the central problematic of both philosophies is somehow time,⁵ and because in both cases time is looked upon as bound up with the most concrete texture of our experience, this thesis can be viewed as a study of the metaphysics of time or of the concept of the concrete in these two philosophies.⁶ But even this twofold possibility of viewing this work is somewhat a simplification of what it actually does.

Professor Whitehead's philosophy is *first*⁷ a cosmology, Professor Heidegger's philosophy *first* [is]⁸ a study of human nature. According to Professor Whitehead, man⁹ is temporal ultimately because of the cosmological notion of the creative advance; according to Professor Heidegger, man¹⁰ is [257]¹¹ temporal¹² because temporality

⁵ Namely, the focus here is on *the philosophical conception of time*.

⁶ The original statement that is typed in Malik's thesis reads as follows: 'this thesis can be indifferently viewed either as a study of the metaphysics of time or of the concept of the concrete in these two philosophies'. However, for the sake of clarity, the ambiguous term 'indifferently' has been removed in this context through the editing process.

⁷ Unless indicated otherwise in my footnotes, the *italicizations* in the edited text follow Malik's underlined terms in his original typescript.

⁸ As highlighted earlier, any insertions of words in the body of the text indicated by square brackets constitute an editorial intervention on my part to render the reading smoother or grammatically correct.

⁹ Malik's introductory remarks resonate with the nuanced reading that Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* necessitates. Any implied focus on the terminology of humanism, such as 'man', 'human', 'subject', 'ego', will be eschewed in accordance with the Heideggerian parlance that uses '*Dasein*' (being there/here [Da] as in '*In-der-Welt-Sein*' [being-in-the-world]). Such terminology aims at overcoming the language of classical metaphysics and humanistic anthropologies, or theories of subjectivity, and Cartesianism. These will be pointed out in the footnotes to the present edition of Malik's text. It is also possible to witness how Malik begins to use the designator '*Dasein*' instead of the terms 'I', 'self', 'ego', 'subject', 'man', 'soul', that belong to the family of appellations of classical metaphysics, and not to the Heideggerian fundamental ontology that aimed at deconstructing such metaphysical systems that occluded the question of being. Malik noticeably shifts towards using '*Dasein*' on page 268 of his thesis in 'Section III', 'The Problem of Being and the Importance of the Ontology of Man'. Malik's struggle with the Heideggerian terminology and its rendering into English reveal what later becomes commonplace amongst many commentators and translators when they cannot find satisfactory anglophone renditions to account for Heidegger's specific appropriation and coining of German expressions.

¹⁰ Regarding the use of the designator 'man', Malik later takes a more nuanced reading of Heidegger that avoids such parlance when thinking about the authentic (*eigentlichen*) worldly mode of being of *Dasein*, as being-there/here in the world of the mortal being (θνητός; *thnētós*). This is undertaken in view of retrieving the question of being (*Seinsfrage*) from its history of forgetfulness (*Vergessenheit*) and turning it into a question about the meaning of being (*Die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein*). It must also be noted that to reflect the anglophone linguistic style that was prevalent in the 1930s, at times Malik refers to *Dasein* as 'he', 'his', 'him', 'himself', as if pointing to a 'male person', but his aim is broader and refers to the experience of the [human] being when thinking about its own *being*. Such designations have been retained as they appeared in the original thesis despite the fact that they are not gender-neutral.

¹¹ As noted earlier, the pagination of Malik's typed original text is included in square brackets in the edited version.

¹² The focus here is on temporality (*Zeitlichkeit* [rather than *Temporalität*]), as the basis for the existential analytic of *Dasein*. The temporal character of *Dasein* marks the horizon of *Sein und*

is the meaning of his being[,]¹³ a phrase that will become clear only in the sequel. Everything, according to Heidegger, depends in the end on the view that you take initially of the nature of man, i.e. of your own nature. It is this presupposition – what you hold yourself to be – and not any abstract presupposition as to the nature of sense-data or knowledge or propositions, which in the end determines your philosophy. Consequently, Heidegger devotes 323 pages of his chief work *Sein und Zeit*¹⁴

Zeit, but the later thought of Heidegger shifts towards recognizing the priority of spatiality as well. Even *Dasein*'s care is a manner of making-room (*Einräumen*) for a leeway (*Spielraum*) or a clearing (*Lichtung*) that lets worldly dwelling be. This also brings about an emphasis on *the place of being* besides the question of the meaning and truth of being, or additionally by pondering over *Ereignis*, as an event of appropriation that takes place in dwelling by way of the gathering of the fourfold (*Das Geviert*) into an essential oneness of *earth–sky–divinities–mortals* (*Erde und Himmel, die Göttlichen und die Sterblichen*). This is set out, for instance, in Heidegger's letter *Bauen Wohnen Denken* (Building Dwelling Thinking), in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen: Günther Neske Verlag, 1954), pp. 145–162; Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 145–161; Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, 2nd edition, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), pp. 347–363. This refers to the ontological character of dwelling, which carries a spatial significance (*Raumbedeutung*) in attending to the question of being (*Seinsfrage*), and in the sense of how this complements the focus on the temporal character of *Dasein*, while taking into account the unfolding of the essence of modern technology (*das Wesen der modernen Technik*; see: Martin Heidegger, 'Die Frage nach der Technik', in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, *op. cit.*, pp. 13–44; esp. pp. 23–28). This concealed unfolding of historical being manifests itself in our era as a phenomenon of en-framing (*Gestell*) that overwhelms all the modes of revealing truth by positing beings as orderable *standing-reserve* (*Bestand*) of resourceful locked energies that get unleashed by technical command, which is tied to the *ecoidal* threat of devastating the earth (*Verwüstung der Erde*). I discuss this question in Nader El-Bizri, 'Being at Home Among Things: Heidegger's Reflections on Dwelling,' *Environment, Space, Place*, Vol. 3, No.1 (2011): 47–71; Nader El-Bizri, 'On Dwelling: Heideggerian Allusions to Architectural Phenomenology,' *Studia UBB. Philosophia*, Vol. 60, No. 1 (2015): 5–30. Moreover, this direction in architectural phenomenology from a Heideggerian standpoint orientated my rethinking of the notions of space and place in my investigation of Plato's conception of *Khôra* (χώρα) in the dialogue: Plato, *Timaeus*, trans. R. G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library, Vol. IX (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999). I addressed related aspects in Nader El-Bizri, 'Qui-êtes vous Khôra? Receiving Plato's *Timaeus*,' *Existential Meletai-Sophias*, Vol. 11, Issue 3–4 (2001): 473–490; Nader El-Bizri, 'ON KAI ΧΩΡΑ: Situating Heidegger between the *Sophist* and the *Timaeus*,' *Studia Phaenomenologica*, Vol. IV (2004): 73–98; Nader El-Bizri, 'Ontopoïēsis and the Interpretation of Plato's *Khôra*,' *Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 83 (2004): 25–45; Nader El-Bizri, "A Phenomenological Account of the 'Ontological Problem of Space,'" *Existential Meletai-Sophias*, Vol. 12, Issue 3–4 (2002): 345–364. This line of analysis accords with Heidegger's laconic confession in the lecture 'Time and Being' (*Zeit und Sein*) that the attempt in *Sein und Zeit* (section 70) to derive spatiality from temporality (*Zeitlichkeit* [rather than *Temporalität*]) has been untenable; see Martin Heidegger, *Begriff der Zeit*, ed. William McNeill (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 10–14; Martin Heidegger, *Time and Being*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper, 1969), p. 23 (*Zeit und Sein*, in *Zur Sache des Denkens*, *Gesamtausgabe* XIV).

¹³ I retained Malik's writing style, including the use of dashes (... – ... – ...) in his propositions.

¹⁴ Malik refers to Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Halle an der Saale: Verlag Max Niemeyer, 1935), based on the *editio princeps* (Husserl, *Jahrbuch* VIII, 1927). For the editorial remarks and comments that I introduce in the footnotes, I refer to the edition of 1935 which Malik also used, while also consulting the following: Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen:

– on which what I say in this thesis about Heidegger is exclusively based – to the pure phenomenology of human nature.¹⁵ This chapter deals solely with this phenomenology of human nature. Because his doctrine of time is a ‘construct’¹⁶ from concrete human nature,¹⁷ and not conversely, a treatment of this doctrine presupposes what I say in this chapter.

The great value of phenomenology consists in its patient, unhurried bringing[–]out (*Aufzeigung, Ausweisung, Aufweisung*)¹⁸ of [the] concrete phenomena. In this chapter, because of [,] I hope [,] understandable reasons, I yield to a certain measure of hurriedness. Consequently, let this be said: I am very conscious (in [some places] more than in others) of the relative inadequacy of my treatment [of] Heidegger’s original phenomenology.¹⁹

This chapter is for the most part exposition. But I endeavor to put as much of my soul in[to] it as is consonant with its subject-matter. In many cases[,] the exposition consists of putting an original existential concept of Heidegger in terms drawn out of and borne by my own personal experience.²⁰

Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1953), Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), [14th reprint of the Niemeyer edition in the *Gesamtausgabe Band 2*, herausgegeben von Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann]; Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001) 20th reprint of the 1962 translation; Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York, 1996); Martin Heidegger, *L’Être et le Temps* (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), and the Emmanuel Martineau version of Richelieu, 10th February 1985 (*bors commerce edition*), as well as the French translation of François Vezin (Paris: Gallimard, 2007).

¹⁵ It is worth noting that Malik takes the analytics here to be ‘phenomenological’ in resonance with Heidegger’s own propensities in thinking. However, Heidegger was not a classical Husserlian phenomenologist *stricto sensu*. He was rather critical of Husserl’s ‘epoché’ transcendental reduction in its attempt to disclose an ‘absolute transcendental ego’. Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology mediated its fundamental ontology through an *existential analytic* of *Dasein* and a critique of the classical metaphysics of subjectivity.

¹⁶ I retain throughout the stylistic use of single quotation marks.

¹⁷ What is meant by *concreteness* here refers to the situational character of a lived existential experience in the world in which a mortal ponders over being-toward-death (*Sein zum Tode*).

¹⁸ The *italicization* of the German terms ‘*Aufzeigung, Ausweisung, Aufweisung*’ is mine; they designate the bringing-out of a phenomenon by way of making it manifest.

¹⁹ Heidegger’s fundamental ontology (*Fundamentalontologie*) is seen as a phenomenology (*Phänomenologie*) of the existential analytic of *Dasein*’s in being-in-the-world in the mode of being-towards-death.

²⁰ Malik is careful throughout to reveal the nuanced reading that a hermeneutics of Heidegger’s thought requires. This becomes clearer as his expository account progresses in the text into a deeper probing of the Heideggerian notions, and the care in the use of language that such a new direction in ontological thinking necessitates to overcome the ontic parlance of classical metaphysics or *ousiology* (substance/*ousia*-based [οὐσία] metaphysical analytics). The refined approach that we witness here shows how Malik seeks to turn the Heideggerian meditations on the question of being into his own authentic reflections on the innermost existential sense of his lived-experience (*Erlebnis*).

The words ‘life’, ‘person and personal’, ‘honest’ and ‘moral’, which I occasionally employ in the discussion below, are my own terms, and not Heidegger’s.²¹ I am fully aware of his own objections to these expressions (1).²² I use them here somewhat loosely, in order to bring out in English the concrete basis of Heidegger’s viewpoint.²³ Nothing is more insidious and nothing is more certain to occur in fundamental discussions of this sort than [258] for one to slip into the ‘objective’ feeling that what is here talked about is not one’s personal existence. Nothing at all is meant by this discussion except personal existence. I am not aware that in using these terms I am, for the purposes of this thesis, doing Heidegger’s analysis any injustice. These terms can all be replaced by the single term ‘ontological’, if one can banish from [one’s] mind any possible abstract signification of this term. The interest of these expressions is not to urge any specific doctrine of ‘morality’ or ‘philosophy of life’. Their interest is purely ontological, namely to fasten attention on the hidden truth of the being of things.²⁴ I am interested in truth and in being, entirely unadorned and unabstracted [from]. If the truth of my being is that I *am* through and through care and worry,²⁵ I will give all my life to know that truth and

²¹ Malik is presenting a carefully-nuanced meditation on Heidegger’s thought and the way he turns its directives into hermeneutic modes of addressing his own existential lived-experience. Malik notes explicitly that he uses some terms and designators in a loose manner that do not always accord with Heidegger’s parlance; and this is witnessed with later receptions of the Heideggerian thought by other commentators from within the English language, in particular whenever they attempt to explain the twisting of linguistic forms to carry new modes of ontological thinking that are attuned to Heidegger’s thought. Such translators become apologetic when encountering analytic philosophers.

²² This is the first *endnote* that Malik inserts in his text. The references to his own *endnotes* are kept in the body of the text in the same way in which they appeared in the original, and are indicated between parentheses. These are grouped together in the concluding part of this edition as *endnotes* in line with Malik’s original typescript. Malik here refers to *Sein und Zeit* §10 and §59, pages 45 and 289, of the Max Niemeyer Halle edition of 1935. Section 10 of *Sein und Zeit* explicates ‘how the analytic of *Dasein* is to be distinguished from anthropology, psychology and biology’ (*Die Abgrenzung der Daseinsanalytik gegen Anthropologie, Psychologie und Biologie*). Section 59 recalls how the existential analytic of *Dasein* (*existenziale Analytik des Daseins*) ought to eschew the anthropological orientation in thought and the ‘vulgar interpretation of conscience’ (*Die vulgäre Gewissensauslegung*). We witness this in the mainstream German commentaries on Heidegger, such as Otto Pöggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers* (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1963).

²³ Malik captures the essence of the German text and represents it in the attuned earliest English renditions, twenty-five years before the Macquarrie and Robinson English translation. A partial French translation of sections 46–53 and 72–76 of *Sein und Zeit* was included by way of extracts in the anthology of Henry Corbin published by Gallimard in 1938 in *Qu’est ce que la métaphysique?* and the French translation of ‘Hölderlin et l’essence de la poésie’, *Mesures* 3 (15 juillet 1937), pp. 120–143. The French renditions by Rudolf Boehm and Alphonse De Waelhens followed in 1964, and by Emmanuel Martineau in 1985. Therefore, Malik is a pioneer in the transmission of *Sein und Zeit*.

²⁴ Namely: *the Being of beings* (*Sein des Seienden*).

²⁵ Care (*Sorge*) and worry (as ‘anxiety’ or ‘dread’ for what Heidegger refers to as ‘*Angst*’). *Care* is the being of *Dasein* as it is fundamentally attuned in its flight from what anguishes it about

not to blink it. Thus[,] it is truth and being which finally obsess me here, and the suspicion that people usually hide the truth from you, and also from themselves, feigning that what they tell you is the truth.²⁶ From these remarks, and from what I shall discuss in the following section, the terms ‘ontological’ and ‘phenomenal’,²⁷ for the purposes of this chapter, may be looked upon as meaning almost the same thing.

Section II

The Phenomenological Method

The method of Heidegger’s investigation of the nature of man and of time is the phenomenological method. He takes up the explanation of this method in one long section at the beginning of his *Sein und Zeit* (1).²⁸ I say a word here about this explanation, and then I comment on the method as a whole.

[259] The term ‘phenomenology’ refers to a *method* of investigation. It does not characterize the subject-matter investigated, but only the ‘how’ of the carrying out of this investigation. And this ‘how’ is simply the maxim: “*zu den Sachen selbst!*” (2)²⁹ – i.e. ‘go to the subject-matter itself!’ (The distinction in German between the words ‘*Sache*’ and ‘*Ding*’ is hard to render into English). Both are commonly translated by the inadequate word ‘thing’.³⁰ But the term ‘*Sache*’ refers more to the peculiar content and nature of things. Thus[,] different things have different ‘*sachliche*’ natures. The term ‘subject-matter’ is not very good, because it suggests that we are talking about some theoretical branch of science with *its* particular ‘subject-matter’, whereas ‘*Sache*’ means something much more primitive. Thus[,] in the maxim “*zu de[r] Sache*

its existence, and by way of disclosing its being through *angst* with regard to its destiny towards death (*Sein und Zeit* §§39-40).

²⁶ Truth (*Wahrheit*).

²⁷ Ontological (*ontologisch*), as distinct from ontic (*ontisch*), and phenomenal (*phänomenal*).

²⁸ The phenomenological method of Heidegger is elucidated in §7 of *Sein und Zeit* (p. 27f): *Die phänomenologische Methode der Untersuchung*.

²⁹ As Heidegger asserts, phenomenology (*Phänomenologie*) embodies the maxim (*Maxime*) ‘*zu den Sachen selbst!*’; i.e. ‘To the things themselves!’; *Aux choses mêmes!* (*Sein und Zeit*, §7, pp. 27–28).

³⁰ It is intriguing how Malik engages here in a line of etymological analytics to determine the proper English translation of ‘*Sachen*’, and how he reflects upon its connection with ‘things’, but then settles on the rendition ‘subject-matters’. He does not seem to be satisfied with how later scholars translated the maxim ‘*zu den Sachen selbst!*’ in English and French parlance as ‘To the things themselves!’ and *Aux choses mêmes!*. However, Malik is finding the term ‘subject-matter’ inadequate too; which on the whole reveals how the translation of Heidegger’s expressions remains a matter of debate. Explanations and justifications continue to accompany the commentaries concerning the usage of particular turns of phrase to elucidate Heidegger’s terminology; hence turning the use of language itself into an occasion for thinking about what better facilitates our ponderings over meaning when attending the question of being.

selbst” you are asked to attend to things in themselves *as they are*,³¹ and to draw out of these things what you want to say of them. ‘*Sache*’ refers in general to the fact that things – animals, mountains, airplanes – have their *own specific total natures*, and that we should morally beware in advance of huddling all things indiscriminately together, as though they were all alike. The phrase ‘*der Sache nach*’, which Heidegger is fond of employing, means just this necessity of arresting ourselves, as it were, before the final nature of the thing we are talking about, in its own ‘objective’ self-right.

Because phenomenology, as [a] method, does not prescribe subject-matter for investigation, but rather sends us straight to whatever we want to investigate, it simply is the *essence of method as such*. It says, *in fine*: “You want to investigate cats? Fine, go to it with all your might. Only remember one moral maxim: do not have pre-conceptions about what cats should *be*. Try to subordinate yourself in all loyalty and seriousness to the object of your investigation.”

This antecedent moral readiness is diametrically opposed: “*entgegen allen freischwebenden Konstruktionen, zufälligen Funden, entgegen der Übernahme [260] von nur scheinbar ausgewiesenen Begriffen, entgegen den Scheinfragen, die sich oft Generationen hindurch als ‘Probleme’ breitmachen*”, i.e. ‘opposed to all freely-floating constructions, to all accidental findings, to the adoption of concepts which are only apparently accounted for, to all the pseudo-questions which often for generations boast of being “problems”’ (3).³² Should one retort that this phenomenological maxim is after all perfectly clear, and is, besides, the guiding principle of every scientific investigation, then Heidegger would simply remark that this ‘perfect clarity’ should be made even clearer.

³¹ It would have been preferable to avoid the use of ‘in’ here, since it is a metaphysically-loaded Kantian expression that refers to the ‘thing in itself’ (*Ding an sich*), as in saying: ‘in themselves’, which refers to the realm of *noumena* as opposed to *phenomena*, and that points to an underpinning reality that is unknowable. Heidegger’s call to ‘things themselves’ is a mode of overcoming the metaphysics of Kant’s ‘things-in-themselves’. See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* [*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*], trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), A256, B312. As we can see in the body of the text, Malik hints in his proposition ‘to attend to things *in* themselves *as they are*’, while what is intended in attunement with Heidegger is ‘to attend to things themselves *as they are*’ (*die Sachen selbst*).

³² *Sein und Zeit*, §7, pp. 27–28. The translation that Malik offers in this context is a clear example of the refined rendering that he manages to advance in the English language that is on a par with anglophone renderings sixty years later, such as may be found in Joan Staumbaugh’s SUNY version of *Being and Time* of 1996. The same proposition reads as follows: ‘opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings; it is also opposed to taking over concepts seemingly demonstrated; and likewise to pseudo-questions which often are spread abroad as “problems” for generations’. This also captures the essence of the translation by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (in the 2001 Blackwell reprint of the 1962 English edition), which reads as follows: ‘opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings; it is opposed to taking over any conceptions which only seem to have been demonstrated; it is opposed to those pseudo-questions which parade themselves as “problems”, often for generations at a time’.

Phenomenology, according to the etymology of the word, means ‘the *logos* of the phenomena’. What is *logos*, and what are phenomena? Heidegger discusses the Greek origin of the word ‘phenomenon’, and concludes that a phenomenon is that which reveals itself in itself (*das Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigende* (4)). Showing itself, manifesting itself, exhibiting itself, coming to light, all are the totality of all those things which are in the light, or which can be brought to light, namely what the Greeks simply [termed] τὰ ὄντα (i.e. that which *is*).³³

The term ‘phenomenon’ is to be sharply distinguished from either the term ‘appearance’ or the term ‘mere appearance’.³⁴ Whatever is called by these two latter terms must still presuppose a more basic, positive phenomenon. It is only because something has shown itself, i.e. has been a phenomenon, that *it can* show itself as that which *it* is not, in other words, that *it can* ‘only appear as...’. Thus [,] phenomena are never appearances; on the contrary, every appearance depends for its own being on some positive phenomenon.³⁵

Two negative determinations complete the formal meaning of the term ‘phenomenon’: (a) that it should remain undetermined[,], which being is spoken of as phenomenon, and (b) that it should remain completely open, whether that [261] which shows itself (the phenomenon) is a being (*Seiendes*) or a character of a being (*ein Seinscharacter des Seienden*).³⁶

But a phenomenon, as that which is to be shown or displayed or elicited or brought out, is not this or that being, but *the being* (*Sein*) of these beings (*des Seienden*) (6).³⁷ And it is this *Sein* which, on account of a peculiar character of human nature which Heidegger will later carefully delimit and point out, has a constant tendency to get itself hidden and covered up, and which therefore requires constantly to be brought out and shown. The term ‘phenomenon’ refers preeminently to this *Sein* of things which[,], because of this tendency [towards] self-concealment, is not all given on the surface of things, but has, as it were, to be dug into and conquered.

³³ Namely: τὰ ὄντα (*ta ontá*) as *das Seiende* (‘beings’; ‘that which is’); *Sein und Zeit*, §7, p. 28. It has become common in anglophone translations to render *Seiende* as ‘beings’, although Malik seems to be attuned to Heidegger’s take on it in considering this as the phenomenon of ‘that which is’, namely pointing out ‘the being that has come into presence within the open region of being’.

³⁴ Phenomenon: *Phänomen*: Φαινόμενον (*phainomenon*), as derived from the verbal φαίνεσθαι (*phainesthai*) of ‘showing itself’, whereby phenomena are not simply appearances (*Erscheinen*).

³⁵ *Sein und Zeit*, §7, pp. 28–29. In this context, Malik offers a poignant expository account of Heidegger’s etymological analysis.

³⁶ *Sein und Zeit*, §7, p. 31. The intention is to state that if in the way we grasp the *phenomenon* we leave undetermined which beings are addressed through it, and that we also keep open whether such self-showing is actually of a particular being, or a characteristic of the *being* of beings, then we are dealing with the *formal* concept of *phenomenon* (*formaler Phänomenbegriff*).

³⁷ *Sein und Zeit*, §7, pp. 34–35, as in interpreting the preliminary concept of phenomenology (*Der Vorbegriff der Phänomenologie*). This is also addressed in *Sein und Zeit*, §14, p. 63, in a phenomenological description of worldliness (*Weltlichkeit*).

Heidegger gives a very important explanation of the Greek term λόγος. I shall not go into this explanation here in detail (7).³⁸ I shall only say that, according to Heidegger, *logos* as speech or talk is simply making clear that which you are talking about. The talk lets that which is talked about be seen of itself. That which is said in a speech, insofar as this speech is genuine, should be drawn out of that which the speech is talking about. It is only in this immediate submitting to the demands and nature of that which you are talking about[,] that your verbal communication can make clear, in what it says, the being you are talking about, and can make it accessible to others. Sheer verbalization is not the only form of this communicative, disclosing articulation.

In combining the concepts of phenomenon and of *logos*, Heidegger gives a more unitary conception of phenomenology as a science. Phenomenology is simply letting that which manifests itself, manifest itself as it does of itself (“*Das was sich zeigt, so wie es sich von ihm selbst her zeigt, von ihm selbst her sehen lassen*” (8)).³⁹ The science of phenomena so grasps its objects that it conducts everything it discourses about [them] in immediate [262] living proximity to these objects themselves. It lets its objects speak for themselves.⁴⁰

I wish now in my own words to express my understanding of what Heidegger’s phenomenology is. I mention seven characteristics of this conception of philosophical method.

1. There is in the first place a decisive note of freedom of all shackling philosophical prejudices. I am asked to go to the phenomena themselves, and to live amidst and on these abundant, innocent phenomena which life is so full of. And let me be free of systematic preconceptions as to what is or is not true and fundamental and ‘metaphysical’ and important in these phenomena. The reading of

³⁸ The concept of λόγος (*logos*) refers to a particular mode of saying that lets what self-shows itself show itself from itself. This is elucidated in *Sein und Zeit*, §7, pp. 32–33. Here, the *logos* has the sense of *apophansis* (ἀπόφανσις) as what allows for self-showing in the saying.

³⁹ The elucidation of *Phänomenologie* figures in *Sein und Zeit*, §7, pp. 34–36. The inner relation between the expressions *phenomenon* and *logos*, as embedded in the coined term ‘phenomenology’, points to the Greek *legein ta phainomena* (λέγειν τὰ φαινόμενα), which also means *apophainesthai ta phainomena* (ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα) in being that which lets what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it self-shows itself from itself; hence leading to the maxim of phenomenology as a type of research that attends ‘to things themselves!’ (‘zu den Sachen selbst!’).

⁴⁰ The use of the expression ‘objects’ here would have been better substituted by the designations ‘phenomena’, ‘things’, or ‘beings’ so as not to imply that an object is posited over and against a subject in a Cartesian binary view; since this does not accord with the existential analytic of *Dasein*, even if Husserlian phenomenology would have tended to use such terms, which were eschewed by Heidegger in practicing phenomenology as fundamental ontology. It is clear that for Heidegger, *ontology is possible only as phenomenology* (*Ontologie ist nur als Phänomenologie möglich*), albeit as grasped in his own specific sense of what *Phänomenologie* entails (*Sein und Zeit*, §7, p. 35); namely as the science of the being of beings *qua* ontology / *die Wissenschaft vom Sein des Seienden* (*Sein und Zeit*, §7, p. 37). *Dasein* is interpreted in terms of temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) while explicating time (*Zeit*) as the transcendental horizon of the question of being (*Frage nach dem Sein*).

Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* exerted on me a purging influence; it had the effect of shaking me violently and restoring me to the loud phenomena of life. Death and fear and conscience are not, as some believe, metaphysically unimportant; they are of the essence of existence.

2. There is also the belief that nothing absolutely is not, in the moral sense that the beings of the world *are* all *there* to be reached and lived and appreciated. This is the Greek sense of the lucidity and transparency of being. If I miss being, then I should blame my personal distortion, and not being itself. The grounds of error and distortion and not-being are in my moral nature,⁴¹ and not in being as such.

3. This attitude implies a certain un-rebellious submissiveness to truth. You should aim at the positive core of truth, and not at once jump to exceptions and negative instances. Truth explains error, and not conversely. Reality explains appearance, and not conversely. Truth can get itself hidden or forgotten or distorted. But whatever *then* 'appears', must be grounded in truth. If you are initially morally frightened, as lots of philosophers are, and are all the time seeking negative instances, then something is definitely the matter with *you*. Listening to and obeying your truth are [263] primary phenomenological virtues.

4. Then you should stick to life, life in the moral existential sense. The German word '*Existenz*' cannot be accurately rendered by the term 'existence'. But what is meant is life in the non-biological, concrete, moral, honest, phenomenal sense. The term 'experience' does not convey this sense at all. Also, if I use it here, I run the risk of confusing what Heidegger means by '*Existenz*' with what Professor Whitehead means by 'experience'. The term 'personal existence' is, to my knowledge, the nearest rendering in English of what Heidegger means by *Existenz*.⁴² It is *you*, the moral whole of you, that is meant. But [']existence['] and [']existential['] are to be

⁴¹ The ethical-moral tone here takes a turn in thinking that is not found in Heidegger's focus on the existential lived and situational experience that gives priority to fundamental ontology over ethics. It is precisely this aspect of Heidegger's thinking that later attracted Levinas' critique; namely that the existential analytic of *Dasein* is undertaken from the impersonal standpoint of solitude (*Dasein esseulé*). *Dasein* stands accordingly *side-to-side* (*côte à côte*) with others, around a common project, theme, or goal, instead of being *face-to-face*. According to Levinas, this constitutes the meaning of Heidegger's notion of *Miteinandersein*, as being reciprocally with one another (*être réciproquement l'un avec l'autre* [Emmanuel Levinas, *Le temps et l'autre* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991), pp. 18–19, 69, 88–89]). I treated this question elsewhere in Nader El-Bizri, 'Uneasy Meditations following Levinas', *Studia Phaenomenologica*, Vol. VI (2006): 293–315; Nader El-Bizri, 'Ontological Meditations on Tillich and Heidegger', *Iris: Annales de Philosophie*, Vol. 36 (2015): 109–114; Nader El-Bizri, 'Variations ontologiques autour du concept d'angoisse chez Kierkegaard', in *Kierkegaard, notre contemporain*, ed. Nicole Hatem *et al.* (Beirut-Copenhagen: Presses de l'Université Saint-Joseph – Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, 2013), pp. 83–95. We can see how Malik prefers the *existential* path to the *moral* one.

⁴² Heidegger's take on *Existenz* passes via descriptive phenomenology as an ontological-ontic hermeneutic of the being of *Dasein*, which also has the primary meaning of being in the analysis of the existentiality of existence (*Analytik der Existenzialität der Existenz*); *Sein und Zeit*, §7, pp. 37–38.

preferred to the word 'moral' and its derivatives, because they involve the notion of non-existence also. The 'you' which is meant is the 'you' which is balanced all the time between existence and non-existence. What you are asked to stick to in the phenomenology of man is everything which makes all the difference to *your existence [as such]*.⁴³

5. Because the proper methodological attitude in phenomenology is submissive obedience to truth, the only proper phenomenological method is description (9).⁴⁴ You let truth 'come to word' through you. Your function is not to create or deduce truth, but to just let it express itself. If it does not express itself, do not blame it, but blame your subconscious abstract system of prejudices. And it is not a sheer 'abstract system of prejudices' that is to be blame[d], as if these things could have any existence apart from you; it is your total moral attitude which has to be radically changed, before truth can come to word descriptively through you. Phenomenology endeavors to be removed *only one step* from truth, namely the step of description itself.

6. But what is this truth we are talking about? It is nothing other than the honest phenomena of existence: suffering and death and life and that [264] lost-ness in 'projective continuity' which makes you say, as soon as I mention 'suffering and death', that I am pitifully duped, and that suffering and death are not the truth.

7. Finally, Heidegger's phenomenology cannot be defined in advance of its actual carrying out.⁴⁵ Phenomenology is self-abnegating loyalty to phenomena, and this

⁴³ It is fascinating to see how much one has to struggle with language to meet the directives of fundamental ontology as a particular method in phenomenology that mediates the reflection on the question of being through an existential analytic of *Dasein*. Heidegger wrestled with the German language, as well as with Greek and Latin, in order to reawaken the question of the meaning of being from its history of forgetfulness within classical metaphysics; albeit all along needing to use a language that is saturated with the expressions that are inherited from the history he endeavoured to deconstruct. It is no wonder that an encounter with Heidegger's thought as early as Malik's, and by way of mediating it through the English language, wrestles also with the anglophone utterances that belong to the language of metaphysics, such as 'man', 'human', 'ego', 'subject', 'personal', 'soul'. The Heideggerian parlance is still quite unsettling even in our era; especially when it is explicated in anglophone circles of philosophy, trying to avoid making it sound like confused language. This seems to be the case with Malik's own attempt to interpret Heidegger in a way that would be acceptable at Harvard, specifically when making comparisons with Whitehead.

⁴⁴ *Sein und Zeit*, §7, p. 37.

⁴⁵ This is indeed the case; namely that we do not simply write expository accounts on Heidegger but attempt to engage in a Heideggerian mode of thinking that is pertinent to our own thought. This approach informed many of my studies, including Nader El-Bizri, *The Phenomenological Quest between Avicenna and Heidegger* (Albany: State University of New York, 2014), 2nd ed.; Nader El-Bizri, 'Avicenna and Essentialism', *Review of Metaphysics* 54, No. 4 (2001), 753–778. This direction in my research was initiated by my ponderings over the ramifications of Heidegger's own observations in *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (*The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*; *Gesamtausgabe* 24) (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975); Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1982, section 10), where it is argued that the distinction between essence and existence in Avicenna's metaphysics, and the way

loyalty can only manifest itself with the expression of these phenomena. It is permeated throughout with the passionate sense that *the truth* must be expressed, and that this truth *is* the concrete living phenomena of human existence. The knowledge of the nature of phenomenology ‘grows’ on you as you advance in its study.

There is a clear resemblance between phenomenology and Professor Whitehead’s conception of the method of metaphysics as ‘descriptive generalization’ (10).⁴⁶ But Professor Whitehead picked and chose from the totality of the phenomena in accordance with his antecedent cosmological purpose. The result was that the phenomena which he did capture were presumed by him to apply not to man as a personal, moral existence (the whole phraseology has no meaning in his problematic), but to [the] *eminent being* everywhere, God,⁴⁷ my present occasion of experience, as well as “the most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space” (11).⁴⁸

it influenced ontological thinking in scholasticism, further contributed to the occlusion of the question of being. I contested this Heideggerian proposition on the basis of my own reading of Avicenna’s texts, not only through the Latin mediaeval assimilation and adapted transmission of Avicennism, but also by returning to the Arabic versions of the Avicennian treatises in their ontological, epistemological, mystic, and linguistic divisions. This line of inquiry has been phenomenological in its penchant while disclosing the particulars of how Avicenna’s thought took the question of being (*al-wujūd*) to be the most central question of philosophical investigation. Moreover, this Avicennian philosophical heritage was the foundation for subsequent developments that attested to the rise of a new strain in ontology that surpassed substance- and subject-based metaphysics (i.e. *ousiology* [based on οὐσία]) when thinking about the modalities of being (necessity, contingency/possibility, impossibility).

⁴⁶ Here, Malik refers to Chapter XV on the ‘philosophic method’ in Whitehead’s *Adventures of Ideas*, and also to the definition of metaphysics as a mode of description as described in Whitehead’s *Religion in the Making*, pp. 84, 88f. (reflecting critically on the metaphysical relationship of God with the moral order, and in thinking about the Godhead as a non-temporal actuality). See Alfred North Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933); Alfred North Whitehead, *Religion in the Making* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927, 1st ed. 1926). Speculative philosophy is an endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted. It hence embodies the method of the working hypothesis. Whitehead takes the main method of philosophy in dealing with its evidence to be that of descriptive generalization, including the description of experience (*Adventures of Ideas*, *op. cit.*, pp. 222, 234–236).

⁴⁷ Malik returns to the ethical orientations in thinking even by way of hints and insinuations, in addition to having a theological signifier that signals his own line of interpretation and lets his own voice appear in the midst of his analytic *cum* hermeneutic reading of Whitehead and Heidegger. The discussion of the theological underpinnings of metaphysics as disclosed by an existential analytic of *Dasein* is elucidated so as to show how the anthropological and psychological directives in theorizing get entangled in classical ontologies with theological guidelines in thinking; see, for example, *Sein und Zeit*, §10, pp. 49–50.

⁴⁸ This proposition is quoted from Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930), p. 28; it occurs in the context of Whitehead’s account of the philosophy of the organism in terms of the notions of an ‘actual entity’, a ‘prehension’ (as a grasp or seizing or taking-hold of mental entities), a ‘nexus’, and an ‘ontological principle’. Actual entities are taken to be concretized actualities of occasions as ‘final real things’, wherein there is no going-behind to a more real reality than that of their actuality. It is in

Section III

*The Problem of Being and the Importance of the Ontology of Man*⁴⁹

Heidegger's central problem is ontology. He wants to know (i.e. to be) what 'being' is.⁵⁰ People talk about all sorts of things, and say that all these things 'are'. Heidegger inquires into the meaning of this being in [265] general (*der Sinn des Seins überhaupt*).⁵¹

In German and in Greek there are two words related to 'being' which cannot be easily translated into English. These words are τὸ ὄν and τὰ ὄντα; *Sein* and *Seiendes*.⁵² The distinction is between being as such and in itself, and the various beings that are. An apple *is*, but 'there is' the distinction between the apple which is, and the being of the apple. It is being in the latter living, immediate sense, which is meant by the word '*Sein*'. The sense is very close to Professor Whitehead's sense of self-immediacy (1).⁵³ The difficulty of distinguishing in English between *a* particular being and *the* being of that particular being arose in our discussion of Professor Whitehead's metaphysical situation (2).⁵⁴ Wherever we use the word 'being' here,

this context that the notion of the Godhead as the most actual is evoked, albeit by stating that such an actuality of the Divine is an attribute that marks all actual entities, including 'the most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space'. This is itself seen as a consequence of a substance-based metaphysics, wherein the notion of *substantia* or *ousia* (οὐσία) is transformed into that of an *actual being*. The distinction between the most eminent actual entity, as the Godhead, and other actual entities, is that the idea of Divinity is associated with actuality in the highest modality of absoluteness, whilst other beings refer back in their actuality to the particulars of their surrounding environment.

⁴⁹ The use of the appellations 'man' or 'soul' still figure in Malik's thesis; even though he attempted to elucidate how fundamental ontology turns towards a reappropriated parlance that evokes the phenomenon of what is experienced in being-in-the-world as *Dasein*, and as he himself explicates in this present section.

⁵⁰ We witness again the difficulty in accounting for Heidegger's fundamental ontology and its question, which is ontological rather than epistemological, and which is focused on awakening the pondering over the questions of the meaning, truth, and place of being, and doing so by way of an existential analytic of the mode of being of the mortal as thrown into the world in being-toward-death.

⁵¹ Namely, *Die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein überhaupt*.

⁵² This points to the ontological difference between τὸ ὄν (*to on*) and τὰ ὄντα (*ta onta*), as a differentiation between *Sein* (being [*Seyn*]) and *Seiendes* (beings). This mode of thinking in ontology is already highlighted in *Sein und Zeit*, §1, p. 4. Indeed, *being* cannot be understood as a being. It is in this sense that *das Sein* is also grasped as 'presencing' (*das Anwesen*), whereby *das Seiende* designates *the being that has come into a presence within the open region of being*. *Enti non additur aliqua natura* (*being* cannot be defined by attributing beings to it). The concept of being is indefinable (*Der Begriff Sein ist undefinierbar*). Heidegger here draws a distinction concerning the ontological difference between being and beings, versus the conceptions of τὸ ὄν and τὰ ὄντα in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, ed. W. David Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), B3, 998 b 22, and B 4, 1001 a 21.

⁵³ Malik, *The Systems of Whitehead's Metaphysics*, *op. cit.* (with a reference to Malik's doctoral thesis), note 4, Section VI, Chapter I.

⁵⁴ Malik, *The Systems of Whitehead's Metaphysics*, *op. cit.* (with a reference to Malik's doctoral thesis), notes 1 and 11, Section II, Chapter II.

the context should be enough to establish which of the two senses of the term we mean.

It is the meaning of 'to be at all' which is in question. Although this meaning is presupposed in everything 'we' do and do not do, still, so far as our comprehension of it is concerned, it is the obscurest of all concepts. Long ago Aristotle remarked that being is not a genus of which the various beings are species;⁵⁵ its universality transcends that of genus. Because of this fact, being cannot be defined, in [an] ordinary sense of definition; you cannot derive it or build it up from concepts, because concepts and things are themselves *particular* beings, and being, in the sense of 'to be at all', cannot be conceived in terms of particular beings. *Thus the being itself of a being 'is' not itself a being.* And if one should object that being 'is' after all perfectly obvious, and nothing more can be done or said about it, let one kindly remember that in philosophy it is precisely the obvious matter, and most especially the 'perfectly obvious' matters, that should be made the most 'questionable'.

Approaching and grasping being is a different matter from approaching [266] and grasping particular beings. Phenomenology alone is adequate to this task of approaching and conceiving being.⁵⁶

There can 'be' no being (*Sein*) which 'is' not the being of particular beings. Always[,] being means the being of some particular being (3).⁵⁷ But 'there are' innumerable beings, and some of these beings 'are' in different senses. To inquire after being in itself means that we are having in mind a particular being which we intend to interrogate in respect of its being (4).⁵⁸ [At] which of the infinite beings that the world is cluttered with shall we stop and read off its being? Which being shall serve in its being as the key to the disclosure of being? Is this choice of an exemplary being an arbitrary choice, or is there a being which enjoys a unique priority in the

⁵⁵ Being is not a *genus*: οὐτε τὸ ὄν γένος / *oute to on genos* (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, *op. cit.*, III.3.998b23), since a *genus* must be differentiated by some *differentia* that falls outside it, so accordingly, if being is a *genus*, then it would have to be differentiated by the *differentia* that fell outside of it as non-being, which is absurd. A given kind is differentiated into *species* by *differentia*. The *species* is the form (*eidōs*; εἶδος) or essence, while the *genus* is the kind under which it falls, and the *differentia* characterizes the differentiation of *species* under an overarching *genus*. For example, a *human being* is a species under the *animal* genus that is differentiated by the *differentia* of *being rational*. See also *Sein und Zeit*, §1, p. 3.

⁵⁶ That is, phenomenology (*Phänomenologie*) in the sense elaborated earlier as a Heideggerian fundamental ontology (*Fundamentalontologie*) that is guided by the maxim 'zu den Sachen selbst!', and that passes by way of an existential analytic of *Dasein* (*Sein und Zeit*, §7, pp. 34–36).

⁵⁷ *Sein und Zeit*, §2, p. 6, and §3, p. 9. The *being* of beings is itself not a being, and beings themselves are interrogated by way of pondering over the question of *being*, and specifically with regard to their own *being*; whereby *being* is always the *being* of a being (*Sein ist jeweils das Sein eines Seienden*).

⁵⁸ This applies to the case of the existent that in metaphysical terms, we historically termed the 'human being', while avoiding anthropology, theology, psychology, and biology in the existential analytic of *Dasein*; *Sein und Zeit*, §10, p. 49.

present task of the working out of the question of being? Which is this exemplary being, and in what sense does it enjoy this priority?⁵⁹

At this point Heidegger makes a very important decision which determines the character of his whole work. And this decision cannot be fairly judged at present. Any hasty judgement passed on this decision is likely to be very external, and to miss the entire point of the character of such fundamental investigations. These original, moral decisions (or ‘presuppositions’, as some people, who have *decided* not to talk in moral terms, would prefer to say) cannot give you an immediate justifying account of themselves;⁶⁰ they only ask you to be patient, and to look for this justification in the process which puts them [in]to effect.⁶¹

⁵⁹ All this questioning leads back to *Dasein*.

⁶⁰ This proposition and what Malik further elaborates in Section IV on *Mitsein* (being with) would have offered an eloquent response to critics such as Levinas who questioned Heidegger’s existential analytic of *Dasein* on ethical grounds, by stating that such analysis was undertaken from the standpoint of an impersonal lonely *Dasein* (*essulé*), rather than simply being alone, and specifically standing as such in a neuter relation of *side-to-side* (*côte à côte*) with others rather than *face-to-face*. Levinas, *Le temps et l’autre*, *op. cit.*, pp. 18–19, 69, 88–89.

⁶¹ The publication of Heidegger’s *Schwarze Hefte* (*Black Notebooks*; *Cahiers noirs*) in the volumes GA 94–97 of the *Gesamtausgabe* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2014–2015) added to the heated polemics that surround the association of his thinking with Nazism. The main critiques against Heidegger are set out in Peter Trawny, *Heidegger et l’antisémitisme. Sur les Cahiers Noirs* (Paris: Le Seuil, 2014); Peter Trawny, *Heidegger und der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2015). Earlier criticism may be found in Emmanuel Faye, *Heidegger: l’introduction du nazisme dans la philosophie* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2005), Victor Farias, *Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus* (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1989) [*Heidegger et le Nazisme* (Paris: Éditions Verdier, 1992)], and in the writings of notable theorists such as Theodor W. Adorno, *Jargon de l’authenticité*, trad. E. Escoubas (Paris: Payot, 1989). Recent attempts to contextualize this question were presented in François Fédiér (ed.), *Heidegger à la plus forte raison* (Paris: Fayard, 2007), Jürgen Habermas, ‘Work and *Weltanschauung*: The Heidegger Controversy from a German Perspective’, *Critical Inquiry* Vol. 15, No. 2 (1989), pp. 452–454, and also in his ‘Martin Heidegger: on the publication of the lectures of 1935’, in *The Heidegger Controversy*, ed. R. Wollin (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1993). It is reported that Heidegger himself referred to that epoch as being the greatest folly of his life (*die größte Dummheit seines Lebens*); see Heinrich Wiegand Petzet, *Auf einen Stern zugehen. Begegnungen und Gespräche mit Martin Heidegger 1929–1976* (Frankfurt am Main: Societäts-Verlag, 1983), p. 43, and Frédéric de Towarnicki, *À la rencontre de Heidegger. Souvenirs d’un messenger de la Forêt Noire* (Paris: Gallimard, 1993), p. 125. I discussed this matter elsewhere in Nader El-Bizri, ‘Les *Cahiers noirs* de Heidegger’, in *Amiel et le Journal Philosophique*, ed. Nicole Hatem (Beirut: Éditions de l’Université Saint-Joseph, 2017), pp. 253–277. Disputations also arose around Malik’s co-founding of the paramilitary Lebanese Front during the civil war in Lebanon; however, it is not within the scope of the ontological commentaries here to investigate these political controversies that require separate inquiries of their own. A recent study examines some biographical aspects of Malik’s political praxis and how they were judged negatively by his relative Edward Said against the background of US foreign policy in the Middle East; see Mark D. Walhout, *Arab Intellectuals and American Power: Edward Said, Charles Malik, and the US in the Middle East* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2020).

But this is what Heidegger says (5).⁶² When the question of being is explicitly posited, and when it is carried out in complete transparency, then its working out will clearly require the explication of how we can look into the being of particular beings, how we already have a rough, average understanding of the meaning of being, and how we can grasp this meaning conceptually; it also requires preparing the possibility of the right choice [267] of the exemplary being, and working out the genuine mode of access to this being. All these [ways of] looking into, understanding, grasping, choosing, having access to, are behaviors constitutive of the very question itself, and are themselves therefore modes of being of a particular being, namely of *the* being which we, the questioners, *are* ourselves. The working out of the question of being must therefore mean, making a being – the questioning being – transparent in its being. The question has not asked itself; the question itself, as mode of *our being*, is essentially determined by us. This being, which we ourselves are and which, among other things, has the being-possibility (*Seinsmöglichkeit*) of raising questions, is termed *Dasein*.⁶³ Thus[,] in order to be able to raise the question of the meaning of being[,] we require an antecedent adequate explication of a being (*Dasein*) in respect of its being.⁶⁴

Dasein means man, but it means man as he honestly is. It does not mean man in the abstract biological sense, nor in the absurd philosophic sense which[,] [is one] in one's self-cleverness[,] one] may think man is or should be. It means *you*

⁶² *Sein und Zeit*, §2, p. 7.

⁶³ It is telling that Malik's attuned approach to Heidegger's terminology did not push him readily to translate the term '*Dasein*' as 'existence'; nor did he substitute it with 'being-there' wherein the '*Da*' designates 'there'. Malik retained the use of the German '*Dasein*' within the English commentary; hence anticipating how this term would become commonplace in subsequent commentaries on Heidegger in francophone and anglophone texts. Malik's attunement to Heidegger's thought is remarkable, since he does not venture into translating '*Dasein*' as, for instance, Henry Corbin did, who rendered it as '*réalité-humaine*' in his French translation of *Was ist Metaphysik?* for Gallimard in 1938.

⁶⁴ *Dasein* is the situational and experiential mode of being of the mortal who is preoccupied with the question of its being-in-the-world, as immersed in involvements with things and others. The aim is to reawaken anew the question of the meaning of being against the horizon of the interpretation of time. The being who inquires about the possibilities of its being, is terminologically reappropriated by Heidegger in the use of the German term '*Da-sein*' (*Sein und Zeit*, §2, p. 7), and by way of avoiding the nomenclature of classical ontology that refers to a given 'subject' or '*ego*'. The elucidation of the question of being (*Seinsfrage*) against the horizon of the interpretation of time (*Zeit*) has to pass by an existential analytic of *Dasein* (*existenziale Analytik des Daseins*). Accordingly, Heidegger's fundamental ontology itself must be articulated as an existential analytic of *Dasein* (*Sein und Zeit*, §4, p. 13). The meaning of *Dasein* is temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*), wherein time (*Zeit*) is the horizon of the understanding of such a mode of being (*Sein und Zeit*, §5, p. 17). As mortals we reflect on our being-in-the-world (*In-der-Welt-sein*) as being-towards-death (*Sein-zum-Tode*), when we are not busy with hurried and hassled everyday dealings in the public sense of self. *Dasein* is '*être-là*' qua 'being-here', or '*être-le-là*' qua 'being-the-here' (*cum 'bereness*'), as Jean Beaufret noted in his *Dialogue avec Heidegger, Tome II: Philosophie moderne* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1973), p. 51, and in his *Dialogue avec Heidegger, Tome IV: Le chemin de Heidegger* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1985), pp. 113–115.

and *I* in our honest concreteness[,] and impossibility. What Heidegger is saying is that *you* and *I* and *he* are peculiar beings, who *sometimes* ask themselves the question as to the meaning of being (*Sein*). This self-questioning about the meaning of being is a particular mode of our total being, and, since certainly we are not all our life philosophizing, we do take on many other modes of being. But it is man, in the sense of *Dasein*, who is in the end responsible for his philosophizing. To forget this point is to forget the cardinal point in philosophy. In this work I shall speak of man or *Dasein* interchangeably, meaning in either case the actual, living man in his personal, total, moral existence, an existence which every now and then suddenly becomes 'philosophic', and puts to itself (i.e. literally *becomes*) disturbing questions. And I shall repeatedly employ the personal pronouns 'you' and 'I', and some-[268]-times he (she), to force this personal, existential basis of the whole discussion to stay in the foreground, and to check the constant insidious temptation to slip back into a state of beautiful, healthy objectivity. The words 'you', 'I', 'man', '*Dasein*' are used synonymously in this thesis.

Man is not just a being *among* other beings – chairs and events and philosophy departments. Man is rather distinguished by the phenomenal fact that *in his being it is his very being which is always at stake* (*[es] in seinem Sein um dieses Sein selbst geht*) (6).⁶⁵ If one says: no, man is a peculiar group of events, like those events that are occurring in the center of the sun, only perhaps a bit more complex, then I say: how does one know that this is so? The truth is that one is saying so, only because one is dominated by a peculiar, abstract outlook. If the being of man consists in the fact that this being 'is always at stake', then this must mean that man must always have some *understanding* of his being. It belongs to man's being, not only that it always be at stake, but also that it be in some measure disclosed or opened up before him. And thus the understanding of being is itself a determination of man's own being. This twofold ontological characterization of man, the fact that in his being this being is always at stake, and the fact that this being is always to some extent disclosed to him (i.e. he 'has' some understanding of it), constitutes what Heidegger calls the *Existenz* of *Dasein*, which we simply translate [as] man's existence.

Man, being the being which takes on the mode of questioning the nature of being, and possessing essentially in his own life a nascent, more or less structured understanding of being, must himself be the being by whom we should stop and read off the nature of being. Every ontology is grounded ultimately in the ontology of man in the sense of *Dasein*. It is honest personal existence, it is you and I in our un-befogged transparency of being, which can shed any light on questions of ontology.

⁶⁵ *Dasein* is concerned about its *being*. The ontic distinction of *Dasein* is that it is ontological; in the sense that it always grasps itself in terms of its existence (*Existenz*) by seizing its existential possibilities through an ontic understanding.

[269] Heidegger points out (7)⁶⁶ that Aristotle and Aquinas were clear on the issue that it was the soul of man[,]⁶⁷ which had *first* to be studied if we should hope to obtain a clear conception of the nature of being. The analysis of the constitution of the soul of man (i.e. in Heidegger's language, of *Dasein*, or of you and me) as a necessary pre[-]requisite for any other ontological study, is called by Heidegger "*Fundamental-ontologie*" (8).⁶⁸

Section IV

The Basic Existential Structures

By 'existential structures' (*Existenzial, Existenzialien*) is meant the characters of being (*Seinscharactere*) of *Dasein* (1).⁶⁹ They are to be sharply distinguished from what are called 'categories', which are determinations of beings which are not of the nature of *Dasein*. The categories constitute *man's* means of approach to the beings which are 'inside the world'. Man is not such a being, at least not to himself; and he therefore requires a radically different mode of approach to himself. Think of calling myself colorful or extended, or relational, or occurrent, or passing, or what not! The indubitable phenomenal truth is that *I* can (although I sometimes do) apply none of the categories which determine things to myself. There are therefore two characters of being (*Sein*), the categories and the existential structures; the categories determine a being whose nature is a 'what',⁷⁰ the existential structures a being whose nature is a 'who'. The proper relationship between the two types of

⁶⁶ *Sein und Zeit*, §4, p. 14.

⁶⁷ Even with the classical metaphysical conceptions of the soul as ψυχή (Aristotle), *anima* (Thomas Aquinas), or *nafs* (Avicenna), the ontic-ontological priority of *Dasein* in fundamental ontology is upheld through an existential analysis in Heideggerian phenomenology. This ontic-ontological priority of *Dasein* (*Der ontisch-ontologische Vorrang des Daseins*) was sensed all along without *Dasein* itself being fundamentally grasped ontologically. *Sein und Zeit*, §4, p. 14.

⁶⁸ *Sein und Zeit*, §5, pp. 13, 14 *et passim* (namely: '*Fundamentalontologie*', that is to be sought through an existential analytic of *Dasein*).

⁶⁹ *Sein und Zeit*, §9, p. 44f. The existential analytic of *Dasein* is prior to any anthropology, psychology, biology, or theology; rather its structure of existentiality (*Struktur der Existenzialität*) is posited *a priori*.

⁷⁰ The categories (Κατηγορίαι; *Categoriae*) account for the *whatness* of a given substance (οὐσία, *ousia*) in the sense of determining its *essentia* through what is predicated of it as *praedicamenta*, rather than evoking its *existentia*. This relates to the tenfold modes of being and to what can be said about them; namely: substance (οὐσία, *ousia*), which is not predicated on anything, then the categories quantity (ποσόν, *poson*), quality (ποιόν, *poion*), relation (πρός τι, *pros ti*), place/the-where-about (ποῦ, *pou* [*topos*]), time/timing (πότε, *pote*), being in a posture/position (κεῖσθαι, *keisthai*), possession of a state of affairs (ἔχειν, *echein*), action (ποιεῖν, *poiein*), affection (πάσχειν, *paschein*). See Aristotle, *Categories and De Interpretatione*, trans. John Ackrill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), *Categoriae*, 1b25–2a4.

characters of being cannot be determined abstractly and hurriedly in advance of the carrying[-]out of the existential analysis of man.⁷¹

The phrase ‘existential structure’ is a poor rendering in English of [270] Heidegger’s term ‘*Existenzial*’. The word ‘structure’ is terribly abstract. But what is meant is a total mode of being of myself, that which fills out the dots in the phrase ‘I am...’, ‘you are...’. For example, when I say ‘man is an anxious being’, anxiety, as a total mode of being of man, is an existential structure.

Heidegger elicits phenomenologically and with great patience the following existential structures of man (2):⁷²

1. From the very beginning, and throughout everything Heidegger says, it must be absolutely kept in mind that the object of his thought is not an ‘occasion of experience’, nor a thing, nor the animal man, but man in the existential sense of *Dasein*. This sense was formally defined in the previous section. It is you and I and he himself, in our honest total concreteness, which he is all the time having in mind. Our total being is always in the balance; our essence is ‘to be or not to be’. The essence of man is his *Existenz*,⁷³ in the twofold sense of existence we defined in the previous section. *Therefore, his existential structures are not given ‘properties’ which attach to a thing, say a table, which is on-hand; they are always for him possible ways or modes of being* (3).⁷⁴ This is the significance of the German word ‘*Dasein*’; it expresses total being, and it expresses total being *there* no less than *here*, where ‘there’ and ‘here’ are used in the most general sense (the German word ‘*Da*’ meaning indifferently here or there (4)).⁷⁵ My existence is prior to anything else that I may be. *First* I exist,

⁷¹ Namely, the existential analytic of *Dasein* (*existenziale Analytik des Daseins*).

⁷² In this context, the word ‘man’ designates ‘*Dasein*’, while the intention is gender-neutral. As Malik notes, this whole section offers an abridged exegesis of complex analytics that occur over 140 pages of *Sein und Zeit*, which indeed continued to pose great philosophical challenges for subsequent commentators in Heideggerian studies. These are covered in *Sein und Zeit* under the heading ‘The Interpretation of *Dasein* in terms of Temporality and the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon of the Question of Being’.

⁷³ This proposition is offered by Malik as an interpretation of Heidegger’s statement that ‘The “essence” of *Dasein* lies in its existence’ (*Das ‘Wesen’ des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz*); *Sein und Zeit*, §9, p. 42. What is at stake here is that the *essentia* (*whatness*; quiddity) of *Dasein* must be grasped in terms of its *existentia* (*beingness*); albeit without the classical grasping of *existentia* as an objective presence (*Vorhandenheit*). Malik’s own saying in this regard, that ‘the essence of man is his *Existenz*’, has different ramifications in terms of how it tangentially evokes the parlance of mediaeval onto-theology (Avicennism at its roots) wherein the Necessary-Being *per se* is that whose Essence is none other than its Existence, while contingent beings have their existence superadded to their essence in being brought from potentiality to actuality by an external causal chain. I discussed this in ‘Avicenna and Essentialism’, *art. cit.*

⁷⁴ *Sein und Zeit*, §9, p. 42.

⁷⁵ *Sein und Zeit*, §28, p. 132 (namely the thematic of analyzing the mode of being-in [*In-sein*]). As the analysis becomes clearer within Malik’s section on Heidegger, the reflection on the ‘*here/there*’ signifier of the ‘*Da*’ in ‘*Dasein*’ is itself pondered over from the viewpoint of *being-in* (*In-sein*), as in *being-in-the-world* (*In-der-Welt-sein*). The being of *Dasein*, as being-in-the-world, is already a mode of thrownness into the *here/there* of worldliness (*Weltlichkeit*). It is such *here-*

and *then* I exist in this or that mode of myself; and I *can* exist only in one or the other of my possible modes of existence. My mother cares primarily for my existence [as such], and only secondarily for the ‘quality’ of this existence. I am, and I have to be this being of mine, so long as I live. And so long as I am, I concern myself primarily with my being, that is I always am one or the other of my various possibilities of being.

[271] 2. And what are these various possibilities or modes or ways of being of *Dasein* (*Seinsmöglichkeiten*, *Seinsmodi*, *Seinsweisen*, *Seinkönnen*)? The two most fundamental possible ways of being are what Heidegger entitles ‘*Eigentlichkeit*’ and ‘*Uneigentlichkeit*’⁷⁶ (5), which we translate into authenticity and unauthenticity of being. Whatever other possibility of your being, you are, you will be it either authentically or un-authentically, or in some state which is a half-hearted mixture of both. You are always either fully yourself in what you are, or you are fully not yourself, or you are in a confused, medium state between the two. (I shall never say here ‘you do your job’ full[y] well, or half-heartedly, etc., because ‘doing one’s job’ is precisely the sort of externality that Heidegger wants so radically to get away from. In one’s ordinary conversation, [for] every ‘what will you do?’ must be substituted [with] ‘what will you be?’, and [for] every ‘I want next year to do so and so’ must be substituted [with] ‘I want next year to be this or that possibility of myself’. One’s magnificent talking in terms of ‘jobs’ and ‘jobs done well’ and ‘he did a very poor job’ always takes existence for granted, and thinks of the job as something external to your being. And you can be one or the other of these ways of being only because you *are* your possibilities.⁷⁷

ness of an I-[am]-*here* (*Ich-Hier*) that is characterized by inner-worldly (*innerweltlich*) de-distancing and directionality of care (*Sorge*). It is such existential spatiality (*Die existenzielle Räumlichkeit des Daseins*) of *Dasein* that determines its place (*Ort*) in the world; wherein the spatial is disclosed by *Dasein* as being this *here/there* of *being-in-the-world*. This affirms the equiprimordiality of space and time in the disclosure of the spatial significance (*Raumbedeutungen*) of attending to the question of being in reflections on dwelling, the open region of being, the place of being, etc. I discussed these in detail in El-Bizri, ‘Being at Home Among Things: Heidegger’s Reflections on Dwelling,’ *art. cit.*; El-Bizri, ‘On Dwelling: Heideggerian Allusions to Architectural Phenomenology,’ *art. cit.*; El-Bizri, ‘*Qui-êtes vous Khôra?* Receiving Plato’s *Timaeus*,’ *art.c cit.*; El-Bizri, ‘ON KAI XΩPA: Situating Heidegger between the *Sophist* and the *Timaeus*,’ *art. cit.*; El-Bizri, ‘*Ontopoïēsis* and the Interpretation of Plato’s *Khôra*,’ *art. cit.*; El-Bizri, ‘A Phenomenological Account of the *Ontological Problem of Space*,’ *art. cit.* Furthermore, Malik captures the essence of what is meant by the ‘being *here/there*’ as entailed by the ‘*Da*’ in ‘*Da-sein*,’ and in a manner that later figures in Beaufret’s grasping of ‘*Dasein*’ as ‘*être-là*’ (‘being-*here*’) or ‘*être-le-là*’ (‘being-the-*here*’; ‘*hereness*’); Beaufret, *Dialogue avec Heidegger*, *Tome II*, *op. cit.*, p. 51, and *Dialogue avec Heidegger*, *Tome IV*, *op. cit.*, pp. 113–115.

⁷⁶ ‘*Eigentlichkeit*’ as authenticity, and ‘*Uneigentlichkeit*’ as inauthenticity; both are determined on the basis of how my *Dasein* is always mine (*durch Jemeinigkeit bestimmt ist*); *Sein und Zeit*, §9, p. 43.

⁷⁷ Existential possibility (*Möglichkeit*) is the most original and primordial ontological determination of *Dasein*, which is thrown into the possibility of being freed towards its ownmost potentiality of being. As such, it is by constantly adopting the possibilities of its being,

3. In order to bring out more sharply man's peculiarity over against any other being, Heidegger distinguishes two other kinds of being, what he calls 'Vorhandensein' and 'Zuhandensein' (6).⁷⁸ We translate these two terms simply as 'things on-hand' and 'things at-hand'. A book [on] a shelf is something on-hand; a tool in the process of its utilization is something at-hand.⁷⁹ It is impossible to conceive of man's being under either title. It is true, one may think of other men as sheerly on-hand and at-hand. But the crucial point about this matter is whether *you* can think of *yourself* as a tool or as something just on-hand.⁸⁰ Furthermore, on-hand-ness and at-hand-ness are both determinations of being grounded ontologically in man's existence. Nothing is [272] on-hand and at-hand except insofar as it answers to some structure in man's constitution in respect to which it *is* on-hand and at-hand. Man's existence, being in itself always at stake and always possessing (being) some understanding of what 'it is all about', is absolutely different from the being of tables and stones and oceans and ideas and events.

4. A phenomenally plain existential structure of man is that he exists in the world. This fundamental constitution (*Grundverfassung*)⁸¹ of *Dasein* Heidegger calls 'In-der-Welt-sein' (7).⁸² And when I say being-in-the-world belongs to your existence[,] I do not mean by 'in' that here is a 'world' – space, time, America, Cambridge – 'in' which you 'occur'; if I had meant that I would have reduced you to a thing on-hand, and you would then just be 'in' another thing on-hand. What I mean is that you carry *your* world with you, so long as you exist. The whole of your existence is determined by being-in-the-world. You are always in the world in the

grasping them, or going astray by failing to understand itself; *Sein und Zeit*, §31, pp. 143–144.

⁷⁸ Malik renders 'Vorhandensein' (*Sein und Zeit*, §9, p. 42) and 'Zuhandensein' (*Sein und Zeit*, §15, p. 69) respectively as 'thing on-hand' and 'thing at-hand'. Later renditions of 'Vorhandensein' suggest 'being-present-at-hand' (Macquarrie, Robinson) or 'objective presence' (Stambaugh), while 'Zuhandensein' is 'ready-to-hand' (Macquarrie, Robinson) or 'handiness' (Stambaugh).

⁷⁹ A book on a shelf is objectively *present* on-hand (*Vorhandensein*; *sous-la-main*), while a tool in the process of being used is handy and ready to hand (*Zuhandensein*; *à-portée-de-la-main*).

⁸⁰ 'Vorhandenheit' and 'Zuhandenheit' cannot characterize the being of *Dasein* that is always mine in its being (*Jemeinigkeit*); even though the later turn in Heidegger's thinking asserts that all beings are brought under the fold of the *Gestell* (en-framing) of the essence of modern technology (*das Wesen der modernen Technik*) to be posited as standing-reserve (*Bestand*), readied to be ordered about in a manner that turns beings into functional utilitarian resources (Heidegger, 'Die Frage nach der Technik', in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, *op. cit.*, pp. 13–44; esp. pp. 23–28). This leads to thinking about the nature of *equipmentality* that turns the *Vorhandenheit* into what is handy in *Zuhandenheit*; hence positing beings as present in a mode of readiness in functionality and utility, as in handling an equipment or tool (*Werkzeug*) in the technical sense. It is in this that the peril (*Gefahr*) of the planetary dominance of *Gestell* appears.

⁸¹ *Grundverfassung* as *Seinverfassung*.

⁸² *Sein und Zeit*, §§11–12, pp. 52–53. *In-der-Welt-sein* (being-in-the-world) is grasped as a unified phenomenon in the fundamental constitution of *Dasein* (*Das In-der-Welt-sein überhaupt als Grundverfassung des Daseins*). Here, being-in (*In-sein*) is the formal existential expression of the being of *Dasein*, which also carries within itself the structure of being-with-[others] (*Mitsein*).

sense that you are always attending to this, doing that, giving up that, dodging this, worrying about that, undertaking, accomplishing, speaking, determining, etc. These are various ways of your *being-in-the-world*. The general existential structure behind any and every mode of your being-in-the-world is obviously a form of caring for, or dealing with, or attending to, or being concerned with. This underlying existential structure Heidegger calls ‘*Besorgen*’ (8).⁸³ I shall use the word ‘caring’ to signify this term, and for Heidegger’s famous term ‘*Sorge*’, as the essence of the being of man, I shall simply employ the term ‘care’.⁸⁴ For the present I am affirming that any mode of being-in-the-world of yourself is existentially characterized by care.

5. Your caring, active intercourse with the world round about you reveals to you a special kind of being[s] of the nature of meaningful objects and tools and signs (what the Greeks called *πράγματα*)⁸⁵ which fit in with one another in [273] various ways. Heidegger discusses the various phenomena which are thereby revealed (9).⁸⁶ Nothing reveals itself as a pure ‘thing’ in this world round about you. You possess (i.e. really ‘are’) a special kind of illuminating light (called ‘*Umsicht*’)⁸⁷ which uncovers meaningfulness in this active, concerned intercourse of yours. Every tool, every sign, every object at-hand[,] has essential reference to some other such object; and the being (*Sein*) of each such object resides precisely in its *fulfilling* this function of essentiality relating itself to the rest of the tools and signs disclosed in your world. Thus[,] there can be no disclosed meaning of anything in your world unless that thing has already fitted a comprehensive totality of meaning. This comprehensive scheme of meaningfulness, in which the things which are sought and cared for by you fit and point to one another, and in their being are *for* one another, is the original, existential phenomenon of ‘the world’. Every other meaning of this term presupposes this existential meaning as its concrete basis. Trace phenomenally the fitness (or unfitness) of the tools of your world to one another, and you are bound in the end to come back to a final being, ‘for the sake of’ which all these tools *are*, and which in itself *is* ‘for the sake of’ nothing beyond itself. This being[,] for whose sake every tool in your world is, is you yourself, what Heidegger calls the final

⁸³ *Sein und Zeit*, §12, p. 57.

⁸⁴ The rendition of *Sorge* as *care* (*cura*) later becomes a standard English translation. Caring is an ontological mode of *Dasein*’s engagement within the world. It is what characterizes the worldliness of *Mensch-sein* (‘human beingness’). Ontically and ontologically, being-in-the-world is a mode of *taking-care* (*Besorgen*), which also has the character of heedfulness and concern (*Fürsorge*).

⁸⁵ *Sein und Zeit*, §15, p. 68. Things (*Dinge*) are called *πράγματα* (*pragmata*) in the sense that taking-care of them happens through praxis (*πρᾶξις*; *Umgang*).

⁸⁶ *Sein und Zeit*, §14, p. 63; on the worldliness of the world (*Die Weltlichkeit der Welt*).

⁸⁷ *Sein und Zeit*, §15, p. 69. *Umsicht* is circumspection, like *Umgang* is *praxis*; both belong to *Umwelt* as a surrounding worldly environment in which we take care of things and others. This worldly character makes itself known through inner-worldly beings (*Die am innerweltlich Seienden sich meldende Weltmäßigkeit der Umwelt*); *Sein und Zeit*, §16, p. 72.

‘*Worum-willen*’ (10)⁸⁸ (i.e. ‘that for the sake of which’) beyond which *you*, remaining yourself, can make no appeal. Heidegger’s point throughout is to show how the ontology of everything man cares for and talks about (and talking about is a mode of caring for) is grounded in man’s own ontology. This is the indubitable truth to Heidegger, a truth which can get itself hidden only because we occasionally become abstract. The whole tenor of Heidegger’s analysis is merely to elicit or point out this phenomenal truth: to blow away the concealing mists of abstraction, and to just let the honest truth reveal itself in its overpowering clarity. And this final [274] honest truth is you and I living, interacting with our world, enjoying our life, facing it, hiding it, planning ahead, worrying, and in every such existential mode of our being all the issues involved revolve about our being or not-being.

6. The essential constitutional spatiality of man is next revealed phenomenally. ‘Space’ is then grounded on this existential original spatiality of *Dasein* (11).⁸⁹

⁸⁸ *Sein und Zeit*, §18, p. 84. That *for-the-sake-of-which* (*Worum-willen*) always concerns the being of *Dasein*, which is essentially concerned *about* its being; ultimately *Dasein*’s being is the most genuine and unique *Worum-willen*.

⁸⁹ *Sein und Zeit*, §§21–24, pp. 101–113 (esp. §24, pp. 110–113 on the spatiality of *Dasein* and space [*Die Räumlichkeit des Daseins und der Raum*]). This evokes the spatial significance of the existential analytic of the worldliness of *Dasein* in attending to the question of being, and not simply doing so against the horizon of temporality, but with an equal grounding in spatiality. Letting inner-worldly beings be encountered, which is constitutive of being-in-the-world, is a mode of *giving space* (*Raum-geben*) that is also making-room (*Einräumen*). Space is disclosed and discovered in the spatiality of being-in-the-world. It is neither in the subject, and the world is not in space as such; rather space is *in-the-world* given its disclosure through the being-in-the-world of *Dasein*, which is spatial in a primordial sense. The fact that space *shows itself in a world* does not tell us anything about its kind of *being*, which is not the same mode of *being* as that of the *res extensa* or *res cogitans*. Space is not reducible to a geometrical *extensio*, as Descartes proclaimed, or to an objective absolute, like Newton argued, or to a relational quantifiable function, as Leibniz conjectured, nor is it a Kantian pure *a priori* subjective form of outer intuition, or constituted by transcendental subjectivity in its kin-aesthetic corporeal functions as understood in Husserlian phenomenology. The decisive task of grasping the ontological bearings of the problem of spatiality lies in freeing up the question of the being of space from the narrowness of undifferentiated and random concepts of *being* (*Sein*; *Seyn*). The *being* of space would be best understood if the *question of being* (*Seinsfrage*) was itself addressed from the standpoint of the spatiality (*Räumlichkeit*) of *Dasein*’s *being-in-the-world*, since *Dasein* is spatial (*räumlich*) insofar as it manifests care (*Sorge*) in the way it comes across things and handles them, and accordingly reveals a region (*Gegend*) that is founded on handiness (*Zubandenheit*). *Dasein*’s making-room (*Einräumen*) is not readily reducible to a quantifiable three-dimensional positioning, but rather grants a *leeway* (*Spielraum*) or a *clearing* (*Lichtung*) in the opened region of useful and present worldly things, which are encountered in directional *de-distancing* (*Ent-fernung*). The *making-present* of things lets *space* itself come into *presence* by way of *making-room* for things that are admitted within its opened region. I have elaborated on these aspects in El-Bizri, ‘Being at Home Among Things: Heidegger’s Reflections on Dwelling,’ *art. cit.*; El-Bizri, ‘On Dwelling: Heideggerian Allusions to Architectural Phenomenology,’ *art. cit.*; El-Bizri, ‘*Qui-êtes vous Khôra?* Receiving Plato’s *Timaeus*,’ *art. cit.*; El-Bizri, ‘ON KAI XΩPA: Situating Heidegger between the *Sophist* and the *Timaeus*,’ *art. cit.*; El-Bizri, ‘*Ontopoïesis* and the Interpretation of Plato’s *Khôra*,’ *art. cit.*; El-Bizri, ‘A Phenomenological Account of the “*Ontological Problem of Space*,”’ *art. cit.*

7. Another existential constituent of man's being is his *being-with* 'the others' (12).⁹⁰ Of the various objects which encounter man in his world are some which are neither things, nor tools, but just other men. And we encounter these others not in isolation from the world and its concerns, but straight in the midst of our (and their) caring activity. We let their existence be disclosed to us *as* that existence is attending to this matter, and caring about that matter, and dealing with that other matter. From the very beginning we *are*, in our very being, essentially *with* others. The statement that I (*Dasein*) am essentially being-with (*Mitsein*) is to be understood as an existential, ontological statement, and not as a categorical statement;⁹¹ I am not first something all by myself, and then subsequently qualified by being-with others. One of the modes of being of the whole of me is to be with others. And I *am* always *with* them, whether I let this essential mode of being of me assert itself authentically or not. With this existential mode of being of myself goes a special kind of *caring for* these others, which Heidegger simply calls '*Fürsorge*' (13),⁹² and which in turn implies a special kind of understanding and attending to these others. It is because it belongs to my existential constitution *to be with* others that I can in the first place understand them, care for them, share with them the same world, recognize them, and leave them to that precious personal freedom of themselves which alone can make them genuine to me. Thus, so long [275] as *Dasein* exists, he *is* not only in-the-world, but also he *is* essentially *being-with* others.⁹³

8. Being-with-others makes possible another existential mode of being, which Heidegger next takes up and describes (14).⁹⁴ He calls it being one-self (*Manselbst*). Nowhere does Heidegger talk more truly from his heart than he does when he

⁹⁰ *Sein und Zeit*, §25, p. 117.

⁹¹ Malik here hints at Whitehead's *Process and Reality* by explicating how the concrete aspects of experience provide a ground for grasping reality.

⁹² *Sein und Zeit*, §26, p. 121. This special kind of *caring for*, which Heidegger calls '*Fürsorge*', is a mode of concern that is marked by heedfulness.

⁹³ Malik is here attuned to the entailments of Heidegger's reflections on *Mitsein*. His interpretation in this regard is already a refined response to the later critique that is levelled by Levinas at Heidegger nearly thirty years after Malik composed his doctoral thesis. Levinas critiqued Heidegger's existential analytic of *Dasein* by picturing it as being conducted from the standpoint of the impersonal and lonely character of *Dasein* (*Dasein esseulé*), and specifically in being a relation of *side-to-side* (*côte à côte*) with others, around a common project, theme, goal, instead of being a *face-to-face* relationship with others in *Miteinandersein* (as being reciprocally with one another; *être réciproquement l'un avec l'autre* [Levinas, *Le temps et l'autre*, *op. cit.*, pp. 18–19, 69, 88–89]). I treated this elsewhere in El-Bizri, 'Uneasy Meditations following Levinas', *art. cit.*; El-Bizri, 'Ontological Meditations on Tillich and Heidegger', *art. cit.*; El-Bizri, 'Variations ontologiques autour du concept d'angoisse chez Kierkegaard', *art. cit.*, pp. 83–95. What Malik notes in this regard runs against the grain of Levinas' critique, and does so with a hermeneutic sensitivity in presenting what is set in *Sein und Zeit*.

⁹⁴ *Sein und Zeit*, §27, pp. 126, 129. Heidegger's reflections on *Mitsein* are elaborated in terms of the everyday dealings with others (the neuter 'they'; *Das Man*) in how they distract us from attending to the question of our being as mortals, and which thus comfort us about the *angst* that marks the disclosure (*Erschliessen*) of our being-towards-death.

portrays this mode of existence. The German word ‘*Man*’ (analogous to the French ‘*on*’)⁹⁵ is here translated simply by ‘one’, and should be understood to mean an essential, existential structure of man.⁹⁶ The possibility of our being is the average, daily mode of being in which you and I find ourselves most of the time. I (i.e. you) compare myself with the others all the time: I am not as bad as they; ‘what will others say?’; this job I can do as well as any other person can do it; ‘this thing he talks about?’ – I never do (am) that; thank heaven I am not reduced to such a state yet; ‘Hegel published the phenomenology at the age of 37?!’ – Ah, I still have a chance to publish a great work! – I shall certainly do (be) this, out of sheer spite; and thus I seek all the time by such subtle comparisons with others to establish an essential difference between them and me. But this tremendous comparative concern betrays my underlying domination by and lostness in the others. *I never am myself*.⁹⁷ In fact, having these others so maddeningly on my mind all the time, I do not even know what being-myself means in the first place. I am oneself, not myself. I do what the others do; I enjoy myself as one enjoys oneself; I read, see and judge literature, art, and even ‘truth’, as one judges these things; I find revolting what one finds revolting. My total mode of being in my daily existence is prescribed and colored for me by this strange ‘one’, this ‘one’ ‘who’ is everybody and yet nobody, and ‘who’ therefore levels down all distinction, and difference, and exception, and value, and excellence, to a state in which everything is as good as everything else. This [276] ‘one’ relieves me blissfully of my responsibility and decisiveness, and meeting me as it were half-way, it tempts me so alluringly that I just let *myself* go. It is the mode of ungenue and unauthentic existence. It is an original phenomenon and belongs to man’s positive existential constitution. And with this ‘oneself’, which belongs to me as a man, goes a characteristic mode of looking at things (including myself) and understanding them. For the most part man lives in this lost state of ‘one’ – the newspapers, the outlines of history and the digests of universal knowledge, the covering-up clevernesses and smiles of social life, the man-in-the-street, common-sense, public opinion. And if he ever comes back to himself[, to] his true authentic being with its real possibilities, then he does all this always by

⁹⁵ Like the phrase ‘*on est...*’ instead of ‘*nous sommes*’; hinting at ‘we are...’; but in a neuter indefinite sense that points to the human being as a subject *qua* someone (*quelqu’un*). Malik’s rendering as ‘one’ is fitting indeed.

⁹⁶ ‘Man’ understood herein as ‘*Mensch*’.

⁹⁷ This marks our *lostness* (*Verlorenheit*) in quotidian dealings with others in everyday busy modes of being-among-one-another (*Untereinandersein*) in the midst of the distracting *They* (*Das Man*), which is not the same mode of care as that which determines being-for-one-another (*Füreinandersein*). This is what Heidegger sees as an existential call to be authentic in being-towards-death, which individuates *Dasein* by freeing it from the impact of the idle talk of the *They*; *Sein und Zeit*, §53, pp. 260, 263. This avoids *falling prey to the They* (*Verfallen in das Man*). It is in this context that we can grasp Malik’s statement ‘*I never am myself*’. Falling prey (*Verfallen*) to the tranquilization (*Beruhigung*) of the neuter *They* about my existential *angst* concerning my being-toward-death is an alienation (*Entfremdung*) from how I take my existence as a mortal as being authentically mine.

violently clearing away all his own concealments and muddle-headedness, and by smashing his own distortions with which he has bolted up his soul inside his own confused prison. You understand well what Heidegger is talking about here, or you are not a man.

9. We pointed out above (15)⁹⁸ that as all the issues of man's existence revolve about this existence, there must be in man an original mode of being whereby he 'understands' himself. Since we are all the time interacting with and for our existence, this existence must be to some extent always disclosed to us. The self-disclosure of existence belongs to my essence. And this self-disclosure takes on two modes of itself – feeling (*Befindlichkeit*)⁹⁹ and understanding properly so called (*Verstehen*). Before saying a word about each one of these modes of self-disclosure it must be again emphasized that what is meant by disclosure in general is an existential structure of man. I *am* not first something – a 'subject', or what not – and then[,] secondarily and by the way[,] I acquire a 'quality' of understanding and of feeling. This picture is complete nonsense to Heidegger. I *am* originally my understanding and [277] my feeling. These are 'from the very beginning' modes of my existence, apart from which I am nothing. They are modes of being wherewith I am my 'Da', i.e. wherewith I *am* 'there' no less truly than I *am* 'here', where 'there' and 'here' are used in the most general metaphysical sense. My world, myself, my existence, are always more or less dimly disclosed to me; they are always articulated or traced out into some structure or plan which in every detail constitutes me essentially into what I am. Man "*ist in der Weise, sein Da zu sein ... Das Dasein ist seine Erschlossenheit*" (16).¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ Reflecting on the human being, Malik notes: '*in his being it is his very being which is always at stake*' (*das Dasein [dem es] in seinem Sein um dieses Sein selbst geht*). This correlates with *Sein und Zeit*, pp. 12, 42, 44, 84, 114, 115, 117, 123, 133, 143, 191, 231, 232. The ontic distinction of *Dasein* is that it is ontological, and that it always grasps itself in terms of its existence (*Existenz*) by seizing its existential possibilities.

⁹⁹ What Malik renders as 'feeling' for *Befindlichkeit* is akin to 'attunement', while 'feeling' would have been closer to *Gefühl* as it relates to emotion; moreover, *Befindlichkeit* has an existential sense of *Stimmung* (mood).

¹⁰⁰ *Sein und Zeit*, §28, p. 133. Namely, 'When we talk in an ontically figurative way about the *lumen naturale* in the human being (*Menschen*), we mean nothing other than the existential-ontological structure of this being, the fact that it *is* in the mode of being its *there* (*sein Da zu sein*). To say that it is "illuminated" means that it is cleared in itself *as* being-in-the-world (*In-der-Welt-sein*), not by another being, but in such a way that it *is* itself the clearing. Only for a being which is existentially cleared in this way does that which is present-at-hand become accessible in the light or concealed in darkness. By its very nature, *Dasein* brings its "*there*" along with it. If it lacks its "*there*", it is not factually the being which is essentially *Dasein*; indeed, it is not this being at all. *Dasein is its disclosure*. *Dasein* perdures in the openness of the *Da* (*there*) as clearing (*Lichtung*), which is truth as ἀλήθεια (*alêtheia* as *Unverborgenheit*) through an event (*Ereignis*) of un-veiling (*dévoilement*).'

10. Heidegger describes phenomenologically how some feeling-tone¹⁰¹ underlies every mode of existence of man, and how this underlying feeling-tone discloses this existence to itself (17).¹⁰² We are always in some mood or other, we are always feeling gay, or depressed, or spiteful, or tired, or annoyed, or challenged. Man ‘*je schon immer gestimmt ist*’ (18).¹⁰³ Man’s being is in this way revealed to himself as a weight and a burden (*Last*).¹⁰⁴ He is brought up un-mediatly¹⁰⁵ before his ‘*Da*’ (*thereness*) and his ‘*Dass*’ (*thatness*)¹⁰⁶ – there I *am* that, and I cannot help it! Mood and feeling disclose to man ‘what the matter is with him’ (*‘wie einem ist*’ (19)).¹⁰⁷ And whatever this matter be, man has got to take it over and *be* it. Man finds himself always delivered unto his feelings, and any effort on his part to get away from his feelings serves to disclose them all the more starkly to him. This self-disclosing existential state of man, whereby man always finds himself in the grip of some feeling-tone (no matter how mild or how violent or of what variety) which man has got perforce to *be*, is called by Heidegger man’s ‘*Geworfenheit*’ in his ‘thereness’ (and ‘thatness’) (20),¹⁰⁸ which I simply translate by the term ‘prejection’,¹⁰⁹ a term suggested by Professor J. D. Wild.¹¹⁰ This term merely denotes the honest fact that man is always in some mood or ‘frame of mind’ which opens out structurally before him his world and his existence, and which dictates to him the ‘truth’ he is to ‘see’ there (i.e. his own truth).

[278] 11. Prior to any knowledge or theory there is man’s existential understanding (*Verstehen*) in which things take on some articulate outline in his own existence. This primeval understanding concerns man’s own being and is the ontological ground of all knowledge and truth and apprehension and reflection. Whether you express it or not, you always have (i.e. are) some picture of what ‘it is all about’. Feeling and understanding absolutely go together: every understanding of yours is undergirded by some feeling-tone, and every mood articulates your world for you

¹⁰¹ Namely as *Befindlichkeit* (attunement; disposition) and *Stimmung* (mood).

¹⁰² *Sein und Zeit*, §28, p. 134.

¹⁰³ Recte: Man ‘*ist je schon immer gestimmt*’.

¹⁰⁴ The fact that moods change means that *Dasein* is always already *in a mood*; *Dasein* is moody, even if it becomes tired of itself and takes its own being as a burden (*Last*) without knowing why with regard to its primordial disclosure of its moods. Even when what burdens it is alleviated and lifted, the very mood that accompanies the attunement to such alleviation is a mode of disclosing *Dasein* to itself as being burdensome in character (*Lastcharakter*).

¹⁰⁵ Namely, without mediation, immediately.

¹⁰⁶ *Thatness* points to the pure fact *that it is* (*Dass es ist*).

¹⁰⁷ *Sein und Zeit*, §29, p. 134.

¹⁰⁸ *Sein und Zeit*, §29, pp. 135–137.

¹⁰⁹ ‘*Geworfenheit*’ is translatable as ‘prejection’, albeit it was later rendered in anglophone contexts as ‘*throwness*’ (or in the francophone rendering as ‘*être-jeté*’).

¹¹⁰ John D. Wild was the co-director with William Ernest Hocking of Malik’s PhD at Harvard University. Wild started as an empiricist but later became an existential phenomenologist, while Hocking was a pragmatist and empiricist who was interested in the philosophy of religion, and maybe the first among American philosophers to study with Husserl.

(i.e. in you) in a special way. Thus[,] understanding and feeling are equally original existential structures of man's being.

But what is meant by understanding? Understanding means the primary articulation of your world, and articulation which *is* 'for the sake of' your own existence (21).¹¹¹ It is this ubiquitous reference of every structure in your world, of every meaning in it, to your existence (*Dasein*) which constitutes your understanding. Thus[,] you *are* your understanding in exactly the same sense in which you *are* your world and you *are* your feeling. But it is the note of possibility which is the most important moment in Heidegger's analysis of understanding. You say you can do (be) this, and you cannot do (be) that. You are always seeing yourself in the light of what you can or cannot be. Understanding is precisely this self-seeing in terms of your own possibilities. "*Im Verstehen liegt existenzial die Seinsart des Daseins als Seinkönnen*"¹¹² (22).¹¹³ The word 'Seinkönnen', which recurs frequently in Heidegger, means existential possibility of being;¹¹⁴ it means my 'can-be';¹¹⁵ it does not mean possibility in the abstract. I shall simply translate it by 'possibility of being' or 'capacity to be', meaning by these two phrases what I have just been explaining. Man is not a thing on-hand[,] having, as a further addition to his being, the capacity to be some possibility; man is primarily being-in-possibility (*Möglichsein*)¹¹⁶ (23).¹¹⁷ Man is always what he can be and [279] how he can be what he can be. (A person who is at present quite influential told me that he was once unemployed, and when he obtained his present influential job, overnight his neighbors and his wife (and he himself) viewed him as a great man, who they listened to and respected. This is always the case with everybody: we always see ourselves and our world in the light of our possibilities)[.] And man *can be* his care about and in the world, his care for others and his personal possibility of being which is most truly his own. "*Das Dasein ist in der Weise, dass es je verstanden bzw. nicht verstanden hat, so oder so zu sein*" (24),¹¹⁸ i.e. I exist in such a way that I have ever understood or not understood to be [this way or that].

¹¹¹ *Sein und Zeit*, §31, pp. 143–148. This relates to *Dasein*'s understanding (*Verstehen*) in pondering over the meaning of 'for-the-sake-of-which' (*Worum-willen*) that always concerns *Dasein* in its being.

¹¹² The mode of being of *Dasein*, as a potentiality to be (*Seinkönnen*), rests existentially on understanding (*Verstehen*).

¹¹³ *Sein und Zeit*, §31, p. 143.

¹¹⁴ *Seinkönnen* as a 'potentiality of being'.

¹¹⁵ Namely my 'potential-to-be' or 'potentiality'; albeit in its destining towards-death *no longer being* my ownmost potentiality.

¹¹⁶ *Sein und Zeit*, §31, p. 143. *Dasein* is not something objectively present (*Vorhandenes*) which then has, as an addition, the ability to do something but is rather primarily being-possible (*Möglichsein*).

¹¹⁷ *Sein und Zeit*, §31, p. 143.

¹¹⁸ Namely, that *Dasein* finds itself in the situation that it actually understands, or has not understood, to be this or that way (*Sein und Zeit*, §31, p. 144).

This existential structure of understanding is termed “*Entwerfen*” (25)¹¹⁹ which I translate [as] ‘projecting’.¹²⁰ Man projects himself (sketches himself out, outlines himself, traces himself out, plans himself out) onto his possibilities. Man’s understanding of his world, and of himself, is always in terms of his possibilities of being. Man’s existence (which includes his world) discloses nothing which is not possibilities of being of *Dasein*. Understanding, as projecting, is that mode of being of man in which he *is* his possibilities as *possibilities* (26).¹²¹ Thus man *can* understand himself in terms of his world, or he *can* project himself onto his own ‘*Worum-willen*’¹²², ‘seeing’ that his world is for his own sake, and not conversely. Accordingly, as man’s self-understanding is in terms of himself (to whom his world belongs), or of his world (which is for his sake), it is either authentic (*eigentlich*) or unauthentic (*uneigentlich*), and in either case it *can* be either genuine or ungentine (*echt oder unecht*). Thus[,] understanding itself in its own fundamental possibilities is to be understood through and through in terms of possibility of being – it *can* assume this possibility or that possibility (27).¹²³

It is not possible for me here, [given] the limitations of this thesis, to do justice to the other phenomena which Heidegger grounds in this foundational [280] existential understanding (28).¹²⁴ He discusses the internal light of *Dasein* with which *Dasein* illuminates his own being. He explains what transparency of being (*Durchsichtigkeit*) means. He grounds in a masterly way intuition, thinking, the phenomenological *Wesensschau*, explanation (*Auslegung*), the *a priori* structures of knowledge, meaning (and nonsense), in the basic existential understanding of *Dasein*. He raises the problem of circularity, and shows how in understanding[,] ‘there is’ an essential circularity (egocentric predicament, if you please)¹²⁵ which *is* man’s own existence, inasmuch as man *is* his own possibilities. Then[,] he takes up the question of expression and formulation and elicits carefully such phenomena as predication, showing, the *logos*, communication, holding, reality, validity, bindingness, the *copula*, talk, speech, words, hearing, listening, and being silent. In all this rich range of phenomena not for one moment does Heidegger lose sight of the fact that he is throughout talking about *Dasein*, this living (being) man, the fundamental concrete elements of whose life are his moral dealings with his own being, whereby every issue, every

¹¹⁹ *Sein und Zeit*, §31, p. 145.

¹²⁰ What Malik proposes is now a standard translation for ‘*Entwerfen*’ as ‘projecting’; with ‘project’ for ‘*Entwurf*’. Understanding has the existential structure of what Heidegger terms a ‘project’. Hence *Dasein* is thrown into the mode of being of *projecting* itself into the possibilities of its potentiality to be (*Sein und Zeit*, §31, p. 145).

¹²¹ *Sein und Zeit*, §31, p. 145.

¹²² *Worum-willen*; namely: *for-the-sake-of-which*.

¹²³ *Sein und Zeit*, §31, p. 146.

¹²⁴ *Sein und Zeit*, §§31–34, pp. 148–166.

¹²⁵ *Sein und Zeit*, §2, pp. 7–8; §32, pp. 152–153; §63, pp. 314–315. Heidegger evokes in these sections the hermeneutical circle (*Zirkel, Kreis*) in *Dasein*’s self-understanding of the meaning of its own being.

meaning, revolves about this being itself, in such a way that on every side *the* question is “to be or not to be”.¹²⁶

I can now summarize by saying that man’s self-disclosure (his “*Da*”; his thatness and his thereness; his ‘I have to be what I am’) is constituted by three moments – understanding, feeling and speech (*Rede*). The feeling understanding has already articulated itself into its own peculiar structure, and it is this underlying existential articulation which is what Heidegger means by ‘*Rede*’ (29).¹²⁷

12. In its three-fold structure man’s self-disclosure may be either authentic or unauthentic; i.e. it may so be that man is either himself or not himself (30).¹²⁸ The authentic mode of self-disclosure will be discussed later (31).¹²⁹ The unauthentic mode of self-disclosure whereby man is not himself is taken [281] up by Heidegger and described at length in the three phenomena of talk (*Gerede*, more or less [in] the sense of gossip), curiosity (*Neugier*) and ambiguity (*Zweideutigkeit*) (32).¹³⁰ In my daily existence I *am* gossipy, I *am* curious (news, news, excitement), and I *am* ambiguous. My total being moves itself in this threefold dimensionality of unauthentic self-disclosure. I am hopelessly not myself. This three-fold character of my self-disclosure constitutes my ordinary, daily mode of being, to which Heidegger gives the name ‘*Verfallen in das Man*’, which I translate by the awkward phrase ‘the fall in the mode of ‘one’’.¹³¹ All these things are existential modes of my being, in which, in my daily life, I cannot help but exist.

¹²⁶ This paragraph offers an interpretation that is finely attuned to the complexity and sensitivity of the essence of Heidegger’s thinking in attending to it with a careful hermeneutic reading.

¹²⁷ *Sein und Zeit*, §33, p. 160.

¹²⁸ Malik here refers to the notions of ‘*Eigentlichkeit*’ as authenticity, and ‘*Uneigentlichkeit*’ as inauthenticity, and, in a way, this is determined on the basis of how my *Dasein* is always mine (*durch Jemeinigkeit bestimmt ist*); *Sein und Zeit*, §9, p. 43.

¹²⁹ Malik hints at the *call of conscience* (*Gewissensruf*; *Ruf des Gewissens*) in attending to the existential *angst* over the finitude of a mortal, and of being directional in seizing upon one’s remaining existential possibilities with decisive resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*) rather than reticence (*Verschwiegenheit*).

¹³⁰ Heidegger here addresses the idle talk (*Das Gerede*; *Sein und Zeit*, §35, pp. 167–170) of everydayness, which, in its belonging to language, already harbours within itself a certain interpretation of the understanding of *Dasein* of itself even if this is veiled by *Mitsein*. Idle talk is the communicative mode of the uprooted understanding of *Dasein*. Heidegger also accounts for curiosity as a particular way of encountering the world through perception and by way of a circumspect de-distancing from the *work-world* towards desiring to just perceive it (*Die Neugier*; *Sein und Zeit*, §36, pp. 170–174). Heidegger considers moreover the ambiguity of guessing and hearsay, and precisely through idle talk and curiosity, hence of straying away from *Dasein*’s genuine possibilities of being-with-one-another (*Die Zweideutigkeit*; *Sein und Zeit*, §37, pp. 174–175). Again we notice the way in which Malik offers early English renderings of Heidegger’s terms that later became commonplace amongst Heideggerian anglophone scholars.

¹³¹ The rendering of this awkward phrase in the anglophone reception of the Heideggerian *parlance* would more commonly refer to the ‘falling prey to the *they*’ when attempting to think about the *Verfallen in das Man*, in the sense of ‘they’ (*Das Man*) as the neuter indefinite otherness in busy everydayness (*Sein und Zeit*, §38, pp. 175–180).

I doubt whether since Plato (with his passionate awareness of the decisive difference between the truth of philosophy and the untruth of sophistry) any philosopher has seen and dared to describe the state of untruth and negativity and confusion to which man (and above all the philosopher himself) is intrinsically heir, as Heidegger has matchlessly done.

Section V

Care as the Essence of Man's Being

The natural question arises as to the unity of this variety of existential structures which Heidegger has thus far elicited. What is meant by saying that man *is* his feeling, *is* his world, *is* his being-with-others, *is* his understanding, *is* his fallen-ness, etc.? What is meant by saying that man *is all these things 'at the same time'*? When you sincerely say, "Why, of course Heidegger is right in ascribing all these phenomena to the essence of man; I fully admit that what he says is true of my own life (being). But, [282] then, *what of it?*" When you say these things, you disclose an underlying sense of uneasiness on your part, whereby what you are really seeing is the unity behind all these phenomena. For phenomena are themselves above denial. What is the essence of man's being *as a whole?* – this is your proper question.¹³²

Such an important question cannot be answered by any external, abstract endeavor to put these various structures together and claim that thereby man's essential unity is established. There can be no short-cut to the phenomena: this unity either discloses itself phenomenally, or it does not exist. Consequently, what Heidegger now seeks is an original and far-reaching possibility of disclosure [which] Heidegger finds in the phenomenon of anxiety (*Angst*) (1).¹³³ When you are truly anxious – as you should be again and again in your life, if you are living at all – all your essential modes of being disclose themselves to you at once, and you see the unity of your existence right before your eyes.

Consider what your daily fall in[to] the mode of 'one' really discloses (2). It clearly shows that you *cannot* stand your authentic self, and that therefore you seek refuge from it in your unauthentic mode of being. It is as though you are fleeing before yourself all the time. In this phenomenon of self-flight your true self, although you are turning away from it all the time, will nevertheless reveal itself as *that before which you are fleeing*; for you cannot flee away from that which you did

¹³² Namely, the question of the primordial totality of the structural whole of *Dasein* (*Die Frage nach der ursprünglichen Ganzheit des Strukturganzen des Daseins*), and this being the ontological connection of care (*Sorge*), worldliness (*Weltlichkeit*), handiness (*Zuhandenheit*), objective presence (*Vorhandenheit*) *cum* reality (*Realität*); *Sein und Zeit*, §39, pp. 181–183.

¹³³ *Sein und Zeit*, §§39–41, pp. 181–191.

not in the first place to some extent face. And this self-flight is grounded in a deep sense of anxiety about and for and on account of your total existence.¹³⁴

Heidegger's wonderful analysis of the phenomenon of anxiety and of its essential difference from the phenomenon of fear (3)¹³⁵ cannot be adequately reproduced here. I only make a few remarks which bear essentially on the topic [283] of this section. In fear[,] there is always an object inside your world of which you are afraid; this object locates itself at a special place in your world, approaches you in a special way and threatens to thwart a particular possibility of your being. These are phenomenal characteristics of the emotion (*Befindlichkeit*) of fear. In anxiety, on the other hand, we have a radically different phenomenon. There is no specific object inside your world which is especially making you anxious; nor are you anxious about any particular mode or possibility of your being. Rather what is making you anxious is your being-in-the-world at all; and it makes you anxious not about this or that mode of being of yourself, but about your total existence. *And to be so anxious is itself a mode of being of your total existence.* Thus[,] that which makes you anxious, that about which you are anxious, and *your* being anxious itself, are all one and the same being – your existence-at-all. (One will never understand what I am talking about here so long as one does not fix on the true phenomenon of anxiety in 'his' own life).

In anxiety the world avails me nothing. This object on-hand, that object at-hand, this 'friend', the whole world, everything sinks [in]to meaninglessness. I move about not even seeing these things. That which threatens me is nowhere. And yet I am anxious all over, there is a terrible weight on my heart cramping my very breathing. Never am I so completely alone, so completely disillusioned with the world (in order all the more to be thrown back on 'my own resources'), so completely 'out of place' in the world, as when I am anxious.

¹³⁴ Even when what burdens us is alleviated, the very mood that accompanies the attunement to such alleviation is a mode of disclosing *Dasein* as being burdensome in character (*Lastcharakter*).

¹³⁵ *Sein und Zeit*, §40, pp. 184–190. The fundamental attunement of *angst* (*Grundbefindlichkeit der Angst*) as an eminent disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*) of *Dasein* is not reducible to fear (*Furcht*). The flight (*Flucht*) from what is feared discloses what is threatening from a definite region of being-in-the-world, while *angst* is an attuned feeling that arises from fleeing the predicament of falling prey (*Verfallen*) to the neuter *Das Man* in everyday distractions. In falling prey, *Dasein* flees the *angst* that discloses its being as a mortal in authentic moods that are its own, even though *angst* is indefinite, since it does not know the source of the anguish. *Angst* is anguished about being-in-the-world as being-towards-death; hence *angst* discloses to *Dasein* that its being toward its ownmost potentiality to be is that of ending. As an uncanny (*unheimliches*) feeling, *angst* individuates *Dasein* by fetching it back from the daily familiarities of public life. Fear is an *angst* that has inauthentically fallen prey to publicness (*Öffentlichkeit*). This state of affairs points to the structure of the worldliness of *Dasein* as that of *being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-the-world* (*Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in-einer-Welt*; *Sein und Zeit*, §41, p. 192).

Anxiety (if only man *can* stand it, and not flee forthwith to the nearest thing and hug it) is the supreme feeling in man's being which makes that being transparent to itself.

Heidegger shows how it is precisely in this extreme isolation, this complete self-withdrawal, that things take on their proper perspective. The [284] very possibility itself of things becomes then sharp and clear before our eyes. Things on-hand and at-hand avail us nothing, in order that their very *possibility* as such may stand out all the sharper within our being. The world avails us nothing, in order that its very *possibility* as world may stand out all the more originally in our existential constitution. In anxiety possibility itself is at stake, and therefore *Dasein* himself, for *Dasein* is through and through possibility.

Anxiety takes away from man the possibility of understanding himself in terms of his world and its gossipy explanations. It projects man back on himself[,] and makes him face his authentic possibility of being-in the-world. Anxiety reduces man to his most genuine possibility of being, without distraction and without sentimentality. This most genuine possibility of being is to be himself; and to be himself is to 'realize' his essence, which is to project himself understandingly onto possibilities of his own being. Thus[,] anxiety discloses man's existence as being constituted through and through by possibility.

In anxiety I am forced to pause. I call a halt to my hopeless lostness in this world. I am afforded the chance to be free – free to be or not to be myself. Anxiety cuts ruthlessly across my daily leanings and complacencies, because it threatens to give me the freedom to pull myself completely out of them. Anxiety brings me back for once to my senses and holds out before me the possibility of being authentically or unauthentically myself. If I want to lose myself back in my world, I may, but then anxiety has revealed to me the very being (τὸ ὄν)¹³⁶ of this lostness.

It is because in the very grounds of your being you *are* 'in the first place' anxious that you *can* then be afraid, that you *can* let things on-hand and at-hand disclose themselves to you, that you *can* have a world in which all these things *are*, and that you are free to be or not to be yourself.

[285] And it is on account of this supreme revelation of anxiety that you can see how *your* very being is care (*Sorge*). For anxiety brings out in itself all the fundamental ontological structures of your being – your fall, your feeling, your understanding, the fact that your existence is always at stake and the two most fundamental possibilities of your being – authenticity of being and unauthenticity of being. The unity of your whole being is lifted out into phenomenal clarity in the moment of vision which constitutes anxiety.

The formal expression of this unity of being Heidegger puts in the following formula: '*Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in-(der-Welt) als Sein-bei (innerweltlich begegnendem*

¹³⁶ *Sein* as τὸ ὄν (*to on*), namely, 'what is'.

Seienden)' (4).¹³⁷ Of course[,] I shall not attempt to translate this formidable expression into English.¹³⁸ But its meaning is clear after what I have been saying above. It means that your essence (being) is to be always ahead of yourself, and to be ahead of yourself while you are already in your world, and to be ahead of yourself and in your world as you are already attending to objects inside your world. This character of being, which is your essence, is termed care. And it is your fundamental feeling of anxiety which uncovers to you this care-ful¹³⁹ being of yourself.

The reason why you care *about* the things of your world, and the reason why you care *for* other people, is because you *are* in your being care. Thus[,] you always have three things hanging about your very being: being ahead of yourself, being in your world[,] and attending to immediate things in this world. The term care (*Sorge*) designates the unity of this existential structure of your being.

'*Existenz*' means that you are always one of your possible modes of being (of which the most fundamental are authenticity or unauthenticity of being). Thus[,] the statement that your essence consists in 'being always at stake or in question' means that what you are dealing with in your own life (being) above everything else in the universe is your own possibilities of being. [286] This dealing with (*sich verhalten*) your own possibilities is what [above] is called understanding (5). *Understanding is the being (Sein)* of your own possibilities of being (*Seinsmöglichkeiten*). And this is precisely what Heidegger means when he says *Dasein* is always already ahead of himself (*sich-vorweg*). You are so thoroughly care-ful that you are not only your world (more accurately, the '*Weltlichkeit*' of your world), (6)¹⁴⁰ and not only your attending to this thing and that point and that other matter 'within' this world, but you are also essentially all the time projecting yourself ahead of yourself in what you call your understanding. What you understand is always your *possibility* of being, and a being who is at once his possibility and his factuality can only be conceived as care.

One will probably at once start talking here about practice and theory, and that what Heidegger has given above is perhaps the picture of the practical man, but no[t], e.g. of the thinker and the philosopher. Heidegger knows no such clever splitting[s] in man's existence. Care, as man's structural wholeness, is existentially prior to (i.e. always already in) every factual behavior and state of man (7)¹⁴¹. The

¹³⁷ *Sein und Zeit*, §41, p. 192.

¹³⁸ This phenomenon points to the structure of the worldliness of *Dasein* as that of *being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-the-world* (*Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in-einer-Welt*) amidst inner-worldly beings.

¹³⁹ Malik introduces a hyphen in the word 'careful' in the form of 'care-ful' to highlight 'care' (*Sorge*) as what essentially characterizes *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world.

¹⁴⁰ As Malik highlights in this context, worldliness as *Weltlichkeit* is the fundamental existential structure that constitutes the being of *Dasein*; and it is from that ontological ground, which underpins *Dasein*'s being, that there is a disclosure of the world (*Welt*) in which it is embedded.

¹⁴¹ *Sein und Zeit*, §41, p. 193.

phenomenon of care expresses no pre-eminence of the 'practical' over the theoretical life of man. Care characterizes 'theoretical' activity as much as it does a political action or a quiet self-enjoyment on [the] Miami beach. Theory and practice are both possibilities of being of man, and man's being (*Sein*) must be conceived [of] as care.

Heidegger honestly feels that in his interpretation of the being of man as care he has succeeded in steering completely clear of any preconceived abstract notions of what man should be. He feels that he has not distorted the phenomena one bit, but that he simply has let those phenomena speak for themselves. He put aside resolutely the thousand and one clever traditional theories of the nature of man, and endeavored to fasten on an adequate [287] ontological approach to this strange being. He finds this adequate approach in his conception of 'Existenz' (8).¹⁴² And in order to prove that his interpretation is not just a romantic invention of his mind[,] he gives an old fable (9)¹⁴³ in which man's essence was conceived [of] as care (*Cura*).¹⁴⁴ In this fable care is pictured as the original creator of man, and as his indwelling essence, so long as he lives. Man's existence in the world has the ontological stamp of care. The importance of this mythological testimony consists, to Heidegger's mind, in the fact that in it man, as yet undistorted by theoretical interpretations and purposes, speaks about himself simply and originally. What we have in this fable is the clear voice of man's honest understanding of his own being.

Section VI

Death

The point of Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of death and conscience (1)¹⁴⁵ is that in these two phenomena we seem to obtain a deeper and more original grasp of man's essence than in any of the phenomena (including care) hitherto discussed. Death and conscience are so terribly my own that if anywhere I can obtain an inkling as to the essence of my being[,] it must be through an unbiased examination of the meaning of these two phenomena in my own life. And perhaps in the end

¹⁴² See pages 263 and 268 above in the text of Malik's doctoral thesis.

¹⁴³ *Sein und Zeit*, §42, p. 197.

¹⁴⁴ '*Cura*' evokes one of the antique Roman (Latin) fables (*Fabulae* 220) of Gaius Julius Hyginus which inspired Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (as recounted in *Faust und die Sorge*), and is evoked by Heidegger in his existential interpretation of *Dasein* as care (*cura*; *Sorge*). A pre-ontological self-interpretation of *Dasein* as a *human being* consists as such of a compound of body *qua* earth (*humus*) and spirit (*spiritum*). Accordingly, *care* primordially constitutes the formed human who is held in its preserve (*cura prima finxit, cura teneat quamdiu vixerit*).

¹⁴⁵ *Sein und Zeit*, §§45-66, pp. 231-323. The phenomenological analysis of death (*Tod*) and conscience (*Gewissen*) is mediated through reflections on the authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole of *Dasein* (*Das eigentliche Ganzseinkönnen des Daseins*) in terms of temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) and everydayness, and as experienced through the existential *call of conscience* and the ontological meaning of care (*ontologischer Sinn der Sorge*) in being-towards-death.

all these radically personal phenomena – my *Worum-willen* (2),¹⁴⁶ my daily fall, my understanding, my feeling, my anxiety, my care, my death, my conscience, my guilt¹⁴⁷ – will so converge phenomenally as to bring to light not only my being but also the very *meaning* itself of this being.

It will be recalled that the ontology of *Dasein* was shown (3)¹⁴⁸ to be prior [288] to any other ontology. There can be no unconfused ontology which is not essentially grounded in the first place in man's existence. Inasmuch as what is meant throughout by man and *Dasein* is simply you and I, and inasmuch as you and I are always either authentically or unauthentically ourselves, the ontology of man cannot be complete except if it exhibits phenomenally both these [fundamental] possibilities of our being. Thus far[,] Heidegger has talked either about man's unauthentic mode of being (his daily existence, his fall, the 'one'-phenomenon, fear) or about an indifferent mode of existence which can be either authentic or unauthentic. Feeling, understanding, the world, care, all these phenomena belong to man's essence in general, whether that essence 'be lived' authentically or not. Man's authentic mode of being has not yet been described by Heidegger, and therefore, to complete his analysis of man, he now turns to this authenticity of existence. Furthermore, his analysis cannot claim originality (*Ursprünglichkeit*) except if he makes sure that he has been talking about the whole of man; for nothing about man's being can be omitted in the fundamental ontology he is trying to work out.

Now it belongs to man's being, so long as he exists, to project himself understandingly ahead of himself all the time; i.e. to be his own possibilities. Thus[,] it seems that, so long as man exists, he can never be whole: there will always be possibilities of being ahead of himself to project himself onto. How can man's wholeness be thought out phenomenally? I wish to show here very briefly how Heidegger interprets the phenomenon of death (i.e. the 'meaning' – better, being – of death in human life (*Sein*)) as affording precisely the wholeness that he seeks, and how the allied phenomena of conscience, guilt and decisiveness yield the possibility of authenticity of being; so that by a 'natural' combination of conscience and death we shall have the highest unity and wholeness that man's being can lay claim to. [289]

How are we to conceive of death existentially? The phenomenological purity with which Heidegger considers this question is simply beyond reproduction (4)¹⁴⁹. Death, as something which I always still 'have to go through must belong to my

¹⁴⁶ *Sein und Zeit*, §18, p. 84. The phenomenon of the 'for-the-sake-of-which' (*Worum-willen*) always concerns the being of *Dasein* as its own in a genuine unique way.

¹⁴⁷ Understanding, feeling, angst, care, death, conscience, guilt (*Verstehen, Befindlichkeit, Angst, Sorge, Tod, Gewissen, Schuld*).

¹⁴⁸ *Sein und Zeit*, §5, pp. 13, 14. *Fundamentalontologie*, and its existential analytic of *Dasein*, is presupposed *a priori* in all forms of ontology.

¹⁴⁹ *Sein und Zeit*, §45, p. 231f.

essential, existential ‘*Sichvorweg*’[’],¹⁵⁰ whereby I am always ahead of myself. But it cannot be something which my being always lacks, in the sense, say, in which an unroofed house still lacks its roof. To think of death along these lines is to be thinking of me as essentially a thing on-hand, lacking this or that aspect of itself; which I most emphatically am not. Nor can I obtain an existential insight into the nature (*Sein*) of death by experiencing the death of another; for even here the experienced loss is not the loss of being (*Seinsverlust*) which the dying person himself has suffered; and the question is as to the ontological meaning of dying (as a possibility of being of his own being) to the dying person himself. Death, as the coming[-]to[-]an[-]end of my being (*Zu[m]-Ende-kommen*) and as therefore that which gives me my wholeness, is unconditionally my own. Nobody can take away another’s dying from him. Every man must die his own death. Thus[,] so far as death ‘is’, it is essentially my own;¹⁵¹ and it is my own as the peculiar possibility of my being wherein this being is itself absolutely at stake. Death is an existential phenomenon, and can only be thought of in terms of personal existence.

When I conceive [of] death as my coming to an end, a coming which alone can confer on me wholeness of being, what do I mean by end and wholeness? Heidegger discusses and rejects several possible meanings of these terms (5).¹⁵² My coming to an end is not like bringing an outstanding debt to an end; nor is it like the oncoming, say, of the last quarter of the moon; for in both cases I would be thinking of myself as something at-hand or on-hand, and my being is neither of these two kinds of being (*Seinsart*). Nor can my dying be like the ripening of a fruit (although there are similarities [290] between the fruit and me, inasmuch as my being and the fruit’s being both partake in becoming), for my dying belongs to me always and can befall me any moment, even before I ‘ripen’. My ending in death is not like the ending of a road, or the stopping (disappearing) of rain, or the finishing of a product. All these senses of ending refer to some object whose being is essentially different from my being, and therefore cannot adequately characterize death as the ending of *Dasein*.

¹⁵⁰ The *Sichvorweg*, as the state of being *ahead-of-itself*, points to the structure of the worldliness of *Dasein* as that of *being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-the-world* (*Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in-einer-Welt*; *Sein und Zeit*, §41, p. 192). The primary moment of care and its temporal investments is that of *Dasein*’s being *ahead-of-itself* (*Sichvorweg*), in the sense of always existing for the sake of itself in being related to its potentiality-of-being (*Seinkönnen*). A constant unfinished quality lies in the essence of the constitution of *Dasein*; since as long as *Dasein* is, it has never attained its wholeness (*Gänze*). Rather, *Dasein* reaches its wholeness in death; *Sein und Zeit*, §§46–47, pp. 236, 238.

¹⁵¹ *Sein und Zeit*, §47, p. 240. The everyday *being-absorbed-with-another* in the world is constitutive of being-with-one-another; hence *Dasein* must be within certain limits of another *Dasein*, even by way of empathy. However, no one can take the other’s dying away; even if someone can go to death for another, this is self-sacrifice for the other given that *Dasein* actually takes dying upon itself. Insofar that it *is*, my death is always essentially my own (*Der Tod ist, sofern er ‘ist’, wesensmäßig je der meine*).

¹⁵² *Sein und Zeit*, §47, p. 241f.

Man exists always precisely so, that what he is not yet (his ‘*Noch-nicht*’ (6)¹⁵³) belongs essentially to his being. He is therefore always already his end. The ending involved in death does not mean man’s being *at* an end (*Zu-Ende-sein*) but man’s being *unto* his end (*Sein zum Ende*) (7).¹⁵⁴ Death is a mode of being which man assumes [as] soon as he is. ‘*Sobald ein Mensch zum Leben kommt, sogleich ist er alt genug zu sterben*’ (8).¹⁵⁵ Death, as being unto death, can only be understood in terms of man’s own mode of being (*Seinsart*); i.e. in terms of the existential analysis Heidegger gives of man’s essence. Only so can man’s wholeness, as constituted by his ending, be properly conceived.¹⁵⁶

One more word should here be said about the distinction between being *at* your end and being *unto* your end. The distinction arises from the difference between the mode of being of *Dasein* and the mode of being of any other being. An object on-hand or at-hand can be *at* its end – a table, a journey – but *Dasein*, being always his own possibilities, can only be *unto* his end. It is the function of death in man’s life (being) which is meant by being-*unto*. The word ‘being’ here signifies the active, living, existential mode of itself. As man’s being as a whole can take on any of its possible modes – it can be, and is always, understanding, being-in-the-world, feeling, etc. – so is death to be conceived as one of these possible modes of being, and man is to be thought of as being his death (or unto his death) in the [291] same sense in which he is (or is unto) his understanding. You say *you* understand, *you* feel, etc.; in exactly the same sense, *you* die. And as no object on-hand or at-hand can be thought of as in any way being its understanding, feeling, anxiety, etc. (so that *it* can say, *I* understand, am anxious, etc.), death should be so conceived that in exactly the same sense no object on-hand or at-hand can say, *I* die or end (9).¹⁵⁷

Death is either nothing or it is a possibility of being of *Dasein*. Heidegger [presents] phenomenally what this possibility of being in general is, and then shows its authentic and its unauthentic modes of concretion in man. I say a word about each one of these three considerations.

¹⁵³ *Sein und Zeit*, §48, pp. 242–245. *Dasein* is coming-to-an-end that is not-yet-at-an-end (*Das Zu-seinem-Ende-kommen des je Noch-nicht-zu-Ende-seienden*).

¹⁵⁴ *Sein und Zeit*, §§48-50, pp. 245–250.

¹⁵⁵ *Sein und Zeit*, §48, p. 245. ‘As soon as a human being is born, he is old enough to die right away’; namely that death is a way *to be* (*Der Tod ist eine Weise zu sein*) that *Dasein* takes over as soon as it comes itself to be.

¹⁵⁶ *Sein und Zeit*, §49, p. 247. *Dasein* can end without authentically dying; though on the other hand, as *Dasein*, it does not simply perish, since such an intermediate phenomenon is a biological demise. Dying (*Sterben*) is the way of being in which *Dasein* is toward death (*Dasein ist zu seinem Tode*), whereby it never perishes (*Dasein verendet nie*) but only demises as long as it dies (*Ableben aber kann das Dasein nur solange, als es stirbt*).

¹⁵⁷ *Sein und Zeit*, §52, pp. 258–259. As the end of *Dasein*, death is the ownmost nonrelational, certain and, as such, indefinite, and not to be bypassed, possibility of *Dasein* (*Der Tod als Ende des Daseins ist die eigenste, unzügliche, gewisse und also solche unbestimmte, unüberholbare Möglichkeit des Daseins*). Accordingly, everyday entangled evasion even from *angst* concerning death is an inauthentic way of being toward one’s own beingness as mortals in being-towards-an-end.

Death in general is ontologically grounded in the threefold care-structure of man (10).¹⁵⁸ This care-structure, it will be recalled, is [s]truck with possibility, factual existence in the world[,] and fallen [sic] attending to things (11).¹⁵⁹ As possibility, death is that possibility of my being which is most radically my own (*eigenste*), which I, in absolute isolation from other people, have *to be*, and which I nevertheless can never overtake (while I live, i.e. so long as death 'is'). Thus[,] in my being unto death my constant being ahead of myself (the *Sichvorweg* moment of care) obtains its most original concretion (12).¹⁶⁰ Then, so far as my factual existence is concerned, death hangs over it all the time: I am prejected (*geworfen*)¹⁶¹ in[to] death from the very moment I am prejected in[to] existence. My underlying existential anxiety is precisely anxiety of and about my total existence. It is not fear that possesses me when I truly face my death, it is rather genuine anxiety about my being at all (i.e. my farthest possibility of being). Finally, my self-lost attending to all sorts of things must be interpreted as a convenient flight from my death. I wouldn't face it, and so I flee to the nearest concern and lose myself in it. In this way Heidegger shows that dying is ontologically rooted in care.¹⁶²

This general existential characterization of death is next marvelously [292] projected on its two possible modes – the authentic and the unauthentic modes of being (13).¹⁶³ It is impossible for me to do justice here to Heidegger's discussion. But I can very briefly point out the necessary elements in this discussion which will make it possible for me to talk intelligibly about his metaphysical theory of time. One's attitude towards death – the unauthentic mode of being – is well-known. We shall all die; countless people die daily; 'nothing's surer than death and taxes' [so] one does not worry or think about his death – it is [a] cowardly flight from reality!

¹⁵⁸ *Sein und Zeit*, §50, pp. 249–252. This addresses the existential and ontological structure of death (*Die Vorzeichnung der existenzial-ontologischen Struktur des Todes*) as a phenomenon of being-towards-the-end (*Sein zum Ende*), which is the fundamental constitution (*Grundverfassung*) of *Dasein* in how it is the basis upon which existence, facticity, and falling prey are interpreted.

¹⁵⁹ What Malik designates as possibility, factual existence in the world, and the fallen attending to things, correlate with what is accounted for in more recent anglophone renderings of the Heideggerian parlance as possible existence (*Existenz*), facticity (*Faktizität*), and falling prey (*Verfallen*), in how they are all revealed through the phenomenon of death (*Phänomen des Todes*).

¹⁶⁰ *Sein und Zeit*, §50, p. 251. The notion of *Sichvorweg* refers to *Dasein's* being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-the-world (*Sich-vorweg-im-schon-sein-in-der-Welt*; *Sein und Zeit*, §41, p. 192); wherein *Dasein* exists as such for the sake of itself in its potentiality-of-being (*Seinkönnen*). Death is the ownmost nonrelational, certain and, as such, indefinite, and not to be bypassed, possibility of *Dasein* (*Der Tod als Ende des Daseins ist die eigenste, unbezügliche, gewisse und also solche unbestimmte, unüberholbare Möglichkeit des Daseins*; *Sein und Zeit*, §52, p. 259).

¹⁶¹ 'Geworfenheit' as 'prejection' later became rendered in anglophone contexts as 'thrownness' (and in a francophone rendering as 'être-jeté').

¹⁶² With regard to its ontological possibility, dying is grounded in care (*Das Sterben gründet hinsichtlich seiner ontologischen Möglichkeit in der Sorge*), which presences out of the truth of being (*Aber die Sorge weist aus der Wahrheit des Seyns*); *Sein und Zeit*, §50, p. 252.

¹⁶³ *Sein und Zeit*, §51, pp. 252–255.

One comforts a dying person by encouraging him to believe that he is not going to die; etc. etc. Thus[,] it is as though one has entered into a conspiracy to do everything in one's power to prevent people from facing their death. Excitement, activity, creativeness, achievement, culture, service, the world – these are the things that one would want you to think o[f] and to lose yourself in, but death, the greatest fact of your life, you should never dwell on. Escape it, flee it, hide it, cover it up, until you die!

And when one boasts, saying: “Who isn't going to die? So why talk so much about it?”; one thinks he is certain of death. But what kind of certainty is one's certainty of death? It is a feeling, escaping, covering-up certainty; nothing pleases one more than so disarmingly to admit one's certainty of death as immediately to skip it and forget all about it. Death, the most important fact of your life, is, for one, important only to be *just* admitted, and then forthwith fled from into something ‘more interesting’. “Don't bore me with your talk of death”, exclaimed a charming lady to me once.¹⁶⁴

But the existential, authentic certainty of death is of a totally different character. If you are existentially certain of death, you bring death out in all honesty into the open, and you do not cover it up all the time. And you can be in this way certain of death only if you were certain of [293] yourself (*Fürwahrhalten* (14)¹⁶⁵) for death after all is that possibility of your being which is most radically your own, and which no one can ever take away from you. Before (and underlying) any other certainty is your certainty that you are ‘delivered unto death’. You are certain of nothing as originally and as absolutely as you are of your death. And with this absolute certainty goes an equally absolute indeterminacy as to *when* it will befall you. For this is the peculiar thing about death, that *it is possible any moment*. Thus[,] we can now say that the existential, authentic concept of death has five structural moments: death as my end is that possibility of my being which is most radically my own (*eigenst*), in which nobody else has anything whatsoever to do (*unbezüglich*), of which I am absolutely certain (*gewiss*), which therefore is completely indeterminate (*unbestimmt*) and which I can never overtake (*unüberholbar*) (15)¹⁶⁶.

¹⁶⁴ *Sein und Zeit*, §51, pp. 252–255. This refers to everyday attitudes with regard to being-towards-death, and the way the neuter *They* (*Das Man*) covers over that destiny by evading the pondering over dying and comforting with distractive busyness. *Das Man* does not permit courage in the face of the *angst* of being-towards-death. Temptation, tranquilization, and estrangement (*Versuchung, Berubigung und Entfremdung*) characterize the mode of *falling prey* (*Die Seinsart des Verfallens*); all are in constant flight (*Flucht*) from *angst* concerning death. Such an evasive covering-over of death is an inauthentic mode of being towards it.

¹⁶⁵ *Sein und Zeit*, §52, pp. 256, 257, 265. *Für-wahr-halten* is the *holding-for-true* of something, and hence of taking it to be certain.

¹⁶⁶ *Sein und Zeit*, §58, p. 285; and *Sein und Zeit*, §§50-53, pp. 250–267. The covering-over of being-towards-death in everyday evasion from *angst* is an inappropriate manner of holding something to be true or certain. Rather, the full existential and ontological concept of death is defined as the end of *Dasein*, and as the ownmost non-relational, certain, and, as such, indefinite, and not to be bypassed, possibility of *Dasein*. As the end of *Dasein*, death is within

No positivistic cleverness, no relativistic equivocation, no escape into culture and achievement, no self-lostness in healthy objectivity, can for one moment play with any of these truths about the being of death in man's existence.

Far from fleeing before death, and covering it up [escapingly] all the time, the authentic being unto death (*Sein zum Tode*) will bring it straight into (*einbeziehen*) the heart of man's existence. It will see in it that which holds this existence in the balance all the time and therefore makes it whole. The fact that you are all the time ahead of yourself in your possibilities does not in any way prevent your being whole, *provided you let yourself be authentically unto your death*. Authentic being unto death is itself the being-whole which I said above (16)¹⁶⁷ Heidegger is seeking.

Being unto death is being unto a possibility of your being, and indeed unto that most distinguished possibility described above. To be unto a possibility in ordinary life means to be engaged in realizing that possibility, [294] i.e. in destroying its character of possibility. This mode of 'being-unto' cannot hold of [sic] my being unto death, because in the first place to think of my being unto death along these lines is to think of me as an object at-hand (e.g. a shoe in production) which is sought to be realized, and in the second place the destruction of the possibility of my death means that I cease to exist altogether. Being unto death, existentially understood, cannot mean the 'realization' of my death, nor my sitting down and tensely expecting that great event. Authentic being unto death means my holding out death as a possibility, understanding it as a possibility, maintaining it as a possibility and letting it reveal itself as a pure possibility. This peculiar being unto the possibility of death Heidegger entitles '*Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit*' or '*Vorlaufen in den Tod*' (17).¹⁶⁸ I shall translate this very important concept by the inadequate English phrase 'facing death'. In facing death, you do not bring yourself before death as something 'real' (*wirklich*); you face death as a pure possibility of your being. Death is that purest, outermost and most intimate possibility of my being, a possibility which comprises

this being-towards-its-end (*Der Tod als Ende des Daseins ist die eigenste, unbezügliche, gewisse und als solche unbestimmte, unüberholbare Möglichkeit des Daseins. Der Tod ist als Ende des Daseins im Sein dieses Seienden zu seinem Ende; Sein und Zeit*, §52, p. 259).

¹⁶⁷ As long as it is, *Dasein* has not attained its wholeness (*Gänze*); rather *Dasein* reaches its wholeness in death (*Sein und Zeit*, §§46–47, pp. 236, 238).

¹⁶⁸ *Sein und Zeit*, §53, pp. 261–262. The more common and recent English translations of '*Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit*' and '*Vorlaufen in den Tod*' are respectively 'anticipation of possibility' and 'anticipation of death'. As Macquarrie and Robinson, for instance, explicate in this regard (p. 306, footnote 3, of their translation of *Being and Time*, *op. cit.*), they used 'anticipate' to translate the verbal '*vorgreifen*' as well as '*vorlaufen*', and particularly as having the connotation of 'running ahead' in being-towards-death as 'rushing headlong into it', instead of simply waiting for it, dwelling upon it, or actualizing it. In this sense, *Dasein* is in the mode of *being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-the-world* (*Sich-vorweg-im-schon-sein-in-der-Welt; Sein und Zeit*, §41, p. 192). *Dasein* is *ahead-of-itself* (*Sichvorweg*) by existing for the sake of its potentiality-of-being (*Seinkönnen*).

and determines all other minor possibilities with which I can projectively identify my existence.¹⁶⁹

Heidegger describes in matchless beauty what facing death authentically must mean in a person's being (18).¹⁷⁰ You are never truly free, you are never truly escaping [any]thing, except when you have come to terms with your death and faced it fearlessly. In facing death, you realize your radical aloneness in this world. By shedding back light on your other possibilities of being, death, as the supremest possibility of your being, will unmistakably disclose your life as through and through a texture of personal modes of being. In death as the end of your being you become keenly aware of your finitude; and if you only do not let this keen awareness slip [you], sliding back yourself into the alluring, lost state of 'one'¹⁷¹, you will harbor no illusions whatsoever¹⁷² about your life or possibilities. You will come to your senses[,] and see clearly your finitude and your nothingness. Only thus can you see yourself as a whole. If you hold yourself in the certainty of your death, and if you do not flee from it into the next 'interesting' diversion, your life will acquire such a sense of wholeness, and such a quality of authenticity, that for the first time in your life will you see truth as it really is. In understanding that possibility of your being which is most radically your own, you understand your existence as through and through projection onto possibility. Freed from the world and your self-merging in it, and freed from other people and your lostness in 'one', you can then become yourself. And this is your freedom unto death.¹⁷³

Every time you are truly yourself, i.e. every time you are not just drifting along, but are projecting yourself onto possibilities of your being, and are understanding yourself in terms of these possibilities, every time you do (are) this, death has entered

¹⁶⁹ As the end of *Dasein*, death is its ownmost non-relational, certain, indefinite, and not to be bypassed possibility (*Der Tod als Ende des Daseins ist die eigenste, unbezügliche, gewisse und als solche unbestimmte, unüberholbare Möglichkeit des Daseins*; *Sein und Zeit*, §52, p. 259).

¹⁷⁰ *Sein und Zeit*, §53, pp. 263–266. Being-towards-death (*Sein zum Tode*) is the anticipation (*Vorlaufen*) of the potentiality-of-being (*Seinkönnen*) of *Dasein*. Death as the ownmost possibility of *Dasein* (*eigenste Möglichkeit des Daseins*) is torn away from the neuter *They*. Becoming free (*Freiwerden*) for one's own death in anticipation frees the mortal from its lostness (*Verlorenheit*) in the arbitrary possibilities of the *They* (*Das Man*).

¹⁷¹ Namely, the 'one' (French 'on') as neuter 'They' (*Das Man*).

¹⁷² In rare cases within the text, I inserted the pagination transition number indicating it between square brackets in the location in the original typescript as it occurred in splitting a hyphenated word; here it appeared within the word 'whatsoever'.

¹⁷³ *Sein und Zeit*, §53, p. 266. What is characteristic of the authentic and existentially projected being-towards-death can be summarized as follows: anticipation reveals to *Dasein* its lostness in the *They*-self, and brings it face-to-face with the possibility to be itself; primarily as unsupported by the concerned taking-care of things. An impassioned freedom towards death is released from the illusions of the *They*, and is as such factual, certain of itself, and anxious (*Die Charakteristik des existenzial entworfenen eigentlichen Seins zum Tode läßt sich dergestalt zusammenfassen: Das Vorlaufen enthüllt dem Dasein die Verlorenheit in das Manselbst und bringt es vor die Möglichkeit, auf die besorgende Fürsorge primär ungestützt, es selbst zu sein, selbst aber in der leidenschaftlichen, von den Illusionen des Man gelösten, faktischen, ihrer selbst gewissen und sich ängstenden Freiheit zum Tode*).

to some extent into the determination of your being. For death, as your existential ending, is the source and origin of all possibility: it is what makes existential possibility itself possible. And inasmuch as it belongs to your essence to be always dealing (*sich verhalten*) with possibility – whether authentically or unauthentically – you *are* always your death; i.e. you are dying all the time. The reason for our fall in the mode of ‘one’, and for our losing ourselves in things, is because we do not want authentically to face this final truth of our life. Death, just because it means our most radically personal possibility, and therefore just because it throws us back onto these authentic possibilities of our being for which we alone should be responsible, becomes an intolerable horror. Death throws us back so completely on ourselves[,] that we begin to squirm and kick against the absolute void in which we then find ourselves. And so, unable to stand ourselves, we reach forth for the nearest thing, and hug it.

[296] Heidegger is not asking you to go and commit suicide[,] to know what death is. He is not asking you to sit down and brood over it, in order to discover what it must feel like. You are dying all the time – if you are living, that is. Every time you come back to your genuine possibilities, you touch death. Every time you take over without flight what and who you really are, you die. Every time you face honestly your finitude, and let it enclose you, you know what death is. Every time you snap back to what you, and you alone in all the universe, can do and be, death has asserted its sway over you. And even when you flee it, as you do all the time, the smile with which you admit in all transparency that you are fleeing it in your concerns and cares and pleasures and diversions, betrays unmistakably death’s undying dominion over you.

Section VII

Conscience

Conscience is the last topic whose clarification is essential for an understanding of Heidegger’s metaphysics of time. I treat it here very briefly, and only with a view to the understanding of this metaphysics (1).¹⁷⁴

It was pointed out above (2)¹⁷⁵ that authentic being unto death, viz. my facing my death (*Vorlaufen*), enables me to be whole (*Ganzsein*).¹⁷⁶ The question now is

¹⁷⁴ *Sein und Zeit*, §§54-64, pp. 267–323. This relates to ponderings over the authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole of *Dasein* (*Das eigentliche Ganzseinkönnen des Daseins*) with resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*), and wherein temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) underpins the ontological meaning of care (*Der ontologische Sinn der Sorge*). This interpretative direction points to the phenomenological hermeneutics that is at work within the existential analytic of *Dasein*, whereby self-interpretation belongs to *Dasein*’s being (*Zum Sein des Daseins gehört Selbstausslegung; Sein und Zeit*, §63, p. 312).

¹⁷⁵ Namely on page 294 of Malik’s typed original text of his thesis in Section VI.

¹⁷⁶ Namely that as long as it *is*, *Dasein* has never attained its wholeness (*Gänze*); since *Dasein* reaches its wholeness in death (*Sein und Zeit*, §§46-47, pp. 236, 238).

as to an authentic possibility of my being – *eigentliches Seinkönnen* (or *Selbstseinkönnen*). Heidegger wants to show that in the phenomenon of conscience,¹⁷⁷ and in the possibility of decisiveness arising therefrom, man experiences exactly the same thing as what Heidegger, in his existential analysis of man, has called ‘*Vorlaufen in den Tod*’.¹⁷⁸ In this way Heidegger frees his interpretation of any apparent romanticism or arbitrariness.

[297] Any interpretation of conscience which is not thoroughly existential is a joke; for conscience is absolutely my own and must be ontologically shown to spring from my essence. Hence Heidegger undertakes to implant it in man’s being (which is care). This means for him understanding it in terms of his existential analytic.

The most characteristic thing about conscience is its voice or call.¹⁷⁹ The voice of conscience calls me out of one possibility of my being into another possibility of my being. Heidegger’s analytic is beautifully prepared to deal with such a situation. For the first possibility which conscience calls me to snap out of is, for Heidegger, my essential fallen lostness in the mode of ‘one’,¹⁸⁰ and the second possibility to which conscience summons me to transfer myself is my authentic mode of existence in which I am fully myself. Conscience is myself surveying my two most fundamental possibilities of being – authenticity and unauthenticity of being – and calling me to take up the authentic mode of being myself. It is for this reason[, namely,] that conscience is wholly an inward transaction by me about my two most fundamental possibilities of being, that the voice of conscience is not a sound or a specific verbalized command about a particular situation. Conscience speaks to me in unmitigated silence. ‘*Das Gewissen redet einzig und st[ä]ndig im Modus des Schweigens*’ (3).¹⁸¹

If in conscience I am silently demanding of myself to snap out of my oneness (*Man-selbst*) and to become truly myself, then I am summoning myself to the possibility of being myself (*Selbstseinkönnen*), which means to the possibility of projecting myself on my genuine possibilities of being which present themselves to me at the moment.

¹⁷⁷ Conscience as *Gewissen* releases the primordial *Dasein* from its entanglement with the busyness of the *They*-self. *Dasein*, which is lost in the quotidian affairs of the *They*, is self-called to retrieve itself from this fallen lostness.

¹⁷⁸ ‘*Vorlaufen in den Tod*’ as ‘anticipation of death’.

¹⁷⁹ The voice of conscience: *Stimme des Gewissens* (*Sein und Zeit*, §54, p. 268). This discloses the character of conscience as a call (*Der Rufcharakter des Gewissens*; *Sein und Zeit*, §56, p. 273).

¹⁸⁰ *Das Gewissen ruft das Selbst des Daseins auf aus der Verlorenheit in das Man* (*Sein und Zeit*, §57, p. 275).

¹⁸¹ Conscience is a call of care (*Das Gewissen als Ruf der Sorge*); wherein *Dasein* calls itself in conscience as an unfamiliar caller in the everydayness of the *They*-self. Such a call comes as an alien voice (*Der Rufer ist dem alltäglichen Man-selbst unvertraut – so etwas wie eine fremde Stimme*). It does not report any facts, and calls without uttering in an uncanny mode of silence (*Der Ruf berichtet keine Begebenheiten, er ruft auch ohne jede Verlautbarung. Der Ruf redet im unheimlichen Modus des Schweigens*; *Sein und Zeit*, §56, p. 273, §57, p. 277).

In every way, therefore, conscience can be seen to be the voice of the underlying anxiety of my being. When conscience speaks, it is no power outside me which is addressing me; I am addressing myself. Out of the deepest [298] depths of my anxiety I heave a sigh and face my state, exactly as it is. And this state is nothing other than the fact that I, as personal existence[,] am essentially foreign to this world. When my conscience speaks[,] it is my not-being-at-home-ness (my 'Unheimlichkeit', my 'Unzuhause' (4)¹⁸²) in this world which is then asserting myself. The voice of my conscience strikes 'one' as an alien voice, for what could be more alien to one, lost as he is in the colorful, multifarious, interesting 'world', than the self [being] reduced to its absolute aloneness and projected in the nothingness of the world (5)?¹⁸³

As for the sense of guilt which perforce attached to the call of conscience, it must first be remembered that 'guilty' is a strictly personal predicate, in exactly the same sense in which dying, understanding, anxiety, etc., are personal predicates (6).¹⁸⁴ Guilt must be existentially interpreted, in terms of man's own existential constitution. I shall not go in detail into Heidegger's doctrine of guilt (7);¹⁸⁵ I shall

¹⁸² *Sein und Zeit*, §40, pp. 188–189, §57, p. 276. *Angst* about being-in-the-world has the sense of homelessness, since inner-worldly beings sink away, and worldliness as well as the *Mitdasein* of others do not constitute a home as such. Rather, *Dasein* is thrown back into what it is anxious about in its very being as a mortal, and is as such freed from the *They* for the sake of grasping itself in its ownmost potentiality to be as destined towards death. In *angst*, one has an uncanny (*unheimlich*) feeling of the indefiniteness of the no-thing and no-where, namely of *not-being-at-home* (*Un-zuhause*); hence, everyday familiarities fall apart. The semblance of *being-at-home* in public busyness is a flight onto the domain of the *They*-self away from the uncanny feeling of not-being-at-home (this evokes *expropriation* [*Enteignis*] rather than *enowning* [*Ereignis*]). What feels as not-being-at-home in public busyness is itself as such what fetches *Dasein* back home into being itself authentically. Such a situation has to be seized upon and endured, since it is *Dasein's* originary and primordial (*ursprünglichere*) predicament. The call of conscience as *care* is always attuned to the existential *angst* in its uncanniness (*Unheimlichkeit*), which pursues *Dasein* in its flight away from what anguishes it as it immerses itself in the busied familiarities of publicness. It is in this sense that philosophy is properly home-sickness; a drive of *Nostos*, to be at home everywhere (*Die Philosophie ist eigentlich Heimweh, ein Trieb, überall zu Hause zu sein*). This entails a yearning (*Sehnsucht*) to being brought back home (*wieder in der Heimat zu sein*) from whatever alienates (*die Fremde*). Heidegger appealed herein to Novalis, *Das allgemeine Brouillon, Materialien zur Enzyklopädistik* 1798/99 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1993), No. 857.

¹⁸³ *Sein und Zeit*, §57, p. 277. What could be more alien to the *They*, as lost in the manifold 'world' of heedfulness, than the self as individualized by itself in the uncanniness of being thrown into the no-thing? (*Was könnte dem Man, verloren in die besorgte, vielfältige 'Welt', fremder sein als das in der Unheimlichkeit auf sich vereinzelt, in das Nichts geworfene Selbst?*).

¹⁸⁴ *Sein und Zeit*, §58, p. 280. Summoning or invoking (*Das Anrufen*) *Dasein* from its inauthentic immersion in the *They*-self (*Man-selbst*) is calling upon it to attend to its authentic potentiality-of-being in a conscience that addresses *Dasein* as guilty (*schuldig*). Such a sense of guilt (*Schuld*) is drawn out from *Dasein* itself towards disentangling itself from what holds it back from fulfilling its possibilities in an authentic mode of being-in-the-world. However, being guilty is not marked by owing something or being responsible for it, as if in having debts, or failing to meet the demands placed on it by others.

¹⁸⁵ *Sein und Zeit*, §58, p. 281.

only say that the idea of guilt is fundamentally determined by a certain ‘not-character’. Heidegger’s famous formula for guilt is ‘*Grundsein einer Nichtigkeit*’, which means, being the ground of a privation.¹⁸⁶ This privation Heidegger finds in man’s existence, conceived fundamentally [as] care. For, it will be recalled, care involves both prejection (*Geworfenheit*)¹⁸⁷ and projection (*Entwurf*), and in both structures[,] there is always an essential negativity. As projected in the world in which I find myself (i.e. in my ‘*Da*’, my ‘that’ and ‘there’, the structures of being disclosed to me), there is an all-important sense in which I am *not* responsible for the state of being in which I am; and yet I *have* to take it on and be it. Thus[,] there clings to my being an element which I absolutely am, and yet which I did not choose. In this way my being becomes (i.e. is) the ground of a privation. But, furthermore, I do not exist only as a projected being, I am also all the time projecting myself ahead of myself. In this projection there is a necessary element of freedom, because I am always [299] one or the other of my various possibilities of being. In choosing to be one of these possibilities I still carry in my own being the impress [sic] of the possibilities which I rejected. I remain the possibilities which I did *not* choose, because I *am* my existential possibilities *always*, but these possibilities then determine my being negatively. Whether in the structure of prejection or in that of projection there is an essential privative character which determines my being. I *am* what I did not choose to be, and I *am* what I am not choosing to be.

Care – the being of man – is through and through permeated with privation.¹⁸⁸ Therefore, you do not need to look around for all sorts of rules and norms with

¹⁸⁶ *Sein und Zeit*, §58, p. 283, p. 285. The formal existential idea of being *guilty* (*Schuldigsein*) is that of being-the-ground (*Grundsein*) for a being that is determined by a *not* (*Nicht*); namely, that is *being the ground of a nullity* (*Grundsein einer Nichtigkeit*). A void is within me like an abyss; a hole in my being that swallows the significance of my entire lifeworld; since the worldliness of my being-in-the-world is itself that of my predicament as a mortal in being destined toward death. My lifeworld is thrown towards what annihilates it, and my future is a past. This characterizes the possibilities that could have been and were never lived, and the ever-constrained possibilities that are yet to present themselves in the limitedness of time as I ever get closer to my death. Such an anticipatory outlook on my being is marked by imagining how my traces may ever be received by posterity posthumously in memory. In the disclosure of such nullity, I veil the nothingness in my daily preoccupied business with others and things, and by an embeddedness in the attitudes of the neuter *They*-self with active projects, tranquilizations, comforts, collective goals. I summon the courage to be when the nullity in my being is self-disclosed and brought out into the open in my anticipation of my death, and not when I am busy in the midst of my immersions in the *They*-self of everydayness.

¹⁸⁷ What Malik renders as ‘prejection’ for ‘*Geworfenheit*’ is more commonly designated as ‘thrownness’ in the English parlance of Heideggerians.

¹⁸⁸ *Sein und Zeit*, §58, pp. 284, 285–289. The being of *Dasein* is care. It includes in itself facticity [thrownness], existence [project], and falling prey (*Das Sein des Daseins ist die Sorge. Sie befaßt in sich Faktizität [Geworfenheit], Existenz [Entwurf], und Verfallen*). *Dasein* could never expressly release itself from ‘that-it-is-and-has-to-be’ (*daß es ist und zu sein hat*). *Dasein* projects itself as care upon the possibilities unto which it is thrown; albeit as lagging behind its possibilities, while understanding itself through them. Care is in its essence thoroughly permeated by a nullity (*Die Sorge selbst ist in ihrem Wesen durch und durch von Nichtigkeit durchsetzt*); however,

which to establish man's guilt. *Man is already as such always guilty*. His guilt is the expression of his finitude,¹⁸⁹ of the fact that he has to take over and be his sheer thatness, and of the fact that he cannot possibly shake off his being the possibilities which he has chosen not to be. It is only because man is in the first place ontologically essentially guilty that he can then 'feel' ashamed, or shy, or embarrassed, or good, or bad.

Conscience and guilt belong to your essential being. Conscience is all the time 'speaking' in you, because you are all the time essentially fallen 'in das Man'. You've got to be both your conscience and your guilt. You cannot choose not to be your conscience, because you are anyway for the most part not yourself. What you can choose is to hear or not hear the voice of conscience which is all the time summoning you to your true self. And this true self is the acceptance of your guilt and the being it authentically – the facing and the taking-over without murmur and without flight your total prejection, and the fearless, but fully anxious, identifying yourself wholeheartedly and understandingly with your true, projected possibilities.

This taking[-]over your guilt and being it authentically in no way withdraws you from the world. You be yourself then fully and authentically. You are [300] thrown back on your inmost possibility, namely the possibility of being yourself. What more do you want, in order to be able to play your role [fully] in and for this world and your fellowmen?

And when you let conscience speak, i.e. more accurately, when you let yourself hear it call, your existence takes on a peculiar illumination. Your being, what and who you are, undergoes a special self-disclosure. Your basic existential anxiety reveals itself to you undistorted; your understanding becomes perfectly transparent, for you see yourself then in the light of your true projective possibilities; one's talkative, inquisitive equivocation contrasts then sharply with the still, small, clear and utterly secret voice of your conscience. The willingness to listen to the voice of conscience thus presents you with a fully transparent picture of yourself and of

such existential nullity does not have the character of a privation (*Die existenzielle Nichtigkeit hat keineswegs den Charakter einer Privation*); *Sein und Zeit*, §58, p. 285. This means that Malik's use of the term 'privation' (*privatio*) above would have been more fittingly replaced with 'nullity' to refer to '*Nichtigkeit*'; albeit the ontological sense of nullity is obscure (*Der ontologische Sinn der Nichtigkeit*).

¹⁸⁹ Guilt is conceived as being-the-ground of a nullity (*Die Schuld als Grundsein einer Nichtigkeit*). *Dasein* is not burdened only with factual guilt, given that it is guilty in the very grounds of its own being (*Seiendes, dessen Sein Sorge ist, kann sich nicht nur mit faktischer Schuld beladen, sondern ist im Grunde seines Seins schuldig*). The call herein is that of *care*, whereby being guilty constitutes the being of *care*. *Dasein* stands primordially together with itself in uncanniness, which brings it face-to-face with its undisguised nullity that belongs to its ownmost potentiality-of-being (*Der Ruf ist Ruf der Sorge. Das Schuldigsein konstituiert das Sein, das wir Sorge nennen. In der Unheimlichkeit steht das Dasein ursprünglich mit sich selbst zusammen. Sie bringt dieses Seiende vor seine unverstellte Nichtigkeit, die zur Möglichkeit seines eigensten Seinkönnens gehört*); *Sein und Zeit*, §58, pp. 285–287.

the world. Heidegger uses the term '*Entschlossenheit*', which I translate [as] 'decisiveness'¹⁹⁰, to stand for this completely transparent mode of self-disclosure: namely, the secret, anxious self-projecting on your existential guilt (8).¹⁹¹

This existential structure of decisiveness is most important for the subsequent understanding of Heidegger's metaphysics of time. Decisiveness is a form of existential self-disclosure (*Erschlossenheit*).¹⁹² All truth [is grounded] ultimately in the self-disclosure of *Dasein*, and decisiveness is the authentic mode of all self-disclosure. It is only when you are decisive, i.e. when your whole being takes on the mode of decisiveness as defined above, that you can see things in their proper perspective. Things are always to some extent disclosed to you, inasmuch as self-disclosure (9)¹⁹³ belongs essentially to your existence. But being for the most part merged in the world and lost in 'oneself', your self-disclosure is almost always unauthentic: for the most part you understand yourself in terms of the 'things' of your world, and you are almost always consciously and calculatingly under the domination of your 'oneself' – 'what will he say?', 'what effect will this have on him?', 'will [301] this conform to what *they* think?', etc. In decisiveness you put all this nonsense aside. You wake up and become yourself. You are what and who you are, and let the world go to ... You take up decisively the burden of your guilt, and you do not for one moment flee your true possibilities of being. You will not exaggerate, you will not embellish things, you are absolutely fearless, you will not hope for more than you know you are going to get, you look truth squarely and unflinchingly in the face. You project yourself only on what you *know* you can be (because you already are). Any thought that does not spring integrally from your true possibilities of being you put aside as an escape and a dream and a hallucination. The clarity and transparency of your world, of yourself, of your fellows and of your possibilities is so absolute then that for the first time you know 'why you should exist at all'. It isn't that the contents of your world have changed, or that your fellows have become better; it is simply that you have become yourself[,] and let your existential possibilities of being authentically assert themselves.

In decisiveness alone *are* you authentically yourself. In decisiveness alone *are* you truly in-the-world. In decisiveness alone can your care truly attend to objects at-hand, and truly see objects on-hand[,] and truly care for other people. Only when and as you have chosen to be truly yourself can you give yourself freely to the world. Only then can you let the others be authentically themselves. Only out of your authentic, decisive being yourself can your authentic being-with other

¹⁹⁰ *Entschlossenheit* as 'resoluteness'.

¹⁹¹ *Sein und Zeit*, §60, p. 297.

¹⁹² *Erschlossenheit* as 'disclosedness' is not simply *Entdecktheit* as 'discoveredness'.

¹⁹³ *Sein und Zeit*, §60, p. 297.

people arise, and never out of one's ambiguous, uncertain, jealous, gossipy gatherings and fraternizations (10).¹⁹⁴

Decisiveness does not exist in mid-air, but only in a decisive person. There can be no general rules about *what* you should decide for. Decisiveness 'is' only in decision, better in deciding. And only in decision does your particular *situation* (11)¹⁹⁵ uncover itself. If you decisively understand the [302] call of your conscience, and if you thereupon fearlessly take over your guilt, you plunge into your situation in the world, and you find yourself for the first time free to grapple with it exactly as it is.

The phenomena of conscience and guilt and decisiveness have an essential connection to the phenomenon of death. Facing death (*Vorlaufen*),¹⁹⁶ as authentic being unto your end, is being unto your finitude, and is therefore [a] conscientious taking[-]up [of] your guilt, and being decisively yourself. The combined phenomenon, which Heidegger calls '*vorlaufende Entschlossenheit*'¹⁹⁷, a phrase impossible to translate into English (the expression means the-decisiveness-which-runs-ahead-of-itself-unto-death), gives you that mode of being of man in which he is wholly and authentically himself (*eigentliches Ganzseinkönnen*) (12).¹⁹⁸ It is not when you are decisive about this or that possibility of your being that you attain maximum wholeness and authenticity; only when you have clearly passed to your death and become fully decisive in respect of it that you put on your truest wholeness and authenticity. Man's conscience and guilt and his occasional decisiveness in the affairs of his life, all derive from man's existential delivery unto his death. It is as though by a distant reflection from his end that man obtains whatever decisiveness he shows in his life. If you carry your decisiveness to its limit you [arrive] fully facing your death. Thus[,] the decisiveness which has passed unto death is the most authentic mode

¹⁹⁴ *Sein und Zeit*, §60, pp. 297–298. Resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*) is an eminent mode of the disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*) of *Dasein* in its primordial and authentic being-in-the-world. Resolute (*entschlossenes*) *Dasein* not only responds to its call of conscience and care, but can also become the conscience of others in an authentic being-with-one-another (*das eigentliche Miteinander*).

¹⁹⁵ *Sein und Zeit*, §60, p. 299. The term 'situation' has a spatial significance (*In dem Terminus Situation [Lage – in der Lage sein] schwingt eine räumliche Bedeutung mit*); and as we have noted earlier, being-in-the-world is a spatiality (*Räumlichkeit*) in terms of de-distancing and directionality (*Ent-fernung und Ausrichtung*) given *Dasein's* making-room (*räumt ein*). *Situation* is spatial as such in terms of being the projected *Da* (*here/there* in the world).

¹⁹⁶ *Vorlaufen zum Tode* (as an anticipation of death).

¹⁹⁷ Anticipatory resoluteness (*vorlaufende Entschlossenheit*).

¹⁹⁸ This relates to ponderings over the authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole of *Dasein* (*Das eigentliche Ganzseinkönnen des Daseins*) with resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*), wherein temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) underpins the ontological meaning of care (*Der ontologische Sinn der Sorge*); *Sein und Zeit*, §§54–64, pp. 267–323. This is how resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*) and anticipation (*Vorlaufen*) are brought together; *Sein und Zeit*, §61, pp. 302, 305.

of decisiveness; and it is this authentic mode of decisiveness which Heidegger means by ‘*vorlaufende Entschlossenheit*’.¹⁹⁹

When you pass to the limits of your being and see yourself in terms of these limits. When you press hard against your finitude letting this finitude rebound on you and determine you into what you are. When you are convinced that your resources and your life do not go on and on and on indefinitely, but have an absolute limit, so that to hope to transcend this limit is to indulge self-hugingly in that accursed shallow nineteenth-century [303] sweet continuity. When you are determined to face every lot that befalls you because in the first place you have faced death. When you reach down to the depths of your existence and on every side touch your end, and when this touch does not send you back in flight and fear and rebellion against your finitude. When you are sensitive to distinctions and sharp, clear-cut differences and limits and discontinuities, and are not lost, hopelessly lost, in that beautiful, rationalistic, self-escaping continuity which has been the curse of philosophers throughout the ages. When you clearly perceive, without any alarm and without any desire hurriedly and hushingly to cover the fact up, that it belongs to your sad finitude to be rebelling against this finitude all the time. And when you come out of all this a stronger man, fully yourself, because you have touched your end and known your state, and because you can then harbor no possible illusions as to what or who you are or can be.

Section VIII

The Final Picture

What is man? This is an unauthentic question, because man is not a ‘what’ but a ‘who’. Who is man? Heidegger has answered this question in the foregoing analysis.

Man is *Da-sein*; that is to say, is you and I. We are primarily not this or that characteristic of ourselves, but our existence at all. That is what we care for more than anything else. The essence of man is his existence. This is what is meant by the central conception that all the issues of our being revolve about our being itself. It is our ‘being around’ or our [304] ‘striking around’ that finally matters, to us no less than to others. The concrete is revealed only when your existence [as such] is in question; when it is asserted or threatened; when you are given to understand that this existence [as such] is or is not wanted [around]. Every other experience of

¹⁹⁹ *Vorlaufende Entschlossenheit* as anticipatory resoluteness (*résolution devançante*) grasps the potentiality-for-being guilty that belongs to *Dasein* in being-towards-death. Resolutely, *Dasein* takes over authentically in its existence the fact that it is the null ground of its own nullity; since death is the coming possibility of its impossibility, namely its nothingness. The nothingness before which *angst* brings us reveals the nullity that determines *Dasein* in its ground, which itself is a thrownness to death (*Das Nichts, davor die Angst bringt, enthüllt die Nichtigkeit, die das Dasein in seinem Grunde bestimmt, der selbst ist als Geworfenheit in den Tod*); *Sein und Zeit*, §62, pp. 307–309.

yours is a pale and distant shadow of this fundamental experience of your being. You *first* exist, and *then* you are who you are.²⁰⁰

The [most profound] difference between Professors Heidegger and Whitehead is that the latter takes throughout his existence for granted, whereas to the former this is precisely what you should try to get at. You cannot take your existence for granted, for out of your existence, and what is connected therewith, flows everything else you do or are, including your philosophy. *In fact, philosophy itself is nothing other than the perception of this fundamental existential truth.* Every other conception of philosophy has committed the ‘original sin’ of forgetting and leaving behind (for heaven knows what reasons; but for reasons which will always be grounded in the existence of the person himself who entertains the conception) the ‘creator’ and fixing instead on the ‘creature’;²⁰¹ and every confusion and uncertainty and equivocation is traceable to this original commission. Unless you are first sure of yourself, you will never be truly sure of anything.

In reading Professor Whitehead’s works I could never get over the feeling that as he writes, his personal existence never even ‘occurs’ to him; he puts it behind, takes it for granted, assumes it, and goes on to his fundamental speculative work. To call this personal existence itself in[to] question[,] cannot be even so much as formulated in its terms. Think of finding among his categories at the beginning of *Process and Reality* such things as conscience, anguish, agony, suffering, hope, planning, being or not being yourself, being decisive in your life, concern (I am fully aware of his saying in *Science and the Modern World* and in *Adventures of Ideas* that ‘prehesion’²⁰² [305] is something like the Quakers’ ‘concern’; but his fundamental pluralistic position of actualities here and there and everywhere, and of all these actualities being modelled on the same metaphysical pattern, waters down this slight personal touch to his basic cosmological one-many world, wherein man as emerged in this cosmic epoch, and actualities in ‘far-off empty space’[,] ‘prehend’ each other no less truly than my present occasion of experience prehends whatever it is now prehending). Think, for instance, of reading that the seventeenth category of explanation is

²⁰⁰ It is fascinating to see over these two pages (namely pp. 304–305 of the original typed text of the doctoral thesis) how much the Heideggerian fundamental ontology seems to have impacted Malik’s analysis, especially when directed towards a comparative approach with Whitehead’s oeuvre.

²⁰¹ Malik’s parlance herein seems to move towards an onto-theology that is not Heideggerian in orientation and may itself have been marked by Malik’s own Christian theological thinking.

²⁰² ‘Prehesion’ is used here to designate an un-cognitive pre-epistemic apprehension that refers to an *a priori* non-sensory awareness in perception without presupposing cognition or a co-entanglement with a cognitive act, or with a form of knowledge in grasping the ambient environment and entities within it. See, for example, Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925), 1st ed., p. 69f. The internalized aspects of prehension are then considered in the context of externalized relations with others, and more widely against the background of thinking about the problem of history in Whitehead’s *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933), 1st ed.

that man is or is not at home in the world. All these things are unthinkable as belonging to the *basis* of his metaphysical interpretation. All these things belong, perhaps, to the 'subjective forms' which occasionally arise in man's experience in this cosmic epoch. *But to think of these things as being your only avenues of access to truth, and as being what in the first place make it possible for you to decide to be cosmological and to 'think out' experience and to banish from your sight these very things themselves, is not so much as suspected by him.* Man (more properly, his 'soul') is a 'personal society of occasions' which is fundamentally like the personal society of an atom (without even stopping to consider whether an atom – a complex, abstract conception, answering to certain human theoretical purposes, and therefore falling straight within human total *existence* – exists at all in the same sense in which man exists) or of this enduring piece of bone.

To Heidegger personal existence comes first, and everything else – including time and the process of the world – second. To invert this order is to commit a most fatal error which cannot be made up for in any way, except by a confession (which is a moral – expressive of the voice of conscience – existential matter) that you *have* committed the error; except, that is, by a radical 'change of heart'.²⁰³ And this, from the nature of the case, is impossible. And this impossibility is itself an expression of personal existence.²⁰⁴

[306] But to imagine innocently that this personal existence must be a simple 'I' or a 'subject' or a 'substance' is already to have committed the threefold abstract blunder (a) of trying to conceive who you *must* be, rather than who you *are*, (b) of thinking of yourself as something on-hand or at-hand, which you decidedly are not, because you *are* your possibilities and because the issues of your being all revolve about this being itself, whereas things on-hand and at-hand neither are their possibilities nor do they 'worry' about their existence, (c) and of having in mind some abstract 'theory' – that of Kant or the psychologists (who, it must again be repeated, always forget themselves, whereas it is precisely this that they forget which is here sought) – about who you are, rather than phenomenally going (i.e. coming) to yourself and letting yourself tell who you are.²⁰⁵

For the most part, as you actually exist, you are not yourself. You are merged in the world and lost in the state of 'one'. These are possibilities of your being, and

²⁰³ Again, we notice that Malik's parlance seems to move towards an onto-theology with moral undertones which are not Heideggerian in orientation, and they rather resonate with Christian theological and existential thinking (accounting here for terms used earlier in this context such as 'creator', 'created', the 'moral', 'confession', 'the heart').

²⁰⁴ Malik focuses purely on the existential analytic; there is no sense of the *Seinsgeschichte*, the philosophical-history of being, in contrast with the personal dimensions of forgetting the question of being in the modern nihilist dissolution of philosophy into the particular sciences.

²⁰⁵ Here, Malik offers a lucid summary of what he disclosed in the earlier sections of Chapter VII of his thesis about Heidegger's fundamental ontology and existential analytic of *Dasein*, away from *ousiology*, subjectivity, and ego-based theories in metaphysics or psychologism.

are not foreign to you. Your world is always a system of meaningful signs and tools, which when fully *traced* as to their total articulation, finally somehow converge on your existence as their end (*Worum-willen*).²⁰⁶ This is your sense of being-in-the-world. This mode of your being is existentially 'spatial', and 'space' is but our abstraction from this existential spatiality. Another existential sense (mode of yours is being-with-others: they are always on your mind, and this is possible only because in your own ontology you *are* already *with-others*. This fact may tempt you to fall in[to] the state of 'one', in which you are not yourself, but oneself, dominated and constituted through and through by curiosity, gossip and equivocation. Your existence is always somehow articulate, and this your existential self-disclosure takes the forms of feeling and understanding. Feeling is your being as projected, understanding as projected. When you say 'I understand', you mean you have projected yourself on one of your possibilities of being. The [307] unity of all this complex structure of your existence reveals itself as care. It is on account of this original care that you can care about things, for other people, about your world, about your possibilities of being, etc.

In all this, you are not yet whole, nor yet authentically yourself. You are whole and authentic only in the moment of decisiveness unto death. Only when you seriously face your death and throw yourself decisively upon your most genuine possibility of being at the moment[,] do you know what authentic being-whole means. To Professor Hocking's constant philosophic question as to the nature of the Self,²⁰⁷ Heidegger's answer is: The Self *is* any of its existential possibilities of being; its essence is care; for the most part it is not itself; it is wholly and authentically itself only when it takes on the mode of being of decisiveness, in which it faces fearlessly, but fully anxiously, its finitude, drawing from this finitude its inmost possibility of being at the moment. Not before this happens can you say there is a Self or an I. And, it seems to me, just because first and foremost (*zunächst und zuerst*, a constantly reiterated phrase of Heidegger's) we are not ourselves, but are lost in things and in other people, Professor Whitehead's account of the Self[,] as a 'personal society of occasions'[,] may after all be true, as describing the unauthentic mode of our existence; leaving, just because his concern is primarily (i.e.

²⁰⁶ This is what figures, for example, in *Sein und Zeit*, §18, p. 84, wherein the *for-the-sake-of-which* (*Worum-willen*) always concerns the being of *Dasein*, which is essentially concerned about its being. Ultimately, the being of *Dasein* is the most genuine and unique *Worum-willen*.

²⁰⁷ We see how much Heidegger's thinking is uncanny and alien in the context of this era of its reception in the anglophone milieu, and especially at Harvard University at the time, let alone how it is judged in the analytic school. Malik is endeavouring to explicate Heidegger's parlance and notions not only in comparative terms with Whitehead's philosophy but also to the co-directors of his doctoral research, John D. Wild and William Ernest Hocking. What Malik was experiencing continues to be an issue for those who attempt to teach Heidegger in academia, or when Heideggerians aim at explicating their research to philosophers from other philosophical schools of thought.

first and foremost) cosmology and not personal existence, the authentic mode of our existence entirely out of [the] account.

This total picture constitutes[,] [for] Heidegger[,] the phenomenal facts of our existence. We *are* that way. He believed no man who knows what he is saying can deny this picture. It is what philosophers omit from their account, and with which every philosophy should open. It is the '*Fundamentalontologie*' of man which he worked out. Unless everything else you say about the being (*Sein*) of anything else be somehow finally grounded in this ontology of yourself, what you say will always be abstract and 'freely-floating' (*freischwebend*). [308] Somehow, for some reason, you have not yet come back to yourself and let the phenomena speak simply and irrefutably. To the question as to the meaning and original unity of these modes of our being, the answer is: Temporality.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁸ *Zeitlichkeit* and not *Temporalität*, since the latter (*Temporality with a capital 'T'*) means the former (*temporality with a minuscule 't'*['timeliness']), insofar that *temporality-qua-timeliness* as such is taken to be the condition and horizon for the understanding of being. See, for instance, the distinction between *Zeitlichkeit* as 'timeliness' and *Temporalität* as 'Temporality' in Richard Sembera, *Rephrasing Heidegger: A Companion to Being and Time* (Ottawa: The University of Ottawa Press, 2008), p. 255f.

Chapter VIII

Man and Temporality

Section I

The Background of Personal Existence

It was not *merely* the sweet enjoyment of beautiful continuity that determined me to write the antecedent chapter at such apparent great length. It was *also* the conviction that Heidegger's metaphysics of time cannot be discussed or understood except after his ontology of human nature [has been] properly appreciated.¹ I had to work up to his central phenomenon of '*vorlaufende Entschlossenheit*,'² which is the most authentic, decisive and whole mode of being man's existence can assume. For, according to Heidegger, the original phenomenon of temporality is revealed to man only as man *is* in this authentic state of being-whole.

But in spite of the apparent lengthiness of the foregoing chapter[,]³ I am still afraid I have not done Heidegger's viewpoint justice.⁴ I am still afraid I have not brought out clearly enough his idea of *Existenz* and of the authenticity and unauthenticity of *Existenz*. If you still are under any illusions that these things are 'notions' and 'doctrines' and 'descriptions' of human nature, and that, therefore, *if* they apply to you, they do so because you 'happen' to belong to the 'human genus', I can only say[,] you will not understand Heidegger's metaphysics of time unless you disabuse yourself of these illusions at once.⁵ Not one word of what I

¹ Namely that the existential analytic interpretation of *Dasein* in terms of temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) is co-entangled with the explication of time as the transcendental horizon of the question of being (*Seinsfrage*). This aspect takes into account the hermeneutic analytics of the temporality of everydayness (understanding, attunement, falling prey, discourse, care, etc.), and of being-in-the-world, as well as ponderings over historicity and spatiality.

² *Vorlaufende Entschlossenheit*, as an anticipatory resoluteness, grasps the potentiality-for-being guilty that belongs to *Dasein* itself in its being-towards-death. Resolutely, *Dasein* in its existence takes over authentically the fact that it is the null ground of its nullity; since death is the coming possibility of its impossibility of being, namely as nothingness. The nothingness before which *angst* brings us reveals the nullity that determines *Dasein* in its ground, which itself is a thrownness to death; *Sein und Zeit*, §62, pp. 307–309.

³ Namely Chapter VII of his doctoral thesis, which covers the bulk of the edited text.

⁴ This is a fair insight into the difficulties facing those who attempt to explicate Heidegger's fundamental ontology as witnessed in subsequent interpretations to date, which are indicative of the depths of that thought and the challenges as well as opportunities it offers in addressing the question of being.

⁵ Hence this calls for eschewing *ousiology* (substance-based metaphysics), theories of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, psychologism, onto-theology, and moralizing meta-analytics. This includes the effort of avoiding the parlance and thoughts that hinge on notions such as soul, self, subject, ego, man, rational animal. Thinking would be rather orientated towards one's

said in the previous chapter and of what I say in this chapter is meant to refer to anything except to your personal existence, and to this existence *in its essentials*, [310] i.e. in its existence at all.

Time discloses itself as the *meaning of human existence*. You've got to be thinking of your cares and your anxieties and your fears; you've got to be keeping in mind your daily fall in the world and in the gossipy, curious, equivocal mode of 'one'; you've got to be thinking of your existential world, i.e. of the meaningful total unity within your own constitution of the signs and tools and things on-hand which shoot at you from within your world every moment of your existence; you've got also to bear in mind your feeling and your understanding, the fact that you are always ahead of yourself in what you call your understanding; you must also remember that you are a finite, dying being, enclosed always within your end, and that if you do not rebel against your finitude and seek your escape in all sorts of colorful, worldly amusements and pleasures (including, perhaps, the pleasure of philosophizing) but simply face this finitude, pass to it, touch it and let it rebound on you with a sense of conscientious decisiveness whereby you throw yourself on your best and truest possibility of being at the moment (including, perhaps, the possibility of your philosophizing); you've got to keep all these things in mind, i.e. you've got to keep *yourself* in mind, if you want to let the meaning of your existence, which is time, really reveal itself to you.

In this chapter, I promise merely to trace out how time in its various existential meanings, according to Heidegger, springs from and confers meaning on human existence. This chapter in no way claims to be a *complete* exposition of Heidegger's metaphysics of time. I believe, however, I do justice [fully] to his *central* notions of temporality, meaning[,] and historicity. What follows is almost pure exposition, except for my own personal 'experience' with which I interpret some of what Heidegger has to say. [311]

Section II

The Meaning of Meaning

The being (*Sein*) of man is care. Man is his Self – i.e. there is an authentic Self [as such] to talk about – only when he faces his death [decisively] and, as it were, touches it.⁶ Heidegger now says that the *meaning* of this Self and this care is to be

ownmost existential lived situations in addressing the question of the meaning, truth, and place of being. This unfolds by way of attending to one's own being-in-the-world, namely of *Dasein* as thrown into the flow of time towards death, and to the ground of nullity that this entails, which is a basis for guilt, angst, care, and resoluteness in the anticipation of what annihilates. Such experiential situations call upon us not always to fall prey to the *They-self* in everydayness, which veils our authentic attunement to our reality as mortals by seizing upon the best possibilities, albeit limited ones, within the finitude of our worldly temporal existence.

⁶ Malik is facing similar hermeneutic and linguistic difficulties that the exegetes of Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* struggle with. These arise when attempting to interpret *Dasein* away from the

found in temporality (*der Sinn des Seins des Daseins, d. h. der Sorge, ist die Zeitlichkeit* (1)⁷). In order to make this statement and Heidegger's explanation of it [themselves] meaningful, I say a word here about the meaning of meaning in Heidegger's philosophy.

Meaning, like everything else, is grounded in man's ontology. It is especially connected with man's understanding, which, as we saw in the previous chapter (2), expresses the mode of being of man's possibilities (*Seinkönnen*).⁸ Man is essentially understanding, in the sense that he is essentially his possibilities of being.⁹ It is only because man *first* holds out and maintains (*as possibility*) a particular possibility of his being, that he can *then* go ahead and explain, expound, formulate and criticize what 'he means'. Existential understanding precedes every form of articulation.

In his living intercourse with the world[,] the being (*Sein*) of things discloses itself to him *only as* his own existence is already also self-disclosed to him. Whatever you understand – in science, in life, in tragedy, in war – must first be a possibility of your own total being. *Meaning may be defined as that possibility of your being in which your understanding of something maintains itself* (3). Whatever can then be formulated and expressed in this self-maintenance of your understanding may be called meaning in a derivative sense; for the existential articulation of the understanding itself is prior [312] to its expression. Thus[,] meaning is not a mysterious property which attache[s] to things, or which lies 'behind' them, or which hovers somewhere 'in-between' them and you (4). Only man 'has' meaning; only he can *be* meaningful or meaningless. You are meaningful when your being, and the being of whatever object 'by which you may be stopping', are *together* disclosed in your understanding; and you are meaningless when this disclosure is foggy and confused. And as you *are* always *somewhat* self-disclosed, you always have (i.e. *are*) *some*

language of metaphysics; namely by not evoking selfhood, subjectivity, or statements about 'man' from Heideggerian viewpoints. The disclosure of what is essentially the being of *Dasein* gets unveiled authentically through its being-in-the-world as mediated through thinking about being-towards-death. This is the basis of the individuating potential of becoming *whole*. *Dasein* becomes whole only in death, despite the covering over in busy everydayness of the essence of its reality as a mortal. This is the ground for determining the meaning of *Dasein's* being in the interpretation of its authenticity and totality (*Interpretation der Eigentlichkeit und Ganzheit des Daseins*); *Sein und Zeit*, §63, p. 312.

⁷ Namely that the meaning of *Dasein's* being as *care* is that of *temporality*.

⁸ Namely as its *potentiality-for-being*. As Heidegger noted, if *Dasein's* being is essentially a potentiality-for-being (*Seinkönnen* [ability-to-be]), then, it is being-free (*Freisein*) for its ownmost possibilities (*Möglichkeiten*), and in every case it exists only in the freedom (*Freiheit*) for such possibilities or lack of freedom (*Unfreiheit*) towards them. The ontological interpretation would then come to pass through *Dasein's* ontical possibilities (*ontische Möglichkeiten*) in its potentiality-for-being (*Seinkönnen*); *Sein und Zeit*, §63, p. 312.

⁹ Such possibilities evoke *Dasein's* ontico-ontological potentiality-for-being-a-whole; even if this is a matter that is not rationalized or ontologically clarified, but is rather mediated through myth (*Mythos*), or magic in ritual and cult (*besorgte* [...] in *Ritus und Kultus seine Magie*); *Sein und Zeit*, §63, p. 313.

meaning; but you attain your fullest meaningful transparency only *as you are* your ‘*vorlaufende Entschlossenheit*’.¹⁰

The term which expresses the self-disclosure of understanding (existentially understood) is ‘*entwerfen*’ and its derivatives. I translated it above by ‘projecting’ (5)¹¹. What is meant by this term, however, is [a] picture or plan or sketch or outline; the most primordial structural articulation which your being falls into. When you understand (and you always, insofar as ‘there is’ any trace of ‘you’, somewhat understand, or – better expressed – are ‘given to understand’), you have ‘before you’ some picture or sketch or outline of what ‘it is all about’; this picture is the self-disclosure of your existence – the *Erschlossenheit*¹² of your *Da*.

Every fragment of your understanding, every sketch or outline you have before you, falls within and is upheld by a more original and general framework, which is what Heidegger calls the *Woraufhin*¹³ of the sketch in question (6) (elsewhere he uses the word “*Gerüst*” (7), which means a kind of scaffolding, to denote this more basic structure). *This Woraufhin, being the original framework in which your understanding maintains itself, is itself the meaning of your sketch*. You project your sketch (better stated, the sketch is projected, since you are nothing apart from your sketch) *onto-auf...hin*, and you let it be upheld by[,] this wider, meaning-giving framework. When, for instance, you say (and *mean* it) to an intimate friend with whom you are conversing [313][,] “I understand, my friend, what you mean”, the being (*Sein*) of the thing you understand has already clicked (as a possibility of your being) within the more basic framework of your total being. If this structural clicking does not happen, then simply you do not understand, as you must again and again have painfully experienced in your life.

The laying-bare of the original *Woraufhin* of one of your self-projected sketches means the disclosing of what makes this sketch in the first place possible (8). It means the bringing to the open the framework of honest existential structure on which your understanding ‘lives’ (*sich nähren*) (9). And this basic structure, on which your understanding feeds or lives, and which therefore makes possible your sketched-out self-projection, is the meaning you seek. In the present special case[,] what is sought is the meaning of care, which has been sketched out by Heidegger

¹⁰ This refers to anticipatory resoluteness as a potentiality-for-being-a-whole (*Ganzseinkönnen*), which is a distinctive mode of authentic existential temporalizing; *Sein und Zeit*, §61, pp. 303–304. Anticipatory resoluteness is the way in which *Dasein*’s potentiality-for-being-a-whole has authenticity (*Das existenziell eigentliche Ganzseinkönnen des Daseins als vorlaufende Entschlossenheit*), and this contrasts with the irresoluteness (*Unentschlossenheit*) of being immersed in the dealings of *Das Man*; *Sein und Zeit*, §62, pp. 308–309.

¹¹ *Entwurf* has the sense of being *thrown forward* in projection by way of drafting; mainly as what makes a plan or a project possible, and *on the basis of which* something is brought forth.

¹² *Erschlossenheit* is grasped as a disclosedness of an interpreted worldliness along with its horizons of meanings.

¹³ *Woraufhin* is the *whereupon* framework *on the basis of which* a given projection takes place.

as the essence of man's being. The question therefore is: *What is the original scaffolding of structure (existentially understood) which makes your care-ful¹⁴ being in the first place possible?* To Heidegger, time is this original existential scaffolding. Therefore, the statement *that time is the meaning of human existence*[,] must have become now, formally speaking, perfectly clear. Time, the meaning of man's being, is not something other than man or 'outside' his being; it is he himself as he understands himself (10). Heidegger now proceeds to show how this is so.¹⁵

Before taking up Heidegger's temporal interpretation of man, I again say [that] honest personal existence must be kept in mind all the time. You are now to come back to yourself and think of the tremendous role time plays in your life. Think of your personal past (in actual life), of your personal future, of your immediate present. Think of how every existential phenomenon – death, decisiveness, care, anxiety, understanding, gossip, etc. – discussed in the previous chapter is somehow tainted [by] time. When Heidegger says time is the [314] meaning of your being, he means temporality is such a basic determination of your existence that every one of these modes of your being is to be conceived not as something 'occurring' in time, but as itself in its very meaning temporal. When you are pressed by somebody as to 'what you mean' by your existential phenomena[,], you inevitably must come back in the end to time as *that in terms of which in the last analysis you understand yourself*.

¹⁴ The hyphenation in the original typescript of Malik's thesis is an intentional emphasis to reveal the focus on *care* (*Sorge*) in this term. After all, the existential analytic of *Dasein* passes through a hermeneutic interpretation of the meaning of the being of care (*Sorge*); *Sein und Zeit*, §63, p. 311. The mode of being that in every case is mine, as *Dasein*, is also ontologically the farthest from me in my quotidian distracted preoccupations with publicness. Our care and the concern we closely give to others and things in the midst of which we dwell is a mode of falling prey in everydayness to what veils *Dasein*'s authenticity. The primordial being of *Dasein* has to be wrested from its preoccupied quotidian inauthentic dealings to be taken out from falling into the ontical interpretation of its being. The careful *cum* concerned common-sense takes hold of *Dasein*'s potentiality-for-being and the disclosure of the pre-ontological modes of its hermeneutic interpretation.

¹⁵ This relates to how the existential analytic of *Dasein* against the background of its temporality is set by way of a hermeneutic interpretation of the meaning of the being of care in connection with the onto-ontological projection of *Dasein* upon an authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole, and particularly in the manner *Dasein* understands its being-in-the-world to which it belongs. This discloses the *circle* of understanding within which such interpretation moves from *Dasein* towards itself; *Sein und Zeit*, §2, pp. 7–8 / §32, pp. 152–153 / §63, pp. 314–315. Heidegger evokes in other sections the notion of the hermeneutical *circle* (*Zirkel*, *Kreis*) in *Dasein*'s self-understanding and determination of the meaning of its being.

Section III

The Authentic Phenomenon of Temporality

In your decisiveness unto death (*vorlaufende Entschlossenheit*) you are wholly and authentically yourself.¹⁶ What is the *meaning* of this authentic being-whole,¹⁷ i.e. what is it that makes this mode of your being possible (1)?

I showed above (2) that when you are decisive unto death[,] you have unrebekulously faced your finitude, accepted your state, pulled yourself out of your dispersive lostness in things and in other people, and thrown yourself wholeheartedly on your most genuine personal possibility of being at the moment. You can take on this decisive mode of your being only insofar as you can [as such] come to yourself in your most genuine possibility (*eigenste*), and only insofar as you hold out this possibility as possibility. This you can do because you exist, and because existence is essentially commerce with personal possibility. *This letting yourself come to yourself in this way is the original phenomenon of the future (Zukunft).*¹⁸ You know (better, you are) most originally what the future is only as you come to yourself in your being unto death. This is your original *futurity*, and this is how you are originally *futural*. It is clear then that being unto death is made possible by this [315] original existential futurity of *Dasein*. The term future does not mean a ‘now’ which is not yet, but which sooner or later will be, but rather the return to yourself in that possibility of your being which is most radically your own. You are futural, in the same sense in which you are anxious, you are dying, you understand, etc.¹⁹

In your decisiveness unto death[,] you understand and take over your being-guilty (3). You become the two-fold negativity of your guilt – your ‘background’ which was chosen for you and your rejected possibilities which you personally

¹⁶ Namely insofar that *vorlaufende Entschlossenheit* is an *anticipatory resoluteness* as a *potentiality-for-being-a-whole (Ganzseinkönnen)* that temporalizes; *Sein und Zeit*, §61, pp. 303–304. In this context, Malik offers an explication that resonates with the intended sense in Heidegger’s analysis, albeit while mediating this through a language that appeals to *personhood*, which is non-Heideggerian in orientation. This belongs to reflections on the ontological constitution of selfhood, not in terms of thinking about the self *per se*, but more fundamentally about the *self-same* steadiness of something that is present-at-hand. In saying ‘I’, *Dasein* expresses itself as being-in-the-world (*Im Ich-sagen spricht sich das Dasein als In-der-Welt-sein aus*); *Sein und Zeit*, §64, p. 321. Thus, Selfhood is to be discerned existentially through the authenticity of *Dasein*’s self-care.

¹⁷ Namely: *Ganzsein*.

¹⁸ The *futural (zukünftig)* aspect is disclosed through the existential analytic of *Dasein*’s being ahead-of-itself. *Dasein* is revealed to itself as the *not-yet* insofar as it remains outstanding as long as it is in the mode of being-towards-the-end. It is in this sense that temporality sustains the ontological meaning of care (*Die Zeitlichkeit als der ontologische Sinn der Sorge*); *Sein und Zeit*, §65, pp. 323, 325–330; §66, pp. 336–348.

¹⁹ If authentic or inauthentic being-towards-death belongs to the being of *Dasein*, it is as such only possible in being *futural (zukünftig)*, and in the sense of coming to itself in its potentiality-for-being by way of resolute anticipation that understands *Dasein* in its essence as being *guilty (schuldig)*; *Sein und Zeit*, §65, p. 325.

chose to reject (4).²⁰ In this way, you be authentically as you always already were. This taking[-]over is possible only as futural man can *be* this [or] that 'he always already was', i.e. only as he can be his *beenness* (*Gewesen*).²¹ It is only because you are already your beenness that in coming futurally to yourself[,] you in fact come *back* to yourself (I must in this context point out the unfortunate circumstance, which is of deep existential import, that English, unlike French or German, conjugates the verb 'to be' with the auxiliary 'to have', rather than with itself; thus you say 'I have been', rather than 'I am been', as in French or German. The result is that in English[,] you are thought of as 'having' your beenness, rather than as 'being' it, very much like having a chair or a book. The true existential position is that you *are* your beenness, just as you *are* your anxiety).²² Your facing your own farthest possibility of being (death) means necessarily your coming back to your own inmost beenness. This authentic beenness, to which you, insofar as you are authentically futural, necessarily come back, is the original phenomenon of the past. Thus pastness arises in your being from futurity; and you *are* both your pastness and your futurity in the same sense in which you are your anxiety, understanding, etc.

²⁰ Being-guilty is set here against the background of the authenticity of *Dasein* in how it *always and already was* and in what *has been* ('beenness'). Anticipating its ownmost extreme possibility as that of *no longer being*, *Dasein* turns into what *has been* with a mood of guilt; *Sein und Zeit*, §65, pp. 325–326. Being futural is anticipatory with resoluteness of no-longer-being as the extreme possibility of being-towards-death; coiling back from this authentic disclosure in gazing upon its being, *Dasein* is not only tending to its care for its presencing, but precisely in feeling guilty about what has been, and in how it did not attend to what in its anticipation of the future is disclosed as non-being. *Dasein* is guilty due to what it discloses about its future, that it had always already been what it is; namely that in its thrownness into being, it was all along a mortal, and yet, in its preoccupation with inner-worldly dealings in the sphere of the *They*, it did not attend authentically to its own limited possibilities as a finite being. This occasions guilt and remorse for not seizing its possibilities when all along, already, and always, it was a mortal. It is in this sense that it coils unto itself in guilty recollection of what has been, and precisely after having projected itself into its futural being by way of resolute anticipation. The authenticity of being futural retrieves a recollection of the past by being guilty about what has been. *Dasein's* guilt is entangled with resoluteness as to not let its passing-time be inauthentic; since time as past, present, and future has been grasped by it through an inauthentic understanding of its own essence as being *temporal qua temporary*; *Sein und Zeit*, §65, p. 327.

²¹ *Gewesen* is understood in this sense as that which *has been*; or what Malik refers to as '*beenness*' (*l'être-été*). This designates what *has come to pass* as that which *once has been*. It is not the past as *Vergangenheit*, insofar that it is not what is over, done with, or bygone (*vorbei*). *Beenness* hints therefore at a retrieved re-living of what passed, since as long as *Dasein* exists, it is not past (*vergangen*). *Dasein's* care (*Sorge*) is temporal in being grounded in what always and already *has-been* (*qua* beenness). *Dasein* is what has-been insofar that it exists and is futural in its resolute anticipation of its death; *Sein und Zeit*, §65, p. 328.

²² It is in this sense that Heidegger talks about what seems odd to articulate in language as 'I-am-as-having-been' (*Ich bin-gewesen; je suis-été*); *Sein und Zeit*, §65, p. 328. *I am* (presencing) as *I have all along been* (past), and as *I will continue to be* (futural) in being a *temporal mortal* who is yet *not-to-be*.

Further, your decisiveness unto death not only throws you back on your true past, but also it discloses to you the real situation of your world at [316] the moment; you look about you in your situation and you *see* the meaningful articulation of its tools and signs without distortion and without obscuration. The decisive being-by the tools of your situation is possible only as you already possess (i.e. are) a capacity for *presenting* yourself with these tools as tools. *This mode of being of yourself whereby, as you are decisive unto death and as you take over your true pastness, you present yourself with the truly available possibilities of your world, is the original phenomenon of the present.* You *are* your present (in this sense of presenting (*Gegenwärtigen*)) in the same sense in which you are your futurity, your beenness, your anxiety, etc.

As you authentically come back to your beenness from your futurity, you find yourself before your present situation, with what it really holds out for you by way of things to be utilized for your purposes. The things that you can adjust and use and put together become then clear (i.e. disclosed) to you. We thus have a unity of three phenomena – futurity, beenness and presenting; *this unitary phenomenon of the authentic future, giving rise, in the manner indicated, to the authentic past and the authentic present, and the whole bound up essentially with decisiveness unto death (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit), is termed by Heidegger temporality (Zeitlichkeit).*²³ Thus[,] only as man is characterized as temporality is he *able* to be the authentic being-whole of his decisiveness unto death. In this way[,] temporality is shown to reveal itself as the meaning of authentic care (5).

One will be furious at this point. What is all this ‘German stuff’? What do these things *mean*? ‘Decisiveness unto death’, ‘authentic being-whole’, ‘futurity’, ‘beenness’, heavens, what are these things? What is this way of approaching the problem of time but sheer rationalizing circularity? To whom has the future, e.g., ever meant what it means to Heidegger above? Thank heaven the world is composed of ordinary people, and not of self-entangled German [317] philosophers. What is all this talk but romanticism and caprice?²⁴

²³ *Zeitlichkeit* as temporality is an ἐκστατικόν (*ekstatikon*), wherein the future, the having-been as past, and the present, all are *ecstasies* of temporality (*Wir nennen daher die charakterisierten Phänomene Zukunft, Gewesenheit, Gegenwart die Ekstasen der Zeitlichkeit*); *Sein und Zeit*, §65, p. 329.

²⁴ It is telling how the Heideggerian parlance frustrates not only anglophone readers who try to render the linguistic oddities of his unusual style of prose and his neologisms into English; it is also unusual in the German language. After all, Heidegger wrestled with the German language to move away from what he considered marked by a metaphysics that contributed to the oblivion of the question of being. Language has to be stretched to breaking point to reveal its incapacity to hold onto what calls for thinking about being. What is intriguing about Malik’s passage above in the body of the text is its apologetic confessional expressionism in being *a testimony from one of the early anglophone pioneering exegetes of Heideggerianism*. Although Malik was still a doctoral candidate at the time, he was already showing signs of what it takes to bring the Heideggerian lexicon into the precinct of the English language while retaining its sensical attributes. What Malik endured in terms of frustration in translating Heidegger is not alien to later translators. This is commendable, given that they do so despite the apparent undermining of the communicative agency of language in Heidegger’s

I do not think it necessary to answer all this. For one simply does not want to be personal. What is said above has meaning only to persons, whose existence [as such] has become a problem to them. When one takes one's existence for granted, and never even attempts to question it, then obviously one is not interested in 'himself', but in things and ideas and especially what other people think or have thought. And[,] thus[,] the first condition of appreciating phenomenal temporality, namely calling a halt to all this self-lostness and coming back for once to yourself, one completely misses. But, Heidegger may be consoled, you and I are never only 'one'.

To personal existence[,] what I expounded of Heidegger above is crystal clear. For the deepest joy of personal existence is to face phenomena, and never to let itself be misled into expecting anything 'more important' than phenomena, lying behind them. The true phenomena of human life are that a person is a Self when he has faced his death and 'known' his finitude, and that from this death-facing he comes back to himself, assumes his total past unescapingly and presents himself freely with his immediate world in the only real way in which it will *ever* present itself to him. He who does not know what this means has still to face reality.

Heidegger next shows that the three-fold existential structure of care [is grounded] in temporality (6).²⁵ Your constant being-ahead-of-yourself [is grounded] in the future, your projection in the past and your being-by the worldly objects of your immediate concern in the present (in the existential sense of 'presenting').²⁶ The original phenomenal unity of your temporality makes possible the unity and wholeness of the totality of your care-structures.

At this point arises a most important concept, which must be explained[,] if Heidegger's further interpretation is to be understood. We said temporality, as explained phenomenally above, constitutes the meaning of man's being, i.e. [318] of care. It is the original *Woraufhin*²⁷ in which our understanding of our essence as care holds itself. Thus[,] we are through and through temporal, in the sense described above, and it is this constitutional temporality which makes possible in the first

ways of phrasing things, and by running the risk of sounding *non-sensical*. Such complications are not due to the difficulty of rendering a German philosophical treatise into English, but rather this is part and parcel of Heidegger's deliberate taming of the German language to carry his thought against the grain of the history of metaphysics that had impacted it. Malik manages to provide some clarifications in the two passages that follow, which bring more lucidity with a personal touch to what otherwise remains to this day a vexing matter when trying to explicate the Heideggerian unorthodox modes of saying and thinking to philosophical circles that are not willing to digest or accommodate them patiently.

²⁵ Care is being-towards-death (*Die Sorge ist Sein zum Tode*). This is so in the sense that anticipatory resoluteness (*Die vorlaufende Entschlossenheit*), as the authentic being-towards-the-end, is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of *Dasein* (*Unmöglichkeit*), whereby the future is closed as a finitude that makes *Dasein* a whole. Accordingly, *Dasein* temporalizes in the sense of being *ahead of itself* (*Sich-vorweg*); *Sein und Zeit*, §65, pp. 329–330.

²⁶ The *ahead of itself* (*Sich-vorweg*) is a projection that temporally entangles past, present, and future; *Sein und Zeit*, §65, pp. 327–328.

²⁷ The sense of the whereupon, *Woraufhin*, as that *for the sake of* which *Dasein* projects itself, finds its meaning as a *future*; *Sein und Zeit*, §65, pp. 327–328.

place every feature connected with our essential care. This original temporality is not to be conceived as a being – [a] chair, idea, man; what describes it is not the verb ‘to be’, but the verb ‘temporalize’ itself. Thus[,] we are not to say ‘temporality is’, but rather ‘temporality temporalizes itself’. “Die Zeitlichkeit ‘ist’ überhaupt kein Seiendes. Sie ist nicht, sondern zeitigt sich” (7).²⁸ This concept of the self-temporalization (*Selbstzeitigung*) of temporality is really a very simple matter, and will become clearer throughout the remainder of this chapter. The point to keep in mind at present is that the appropriate verb that goes with temporality is ‘temporalize’, and that temporality temporalizes several possible ways of itself (“*mögliche Weisen ihrer selbst*” (8)).²⁹

In your futurity you come *to* yourself, in your beenness you are *back upon* yourself and in your presenting you are *by* this or that tool or thing. These phenomena of to-ness (*zu...*), back-upon-ness (*auf...*) and by-ness (*bei...*) clearly reveal temporality as the ‘ἐκστατικόν[.]’³⁰ *schlechthin*, i.e. as pure ecstasy (9). In all these phenomena you are essentially ‘outside of’ (better, perhaps, ‘beside’) yourself. Consequently, Heidegger calls the described phenomena of the future, the past and the present ‘the ecstasies of temporality’.³¹ Temporality is itself the most original meaning of ‘being-outside-of’-ness.³² Thus you are not to think of it as a being which first is and then comes out of itself – e.g. an exploding mine; no, rather “*ibr Wesen ist Zeitigung in der Einheit der Ekstasen*”³³ (10), i.e. the essence of temporality is to temporalize itself in the unity of its ecstasies. Temporality, wherever and however it temporalizes itself, ‘is’ at once its three ecstasies, i.e. its three modes of ‘outside-of’-ness. This is a very important principle, which has many [319] applications in Heidegger’s metaphysics.

Thus future, past and present, in man’s existence, always temporalize themselves together: whatever you hold as your future must have in your being a corresponding past and a corresponding present. Although this is always the case, the future

²⁸ Temporality is not *a being* at all; it is rather what temporalizes being; *Sein und Zeit*, §65, p. 328.

²⁹ *Zeitlichkeit zeitigt und zwar mögliche Weisen ihrer selbst*; namely that temporality temporalizes possible ways of itself, and that these make possible the multiplicity of the modes of being (*Seinsmodi*) of *Dasein* and of the fundamental possibility of authentic and inauthentic existence (*der eigentlichen und uneigentlichen Existenz*); *Sein und Zeit*, §65, p. 328.

³⁰ *Zeitlichkeit* is ἐκστατικόν (*ekstatikon*), wherein the future (the *ahead of...*), the having-been (the *before...*), and the present (the *already...*) are its *ecstasies* (*Ekstasen der Zeitlichkeit*); hence temporality constitutes primordially the wholeness of the structure of care (*die Ganzheit der Sorgestruktur*); *Sein und Zeit*, §65, pp. 328–329.

³¹ *Wir nennen daher die charakterisierten Phänomene Zukunft, Gewesenheit, Gegenwart die Ekstasen der Zeitlichkeit*; *Sein und Zeit*, §65, p. 329.

³² Temporality is the primordial *outside-of-itself* in and for itself (*Zeitlichkeit ist das ursprüngliche Außer-sich an und für sich selbst*); *Sein und Zeit*, §65, p. 329.

³³ Temporality is not, prior to this, *a being* that first emerges from itself, rather its essence is temporalizing in the unity of the *ecstasies* [past, present, future] (*Sie ist nicht vordem ein Seiendes, das erst aus sich heraustritt, sondern ihr Wesen ist Zeitigung in der Einheit der Ekstasen*); *Sein und Zeit*, §65, p. 329.

in all modes of temporalization enjoys a certain pre-eminence as the above description of authentic temporality has shown. The original and authentic temporality temporalizes itself out of the authentic future; you wake up to your present situation only as you have *first* [awoken] to your futurity and your beenness (11). Although all ecstasies drop together, as it were, in all forms of temporalization, within any such temporalization one ecstatic does temporalize itself out of another.³⁴

It should be clear that just because I am ‘delivered unto death’,³⁵ my futurity is finite. I exist, in every mode of my being, unto my end. Therefore, my total authentic temporality is itself finite. Time, as most originally disclosed and known to man, is finite, according to Heidegger. The belief in infinite and endless time – evolution, geologic ages, the endless future – is grounded ontologically in the more aboriginal finite and ‘end-ful’ time which belongs to man’s essence. What this grounding is, is a task by itself which Heidegger takes up in one long chapter (12). Man would never have thought of infinite time in which things on-hand and at-hand arise and perish if it were not for his primordial, existential, finite time, whereby his existence [as such] is at stake.

This discussion completes the characterization of authentic, existential temporality. [320]

Section IV

The Temporal Interpretation of the Existential Phenomena of Human Life

In the previous chapter, following Heidegger’s own treatment in *Sein und Zeit*, the phenomenal description of human nature was gradually built up from the ordinary, obvious phenomena of existence to the unity of these phenomena in care. Then I discussed death and conscience as yielding, for man’s existence, its supremest wholeness and authenticity. The original phenomenon of temporality was shown above to be the *meaning* of man’s authentic decisiveness unto death.

Heidegger now takes up (1) the temporality of each of the existential phenomena elicited in the previous chapter. If temporality is the meaning of care (in the sense of meaning described in Section II above)[,] then all human existential phenomena, since they all flow from and are brought to a unity in care, must be grounded in temporality. If you are pressed as to ‘your meaning’ in respect of any existential structure, you will find that you finally couch your meaning in temporal terms. This is so only because your being in any of these phenomena calls up (is

³⁴ Temporality does not first originate through a cumulative sequence of the ecstasies [*qua* past, present, future], but always temporalizes itself through their common origination and equi-primordiality (*Gleichursprünglichkeit*); *Sein und Zeit*, §65, p. 329.

³⁵ *Geworfen in den Tod*; *Sein und Zeit*, §65, p. 329.

in fact made possible by) a particular temporalization of temporality.³⁶ When you gossip, for instance, you there and then take on a special attitude towards time: you have a gossipy future, a gossipy past and a gossipy present. Your total temporality is then of a peculiar flavor, the gossipy flavor. The same is true when you understand, are anxious, attend to the things round about you in your world, etc. Because all these modes of your being are made possible by temporality, i.e. because their meaning is constituted by it, each one of them calls up an [321] associate temporalization of temporality in your being.

Heidegger treats in a masterly phenomenal discussion the temporality of disclosure, feeling, fear, anxiety, hope, curiosity, speech, attending to the objects of your world, spatiality, and the daily uneventful mode of existence. In each one of these possible modes of your being time discloses itself to you in a peculiar way. Do not imagine innocently that time ‘means’ to you the same thing when you understand, as when you hope or when you are sawing a piece of wood. Any such assumption as to the absolute uniformity of the meaning of time to your being under all possible modes of this being is, to Heidegger, complete nonsense, and can only be held by people under the domination of some rationalistic presupposition which has no foundation in the phenomena of existence, i.e. only as these people put on a peculiar abstract attitude. Time temporalizes itself differently for your different existential phenomena.

In any such temporalization the ecstatic unity (“*ekstatische Einbeit*”, a very important concept) of the three ecstasies is absolutely maintained: they all drop together (i.e. are “*gleichursprünglich*”),³⁷ although within this dropping together one of the three always enjoys a certain priority. E.g. understanding temporalizes itself out of the future, although there is always also an associate past and present; whereas feeling temporalizes itself out of the past, although here too there goes with this feeling pastness a feeling futurity and a feeling presenting.³⁸

Also, as you can be any of your possibilities of being either authentically or unauthentically, the temporalization that goes with such a possibility of being varies accordingly. E.g. [u]nderstanding in general temporalizes itself out of the future – you always understand yourself in terms of your futural possibilities; but whereas authentic understanding temporalizes itself from your futural death-facing, unauthentic understanding arises out [322] of a peculiar attitude called “*Gewärtigen*”,³⁹ [which is] described marvelously by Heidegger. “*Gewärtigen*” is the attitude of waiting and waiting and waiting, ‘with your mouth open’. And what are you waiting for?

³⁶ This describes *Dasein's* *having-been* as thrownness (*Geworfenheit*), and its *projection* unto the future is an *anticipation* rather than an *expectation*, while its present mode of being is that of the state of *fallenness* into the distractions of everydayness.

³⁷ This designates the ecstatic temporal equi-primordially (*Gleichursprünglichkeit*) of past, present, and future; *Sein und Zeit*, §65, p. 329.

³⁸ ‘Presenting’ is here understood in the sense of ‘being present’, or ‘presenting’.

³⁹ *Gewärtigen* as awaiting (*s'attendre*) is akin to expecting (*Erwarten*). It is an inauthentic comportment with regard being-towards-death; *Sein und Zeit*, §68, pp. 338–339.

You are waiting for yourself to be, in place of going ahead and just being yourself. Similarly the associate authentic present that goes with understanding is the Kierkegaardian moment of decision (*Augenblick*),⁴⁰ wherein you hold yourself decisively in your honest situation; whereas the unauthentic present of understanding is called “*Gegenwärtigen*”,⁴¹ which is a kind of losing yourself in the objects of your world. Unable to be decisive in yourself, and to hold your entire temporality in one unitary view, you seek stability and decision in your world. And you will never find them there.

I shall not go into Heidegger’s detailed analysis of the ‘meaning’ of temporality in these various phenomena of human life. As you read Heidegger you find yourself without any strain reconstructed into the concrete phenomena of your actual life. You fail nowhere to recognize yourself as you really live.

Such existential phenomena as forgetting, repeating yourself (a very important *authentic* phenomenon, according to Heidegger),⁴² missing something – your keys, e.g., being surprised by something, facing unconquerable obstacles, remembering,⁴³ unsteadiness of character (*Unverweilen*), distractedness (*Zerstreuung*) and the various tenses of verbs, all these personal phenomena are elicited out of the fundamental temporality of *Dasein*. One usually thinks that these personal matters⁴⁴ are of no special philosophic significance. In this one is, as usual, quite mistaken, for the truth is that in each one of these phenomena man somehow is finally brought face to face [with] his existence [as such]; it is his deep-seated anxiety and care which are brought to play in these phenomena. Thus you can say that these phenomena belong to human nature as such; and what belongs to human nature as such cannot be uninteresting or unimportant to a philosopher who has seriously called his existence [as such] into question.

[323] One will further say that phenomena like these belong properly to the ‘science of psychology’. Apart from the fact that [here,] one is only sophisticatedly feigning ‘he’, knows what belongs and what does not belong to psychology, one

⁴⁰ *The glance of an eye*, as an ecstatic moment of *vision* (*Augenblick*), temporalizes itself out of an anticipation of an authentic future (*eigentliche Zukunft*); *Sein und Zeit*, §68, p. 338.

⁴¹ The making-present as *Gegenwärtigen* is an inauthentic moment of being-alongside the things that *Dasein* concerns itself with, as opposed to the authenticity of the *Augenblick* as a moment of vision that temporalizes itself out of resolutely anticipating the futural not-being; *Sein und Zeit*, §68, p. 338.

⁴² The authenticity of *Dasein*’s coming-toward-itself in anticipatory resoluteness is also a coming-back-to-itself as being thrown into its individuation. In anticipation, *Dasein* brings itself forth again into its potentiality-for-being. The authentic having-been is a *repetition*, or a *retrieval* in repeating oneself (*Das eigentliche Gewesen-sein nennen wir die Wiederholung*); *Sein und Zeit*, §68, p. 339.

⁴³ Just as expecting (*Erwartung*) is possible only based on awaiting (*Gewärtigen*), so is remembering (*Erinnerung*) that is made possible on the grounds (*Gründe*) of forgetting (*Vergessen*), and not the other way round; *Sein und Zeit*, §68, p. 339.

⁴⁴ What Malik is referring to here in terms of *personal matters* pertains to an analysis of the temporality of the moods and attuned disposedness of *Dasein* (*Die Zeitlichkeit der Befindlichkeit*); *Sein und Zeit*, §68, p. 339.

must remember that the science of psychology does not exist disembodied, but is a particular total behavior of the *psychologist*. And Heidegger here is talking about the *psychologist*, as personal existence. The facts about man which spring from his very existence must already be ‘known’ to the psychologist in his own life, and all that Heidegger is doing here is simply to marshal responsibility [for] all these existential facts. The existential analytic makes this supreme contribution to psychology[,]⁴⁵ that by disclosing phenomenally the essential elements of human nature, it provides the psychologist with basic concepts with which he can approach and interpret the human material. No spectacle in the whole world presents a deeper and more pathetic blindness than that of a psychologist studying human nature (if he studies human nature at all, for psychologists for the most part study only ‘living tissue’) and in his study forgetting completely about himself as a person.⁴⁶

Section V

Man’s Historicity

The problem of the connexity of human life (*Lebenszusammenhang*) and of history at large is next raised (1). What about man’s birth, and what about the extent of his life since his birth? Death is only one end of man’s life; what about his other

⁴⁵ Malik pre-projects what has become a strand in approaching psychology from perspectives that have been exposed to Heidegger’s thought, if not informed by it, or even impacted by its leitmotifs. This is the case, for example, with the French psychoanalytic Lacanian psychology. The influence of Heidegger on Jacques Lacan, partly through Jean-Paul Sartre, is a matter that has been debated in francophone theories of psychoanalysis. Lacan translated Heidegger’s commentary on Heraclitus, and he discussed concepts pertaining to language and the existential analytic of *Dasein* in his seminars, see Alain Juranville, *Lacan et la philosophie* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1984).

⁴⁶ The insights that Malik presents in this context are stimulating, since they find indirect resonances in current practices that relate to counselling, or the use of phenomenology in some forms of clinical psychology. The existential analytic of *Dasein*, and the evocation of care, angst, disposedness in attunement, melancholy, despair, guilt, conscience, boredom, hope, enthusiasm, gaiety, all designate affects that relate to experiential phenomena that are part of what psychology in continental philosophical thought would account for as being integral to its methods. At the same time such *praxis* involves the role of the psychological analyst as someone who also ponders over their own being in considering the ontological predicaments of the existential situation of the subject of their analysis. This places an emphasis on the *a priori* preconditioning of psychology by fundamental ontology without assuming that the existential analytic of *Dasein* turns into a mode of psychologism, or in positing *Dasein* as subject, ego, person, man, as entailed by a substance-based metaphysics or an analytic philosophy of mind. Moods (*Stimmungen*) are psychical phenomena of temporalizing (*Phänomene der Zeitigung*) that are deducible from temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*); *Sein und Zeit*, §68, pp. 340–341. Malik aimed at explicating the Heideggerian analytics to philosophers who were not accustomed to Heidegger’s thought and parlance; especially in the philosophical milieu at Harvard in the mid-1930s that was influenced by analytic philosophy and pragmatism. Such aspects continue to affect the way Heidegger’s thinking is received in anglophone philosophical settings that go beyond the confines of continental philosophy.

'end', his birth? How are we to conceive [of] man's historicity existentially? How is historical material possible? How is history as [324] *science* possible, and how is it grounded in man's existential historicity? The existential analytic from its very nature is charged through and through with matters of the utmost 'delicacy'; but when it comes to this question of history, and of its meaning in honest human life, the situation becomes for one almost too delicate. It is so upsetting that one will not be able at all to stand it.⁴⁷

The primary historical material is not the historical document or remain, nor the articulate world within which the document had meaning, but the total living man 'who once was there' (*da-gewesen*) (2) and to whose existential constitution this world and that document belonged (3). The historian can do his job properly only as he remembers all the time that the primary object of his concern is existential human nature, with its proper world and its real possibilities.

It is man who is primarily historical, and the things which meet us inside the world – the tools and signs and objects and even the world of nature itself – are historical only in a secondary sense (4). This latter being, which is not of the same nature [as] man, but whose historicity is grounded in that of man, is termed by Heidegger "*Welt-geschichtlich*", namely 'world-historical'.⁴⁸

Since all historicity [finally is grounded] in man's essential historicity, the question becomes pressing: what is this historicity, and how is it grounded in man's existence? This question Heidegger takes up in a remarkable section entitled "*die*

⁴⁷ This state of affairs points to the temporality of fear (*Zeitlichkeit der Furcht*) that discloses the coming of what is threatening, and that is detrimental to the constitution of *Dasein*'s potentiality-for-being. Such disclosure happens by way of everyday circumspection (*alltäglicher Umsicht*); as if expecting an oncoming evil of sorts (*malum futurum*) by fearing the future. Heidegger notes that in the face of such potentiality one backs away in bewilderment, which is as such based on oblivion, and thus gives an existential-temporal meaning to fear. Aristotle took fear to be a kind of depression and bewilderment (λόπη τις ἢ ταραχή; *lupê tis hê tarakhê*); *Sein und Zeit*, §68, p. 341. See Aristotle, *Art of Rhetoric*, trans. J. H. Freese (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1926), Loeb Classical Library 193, B 5, 1382a21 sq. It must be added that in terms of the temporality of attunement (*Die Zeitlichkeit der Befindlichkeit*), *angst* differs from *fear* in the sense that its source springs from the anticipatory resoluteness towards the future, while *fearing* issues from a sense of a lost presence in which *Dasein* is apprehensive, and that hence lets *Dasein* fall prey to what threatens it more than ever. It is in this sense that what is mistaken for *angst* is turned into a depressive *phobia*; *Sein und Zeit*, §68, pp. 344–345.

⁴⁸ Historical (*geschichtlich*) being (*Seyn*), as the hidden ground of the primordial appropriating happening of *Dasein*, is set within a shared destiny or lot (*Geschick*) of a community and a people. The historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*) of *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world does not take the historical as being a recorded objectified chronicled history (*Historie*), but thinks of it from the viewpoint of the truth of being. Heidegger is ultimately focused on the exposition of the existential and ontological problem of history (*Die existenzial-ontologische Exposition des Problems der Geschichte*); *Sein und Zeit*, §72, pp. 372–373.

Grundverfassung der Geschichtlichkeit”, i.e. ‘the fundamental constitution of historicity’ (5).⁴⁹ This is one of the most inspiring sections of the whole book. In it Heidegger discusses the *existential* concepts of heritage, tradition, destiny, lot (*Geschick*), choice, repetition, future.

Man’s historicity is nothing other than a more concrete version of his existential temporality, which was worked out above (6).⁵⁰ The central concept is, as always, decisiveness unto death (*vorlaufende Entschlossenheit*). When [325] I am truly decisive unto death, I face it fearlessly, pass to and touch it, realize *fully* my finitude, and *come back to myself* ‘knowing’ who I am without any distortion. The very desire to distort or exaggerate simply vanishes before *death*. And what do I ‘find’ when I thus come back to myself? I find *myself* in my honest feeling and my honest prejection, I take over decisively and unescapingly my ‘*Da*’ – my thatness and my there-ness, and I throw myself wholeheartedly in the immediate situation of my existence. *Real* possibilities open up before me then, and not dreams and far-off pleasant flights. I content and identify myself joyfully with these possibilities, be they small or great, for I then am reconciled in my heart to the truth that that is *all I can be*. All this belongs essentially to my conscious living ‘in the shadow of death’, and unless you make the effort to snap out of your lostness in the mode of ‘one’, and really [to] face death with me, you will not appreciate what is weighing on my heart at the present moment.

And where do the *real* possibilities with which I then identify and content myself come from? Not from my death (7), for all my death does to me is to determine me to be determined, to open me out for my real possibilities; under the

⁴⁹ *Sein und Zeit*, §74, pp. 382–387. Handing down a heritage as an inheritance is a mode of anticipatory resoluteness in *Dasein*’s historicizing of its being as freed towards its own death, grasping its own existential finitude as such as a *fate* (*Schicksal*). *Dasein* engages in authentic co-historicizing through its being-with-others as part of a community or a people, and by sharing their destiny and lot. It is in this sense that one’s own finite being-in-the-world is historical by precisely anticipating how one’s own being-towards-death leaves posthumous traces with potential implications on posterity. It is not simply an inheritance that we hand down to posterity as heritage, but our worldly being, with its actions or the lack of some of them, is what affects their future in coping with the effects of our own presencing, and the manner we handled what was also inherited from our ancestors. The realm of such impact covers books, manuscripts, buildings, artifacts, policies, institutions, collective traumas, aspirations in praxis, ideas. Our being-in-the-world does not only affect our contemporaries, but it also co-historicizes with them as a people the manner in which we handled an inherited heritage from our ancestors, and how we destined the allotted effects of our dealing with it to posterity.

⁵⁰ Authentic being-towards-death (*Das eigentliche Sein zum Tode*) as the finitude of temporality is the hidden ground of *Dasein*’s historicity (*Grund der Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins*); *Sein und Zeit*, §74, p. 386. This opens up the sphere of thinking about world-history (*Welt-Geschichte*) on the basis of *Dasein*’s historicity. The historicizing of history is mediated through being-in-the-world, wherein *Dasein*’s historicity underpins world-history, like the ecstatic horizons temporalize temporality. World-history encompasses books, fates, edifices, institutions, landscapes, sites of battlefields. Such traces of being-worldly are ontologically grasped as being *world-historical* (*das Welt-Geschichtliche*); *Sein und Zeit*, §74, pp. 388–389.

power of death the crust of abstraction and escape and self-lostness that I have formed about myself thaws, and I am set free to see things (i.e. myself) as they really are. Death confers my freedom, my decisiveness, my sense of reality, my Self, upon me, and as I am thus real and decisive[,] the possibilities which I see and throw myself upon constitute another dimension of my being, which is what Heidegger calls “*Erbe*” (8), and which I translate by the term ‘heritage’.

I see, accept and take over my heritage, into which I am thrown (*geworfen*), with gratitude. For I cannot be authentic and rebel against my being. If I am truly decisive unto death[,] I *appropriate* my heritage so authentically as to find it (whatever it be) a store-house of real possibilities which have [326] handed themselves down (*sich überliefern*) to me *by me*. “*Wenn alles ‘Gute’ Erbschaft ist und der Character der ‘Güte’ in der Ermöglichung eigentlicher Existenz liegt, dann konstituiert sich in der Entschlossenheit je das Überliefern eines Erbes*” (9);⁵¹ which means ‘if all ‘good’ is a matter of heritage, and if the character of goodness lies in making possible authentic existence, then in decisiveness there is always constituted a handing-down of a heritage’. If I am ever decisive, that fact already means that I am the vehicle of a ‘good’ heritage. My decisiveness comprehends me so wholly and absolutely as to bring out in its being whatever ‘good’ heritage I may ‘have’. Consequently, it is by way of my capacity to be decisive that I can [as such] understand and get at ‘my heritage’, and not conversely.⁵²

The more authentic (10) my decisiveness [is], i.e. the more unequivocally I understand myself, as I honestly face my death, in terms of my genuine, personal possibilities, the more unambiguous and unaccidentally is my finding and choosing *the* possibility of my existence. Only my facing and touching my death can purge my chosen possibility of any accident[iality] and provisionality. There is nothing accidental or half-hearted about what (better, who) I then am; I claim and identify myself for good with my possibility. Only my being-free for my death (*Freisein für den Tod*) can possibly give me my absolute purpose in life, and thrust my existence in its finitude.⁵³ This joyfully[-]grasped finitude of my existence tears me violently out of

⁵¹ *Sein und Zeit*, §74, pp. 383–384. If the character of goodness becomes manifest in making authentic existence possible, then the handing-down of an inherited heritage happens through anticipatory resoluteness. If a given heritage makes authentic existence possible, then *Dasein*’s anticipatory resoluteness handles its inheritance from ancestors as that which accentuates authenticity in the midst of its contemporaries, and in destining this to a futural posterity as that which brings authenticity into their lifeworld, insofar as it gives continuity as a tradition. In the thrownness from its birth, *Dasein* inherits a realm of possibilities through what has been handed down from ancestors as worldly prospects, burdens, opportunities, conflicts.

⁵² The resoluteness with which *Dasein* comes back to itself, discloses current factual possibilities of authentic existing by revealing them as heritage. A resolute coming back to thrownness involves handing oneself over to traditional possibilities (*Das entschlossene Zurückkommen auf die Geworfenheit birgt ein Sichüberliefern überkommener Möglichkeiten in sich*); *Sein und Zeit*, §74, p. 383.

⁵³ It is only by the anticipation of death that every accidental and provisional possibility is driven out. Only being-free for death gives *Dasein* its goal outright and pushes its existence

the infinite multiplicity of alluring possibilities of ease and comfort and pleasure and softness and escape and dreaming and self-losing and self-forgetting, and brings me back to *the simplicity of my destiny*.⁵⁴ This is what Heidegger calls the original historicity of *Dasein*; it is that existential character of his being which is grounded in his authentic decisiveness, and which he hands down to himself as an inherited, but at the same time chosen, possibility of his own existence.⁵⁵

Seeing himself in the light of his death, and adopting decisively his destiny [327] in existence, man becomes the free master of his finitude. *Then* accidents and good or bad luck and whatnot can befall him. Fortuitous circumstances blowing driftingly on one can never impart to one a sense of destiny.⁵⁶

The man with destiny exists essentially in the world. His existence, as being-with-others, assumes the character of choosing and having a lot (*Geschick*)⁵⁷ with these others. This lot or fortune is the historicity of society. It asserts itself through communication and struggle. The full, authentic historicity of man arises both from his having (being) a personal destiny and from his staking this destiny in and for his generation (11).

Destiny (*Schicksal*),⁵⁸ as defined above, requires as the condition of its possibility the ontological constitution of care; i.e. it requires temporality. A being can exist as a being with destiny only if death, guilt, conscience, decision, freedom and finitude constitute the grounds of his being (*Sein*). Such a being will be, in the essence of his existence, historical (12).

Because (as we have shown above (13))⁵⁹ of the preeminent role which the future plays in man's temporality, the essential character of historicity lies neither in

into facing its finitude (*Nur das Freisein für den Tod gibt dem Dasein das Ziel schlechthin und stößt die Existenz in ihre Endlichkeit*); *Sein und Zeit*, §74, p. 384.

⁵⁴ Once *Dasein* grasps the finitude of its own existence (*Endlichkeit der Existenz*), it becomes motivated to snatch itself back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities that offer themselves in the mode of comfortable shirking or taking things lightly. It would thus bring itself into the simplicity of its destiny and fate (*Schicksal*); *Sein und Zeit*, §74, p. 384.

⁵⁵ This designates *Dasein's* primordial historicizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness in which *Dasein* hands itself down to itself as *free for death* (*frei für den Tod*); *Sein und Zeit*, §74, p. 384.

⁵⁶ *Dasein* reaches its authenticity by the blows of fate, only because in the depths of its being, *Dasein* is its own fate; *Sein und Zeit*, §74, p. 384.

⁵⁷ A more common rendering in English would suggest 'destiny' for the German term '*Geschick*' in reference to the irresolute mode of being, and 'fate' for '*Schicksal*' in indication of resoluteness; see, for instance, the use of these terms in *Sein und Zeit*, §74, p. 384. Heidegger differentiates between these two synonymous terms. *Schicksal* as *fate* is the destiny of the resolute *Dasein*, while *Geschick* as *destiny* is the lot of the irresolute one in being absorbed by what is not authentically their ownmost existential destining but that of others with vicissitude.

⁵⁸ *Schicksal* as *fate* is a destining of the resolute *Dasein*, while *Geschick* as *destiny* is the lot of the irresolute one. See note 1 on p. 436 of the 1962 English translation of *Sein und Zeit* by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson.

⁵⁹ It is worth noting that throughout this section, Malik offers his own English translation directly from *Sein und Zeit*, and at times this is not merely a paraphrasing but an immediate

the past nor in the present, but in the future. It is only as man can come to himself (i.e. only as he *is* his futurity)[,] that he can be authentically historical. The importance of the past in history is conferred upon it from this original pre-eminence of the future, because a man who has faced his death, and therefore 'become' his futurity, will then necessarily fall back upon his prejection, which is the horizon and locus of his pastness (14).⁶⁰

This is all authentic historicity.⁶¹ Unauthentic historicity, on the other hand, is when 'one' dominates existence (15). It is self-forgetfulness, and self-interpretation in terms of the passage of events 'out-there'. It is marked by distractedness. It fastens interest on front-page news, and can never begin its way without reading the morning newspaper at the breakfast [328] table. Circumstances, opportunities, chances, these are what unauthentic historicity knows about and waits for. One's fate is the product of circumstances and conditions. One understands one's history not in terms of personal decisive existence, but in terms of the *things* one cares about. Unauthentic historicity is when one looks through the window with great expectations for the mailman twice a day, and when one is sorry [that] there is no mail delivery on Sunday. It is when one waits and waits for the great explosion to happen in Europe,⁶² in the self-relieving hope that the burden of existence will thereby 'somehow' be lightened. It is the craving for change, for change's sake. When one is thus distracted by his preoccupations and businesses, and is dispersed all over the place, one of course finds no connexity, no coherence (*Zusammenhang*) in one's life: nothing bears fruit, nothing 'hangs together', nothing comes to a

translation from the German text. In most cases, Malik's renderings are close enough to the English translations that were published decades after he wrote his doctoral thesis, be it the Macquarrie and Robinson version, or the one by Stambaugh. This further reveals the merits of Malik's own text in being a testimony to the early anglophone reception of *Sein und Zeit*, especially as it unfolded at Harvard University in the 1930s. The fact that Malik faced difficulties in rendering the complex Heideggerian German phraseology into English was not only his predicament, but it continues to challenge commentators of Heidegger. Macquarrie and Robinson continuously highlighted such difficulties in translation in the footnotes of their version of *Being and Time*.

⁶⁰ Only *Dasein*, as an entity *qua* being (*Seiendes*), which, in its being (*Sein*), is essentially *futural* (*wesenhaft zukünftig*), and is as such free for its own death (*frei für seinen Tod*), and can let itself be thrown back upon its factual *here/there* (*Da*) by shattering itself against death. *Dasein* is equiprimordially what has-been (*als zukünftiges gleichursprünglich gewesen*) when it handles itself as a past to be inherited, whereby its thrownness (*Geworfenheit*) is taken over as a moment of vision (*augenblicklich*) within its own time (*seine Zeit*); *Sein und Zeit*, §74, p. 385.

⁶¹ Only authentic temporality, which is at the same time finite, makes possible something like fate; namely authentic historicity (*Nur eigentliche Zeitlichkeit, die zugleich endlich ist, macht so etwas wie Schicksal, das heißt eigentliche Geschichtlichkeit möglich*); *Sein und Zeit*, §74, p. 385. Authentic being-towards-death, that is to say, the finitude of temporality, is the hidden ground of *Dasein's* historicity (*Das eigentliche Sein zum Tode, das heißt die Endlichkeit der Zeitlichkeit, ist der verborgene Grund der Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins*); *Sein und Zeit*, §74, p. 386.

⁶² This is a telling remark that signals the mood that is felt in Europe, and that Malik would have witnessed during his visit to Germany, and in his ponderings over the news that followed his sojourn there and its aftermath.

head.⁶³ Then one, feeling in the depths of his being the unmistakable call of his conscience, begins with great noise to raise questions about the unity and meaning of life. You can be sure that whenever people talk much about the unity and connexity of human life, they are in the depths of their being in a state of distractedness and indecision about *themselves*, and that their loud talk merely registers the fact that they are alive to the voice of their conscience. If they let this voice be fully heard, if they do not at once slip into a state of gossipy, rationalistic talk about the ‘unity and meaning of life’, if they gather themselves up into a mode of being of authentic decisiveness, then they will snap back into their real historicity, whereby, free of any self-flight and of any illusions about themselves and about the world, they become free for their authentic possibilities which they draw out of their authentic heritage.⁶⁴

⁶³ As if it were indeed the case that *Dasein*’s inauthentic historicity (*die uneigentliche Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins*) directed Heidegger’s thinking in *Sein und Zeit* (§74, p. 387) towards the question of the constitution of the *connectedness of life* (*Zusammenhang des Lebens*) and the nexus of life (*Lebenszusammenhang*), which also suggests an influence on the Husserlian phenomenological conception of contextualizing the lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*) from the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey. Heidegger’s own approach in phenomenology integrated insights from Dilthey’s hermeneutics that orientated his own critique of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction that brackets the world rather than focusing on immediate lived experiencing. Heidegger stated in this regard that ‘it becomes plain in what sense the preparatory existential-temporal analytic of *Dasein* is resolved to foster the spirit of Count Yorck in the service of Dilthey’s work’ (*So wird deutlich, in welchem Sinne die vorbereitende existenzial-zeitliche Analytik des Daseins entschlossen ist, den Geist des Grafen Yorck zu pflegen, um dem Werke Diltheys zu dienen*); *Sein und Zeit*, §77, p. 404. Heidegger referred in this regard to the philosopher Count Hans Ludwig Paul Yorck von Wartenburg, who engaged in longstanding collaborations with Dilthey. Further reflections on Dilthey’s thoughts are to be found in Heidegger’s essay ‘Wilhelm Dilthey’s research and the struggle for a historical worldview (1925)’, published in *Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond*, ed. John van Buren (New York: State University of New York Press, 2002), pp. 147–176. For a wider discussion of this matter, see Robert C. Scharff, *Heidegger Becoming Phenomenological: Interpreting Husserl Through Dilthey, 1916–1925* (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2019); Eric S. Nelson, ‘Heidegger and Dilthey: A Difference in Interpretation’, *Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger*, ed. (2018), pp. 129–134; Jacob Owensby, ‘Dilthey’s Conception of the Life-Nexus’, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (1987): 557–572; Rudolf A. Makkreel, ‘Husserl, Dilthey and the Relation of the Life-World to History’, *Research in Phenomenology*, Vol. 12 (1982): 39–58.

⁶⁴ The relation with others in everydayness is that of being-absorbed-with-one-another in the world, wherein *Dasein* must be gripped within certain limits by another *Dasein* by way of empathy; *Sein und Zeit*, §47, p. 240. However, no one can take the other’s dying away, even if someone goes to death for others in self-sacrifice. This is the sense that was historically attributed to the witnessing testimonial of martyrdom. I discussed this elsewhere in Nader El-Bizri, ‘Being-towards-death: On Martyrdom and Islam’, *Cristianismo nella storia: Ricerche storiche esegetiche teologiche*, Vol. 27 (2006): 249–279. Such a mode of being-with-others takes the form of being-for-others in being-towards-death. This resolute intention of safeguarding a communal destiny goes beyond the bounds of everyday attitudes of tranquilization and estrangement (*Beruhigung und Entfremdung*) that characterize the mode of falling prey (*Die Seinsart des Verfallens*) to the *They-self* (*Das Man*) as a flight (*Flucht*) from death. Being-for-others, in co-historicizing the history of a people (be it nationalistic, proletarian, patriotic, or religious) can turn into a mode of self-sacrifice, by *holding-for-true* something (*Für-wahrhalten*); *Sein und Zeit*, §58, p. 285; and §§50–53, pp. 250–267. This counters the critique that

On this total existential basis Heidegger proceeds to found the possibility of world-history, of the history of things in the world, of natural history, of the connexity of human life and of *history as science*.⁶⁵ I shall not take [329] up here any of these fascinating (and highly disturbing) topics (16). I have aimed in this section only at setting forth the existential grounds of man's historicity. I shall only conclude by saying that the remarks Heidegger makes (17) about the possibility of history as science are of the utmost importance to those historians who may have the free conscience to be determined in their historicizing, not to forget themselves.⁶⁶ These remarks have also served to open my eyes disturbingly to myself and to lots of things in the Western World.⁶⁷

Section VI

The Time of Daily Life

All aspects or functions of time [are finally grounded] in the temporality of man. How is the vulgar, astronomical, chronometrical conception of time possible? How do clocks, calendars, etc., arise?

Levinas directed at Heidegger's existential analytic of *Dasein* and its supposedly impersonal solitary character of being-alone (*esseudé; Alleinsein*) as it stands *side-to-side (côte à côte)* with others, around a common project. It is rather by turning being-with others into an authentic being-for-others in parenting, charity, hospitality, or self-sacrifice in how *Dasein* may assume its dying upon itself for the sake of others. However, being-for-one-another (*Füreinander*) can become a mode of being against (*das Wider*) an-other in times of competition, or of open strife, conflict, resistance, revolt, insurgency. Being-with-others can become marked by hate and violence in being against one another (*Widereinandesein*); I discussed this in El-Bizri, 'Uneasy Meditations following Levinas', *art. cit.*; El-Bizri, 'Ontological Meditations on Tillich and Heidegger', *art. cit.*; El-Bizri, 'Variations ontologiques autour du concept d'angoisse chez Kierkegaard', *art. cit.*

⁶⁵ *Sein und Zeit* §75 deals with *Dasein's* historicity and world-history (*Die Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins und die Welt-Geschichte*).

⁶⁶ Namely that the *historicizing of history* is historicizing one's own mode of being-in-the-world (*Geschehen der Geschichte ist Geschehen des In-der-Welt-seins*), since *Dasein's* historicity is essentially the historicity of the world (*Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins ist wesenhaft Geschichtlichkeit von Welt*); *Sein und Zeit*, §75, p. 388.

⁶⁷ One can only speculate about what the 'disturbing topics' that Malik alludes to are, or what is disclosed 'disturbingly' about himself and concerning 'a lot of things in the Western world'. This is coming from a pioneering Lebanese who is absorbing Heidegger's thought in the mid-1930s at the time of the rise of Nazism with the threat of a coming global war, all while being a doctoral candidate at Harvard University under the mentorship of Whitehead; added to this must be the background escalation of strife in historical Palestine and an intensification of the patriotic drive for independence in Lebanon. These situations offer manifold aspects for speculating about what Malik found vexing in the reflection on history and heritage and how the biographical is interwoven with the philosophical penchant. I discuss this elsewhere in Nader El-Bizri, 'A Levantine Reception of Heidegger', in *Heidegger and the Islamicate World* (New Heidegger Research Series), eds. Kata Moser and Urs Gösken (London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2018).

The last chapter of *Sein und Zeit* takes up an existential discussion of this question.⁶⁸ Limitations both of ‘space and time’ forbid me from treating this important discussion here adequately.

It is not difficult to see, if you keep steadfastly in mind the existential point of view, that every matter connected with time must ‘somehow’ spring from man’s existence, which is essentially temporal. The difficulty arises in showing phenomenally *exactly how* (i.e. in the *Aufzeigung*) the various roles time plays in factual human life – the clocks, the time-tables, the appointments, the time-signals, dating, time-planning, etc. – are essentially bound up with man’s original temporality.⁶⁹

The chief character of the time of daily existence is that it is some [330] kind of continuum in which things and events arise and perish. It is this character of ‘inness’ which is intended by the word ‘*Innerzeitigkeit*’ with which Heidegger designates this kind of time. Accordingly, the things which are ‘in time’ are spoken of as ‘*innerzeitig*’. These things cannot be temporal in the original sense in which man is temporal; but their ‘*Innerzeitigkeit*’ [is grounded] in man’s existential temporality.

Scientists and historians speak of the ‘time-factor’; but more original than this abstract, scientific ‘time-factor’, which is met with in science, history and nature, is the fact that man already before any theoretical interest ‘reckons with time’ and adjusts his affairs in accordance with it (1). In fact[,] the abstract time of the scientists is itself rooted in this more concrete time of daily existence. Thus[,] in the end[,] Heidegger distinguishes five different fundamental concepts connected with time: *Zeitlichkeit*, *Zeitigung*, *Geschichtlichkeit*, *Innerzeitigkeit* and the abstract time of science. (i) *Zeitlichkeit*, or [t]emporality, is the meaning of man’s existence; it is the final existential framework on which everything about man must in the end be projected; it is what makes man’s being as care possible; it is not a being, but the condition of the possibility of man’s being (2); this fundamental temporality I took up in section iii above. (ii) The term ‘*Zeitigung*’, or temporalization, is the only appropriate term to be used in connection with temporality; this latter ‘is not’, but temporalizes itself;

⁶⁸ The final chapter of *Sein und Zeit* (VI) is entitled *Zeitlichkeit und Innerzeitigkeit als Ursprung des vulgären Zeitbegriffes* (‘Temporality and within-time-ness as the source of the ordinary conception of time’). The existential analytic takes into account *Dasein*’s reckoning with time in an elemental comportment that precedes the use of any measuring equipment by which ordinary chronological/objective *time* could be determined. *Dasein*’s experiencing of time is grasped within the existential horizon of understanding being as encountered in worldliness in terms of what is ready-to-hand and present-at-hand; *Sein und Zeit*, §78, pp. 404–405. Heidegger appealed to Hegel’s way of taking the relationship between time and spirit (*Zeit und Geist*) as an elucidation of what is deepened in the existential-ontological interpretation of *Dasein*’s temporality (*Zeitlichkeit des Daseins*), and of world-time (*Weltzeit*), as well as the explication of the source of the vulgar *qua* ordinary conception of time (*Ursprungs des vulgären Zeitbegriffes*); *Sein und Zeit*, §78, p. 405 (Heidegger further elaborates on the Hegelian thesis in *Sein und Zeit* §82).

⁶⁹ This is determined by way of *Dasein*’s temporality (*Die Zeitlichkeit des Daseins*) in the manner in which it is essentially ahead of itself (*wesenhaft ihm selbst vorweg*) and by projecting itself upon its potentiality-for-being (*Seinkönnen*) as thrown in the world; in *Sein und Zeit*, §79, p. 406.

the two most original modes of temporalization are authentic temporalization and unauthentic temporalization; every other existential structure of man [is grounded] in its own peculiar mode of temporalization; this whole matter was taken up above in sections iii and iv. (iii) *Geschichtlichkeit*, or historicity, was discussed in the previous section; there it was shown how historicity, as an ontological constitution (*Seinsverfassung*) of man's existence, [is grounded] in temporality. (iv) *Innerzeitigkeit*, or the time of daily life, is the time which belongs to [331] all the beings – on-hand, at-hand, nature, what[ever] – which are not of the nature of man; in this section I say [a] few words about this type of time. (v) Finally[,] there is the theoretical time of astronomy and science which [is grounded] in,⁷⁰ but which further abstracts from, the time of ordinary existence.⁷¹

Heidegger discusses in [a] straightforward, phenomenological description the following temporal phenomena which characterize our daily existence: taking time, or giving time to oneself; losing time; later, formerly, now; today, tomorrow, yesterday; dates and dating; intervals and spans and durations of time – ‘it takes me two weeks to do this job’; X always ‘has’ time to do what he wants, whereas Y never seems to ‘have enough’ time to do what he wants; the sun, its light and warmth; day and night; clocks and their various kinds; ‘what time is it?’; time-reckoning (*Zeitrechnung*), and time as popularly understood (*Weltzeit*). In all these phenomena[,] Heidegger shows that the time [that is] meant belongs to tools and signs and things on-hand. Since the being (*Sein*) of these things is disclosed in connection with man's world, and since man is essentially in-the-world, the time of these phenomena is finally rooted in man's original existential temporality.⁷²

⁷⁰ The astronomical and calendrical time-reckoning (*astronomische und kalendarische Zeitrechnung*) has its own existential-ontological necessity in the basic state of *Dasein* as care (*Grundverfassung des Daseins als Sorge*); *Sein und Zeit*, §80, p. 411. *Dasein* historicizes from one day to another in terms of interpreting time by way of dating it through the movement in distinctive places in the sky of the heavenly body that emanates light and radiates warmth (sunrise, noon, sunset). Along with the temporality of *Dasein* as thrown (*geworfenen*), abandoned to the world, and giving itself time (*zeitgebenden*), something like a clock (*Uhr*) is disclosed and discovered as what is *ready-to-hand* (*Zuhandenes*), which in its regular recurrence has become accessible in one's making-present awaitingly (*das in seiner regelmäßigen Wiederkehr im gegenwärtigen Gegenwärtigen zugänglich geworden ist*). The measurement of time, and the explicit making of time public, and as an object of concern, all are grounded in the temporality of *Dasein*, which itself is the clock; *Sein und Zeit*, §80, pp. 413–416.

⁷¹ *Dasein* cares, awaits, retains, and makes-present (*Das gegenwärtig-behaltend-gegenwärtigende Besorgen 'läßt sich' so oder so Zeit und gibt sich diese besorgend an, auch ohne jede und vor aller spezifisch rechnenden Zeitbestimmung*) in the ecstatic equiprimordiality of the future that is awaited with anticipation, the past as what has been, and presencing as the fallen state in the world. *Dasein* gives itself time in taking care even without determining time by any specific reckoning and prior to what can be reckoned about timing. When *Dasein* is living along in an everyday concerned caring way, it just never understands itself as running in a continuously enduring succession of pure nows (*Gerade im alltäglich besorgenden 'Dahinleben' versteht sich das Dasein nie als entlang laufend an einer kontinuierlich währenden Abfolge der puren 'jetzt'*); *Sein und Zeit*, §79, p. 409.

⁷² This is what Heidegger aimed at demonstrating in his interpretation of time through the existential analytic of *Dasein*, in contrast with what he attributes to the classical metaphysical

All these phenomena fall within the orbit of total human life. This life *is* either authentic[ally] or unauthentic[ally], and in either case man is essentially projected in his world, self-projected ahead of himself and immediately attending to this or that object of his concern. He also is essentially with-others, so that he is unthinkable apart from this mode of his being. Finding himself in his world and among others[,] he *can* (and first and foremost actually does) merge himself in the world and lose himself in the mode of 'one'. It is only by keeping in mind this total concrete picture of yourself that you can understand the meaning of any of these phenomena. It is man's ecstatic temporality in his actual existence – which is such that every one of its issues, every one of its modes of being, involves it as a whole, in [332] the sense of 'to be or not to be' – which is bodily presupposed in any temporal phenomenon referring to things arising, enduring and perishing 'in time'.

Your total being takes on a special temporalization (*Zeitigungsart*) when you are primarily attending to your world. Your future is one of waiting and waiting (3); your past is one of holding on to something; and your present is one of losing yourself in the immediate affairs of your life. All three ecstasies are, as always, equally open within your being; but your present as within this ecstatic unity, [is] a pre-eminence. Because you are merged in the immediate objects of your concern, you understand yourself in terms of your world. The more waiting man merges himself in the objects of his concern, and therefore forgets himself, the more is his time, which he 'allows' himself, in its essence concealed from him (4). To exist this way is to exist unauthentically and indecisively. 'I have no time' is the characteristic saying of an indecisive person who, losing himself in his many preoccupations, has therewith also lost his time (5). While the unauthentically and indecisively existing person always loses time and never 'has' time, the temporality of authentic existence, on the other hand, is distinguished precisely by the fact that in its decisiveness[,] it never loses time and it 'always has time'. For this latter temporality has, in respect of its present, the character of the Kierkegaardian moment of decision (*Augenblick*).⁷³ This mode of being of the present means that you do not confront your

tradition, which he considers from the standpoint of his reading in Chapter VI of *Sein und Zeit* of commentaries on the conceptions of time by Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Kant, and Hegel. It is worth noting that the ground upon which Hegel has explicitly provided a connection between time and spirit is suited to elucidate the interpretation of *Dasein* as temporality. Heidegger examines as such the ontological connections between temporality, *Dasein*, and world-time, while linking this in *Sein und Zeit* §82 with the relation between time and spirit (*Zeit und Geist*) as it figured in the second section of Hegel's *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften)* under the title 'Philosophy of Nature' (*Philosophie der Natur*).

⁷³ The irresoluteness of inauthentic existence temporalizes itself in the mode of making-present that does not await but forgets. The irresolute *Dasein* understands itself in terms of the closest events and be-fallings that are encountered in making-present and thrust upon its being. This indicates a busy losing of itself in the objects of quotidian concern, and hence losing time as well. The characteristic of such inauthenticity is that of 'having no time!' ('I have no time'; *ich habe keine Zeit*), since it is a mode of constantly losing time. As for the authentic temporality of resoluteness (*Zeitlichkeit der Entschlossenheit*), it 'always has time' (*[hat] immer*

immediate situation by letting it overwhelm you, but rather by seeing it in the light of your authentic future and your authentic past; it is holding yourself fast in your genuine personal future and in your genuine personal past which saves you from being just lost in your immediate world. Extending itself authentically and self-holdingly over its entire historical temporality, this mode of existence 'always' has time 'for' that which the situation demands of it. The decisive person never lets his world so confront him as to compel him to lose inde-[333]cisively his time at it. Taking time and losing time belong to people whose time is allotted to them, and not to those who control their own time themselves.⁷⁴

This is all I *have* 'time and space' [for] to expound [on] Heidegger's metaphysics of time in this dissertation.⁷⁵

Zeit), and its relation to its present has the anticipatory character of a *moment of vision* (*de[r] Charakter des Augenblicks*); *Sein und Zeit*, §79, p. 410.

⁷⁴ In the seminar of 1936 on Schelling, Heidegger offers an analysis of the average quotidian evasion of the moment of vision and resoluteness (when past and future come together in the present), and the flight from wresting the truth of being-towards-death authentically. The average attitude of everydayness recognizes its own complacency in such a lack of resolute anticipation without further ado. Only a few are capable of rising and attaining such authentic resoluteness in terms of their decisive self-knowledge over their own being. This is a momentous act that is nearly that of heroism in standing within the openness of the truth of history, and the perdurance (*Inständigkeit*) that carries out what it must sustain prior to any calculation or reckoning. This is a lucid knowing of the uniqueness of the existence that *Dasein* takes upon itself with steadfast resolve, with a deep-seated certainty that remains silent and unmoved by its own realization of its moment of greatness. It stands in the openness of truth without disclosing or saying what it wants or what it knows; it is being *here/there* in the world without fear. See Martin Heidegger, *Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1985), esp. pp. 155–158 (*Schellings Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit*).

⁷⁵ In the existential-temporal analytic of *Dasein* (*Die existenzial-zeitliche Analytik des Daseins*) in the fundamental ontological (*fundamentalontologische*) elucidation of the meaning of being, the temporalizing of temporality is the ground upon which the sense of being (*Seinssinn*) is interpreted, wherein time is manifested as the horizon of being (*Horizont des Seins*); *Sein und Zeit*, §83, pp. 436–437.

[Appendix]*

* Malik's hermeneutic interpretation of Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* reached its conclusion on page [333] of his doctoral thesis. As noted earlier, the treatment of the conception of time in the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead within the major part of the thesis has been published separately (Malik, *The Systems of Whitehead's Metaphysics, op. cit.*), while Chapter IX of the thesis deals partly with a comparison between Heidegger and Whitehead, with a significant part of Section II focusing on Whitehead, and Section III offering Malik's own remarks on the comparative topic at hand. Taking these aspects into account, it was preferable to set the rest of the text of the thesis as an 'Appendix' in order to demarcate its separation with more clarity from Malik's direct engagement with Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*, and also to accommodate the emphasis within its contents on Whitehead's process philosophy. This was undertaken as a compromise between leaving out Chapter IX altogether, or forcing its content on the thematic focus on *Sein und Zeit* that was covered on pages [256–333] (Chapters VII–VIII) of the thesis.

Chapter IX

The Existential Basis of the Cosmology of Process

Section I

Certain Comparisons

I am treading here on dangerous ground. At the risk not only of expressing trivialities, but also of appearing somewhat superficial and external, I venture to suggest the following broad comparisons between Professors Whitehead and Heidegger.¹

Both philosophers are ontologists. The problem of being is their primary concern. Everything else – knowledge, science, morals, religion – is subordinate to the problem of being[,] and must be shown by philosophy to spring from the nature of things. Both require that being be so conceived that in its essence[,] it guarantees our access to it; also our knowledge of it as well as our ignorance and error. In this respect, both are pre-eminently Greek in their outlook. This general characterization, after what is said above in this thesis, is so obviously true about the two philosophers that it is unnecessary to support it by reference to particular doctrines. Professor Whitehead seeks what is *actual*, the completest being; Professor Heidegger inquires after the *Sein* of things, and of its meaning in general.²

¹ What troubled Malik about comparative philosophy remains a tortuous task to establish given the differences between the schools of philosophizing that separate the analytic philosophers from their continental counterparts. This may have been more labyrinthine when comparing Whitehead with Heidegger, with the principal challenge of interpreting the Heideggerian notions at this very early phase in the reception of *Sein und Zeit* within the anglophone context, along with the burden of translating it.

² The main challenge that faces Malik's reading is that while he brought Heidegger's thought into an anglophone context, and situated it close to Whitehead's metaphysics, he interacted more closely with Whitehead than Heidegger. Moreover, while Whitehead's thought on time might have been accounted for in the major part of the thesis, Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* was explicated in a shorter section of it. Another factor to add to the difficulties of a comparison is that Heidegger might have viewed Whitehead's philosophy as still marked by classical ontology even if he did not focus on it as a theme of his critical ponderings over the oblivion of the determination of the meaning, truth, and place of being. It is also the case that many Heideggerians may not have been well predisposed to such a comparative task, and they would have adopted a critique of Whitehead on Heideggerian grounds (we perhaps sense some resonances with this in what Malik daringly presents in his hermeneutics hereinafter). As Malik highlighted with clarity and praiseworthy prudence on page [337] of his thesis concerning the similarities and dissimilarities between Heidegger and Whitehead: *'Let there be no illusions about what I am saying. The differences hidden underneath these more or less superficial similarities are of greater importance than these similarities themselves. The two philosophers have never read each other. They spring from entirely different backgrounds, different not only in language and nation, but also in personal experience and training'*. He added on that same page: *'I*

Both philosophers are fundamentally actuated by the belief that time holds somehow the key to the mysteries of the universe. To both *being is in the end essentially temporal*. Both speak of the ‘final constitution’ of being, and in ascertaining what this constitution (*Verfassung*) is, both are in advance oriented primarily towards time. To the one, time is process or [335] an abstraction from process, and process is the ontological constitution of actuality; to the other, time is the meaning of human existence, and therefore the transcendental horizon of the question of being in general (*der transzendente Horizont der Frage nach dem Sein*) (1).

Both look on ‘concrete experience’ as the only repository of truth; but whereas to Professor Whitehead this concept finally boils down to something aesthetic and cosmological, to Professor Heidegger the phenomena are all how man honestly lives. It is man’s being ‘throughout his life’, and his caring for and protection of this being, which is the object of Heidegger’s primary concern. But although concreteness means in the one case something cosmological and aesthetic, and in the other something moral and existential, both want fundamentally to turn their backs against the abstractions of the scientists and the philosophers, and to face what, according to their different lights, is genuinely and refreshingly concrete.

Both conceive the proper method of philosophy to be description. But Professor Whitehead is not as consistent in applying this method as Professor Heidegger is. Professor Whitehead begins his chief metaphysical work with a “speculative scheme”, and says that the framing of such a scheme, and the unflinching exploratory “interpretation of experience in terms of this scheme”, constitute “the true method of philosophical construction” (2). The unity of this scheme is what I worked out in this thesis and entitled the one-many world. Thus[,] Professor Whitehead leaves the strong impression that he is dominated in his description of experience by a presupposed one-many background of structure, while Professor Heidegger, on account of his conscious adoption of the phenomenological method, seeks everywhere direct facts about human nature. For instance, when he interrogates life and finds it to be a tangled tissue of care and self-flight and death and finite temporality, I do not believe anybody can question this conclusion; [336] but you can raise doubt after doubt about God’s consequent nature,³ the

have no desire at present to bring the two philosophies together. Such a desire [would] mean some form of childishness. It [would spell] hurriedness of spirit, which is very bad. It would also [mean] a superficial externalism towards both. It [would signify], further, that I have missed the central point of all philosophy, namely, that a philosopher’s philosophy, to the extent that it is genuine, i.e. his own, is primarily his own way of relieving his heart of a burden weighing on it’. Moreover, and tellingly, we read on page [338] of Malik’s thesis: ‘I find myself more truly in Professor Heidegger’s than in Professor Whitehead’s philosophy’; and in a spirit of integrity as a thinker who stands on his own, or who is discovering his own unique philosophical voice, Malik adds: ‘I do not quite find myself in either philosophy’.

³ The reflection on divinity in Heidegger’s thought occurs in a more evident way after *Sein und Zeit*. This figures, for instance, in the meditations on dwelling in *Bauen Wohnen Denken* (Building Dwelling Thinking; in *Vorträge und Aufsätze, op. cit.*, pp. 145–162; specifically in the consideration of the gathering of the fourfold (*das Geviert*) *earth-sky-divinities-mortals* (*Erde*

function of eternal objects, the sort of ‘feelings’ atoms may have in the center of Jupiter, the doctrine that the Self is a “personal society of occasions”, the doctrine that consciousness is *nothing but* a subjective form, etc.

To both, feeling and possibility play a most crucial role. But here, too, the fundamental difference between cosmological and existential initial orientation makes all the difference in the final significance of these two concepts. “*Befindlichkeit*”⁴ and “*Geworfenheit*” cannot mean the same thing as ‘physical feeling’ or ‘physical prehension’;⁵ although both philosophers interpret these concepts on a background of pastness: what you feel physically must be ‘in’ your past, and ‘*Befindlichkeit*’ temporalizes itself out of your existential pastness. As to possibility, hardly any feature can be pointed out that is of greater importance to both philosophers. Possibility is of the essence of actuality; it is God’s ordered reaction on the appetitive past; it is what is meant by the mental functionings; it is the notion of the effective agency of novel eternal objects. To Heidegger, nothing is more important in man’s being than the *Sichvorweg* existential character of care⁶ – always

und Himmel, die Göttlichen und die Sterblichen) into their essential oneness in dwelling. This resonates with Heidegger’s *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Contributions to Philosophy)* where he notes that a people are only a people when they receive their history as apportioned by the finding of their God, and precisely in the midst of the distress from the abandonment of being (*Seinsverlassenheit*) in a flight of the gods (*Flucht der Götter*). Ultimately, what belongs to the essence of a people is grounded in the historicity of those who belong to themselves out of belonging to a god (*das Wesen des Volkes gründet in der Geschichtlichkeit der Sichgehörenden aus der Zugehörigkeit zu dem Gott*); Martin Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie: Vom Ereignis* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989), §§251–254. This accords with Heidegger’s reflections on Rilke’s call ‘*Jetzt wär es Zeit, daß Götter träten aus bewohnten Dingen*’ (‘now it is time that gods emerge from things by which we dwell’); Rilke, *Gesammelte Werke, Band II, op. cit.* p. 185.

- ⁴ *Befindlichkeit* is usually rendered in English as ‘disposedness’ or ‘attunement’, wherein *Dasein* is always and already disposed towards one or the other existential modes of being-in-the-world (*In-der-Welt-sein*). *Befindlichkeit* entails a mood (*Stimmung*) that discloses *Dasein*’s *Geworfenheit* as a thrownness into its *Da*, namely there/here in the world, and precisely in being-towards-death. Albeit, for most of their affects, *Dasein*’s moods close off the meditation on such a predicament by avoiding to think about *being* as a thrownness towards *not being*. It is in *angst* that the fundamental disclosure of *Dasein*’s thrownness lies, whereby its being-in-the-world is confronted by nothingness, wherein it finds itself in its uncanniness alone with itself, and not at home; *Sein und Zeit*, §57, pp. 276–277.
- ⁵ ‘Prehension’ designates an un-cognitive pre-epistemic apprehension that refers to an *a priori* non-sensory awareness in perception without presupposing cognition, or a co-entanglement with a cognitive act, or with a form of knowledge in grasping the ambient environment and entities within it. The internalized aspects of prehension are considered in the context of externalized co-historicized relations with others.
- ⁶ This points to *Dasein*’s *being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-the-world (Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in-einer-Welt; Sein und Zeit*, §41, p. 192). The primary moment of care (*Sorge*), its temporal investment, is that of *Dasein*’s being *ahead-of-itself (Sichvorweg)*, in the sense of always existing for the sake of itself, and being as such related to its potentiality-of-being (*Seinkönnen*). A constant unfinished quality lies in the essence of the constitution of *Dasein*; since as long as *Dasein* is, it has never attained its wholeness (*Gänze*). Rather, *Dasein* reaches its wholeness in death; *Sein und Zeit*, §§46–47, pp. 236, 238. Death is accordingly the ownmost nonrelational, certain, and as such, indefinite, and not to be bypassed, possibility of *Dasein (Der Tod als*

ahead of yourself, always your possibilities, always seeing and understanding yourself and everything (whether authentically or not) in the light of these possibilities. I have again and again felt that Professor Whitehead's important 'two-poles doctrine' of concrescent activity is the cosmological, abstract version of the much more concrete, existential structure of care that Heidegger is talking about.

Other minor similarities (such as the strain of irrationalism evident in both, the fact that both describe *general* structures applying to what they consider full real, etc.) all flow from these five fundamental similarities.

[337] Let there be no illusions about what I am saying. The differences hidden underneath these more or less superficial similarities are of greater importance than these similarities [are of greater importance than these similarities] themselves. The two philosophers [have] never read each other. They spring from entirely different backgrounds, different not only in language and nation, but also in personal experience and training. Professor Whitehead philosophizes with a distinct[ly] mathematical-scientific background; Professor Heidegger with a complete immersion in the Greeks and in scholastic and German philosophy. The immediate occasion of experience is what is most real to Professor Whitehead; man, living and suffering and worrying about his existence, is the final standard of all reality to Professor Heidegger. But to both great thinkers, it is time and temporal characters which somehow finally constitute being.

Section II

The Phenomenal Basis of Cosmology

I have no desire at present to bring the two philosophies together. Such a desire [would] mean some form of childishness. It [would spell] hurriedness of spirit, which is very bad. It [would] also [mean] a superficial externalism towards both. It signifies, further, that I have missed the central point of all philosophy, namely, that a philosopher's philosophy, to the extent that it is genuine, i.e. his own, is primarily his own way of relieving his heart of a burden weighing on it.⁷ Here are two great men who have felt things deeply, and who have expressed them in a

Ende des Daseins ist die eigenste, unbezüglche, gewisse und also solche unbestimmte, unüberholbare Möglichkeit des Daseins; Sein und Zeit, §52, p. 259).

⁷ This is Heideggerian in spirit given that *Befindlichkeit* yields access to what underpins thought authentically. This is stated more clearly on page [338] when Malik notes that he finds himself more truly 'in Professor Heidegger's than in Professor Whitehead's philosophy', and that this is the case given that Heidegger's thought 'is more personal', and gives him 'a deeper grasp' of his 'own being', and therefore affords him a more 'self-relieving possibility of expression'. He adds on pages [344–345] that *Dasein* is the final *res vera*, and not an 'occasion of experience' *constructed* on the more or less abstract model of the one/many world, thus further affirming his Heideggerian leaning. Accordingly, a philosopher feels restless when thinking as a mortal delivered to finitude and death, and assuming as such an anticipatory imagining through a temporalization out of what is its *futural past*.

masterly way. Great philosophy like this is more like great art, which you may grasp as a whole, or not grasp at all. Your clever, critical, ‘combining and reconciling’ nature experiences a [338] healthy dumbness. Here you are before a ‘genuine other’, and realizing your helpless finitude, you let that other, in deepest humility and respect, speak. It is preferable to let [a] great philosophy be its absolute uniqueness, than to fuse impurely two great philosophies into a blurred mixture.

But let this also be said: I *find myself* more truly in Professor Heidegger’s than in Professor Whitehead’s philosophy. The former, just because it is more personal than the latter, gives me a deeper grasp o[f] my own being, and therefore affords me a more ‘self-relieving’ possibility of expression, than does the latter; although I have worked on Professor Whitehead’s philosophy more intensively and over a longer period of time than I have on Professor Heidegger’s.

And I would not be a man if I did not here add that I do not quite *find myself* in either philosophy.

There can be no doubt that the *truth* (applicability and adequacy) of Professor Whitehead’s philosophy of process is finally grounded in the phenomena of human life. If you persistently interrogate his doctrines as to what they *mean*, this meaning will finally boil down to some phenomenon of human ‘experience’. Subjective form is a generalization of emotion; what Professor Whitehead *means* by the term is something like our ordinary emotions and affective tones.⁸ Subjective aim is a generalization of purpose. Conrescent integration is growth of unity and evaporation of indetermination; but what do these things *mean*? ‘Unity’ and ‘indetermination’ are either pure concepts entertained by a mind belonging to a total existential person, and such pure concepts are not what Professor Whitehead means by these terms; or else they are moral qualities of a moral person. If you in all sincerity press Professor Whitehead as to what he means by these terms[,] he must in the end express his meaning in some such terms as these: here you come on a new situation, you find yourself a stranger in it, you are at first undetermined and uncertain [339] about yourself and about the situation; after a while you attain mastery of yourself and of the situation; conrescence means *something like* this growth in self-unity and evaporation of self-indetermination. This is the highest and least ambiguous *instance* of application of the term; and as thus expounded[,] it is finally perfectly clear. God primordially means actual relevance of possibility; and this can only be understood in personal terms – when such a possibility of *your* being or thought ‘naturally’ suggests itself to *you* under such and such circumstances. God’s consequent nature is a bit hazy, and it is very doubtful whether Professor Whitehead ‘believes’ in it; but what is clear about it can in the end only be expressed in personal terms – reconciliation of immediacy and passage so as to get rid of ‘perishing’; also it explains the

⁸ The rest of Section II in Malik’s thesis is an *addendum* to the section on Whitehead’s conception of time.

possibility of memory: a sudden distant memory that may flash in my mind at present ‘has been’ existing all this interval during which it did *not* assume prominence in my experience *not nowhere*, but in the consequent nature of God, where it has been preserved in its self-immediacy exactly as it was when it first occurred. Such unambiguous instances are what Professor Whitehead [is having] finally [has] in mind when he uses these terms. All else about these terms is aesthetic construction in accordance with the principles of the one-many world. The future is the anticipatory functioning in the present of a possibility of yourself that is going immediately to supersede your immediate present (the example of the “United Fruit Company” (1)). As thus expounded, you *understand* what he means by the term. The past is your immediate self-derivation from yourself “a tenth of a second ago”. Keeping this unambiguous meaning in mind, you at once become aware of your body – your breathing, your slight head-ache, the slight strain in your eye, the various pressures on your body. ‘Physical purposes’ are something like what you feel when you wake up in the morning just before you assume full consciousness – pressures and processes enacting [340] and re[-]enacting themselves in you all over the place: not much clarity and self-definition, confusion, flux, but inexorable reanaction and passage. You understand what Professor Whitehead means when he thus finally comes to *the instance* of his meaning. I can show the same thing to be true for every other notion in Professor Whitehead’s philosophy.

Every concept in Professor Whitehead’s philosophy assumes its full unambiguous transparency of meaning only when it is finally reduced to personal terms, i.e. to terms which involve you in one of your modes of being as a total person.

The careful and complete working-out of the phenomenal basis of Professor Whitehead’s philosophy is a task which I am not here attempting in full. Besides the few rema[rks] I made above[,] I suggest briefly some central principles that should guide such an attempt.

Process can mean either the one-many world which I developed fully in this thesis, in which case it is, as chapter vi above has urged, quite inadequate to personal existence, which in the end is *the moral matrix which has made the one-many world itself possible*; or, insofar as it calls attention to something personal, it can only mean that we are at times confused, which we certainly are most of the time. ‘There is’ process so long as we are overwhelmed by our world; process thus means the state of self-forgetful indecision in which we seek ‘our salvation’ *in* the external *things* of our world. When we are fully decisive and know unconfusedly what we are about, *process ceases to exist for us. Process completely and absolutely ceased to exist for Professor Whitehead when he sat down to describe process.* He cannot possibly deny his basic description of process. [Process must mean to him in every ontological position he has taken the creative growing together of self-objectifying actualities into a self-satisfied transcendent actuality. It is the basic contention of this thesis that he is quite consistent through-[341]out his works in what he meant by process;

the articulated, completed wholeness of the one-many world expresses this consistency. Once you have taken your personal, antecedent decision about how to approach the world [as such], and held yourself firmly in this decision, process and indetermination vanish from your being altogether. And in every self-maintained disclosure of truth – e.g. in every truthful ontological proposition Professor Whitehead makes – he is already beyond process[,] in the region of personal existence, although he may still think that proposition ‘applies equally’ to the self-forming excited actualities in “far-off empty space”.

The fact that we are for the most part overwhelmed confusedly by our world, and therefore all the time undergoing process, is not the final truth either about this world or about ourselves. On Professor Whitehead’s own principles[,] the actualities in yonder cushion are overwhelmed the same way; so are our own less conscious and less self-sustained actualities – when we are drowsy, etc. But none of these latter actualities has ever [bothered], or will ever[,] bother[,] itself about its own ontological constitution. The very τὸ ὄν of that which is in process and not bothering itself about itself is revealed only by and to these other actualities which, presumably in process, are yet bothered about this process.⁹ The truth is that when Professor Whitehead says there are all sorts of grades of actualities, and they fill being completely (no vacuous existence), he is only projecting a distinct one-many background of structure[,] that he firmly entertains[,] on everything. Every truth that has ever been revealed to Professor Whitehead has been revealed to him only as he came back to himself in a moment of vision in which he *first* beheld his own Form of Experience and *then* read off a particular structure belonging to this Form, and projected it on something *out-there*. The rootage of this projected structure in his own Form of Experience and this latter in his own existence *as a person* antecedes any ‘objective validity’ of such a structure [342] for ‘processes out-there’. But this clearly means that the final ontological truth about the world is not of the nature of a cosmological process, but of an antecedent moral decision which is *grounded in and maintained by the philosopher as a total, existential man*.

You are responsible only for your end of the cosmic bond. You know nothing of the *other* end. All this seeing yourself in terms of “far-off empty space” and God and cosmic epochs, and imagining that in all this you are really seeing anything other than yourself, is a sorry illusion. Anything that you have ever done or hoped or thought or ‘seen’ [is grounded] *without remainder* in you as a total, existential person. Whatever the world and its process may be, however the ‘other end’ may influence you, it is the sort of articulation that you *at your end* finally existentially settle into, that determines for you everything, and that you really know anything about. It is not laws of nature *out-there*, it is not rhythmic vibrations *in atoms*, it is not the green reenaction of the green subjective form from the green grass *out-*

⁹ *Sein* as τὸ ὄν (*to on*) *qua* ‘what is’.

there, it is not *what* the science of physics (i.e. the *physicists*) is talking *about*, it is not full and complete and true *actuality*, it is not the *electro-magnetic* society of occasions presupposed by your more complex “personal society of occasions”, it is not the rush of exciting (and excited) *directed* emotions from the *past*, it is not *God*, it is not other *res verae* ‘in’ your constitution, it is not *cosmological* notions applying to *everything* (God included), it is not *life* and *novelty*, it is none of these things that you really *mean*. What you really mean, and what is making possible in the first place all this marvelous richness of interest, [are] ‘simple’, personal, existential modes of being in which you ‘at your end’ decisively maintain yourself. To perceive this point is *existentially* to turn to the ‘creator’ in you (i.e. to come back to yourself) and to turn your back on the ‘creature’ outside [of] you, so far as the revelation of the τὸ ὄν of this creature is concerned.

[343] The true discernment of the phenomenal basis of cosmology will never occur unless this complete return *from* cosmology *to* personal existence is first accomplished. Truth is not *out-there*, but *in-here*, in me as a total man. Grounds, and motives, and ‘human nature’, and conditions of the possibility of things, and existential categories – death and guilt and conscience and care and anxiety and decision and time as honestly lived, become then of the first importance. Everything else will then have to be re-interpreted as a more or less distant reflection of this real reality nearer home.

It is man in the sense of *Dasein* that is the final *res vera*, and not an ‘occasion of experience’ *constructed* on the more or less abstract model of the one-many world.

‘All realization is finite’ must mean that man is by nature delivered unto death, within which he stages his little exciting game, and plays it. Man in his heart of hearts knows nothing more directly or truly than this[,] his deathful state. To Professor Whitehead[,] an occasion of experience is both finite and infinite, finite because of what it *negatively* prehends, and infinite because it still *prehends* somehow everything. This rationalistic symmetry ‘may be true’ of an occasion of experience, but it certainly is not true of man. *In no possible sense is man infinite*. The radical sense of this assertion Professor Whitehead seems to have completely overlooked. The reason for this is the fact that he was all the time fixing cosmologically *out-there* where effects, just because they are self-forgetfully under your complete control, can be more or less rationalistically adjusted so as to obtain a desired aesthetic symmetry. But existing man is incurably and absolutely finite, and reason can never help him to get over his finitude. It is this existential symmetry in man’s being, and his rationalistic rebellion against it, which is the ground at once of temporality, care, the sense of the ‘creative advance’, the grand order of the one-many world, and every quiver [344] with which man’s heart is assailed.

The ‘subject’ in Professor Whitehead’s famous ‘subjectivist principle’ (2) should be interpreted to mean not an occasion of experience in which the ‘whole universe’ is brought [into] focus, but a moral, living, dying, care-ful, existing *man*, to *whom* ‘experiences’, ‘subjects’, ‘principles’ and whatnot come up in the first place for his

attention and study. Unless this original man is recovered, the plunge is bound to penetrate [to] a turbid sea of abstraction.

Immediate, concrete experience, unless it should in the end turn out to be something very abstract, should be interpreted to mean personal existence, with its phenomenal transparency.

Not 'notions' or 'ideas' or 'eternal objects' or 'categories' should be the 'presences' under whose control the philosopher is feeling restless and is thinking out himself, but *himself*, as a total person delivered unto finitude and death.

There is no unity in human life, except the unity of moral decision, when a man authentically comes back to himself, under the wings of his death. Professor Whitehead is right in failing to discover a unitary soul-substance at the basis of life, but then in substituting for this lost unity "a personal society of occasions" he simply, in accordance with his rationalistic one-many presuppositions, let man be swallowed up in a uniform cosmology. Man's unity is of a radically different order either from that of logical consistency, or from the moment-by-moment self-transmitting 'social unity' of the [p]yramids, or from the unity of a tree, or from any other *thing*. Man's unity arises from the fact that he, of all beings in existence, enjoys the unique moral privilege of being able to come back to himself from his lostness in things, and of thereby decisively maintaining and being himself. No tree, no occasion of experience, no stone, no actuality in "far-off empty space", is [345] able to perform this miracle. Think of a dog coming back to himself and worrying about his finitude and death and guilt and cares! *Therefore, to have ruthlessly dissolved man in things is to have affirmed his lostness in them (which is right), to have refused him the right to be freed of them (which is wrong), and to have in effect missed man as man altogether.* Man can only be man by being that which he of all beings can uniquely be, namely by coming back to himself and really being a person. This requires that you shake off your comfortable self-lostness in infinitudes and universes and [whatnot], and for once see yourself in the light of your true finite possibilities. This means temporalization out of the future, and never either out of your past or out of your present. Terribly hard as it may be, this is the only way to face reality and be yourself.

All these personal matters are, to Professor Whitehead's metaphysics of process, 'metaphysically unimportant'. They may well be the peculiar 'defining characteristic' resident in the special social order which is man's life; but man is a late arrival in a very special cosmic epoch. Think of the atoms and the rocks and the planets and the animals and "far-off empty space". An adequate metaphysics must cover all these beings, as well as man. To all this I say briefly two things. (a) Press the question as to what *is* therefore metaphysically important, and you are bound in the end to land in the one-many world, and *only in the one-many world*. But as this thesis has shown (I hope), this background of structure not only does not cover man[,] in what is unique about him, but also on all sides it shows all the marks of a well thought-out a priori system of concepts, governed by the highly *human*

rationalistic principle of categorial completeness. (b) Certainly metaphysics must account for ‘all things’, but not by levelling down all things to the unrelieved uniformity of just one type of final reality, what is called ‘actuality’. This levelling-down commits the fatal rationalistic error of making of being a genus, [346] which, as Aristotle pointed out, being certainly ‘is not’. The only chance that man has to ‘account for all things’, including stones, “far-off empty space” and God, is first fully to [come to] terms with and *understand* his own personal finitude and death. Only in this way can things properly place themselves within the *inscrutable unity of Being*. Any other endeavor to account for all things is self-flight, and in the end does not account for them at all.

This other personal way of viewing things will, I know, be conveniently dubbed emotionalism. At worst, it will be called by worse names.¹⁰ Professor Whitehead’s philosophy has one neat term to cover all these matters, the term ‘subjective form’. Care, decisiveness, anxiety, fear, moral determination, death-facing, guilt, the existential ‘feeling’ of destiny, conscience, understanding yourself in the light of your futurity, all these personal matters are nothing but subjective forms. To expect these things to disclose to you the universe, including God and “far-off empty space”, is anthropomorphism. The point is not to quarrel over words, but to go at once to the heart of the matter and to perceive the Form of Experience entertained in Professor Whitehead’s mind which is enabling him to dismiss all these things as just ‘human subjective forms’. It would take more space than I can here afford to investigate precisely what ‘subjective forms’ Professor Whitehead allows [to be] of metaphysical importance. Such an investigation will disclose that the subjective forms he thus allows (e.g. re-enaction, valuation, anticipation) are such as to fit into his one-many systematic; i.e. into the pure, non-qualitative passage from the past, to the present, to the future. This is the only reason, and not any phenomenal ultimacy attaching to his subjective forms, why he chooses to *suppress* all the other ‘human’ subjective forms. Fear and anxiety, e.g., are barbarously unmetaphysical, not because they *are* so, but because there is no place for them in the one-many Form of Experience.

[347] But a phenomenal grounding of cosmology must aim at expansion in this tabooed region of subjective forms. The deepest constituents of man’s existence cannot be dismissed just because we (who, it must be remembered, are men) feel that, because our cosmological sweep must comprise everything, man is therefore metaphysically unimportant.

With a whole-hearted, fearless return to phenomenal human nature [is] made, some of the finest and in the end most enduring elements in Professor Whitehead’s cosmology will come out in great clarity. I mention in conclusion two such elements. One is his passionate desire to be ontological. The phrase with which he recurrently expresses this desire is “It belongs to the essence (or nature) of...” (3). It

¹⁰ This reflects the criticism that is levelled against Heidegger’s thought by logical positivists.

should be demonstrated in full that every time he uses this phrase what is meant thereby is something grounded either in his presupposed one-many world of structure, or in existential human nature. The other element is his ontological past-present-future structuralization of actuality. An actuality is itself the unity of these three functionings. Time is nothing apart from the constitutional process of the fully real things, the actualities. There is nothing which is fully and completely real (not even God) which is not *in its essence* temporal; i.e. which is not ontologically rooted in its past, and which does not in its very being harbor its own future. Past, present and future are names for three ontological moments in the being of actuality. You can never penetrate deeper into the essence of things than to conceive them as temporal in this way; any other conception of things abstracts from their fullest concrete essence. In this vision[,] Professors Heidegger and Whitehead are absolutely at one. But because of Heidegger's existential outlook[,] there are for him different modes, although, of course, the three ecstasies always 'occur together'. Not all these modes of temporalization reveal being to you with the same truthfulness (i.e. [348] authenticity). The most authentic temporalization of temporality is the passage (i.e. the being) *first* to your futurity (i.e. the authentic coming to yourself under the shadow of your death), *then* the falling[-]back upon your beenness, and *finally* the decisive facing of (i.e. presenting yourself with) your situation. Because Professor Whitehead knows no such moral distinctions in the very foundations of existence, this mode of talking is meaningless to him. But having regard to my personal 'experience' as a total man, I can say that what Heidegger is saying is phenomenally accurate. I am fully myself, and truth and the world reveal themselves most transparently to me, only when I, living wholly under the shadow of my genuine possibilities at the moment (i.e. being undistractedly these possibilities), let myself fall back upon whatever equipment my beenness holds already in store for me, in order to face and meet anxiously whatever immediate situation, or out of my constitutional beenness, fleeing in either case my genuine personal possibilities.¹¹ I am lost, and the world to me is a blur and a confusion.

Section III

The Truth

"Listen then, and I will tell you. *When I was young, Cebes, I was tremendously eager for the kind of wisdom which they call investigation of nature.* I thought it was a glorious thing to know the cause of everything, why each thing comes into being and why it perishes and why it exists; and I was always unsettling myself with such questions as

¹¹ By saying '... out of my constitutional beenness, fleeing in either case my genuine personal possibilities', Malik intended to show how in the unfolding of one's own modes of being, which ultimately become constitutive of who we take ourselves to be in our lived experience, there are certain circumstances in which we ultimately evade genuine personal possibilities in our life by not acting on them. This is when one feels lost and confused.

these: Do heat and cold, by a sort of fermentation, bring about the organization of animals, as some people say? Is [349] it in the blood, or air, or fire by which we think? Or is it none of these, and does the brain furnish the sensations of hearing and sight and smell, and do memory and opinion arise from these, and does knowledge come from memory and opinion in a state of rest? And again I tried to find out how these things perish, and I investigated the phenomena of heaven and earth *until finally I made up my mind that I was by nature totally unfitted for this kind of investigation. And I will give you a sufficient proof of this. I was so completely blinded by these studies that I lost the knowledge that I, and others also, thought I had before; I forgot what I had formerly believed I knew about many things and even about the cause of man's growth...*

"And now," said Cebes, "what do you think about them?"

"By Zeus," said he, "I am far from thinking that I know the cause of any of these things, I who do not even dare to say, when one is added to one, whether the one to which the addition was made has become two, or the one which was added, or the one which was added and the one to which it was added became two by the addition of each to the other. I think it is wonderful that when each of them was separate from the other, each was one and they were not then two, and when they were brought near each other this juxtaposition was the cause of their becoming two... And I no longer believe that I know by this method even how one is generated or, in a word, how anything is generated or is destroyed or exists, and I no longer admit this method, but have another confused way of my own.

"Then one day I heard a man reading from a book, as he said, by Anaxagoras, that it is the mind that arranges and causes all things. I was pleased with this theory of course, and it seemed to me to be somehow right that the mind should be the cause of all things... As I considered these things I was delighted to think that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the cause of [350] things quite to my mind... I prized my hopes very highly, and I seized the books very eagerly and read them as fast as I could, that I might know as fast as I could about the best and the worst.

"My glorious hope, my friend, was quickly snatched away from me. *As I went on with my reading I saw that the man made no use of intelligence, and did not assign any real causes for the ordering of things, but mentioned as causes air and ether and water and many other absurdities.* And it seemed to me it was very much as if one should say that Socrates does with intelligence whatever he does, and then, in trying to give the causes of the particular thing I do, should say first that I am now sitting here because my body is composed of bones and sinews, and the bones are hard and have joints which divide them and sinews can be contracted and relaxed and, with the flesh and the skin which contains them all, are laid about the bones; and so, as the bones are hung loose in their ligaments, the sinews, by relaxing and contracting, make me able to being my limbs now, and that is the cause of my sitting here with my legs bent. Or as if in the same way he should give voice and air and hearing and countless other things of the sort as causes for our talking with each other, and should fail to mention the real causes, which are, that the Athenians decided that

it was *best* to condemn me, and therefore I have decided that it was *best* for me to sit here and that it is *right* for me to stay and undergo whatever penalty they order. For, by Dog, I fancy these bones and sinews of mine would have been in Megara or Boeotia long ago, carried thither by any opinion of what was *best*, if I did not think it was *better* and *nobler* to endure any penalty the city may inflict *rather than to escape and run away*. But it is most absurd to call things of that sort causes. If anyone were to say that I could not have done what I thought proper if I had not bones and sinews and other things that I have, he would be right. But to say that those things are the cause of my doing what I do, and that I [351] act with intelligence but not from *the choice of what is best*, would be an extremely careless way of talking. Whoever talks in that way is unable to make a distinction and to see that in reality a cause is one thing, and the thing without which the cause could never be a cause is quite another thing. And so it seems to me that most people, when they give the name of cause to the latter, are *groping in the dark*, as it were, and are giving it a name that does not belong to it... but they do not look for the power which causes things to be now placed as it is *best* for them to be placed... and in truth they give no thought to *the good, which must embrace and hold together all things*. Now I would gladly be the pupil of anyone who would teach me the nature of such a cause; but since that was denied me and I was not able to discover it myself or to learn of it from anyone else, do you wish me, Cebes," said he, "to give you an account of the way in which I have conducted *my second voyage in quest of the cause?*"

"I wish it with all my heart," he replied...

"I am going to try to explain to you the nature of that cause which I have been studying, and I will revert to those familiar subjects of ours as my point of departure and assume that there are such things as *absolute* beauty and good and greatness and the like. If you grant this and agree that these exist, I believe I shall explain cause to you and shall prove that the soul is immortal."

"You may assume," said Cebes, "that I grant it, and go on."

"Then," said he, "see if you agree with me in the next step. I think that if anything is beautiful besides absolute beauty it is beautiful for no other reason than because it partakes of absolute beauty; and this applies to everything. Do you assent to this view of cause?"

"I do," said he.

"Now I do not yet, understand," he went on, "nor can I perceive those [352] other ingenious causes. If anyone tell me that what makes a thing beautiful is its lovely colour, or its shape or anything else of the sort, *I let all that go, for all those things confuse me, and I hold simply and plainly and perhaps foolishly to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful but the presence or communion (call it which you please) of absolute beauty, however it may have been gained; about the way in which it happens, I make no positive statement as yet, but I do insist that beautiful things are made beautiful by beauty*. For I think this is the safest answer I can give to myself or to others and if I cleave fast to this, I think I shall never be overthrown, and I believe it is safe for me or

anyone else to give this answer, that beautiful things are beautiful through beauty. Do you agree?"...

'Well, then, if one is added to one or if one is divided, you would avoid saying that the addition or the division is the cause of two? *You would exclaim loudly that you know no other way by which anything can come into existence than by participating in the proper essence of each thing in which it participates, and therefore you accept no other cause of the existence of two than participation in duality, and things which are to be two must participate in duality, and whatever is to be one must participate in unity, and you would pay no attention to the divisions and additions and other such subtleties, leaving those for wiser men to explain...* You would not mix things up, as disputants do, in talking about the beginning and its consequences, if you wished to discover any of the realities; for perhaps not one of them thinks or cares in the least about these things. *They are so clever that they succeed in being well pleased with themselves even when they mix everything up, but if you are a philosopher, I think you will do as I have said* (1).¹²

(All *italics* in above quotations mine).¹³

¹² Plato, *Euthyphro. Apology. Crito. Phaedo. Phaedrus* (Loeb Classical Library), ed. and trans. Harold North Fowler (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1914), *Phaedo* 96A-102A.

¹³ The *italicizations* in the original text of Malik's doctoral thesis were terms and phrases that were underlined; however, these were meant to be in *italics*. I have therefore indicated them in the body of the edited text in *italics*.

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[Endnotes]²

Chap. VII. Sect. I.

- (1) Article 10, Z45 and article 59, Z289.³

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Chap. VII. Sect. II.

- (1) Z27f.
- (2) Z27b.
- (3) Z27–28.
- (4) Z28.
- (5) Compare carefully with the general discussion in Z28f.
- (6) Cf. important discussion of this point in connection with the nature of phenomena, Z35 and 63m.
- (7) Z32f. I am only adapting some of Heidegger's important doctrines.
- (8) Z34. See also some very important remarks on phenomenology as a science in the remainder of this section, esp. all of page[s] 35 and 36t.
- (9) Z35.

¹ The endnotes that Malik included in his doctoral thesis in the section on Heidegger are noted on pages [384–387] of his original typed text. I have added the full bibliographical details of the sources he referred to in the footnotes that I introduced in my edition of his text, along with my commentaries. I also retained the formatting that Malik had adopted in his endnotes in the original text of his thesis.

² The abbreviations that Malik used in the endnotes of his typed doctoral thesis correspond respectively to the following bibliographical sources: Z = Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Halle an der Saale: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1935), and the rest refer to the works of Alfred North Whitehead: AI = *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933); FR = *The Function of Reason* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1929); NL = *Nature and Life* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934); PR = *Process and Reality* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930); RM = *Religion in the Making* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927, 1st ed. 1926); S = *Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927); SMW = *Science and the Modern World* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931, 1st ed. 1925). Each abbreviated code (for example Z) is followed by numbers that designate the pagination in the corresponding source; moreover, the letters t, m, b after the pagination of a given abbreviated source designate respectively the top, middle, and bottom of the page of reference.

³ As noted above, the letter 'Z' in Malik's endnotes refers to Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* (namely the edition of Halle an der Saale: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1935).

- (10) See the Chap. on [the] ‘philosophic method’ in ‘AP’; also the definition of metaphysics as description in RM84, 88. Cf. note 8, Sect. II, Chap. I.
- (11) PR28t.

Chap. VII. Sect. III.

- (1) See note 4, Sect. VI, Chap. I.
- (2) See notes 2 and 11, Sect. II, Chap. II.
- (3) This is assumed and adhered to by Heidegger; see esp. Z6b and 9t.
- (4) Compare with p. 49 above.
- (5) Z7. Because this starting point is most fundamental, we follow the text pretty closely in what we say above.
- (6) This phrase is to be found everywhere in Heidegger. See esp. Z12t, 42, 44, 84, 114, 115, 117, 123, 133, 143, 191, 231, 232.
- (7) Z14.
- (8) Z13, 14, and *passim*.

Chap. VII. Sect. IV.

- (1) Z44f.
- (2) This section summarizes, of course in a ridiculously inadequate way, and always with the purpose of the final understanding of Heidegger’s metaphysics of time, the first five chapters (after the introduction) of *Sein und Zeit*, pp. 41–180.
- (3) Z42m.
- (4) Cf. Z132f.
- (5) Z43t and throughout.
- (6) *Passim*, but esp. Z42, 69f.
- (7) Z52f.
- (8) Z57t, and throughout.
- (9) Z63f.
- (10) Z84.
- (11) Z101–113.
- (12) Z117f.
- (13) Z121.
- (14) Z126f. Paragraph 8 above adapts bodily many sentences from Heidegger’s own description. A good portion of it, however, expresses my own feelings on this topic. The last but one sentence in this paragraph is almost an exact translation of a long sentence towards the bottom of Z129.
- (15) P. 268 above.
- (16) Z133.

- (17) Z134f.
- (18) Z134m.
- (19) Z134b.
- (20) Z135.
- (21) Z143. Cf. also p. 273 above.
- (22) Z143.
- (23) Z143b.
- (24) Z144m.
- (25) Z145f.
- (26) Z145b.
- (27) Z146.
- (28) See Z148–166.
- (29) Z160f.
- (30) Compare with pp. 271 and 279 above, where authenticity and unauthenticity were introduced.
- (31) P. 300 below.
- (32) Z167f.

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Chap. VII. Sect. V.

- (1) Z182–191.
- (2) Cf. pp. 275 and 281 above.
- (3) Z186f.
- (4) Z192b.
- (5) P. 278 above.
- (6) “*Weltlichkeit*” is the fundamental existential structure which constitutes the being of *Dasein*, and it is from this structure that such a thing as ‘world’ can arise in the first place.
- (7) Z193b.
- (8) Cf. pp. 263 and 268 above.
- (9) Z197.

Chap. VII. Sect. VI.

- (1) Z231–323.
- (2) See p. 273 above.
- (3) Sect. III, this Chap.
- (4) Chap. I of Section II, in *Sein und Zeit*, p. 231f.
- (5) Z241f.

- (6) This term is used throughout; see, e.g., V 242m, 234t, 245m.
- (7) Z245m. This is [the] most crucial turn in the whole argument. This distinction is repeated again and again by Heidegger; e.g. Z250m.
- (8) This sentence is a quotation which Heidegger takes from a source he mentions in a note on p. 245 in Z.
- (9) See the illuminating statement in Z259t that “*sein zu*” is more or less equivalent to “*sich auseinandersetzen mit*”.
- (10) Z249, article 50. The single paragraph above into which I compress this article is terribly condensed.
- (11) P. 285 above.
- (12) Z251t.
- (13) Z252, to the end of the chapter.
- (14) Z256 and 257, also 265.
- (15) Z285b. Cf. 250–267, esp. 250b and 263m-266.
- (16) See pp. 288 and 289 above.
- (17) Z262. For the argument of this paragraph, see 261–262.
- (18) Z263–266.

Chap. VII. Sect. VII.

- (1) This section covers pp. 267–323 of Z.
- (2) P. 294, above.
- (3) Z273b.
- (4) Z276f. Also Z188, 189.
- (5) For this sentence, see 277f.
- (6) Z281.
- (7) Article 58, Z280.
- (8) Z297t.
- (9) Cf. p. 276f, above. What I am saying here is, for the most part, from Z297f.
- (10) For this paragraph, see Z297b–298m.
- (11) Z299.
- (12) For a complete discussion of this phenomenon, see Z302 and 305f.

Chap. VIII. Sect. II.

- (1) Z17 and 326.
- (2) P. 278f, above.
- (3) Cf. Z151, 324.
- (4) Z151b.
- (5) P. 279, above.

- (6) Z324.
- (7) Z151.
- (8) I am following here pretty closely Z324. Unless the reader keeps in mind throughout that what is said here is about his personal existence, he will miss the intended meaning.

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- (9) Z324b; also on p. 152b the same word is used also on p. 152b in an analogous connection.
- (10) Z325.

Chap. VIII. Sect. III.

- (1) In this section I stick closely to Z325ff.
- (2) Pp. 302–303, above.
- (3) Cf. pp. 298f, above.
- (4) This picture is only roughly true of what Heidegger means by “*Schuldigsein*”.
- (5) This brings me to Z326m.
- (6) Z327f. See p. 285 above for what these three structures are.
- (7) Z328.
- (8) Z328b.
- (9) Z328–329.
- (10) Z329t.
- (11) Z329b.
- (12) The last chapter of *Sein und Zeit*, p. 404f.

Chap. VIII. Sect. IV.

- (1) Chap. IV, Sect. II, of Z, pp. 334ff.

Chap. VIII. Sect. V.

- (1) Chap. V, Sect. II, of Z, pp. 372ff.
- (2) Z380b.
- (3) Z381.
- (4) Z381.
- (5) Z382ff.
- (6) Sect. III, above.
- (7) Z383.

- (8) Z383b.
- (9) Z383–384.
- (10) This paragraph is a more or less literal translation of the first few sentences of Z384.
- (11) Z384–385.
- (12) Z385.
- (13) P. 319, above.
- (14) Z386.
- (15) For this paragraph, see Z389bff.
- (16) Z387 to end of Chapter.
- (17) Esp. Z394–397.

Chap. VIII. Sect. VI.

- (1) Z404.
- (2) Cf. p. 318, above.
- (3) Z409bff.
- (4) Z409b.
- (5) Z410 for this sentence and to the end of this paragraph.

[Appendix]⁴

Chap. IX. Sect. I.

- (1) Z41 and 438.
- (2) PRx and Part I.

Chap. IX. Sect. II.

- (1) AI234.
- (2) PR, Part II, Chap. VII, p. 238ff, esp. last section, 252f, and most especially p. 254.
- (3) See, e.g., AI248, 251; NL26, 27; SMW180; PR33, 340.

⁴ Chapter IX is included in this annotated edition as an ‘Appendix’ since it deals with Whitehead and Heidegger and is not squarely part of the section dedicated to *Sein und Zeit* in Malik’s doctoral thesis, as explained earlier in the technical notes on the edition in my ‘Introduction’.

Chap. IX. Sect. III.

(1) *Phaedo* 96A-102A.

End

Epilogue

Sein und Zeit, ‘Being and Time’, remains outstanding, both in the work of Martin Heidegger and among philosophical works published in the twentieth century, as an unfinished book. Until its seventh edition in 1953, it bore the subtitle *Erste Hälfte*, ‘First Half’. The plan for the book as originally envisaged can still be found unaltered at the end of its ‘Introduction’,¹ but in reality, Heidegger destroyed at least one possible draft of the ‘Second Half’ and did not complete any other. It is widely accepted that lectures prepared and delivered at Freiburg in the Summer Semester of 1927 were yet again directed toward completing the ‘Second Half’,² but that by 1929, or 1930 at the latest, the attempt was abandoned.

What had been projected in the proposed second half was a transition, a *Kebre*, as Heidegger named it, from the elucidation of ‘being and time’ to that of ‘time and being’ as the fundamental ground of understanding itself. There are hints in a number of texts, but especially in the *Letter on Humanism* published in 1947,³ that this transition was delivered in a preliminary way in a lecture given in various versions in 1930 under the title ‘On the Essence of Truth’.⁴ Each of the versions from that year (there are three) speak of how truth has historically been interpreted to have an ‘essence’ in one way when, in fact, what makes this understanding possible (and so grounds the understanding) unfolds precisely the other way about (*umgekehrt*). It is for the sake of an explication of the ground of this ‘other way

¹ Martin Heidegger, ‘Einleitung: Der Aufriß der Abhandlung’, in *Sein und Zeit* (GA2), edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (1977 [1927]), §8, pp. 39–40 (paginated according to the Niemeyer editions). Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson as *Being and Time* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980 [1962]). See *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe* (102 vols.), edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976 and in progress) = (GAnn). Although I have listed current translations of Heidegger’s works here and in the footnotes below, all translations of quotations are my own, unless otherwise indicated.

² These were published as: Martin Heidegger, *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (GA24), edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (1997 [1975]). Translated by Albert Hofstadter as *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1988 (1982)).

³ See Martin Heidegger, ‘Brief Über dem Humanismus (1946)’, in *Wegmarken* (GA9), edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (1996), pp. 313–364. Translated by Frank Capuzzi as ‘Letter on “Humanism”’, in *Pathmarks*, edited by William McNeill (New York NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 239–276.

⁴ This lecture was delivered once more in 1932 and finally published in modified form in 1943 as Martin Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1943, with a second edition containing a revised final section appearing in 1949). See Martin Heidegger, ‘Vom Wesen der Wahrheit’, in *Wegmarken* (GA9), pp. 177–202. Translated by John Sallis and William McNeill as ‘On the Essence of Truth (1930) in *Pathmarks*, pp. 136–154. The earlier versions from 1930, together with a later draft from 1940, appear in ‘X: Vom Wesen der Wahrheit’, in *Vorträge* (GA80.1), edited by Günther Neumann (2016), pp. 327–428.

about' toward which 'Being and Time' had been striving, but could not yet achieve. The 1947 *Letter on Humanism* hints that this *Umkehr* or 'reversal' capable of bringing this hidden ground to light was more substantially accomplished in lectures delivered in 1937,⁵ and then more fully developed in the years up until 1944.

Why is the explication of this ground so difficult, and why did Heidegger proceed toward it with such care and such caution? We can see the answer to this question foreshadowed in the text we have before us, in Charles Malik's exposition of Heidegger's thinking and in Nader El-Bizri's commentary on that exposition: what Heidegger was trying to think through was no mere 'theory', no clever set of accomplished opinions and observations, no bookish exchange with the 'great thinkers' of historical record. Malik was not the first English-speaking visitor to Freiburg,⁶ but he is pre-eminently among the first of those outside German philosophy seriously to attempt to explain Heidegger in detail in the English language, and through an account of Heidegger's actual writing.

What is at issue is the matter of thinking itself, grounded in the life we actually live, through the world we inhabit. Heidegger sought to bring to light that which already stands out in the light (τὸ φαινόμενον, that which lets itself be seen), while at the same time explaining how it *has been* understood and how it *is to be* understood, and who *we are* in that understanding. Such an understanding aspired, in the works of philosophers from Plato and Aristotle right up to Hegel and beyond, to be a 'science', the highest knowledge of knowledge itself. Hegel had made this science a 'doctrine' (*Lehre*), the studied preserve of a technically accomplished 'expert' thinker. From the outset Heidegger had understood that each of us, just in understanding anything at all, is already immersed in what this expertise claims highest knowledge of. Heidegger was therefore asking: what, in the midst of life itself (rather than the abstract site of the technical-linguistic achievement of a theoretical apparatus of thinking – 'absolute logic', as Hegel called it), made such knowledge possible at all?

Charles Malik arrived in Freiburg as Heidegger's task of bringing this 'reversal' to light was still under way: from 'being and time' to 'time and being' on the one

⁵ Almost certainly a set of lectures delivered in the Winter Semester of 1937/38. Published as Martin Heidegger, *Grundfragen der Philosophie: Ausgewählte "Probleme" der "Logik"* (GA45), edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (1992 [1984]). Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer as *Basic Problems of Philosophy: Selected "Problems" of "Logic"*. Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1994.

⁶ Marjorie Glicksman (later Grene) had attended some of Heidegger's lectures and a seminar between 1931 and 1932, with little sensitivity for what she encountered. She published her observations in 1938. Miles Groth gives a summary of Glicksman's and other pre-war anglophone encounters with Heidegger in Miles Groth, *Translating Heidegger*, pp. 29–43. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2017. Groth notes Glicksman was 'confounded' by Heidegger and gave a 'glib and incorrect' account. Groth mentions Malik's thesis at Harvard on p. 30, n. 4. See Marjorie Glicksman, 'A Note on the Philosophy of Heidegger', *The Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 35 (1938), pp. 93–104.

hand, yes, but also the reversal *out* of a merely historically constructed ‘absolute logic’ towards what Heidegger was to call, not philosophy, but ‘thinking’. We might reasonably ask, therefore, why Malik’s engagement with Heidegger concerns the meaning and interpretation of the unfinished book ‘Being and Time’, and not the ‘reversal’ that is preoccupied with the transition to ‘time and being’ and what that reversal makes it possible to understand. An anecdotal report claims something to the effect that, when questioned why he had not removed the ‘First Half’ subtitle even from the 1949 edition of ‘Being and Time’, Heidegger responded, ‘every year they wait with enthusiasm for the “Second Half” of “Being and Time” while still refusing to understand the “First”.’ The way *in* to Heidegger, for the thinker himself, begins with ‘Being and Time’ and what that book addresses. In 1935 this was still the case, so that the way into ‘Heidegger’ is the way into what it is Heidegger is thinking *of*, which begins with the concerns of ‘Being and Time’, in order *only then* to be in any way prepared to undertake the reversal which he himself still sought to elucidate. This ‘reversal’ turns out to be, not some set of astonishing propositions, the body of some new or ‘higher’ logic, but the traversing of a path: the path of thinking itself.

Coming from Harvard, Malik was in one sense part of the earliest anglophone reception of ‘Being and Time’. That reception had already begun with Gilbert Ryle’s incisive but hardly enthusiastic review of a work which he admitted there was good chance he had ‘fallen short of understanding’, but Ryle’s verdict on ‘Being and Time’ was damning: ‘Phenomenology is at present heading for bankruptcy and disaster and will end either in self-ruinous Subjectivism or in a windy mysticism’.⁷ Werner Brock (Heidegger’s assistant, who was Jewish and was helped by Heidegger out of Germany to a Cambridge scholarship in 1934) published a short, but very general discussion of Heidegger’s work in 1935.⁸ There is little else printed in English (not a single journal records a discussion of Heidegger in English in 1939, the year of the outbreak of World War II, for instance, and there is little and often nothing in the years before) until the first translations of Heidegger began to appear from presses in the United States from 1949.⁹ It was only after the war that there was a significant reception of Heidegger’s work. Discussions of

⁷ Gilbert Ryle, (Review) ‘Sein und Zeit by Martin Heidegger’, *Mind*, Vol. 38 (1929), pp. 355–370, 370.

⁸ Brock had given a series of lectures on contemporary German philosophy (including Heidegger) at Bedford College, University of London in 1934. They were published in an edited and expanded version as Werner Brock, *An Introduction to Contemporary German Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1935), pp. 109–117.

⁹ The first translations of Heidegger were published by William Barton and Vera Deutsch with an ‘Introduction’ by Werner Brock in the collection *Martin Heidegger: Existence and Being* (Chicago IL: Henry Regnery, 1949). ‘Being and Time’ was not translated until 1962.

Heidegger began to appear written by post-war visitors to Freiburg.¹⁰ The first major anglophone conference on Heidegger's work was not held until 1966, at De Paul University, convened by Manfred Frings.¹¹ It was only with the war and the exodus of those fleeing Nazi persecution that Heidegger's work gained real traction, especially in the United States, and among those, often confessional, faculties not drawn to the prevailing currents of anglophone philosophy.

In opening a window on Malik's encounter with Heidegger, Nader El-Bizri has undertaken an incomparably valuable service by providing detailed textual and archival analysis of this rare encounter of a student from Harvard with Heidegger from before the conflagration of World War II. This is the importance of what El-Bizri has achieved in giving a wider audience access to Malik's account of Heidegger.

And yet Malik's, even though he came from Harvard and engaged with Heidegger through the English language, is not a *native* English voice. Singularly, Malik is an inheritor of all the elements and traditions of the whole history of philosophy since classical antiquity. Lebanon has been a unique place of exchange for all the voices of the Abrahamic traditions: Jewish, Christian, and Muslim; but no less has it been a crucible of the traditions of antiquity, Greek as well as Roman; nor has it evaded (and still cannot evade) the agonised tensions of modernity and the clashes of great powers. Malik fused and contradicted in his own person the puerile Hegelian antithesis of the oriental and occidental man (toward which much of Heidegger's later discussion of the occidental *Abendland* is at least implicitly opposed).¹² Malik was, instinctually, powerfully well-placed to understand and receive the breadth of Heidegger's intellectual reach and to make that reception available in English.

Yet we must not overlook the inevitability that this young and at the time even inexperienced, and still emergent, philosophical voice receives the philosophical *Auseinandersetzung* – a confrontation more than it is ever a mere conversation – of Heidegger's engagement with the whole of that tradition, with a degree of freshness that at times also bears the marks of a certain naivety. Malik does not represent Heidegger perfectly in every case, nor does he understand with clarity everything Heidegger has to say. Here El-Bizri has an important role to play in rendering and curating Malik's translations of Heidegger into the now more current conven-

¹⁰ George Seidel, a Benedictine monk, visited Freiburg between 1961 and 1962. See Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Socratics (Lincoln NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1964).

¹¹ As recorded in Hans-Martin Sass, Martin Heidegger: Bibliography and Glossary (Bowling Green OH: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1982).

¹² For a condensed discussion of this, see G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie: Erster Band, System und Geschichte der Philosophie*, edited by Johannes Hoffmeister (Leipzig: Meiner Verlag, 1944 [1940]), esp. pp. 223–236). Part translated by T. M. Knox and A. V. Miller as Hegel's Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

tions of Heidegger scholarship. Many of these conventions, however, are also questionable – some even distort Heidegger’s meanings. By exhibiting the connections between Malik’s often very considered translations and the current conventions, El-Bizri enables us to throw the contemporary access to Heidegger’s German into an important historical relief.

Heidegger’s life and thought in itself in many ways ran parallel to the richness and complexity of the Lebanese intellectual tradition, uniquely skilled and adept as he was in the traditions of Greek antiquity, of later antiquity, of Mediaeval metaphysics (and Heidegger was well aware of the debt of Aquinas and Scotus to Jewish and Arab scholars), and of the emergence of the specifically modern metaphysical tradition through Descartes, Wolff, Baumgarten, Spinoza, Leibniz, and the Idealist tradition beginning with Kant and culminating with Hegel and its antithesis in Nietzsche. The real work of examining Heidegger’s confrontation with Hegel is far from being done, and yet Malik’s observation that ‘it is plain that Heidegger forms a kind of a reaction against [Hegel]’ shows the extent to which he had understood and penetrated into the heart of Heidegger’s own thinking, even if only in outline. Malik was, in other words, instinctually attuned by virtue of the ‘from whence’ he himself sprung to the *mood* and voice of what he found in Heidegger, even when he could discern it only in outline.

Malik is far from alone in struggling with the interpretation of ‘Being and Time’. Heidegger frequently betrays a degree of frustration with what he saw as the misunderstandings rife in the reception of his *Hauptwerk*; the continual attempt to understand the term *Dasein* as a designator for the Cartesian subject, or the attempt to interpret ‘Being and Time’ as a work of ‘existentialism’, are just two examples of the ways in which Heidegger’s work was misread even at the time. Even the translation of *Dasein* as ‘être-là’ (by Sartre), ‘being-there’, as the first English translators of ‘Being and Time’ made it, irked Heidegger (see note 169 above). Beaufret’s suggestion of ‘être-le-là’ is in fact a citation of Heidegger himself, who had snapped *Nein!* after Karl Löwith in effect had proffered Sartre’s translation to Heidegger in a public discussion.¹³ In discussion with Eugen Fink around 1966, Heidegger lamented (again, naming Sartre) that in the translation être-là, ‘everything that was gained as a new position in “Being and Time” is lost’.¹⁴

Short and sometimes longer references to the concerns of ‘Being and Time’ appear throughout Heidegger’s lecture courses (including those we know Malik attended), as well as in the ‘Protocols’ and surviving texts of his seminars and classes. These references leave the reader in no doubt that the students and others who

¹³ Jean Beaufret, ‘En chemin avec Heidegger’, in *Cahier de l’Herne* (Paris: Éditions de l’Herne, 1983), p. 212.

¹⁴ Martin Heidegger, ‘Martin Heidegger – Eugen Fink: Heraklit’, in *Seminare (GA15)*, edited by Curd Ochwadt (1986 [1970]), p. 126. “Damit ist alles das, was in ‘Sein und Zeit’ als neue Position gewonnen wurde, verlorengegangen.” Translated by Charles H. Seibert as *Heraclitus Seminar, 1966/67* with Eugen Fink. Tuscaloosa AL: University of Alabama Press, 1979.

studied with Heidegger were expected already to have engaged with 'Being and Time' before they presented themselves to Heidegger in person. With this engagement students entered the hermeneutic circle of Heidegger's work, the very circle of understanding of which 'Being and Time' itself speaks. The students entering this circle did not, and could not, have known the extent to which their place in the circle differed from Heidegger's own. Indeed, even seasoned scholars of Heidegger's work have found themselves constantly surprised by the innovations, the breadth of reach, and the vastly different character of the work which preoccupied Heidegger especially from the 1930s until around 1946, when contrasted with the actual text of 'Being and Time', as a Heidegger other than the Heidegger of 'Being and Time'. This other, hidden, Heidegger, preoccupied with the task of completing the enquiry for which the actual book 'Being and Time' represented the inception, has only gradually and recently come into better view, and is still far from well understood.

Heidegger's broader work has come into view in a variety of ways. 'Being and Time' was published in 1927 as a special edition of a journal edited by Edmund Husserl, only becoming widely available in a new edition in 1929, the same year in which Heidegger's revised lectures on Kant, the so-called *Kantbuch* or 'Kant book', appeared.¹⁵ Apart from three short (but hardly insignificant) publications, the longest of which spanned forty printed pages and the shortest seventeen, nothing else had appeared since 'Being and Time' when Malik began his studies in Freiburg, and with the exception of three short essays on Hölderlin, nothing new was to appear until 1942. Given Malik's interest in Kant (and his acknowledgement of the place of Kant in Heidegger's thought), it is very likely that Malik was familiar with the 'Kant book', but it seems to have played little or no direct part in his thesis at Harvard. Heidegger's predominant focus was without doubt 'Being and Time'. In the 1950s and 1960s, Heidegger published a large amount of material, but very little of it reflects the concerns that he dealt with in a huge amount of material that has only begun to surface since the centenary of his birth in 1989; the Heidegger that has so surprised Heidegger scholars as that material has unfolded, and that I suggest is an 'other' Heidegger about whom Malik could have known little or nothing.

This 'other' Heidegger has really only come into view, however, through the great majority of the volumes of the *Collected Works* or *Gesamtausgabe* as they began to appear from its inception in 1975, a year before Heidegger's death. The Heidegger *Gesamtausgabe* runs to 102 projected volumes, of which only the first sixteen contain material actually published in Heidegger's lifetime. Roughly sixty volumes contain records and preparatory materials for Heidegger's lectures, seminars and public events. The remaining twenty-seven contain a Heidegger glimpsed

¹⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (GA3), edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 1991 (1929). Translated by Richard Taft as *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1990).

very occasionally during his own lifetime, but who was only revealed in any meaningful sense from 1989 onward with the publication of the first of this ‘other’ Heidegger’s work, his *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, ‘Contributions to Philosophy’. This itself is the first of seven revolutionary volumes known as the *Das Ereignis* series, with an additional compendium of 1500 printed pages of additional notes and remarks presented in a separate volume of two books.¹⁶ It would not be unreasonable to entitle the whole of this material documenting the ‘other’ Heidegger his ‘*Nachlaß*’. Several times Heidegger speaks of a thinking that is held back, or that is still carried out within a thinking that deliberately still speaks with the language of metaphysics (for the sake, therefore, of its audience), or of where different matters of thought were held apart from one another. The *Nachlaß* material *is* that thinking that was being held back. Heidegger’s thinking is never indiscriminately unfolded, but rather always in deliberated steps and along carefully followed paths.

Already, then, by the time of Charles Malik’s arrival in Freiburg in 1935, Heidegger had substituted the fulfilment of the actual plan of ‘Being and Time’ for this ‘other’ Heidegger, an (at that time) largely private development of his thought.¹⁷ What, one might ask, might mark the transition point from the Heidegger of ‘Being and Time’ to the ‘other’ Heidegger, the Heidegger sequestered in the texts of his *Nachlaß*, and to which Malik could have had no direct access? This question has dogged Heidegger scholarship with its search for ‘the turn’ and even (in the language of some) ‘the turn before the turn’, as well as other multiple claims of twists in the tale. Karl Löwith and others attempted to isolate a ‘non-Nazi’ Heidegger from the rest of his oeuvre; William Richardson announced a ‘Heidegger I’ and ‘Heidegger II’, with the break identified in 1930 and, ‘at last’, he exclaims, ‘the thinking of being’.¹⁸ This schema (only one of many) seems helped by the appearance of the use of the archaism *das Seyn*, ‘beyng with a “y”’, in texts from around this time.

Heidegger had received Richardson’s suggestion that there was a ‘Heidegger I’ and ‘Heidegger II’, by replying with the enigmatic suggestion that such a schema should only apply if Heidegger I *became possible* with the thought of Heidegger II.¹⁹

¹⁶ *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (GA65), edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (1989) (Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu as *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)* (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 2012). The first of these was begun in 1936, and the last completed around the early 1940s, with additional notes up until 1970. At the time of writing, one, *Die Stege des Anfangs* (1944) (GA72), remains unpublished.

¹⁷ In a letter to Dieter Sinn of 1964, Heidegger begins by noting that he had never in his publications made a presentation of his own thought, with the exception of the lecture “Das Ding” (given in Bremen in 1949). Martin Heidegger, ‘Letter to Dieter Sinn of 24th August 1964’, in: Dieter Sinn, *Ereignis und Nirwana: Heidegger – Buddhismus – Mythos – Mystik zur Archäotypik des Denkens* (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1991), pp. 172–173.

¹⁸ William J. Richardson SJ, *Through Phenomenology to Thought* (New York NY: Fordham University Press, 2003 [1963]), p. 254.

¹⁹ See Heidegger’s ‘Preface / Vorwort’ in German and English to William J. Richardson SJ, *Through Phenomenology to Thought* (New York NY: Fordham University Press, 2003

In *The Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger insists that there is no ‘change of standpoint from “Being and Time”’ in the thinking that came after it, but rather that even from ‘Being and Time’ (as we have seen), Heidegger’s thinking had attempted to unfold what made the thinking of ‘Being and Time’ possible at all.²⁰

Even in 1963, Richardson, like Malik in 1935, could not have known of the ‘other’ Heidegger and so pays little attention to the actual form of Heidegger’s gently provocative response,²¹ but the two remarks, one to Richardson, the other in the *Letter on Humanism*, make the same point. Heidegger’s work must not be read as a process of linear development, but as a continuing *return* to the most originary question. Most superficially, this question is the *Seinsfrage*, the ‘question of being’, the question announced by ‘Being and Time’, but more primordially, this is the question of how the life itself that we have opens before us, making itself present as a *question* of what it is for us ‘to be’. Hitherto, the discipline or practice that addressed this presented itself as ‘philosophy’. In 1932, in the opening of a lecture course on ‘The Beginning of Western Philosophy’, Heidegger announced in the first sentence: ‘Our mission: the abandonment of philosophising?’ That this is posed as a question does not indicate uncertainty on Heidegger’s part, but indicates *how* this mission is to be carried out: namely through *questioning*, the question itself *of being*. ‘Philosophising’ is a translation of a term of Plato’s and Aristotle’s, but it is also the task Hegel that had elevated to becoming not only the highest, but in fact, the *singular* task and work of both the whole of thought and the whole of history. Between Plato, Aristotle and Hegel lies the historical formation of the emergence of metaphysics. Heidegger immediately clarifies what is meant by the ‘abandonment of philosophising’ by adding: ‘*That means the end of metaphysics* from out of an originary questioning concerning the “meaning” (truth) of being.’²²

This seems to be Heidegger’s first use either publicly or privately of the archaic and Swabian dialect word *beyng* (rather than *das Sein*, ‘being’), although by 1936, he

[1963]) pp. viii–xxiii. The German text also appears as Martin Heidegger, ‘Ein Vorwort. Brief an Pater William J. Richardson (1962)’, in *Identität und Differenz* (GA11), edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann 2006, pp. 143–152, 152. “Aber I wird nur möglich, wenn es in II enthalten ist.”

²⁰ See ‘Brief über den Humanismus’ (GA9), p. 159.

²¹ It was enough for Richardson that Heidegger had, in a way, confirmed that there *was* a Heidegger I and a Heidegger II – with little inkling that the real Heidegger II was in 1963 far from being revealed.

²² Martin Heidegger, *Der Anfang der Abendländischen Philosophie: Auslegung des Anaximander und Parmenides* (GA35), edited by Peter Trawny (2012) (Translated by Richard Rojcewicz as Martin Heidegger: *The Beginning of Western Philosophy* (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 2015), p. 1. “Unser Auftrag: der Abbruch des Philosophierens? *D. h. das Ende der Metaphysik* aus ursprünglichem Fragen nach dem ‘Sinn’ (Wahrheit) des Seyns” (Heidegger’s emphasis). It is precisely from this period onward that Heidegger starts to speak of the fulfilment and overcoming of metaphysics, above all in relation to Hegel. See ‘Hegel und das Problem der Metaphysik (1930)’, in *Vorträge* (GA80.1), pp. 281–315.

appears to have employed it in pedagogical contexts quite widely. What does Heidegger mean by *das Seyn*, ‘beyng’? It is only in 1949, in the second published edition of the lecture ‘On the Essence of Truth’, that Heidegger both uses in a public text and explains the meaning of the word: ‘beyng (*das Seyn*) as the difference holding sway between being (*das Sein*) and what is openly present (*das Seiende*).’²³ The appearance of *das Seyn* also marks a departure from the attempt to ground, or even elucidate, a formal ‘ontological difference’ between being (*das Sein*) as presencing and the whole of what is openly in presence (*das Seiende*), while retaining the historical distinction between the two that metaphysics had pointed towards (τὸ ὄντως ὄν) but could never clarify or bring to light. From now on, Heidegger names beyng with the archaic εἶν, ἔμμεναι, of Parmenides and Heraclitus.

From 1931 Heidegger had begun to record the thinking of the other Heidegger in the *Schwarze Hefte*, the ‘Black Notebooks’ that comprise nine volumes, the last of which has a date of 1970.²⁴ Among their more than three thousand printed pages can be found about thirteen pages (all dating from before 1946) recording Heidegger’s (in his own words) ‘reprehensible’²⁵ anti-Semitic remarks. Heidegger’s casual anti-Semitism is unquestionably inexcusable and at times difficult to comprehend. Heidegger’s was a social, ‘cultural’, almost (if the consequences more broadly had not been so terrible) snobbish racism,²⁶ rather than the formal, metaphysical, ‘biological’ racism of Nazi pseudo-science. Heidegger’s politics have too often – and often deliberately – been poorly understood. The Nazis did not manage to seize complete control of the German state until some months after Heidegger had resigned from the Rectorate of Freiburg University. Heidegger was by then, and from then onwards, as openly critical of the authorities as it was safe to be: not a few of the passages in the private ‘Black Notebooks’ and other texts of the period (not least his sharp words about the criminality of Europe’s dictator-leaders) could have got him imprisoned or even shot. Malik’s observations con-

²³ To understand what is being said, it is absolutely essential to avoid the habitual mistranslation of *das Seiende* as ‘beings’. Martin Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1949), p. 26 (see Wegmarken [GA9], p. 201). “Das Seyn als den waltenden Unterschied von Sein und Seiendem”. This was only the second appearance in a printed text of Heidegger’s use of ‘*das Seyn*’. The first is in an essay on Hölderlin that appeared in 1943. See Martin Heidegger, ‘Andenken’ in Paul Kluckhohn (ed.), *Hölderlin: Gedenkschrift zu seinem 100. Todestag, 7 Juni 1943* (Tübingen: J. C. Mohr, 1943), pp. 267–323, 309 f.

²⁴ These comprise volumes GA94–GA102, all edited by Peter Trawny, in the Heidegger Gesamtausgabe. The first was published in 2014, the last in 2022. To date, only the first three have been translated.

²⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Anmerkungen I–V*, edited by Peter Trawny (2015) (GA97), p. 159.

²⁶ Kostas Axelos once – and perhaps not wrongly – calls Heidegger’s social outlook, and his politics (of which racism was an integral part) ‘petit bourgeois’. See ‘Interview with Stuart Elden: Mondialisation without the World’, in *Radical Philosophy*, No. 130 (March/April 2005), p. 26.

cerning Heidegger's distance from the Nazi authorities are a welcome, and critically important, corrective to much that has been written and assumed about his involvement with, and commitment to, the Nazi apparatus.²⁷

It could be argued that Heidegger spent a lifetime rewriting the unfinished text of 'Being and Time'. Heidegger's asides and commentary on aspects of 'Being and Time', and the whole book itself, in one after another of his lecture courses strongly suggest a constant return to the themes and questions considered there. In what was arguably Heidegger's last lecture course, delivered after the lifting of his suspension from teaching in 1955,²⁸ there is still further discussion of the text,²⁹ as well as in a seminar of 1962 and other later texts.³⁰ In 2018 almost an entire volume of *Nachlaß* material appeared, the bulk of its near-600 pages devoted to a reconsideration of 'Being and Time'. The first third of the volume is entitled 'Running Commentary on "Being and Time"' and is dated '1936'. It was composed while Malik was studying in Freiburg. The next third comprises a commentary – 'Insights on Being and Time' – written up until 1941.³¹ Therefore, 'Being and Time' remained unfinished in not one but two senses: Heidegger continued to reinterpret his text until the very end.

Inasmuch as Malik is a predecessor of El-Bizri's at the American University of Beirut, El-Bizri's reminder of the debt we owe to those who precede us is important to note. Above all, that debt is owed to their struggle to introduce and shape us with what they themselves have struggled to understand. It is by no means accidental, therefore, that El-Bizri, following Malik, whom he has brought back into the light so brilliantly, is himself an acknowledged commentator on Heidegger's work.

²⁷ The attempt to discredit Malik's appreciation and observations of Heidegger by drawing parallels between their supposed political commitments is nothing short of ridiculous. Malik's time in Germany was cut short by a pattern of everyday vicious racist harassment: any sympathy of Malik's toward the German politics of the time is unthinkable in this context.

²⁸ Heidegger was suspended from teaching in 1946, following a "denazification" process under the French authorities then administratively responsible for Baden. The suspension was partially lifted in 1951 and had ceased to be in effect by 1955, although Heidegger never regained his position as Professor of Philosophy at the Albert-Ludwigs University.

²⁹ The text of the course was prepared for publication almost immediately, together with shorter, more summary materials, and appeared in 1957. See *Der Satz vom Grund* (GA10), edited by Petra Jaeger (1997 [1957]), pp. 125–138, esp. 128. Translated as *The Principle of Reason* by Reginald Lilly (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1991).

³⁰ The seminar in question is well known, and its protocols and other materials were published in 1969, with the subheading *Zeit und Sein*, 'Time and Being' – the title of the 'missing' third division of 'Being and Time'. See *Zur Sache des Denkens* (GA14), edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 2007 (1969). Translated by Joan Stambaugh as 'Time and Being', in *Martin Heidegger: On Time and Being* (San Francisco CA: Harper Torchbooks, 1972).

³¹ See 'I: Hinweise zu "Sein und Zeit"', in *Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen* (GA82), edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (2018), pp. 7–403, esp. 7–213.

El-Bizri's presentation of Malik's encounter with both the Heidegger of 'Being and Time' and the Heidegger of the pre-war years at the crest of his teaching activity provides us with a much-needed entry into both the beginning and the very centre of the hermeneutic circle of Heidegger's life and work. The English-speaking reception of Heidegger's work has long been underway and yet, for it to advance will require a return to the beginning all over again, a repetition of the very circle in which we all stand in order to understand being (thus to let us be, as 'ones who understand'). This book enables us to experience the freshness and energy of that first beginning yet again. As a work, 'Being and Time' remains among the *most* outstanding, and Malik's considerations of the text, in the way they are presented here, enable us to stand in that questionable presence once again.

Laurence Paul Hemming

Honorary Professor at Lancaster University (UK) in the Philosophy, Politics, and Religion Department and the Lancaster Management School.

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Biographical Note on the Editor [Nader El-Bizri]

Nader El-Bizri is a Leverhulme Visiting Professor in Intellectual History at Durham University and a Professor of Civilization Studies and Philosophy at the American University of Beirut. He is also affiliated with the Department of History and Philosophy of Science and associated with King's College at the University of Cambridge. He previously taught and conducted research at the universities of Nottingham, Cambridge, Lincoln, Harvard, and at the London Consortium, the Institute of Ismaili Studies in London, and the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris. He serves on various editorial boards of academic publishers internationally, including his General Editorship of an Oxford University Press philosophy book series. He also acted as a referee to international research bodies, academies, learned societies, and universities, including the Leverhulme Trust and the Arts and Humanities Research Council in the UK, and the EU Paris-Region Fellowship Programs. His cultural portfolios include consultancies in service of the Science Museum in London, the Aga Khan Trust for Culture in Geneva, and the Solomon Guggenheim Museum in Berlin. He also featured on BBC and France Culture television and radio programs and received various awards and honours, including the Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Sciences Prize, as well as being elected as a Mellon Global Liberal Arts Fellow at Claremont McKenna College in the USA, and an Honorary Fellow at Durham University in the UK.

التوكيد الوضعي على مركزية الترميز والتقنية كمدخل حصري للتفلسف. لم يتم كبح اهتمام مالك بالميتافيزيقا من خلال مثل هذه النزعات داخل المدرسة التحليلية المنطقية في الفلسفة، والتي تجذرت بصفاتها حركة مهيمنة داخل دوائر الفلسفة الموضوعية باللغة الإنكليزية في ثلاثينيات القرن الفائت، وأقامت حصناً لها -على سبيل المثال لا الحصر- في جامعة هارفارد. ولم يكن مالك مهتماً فقط بميتافيزيقيا وابتهد في ذلك المقام، ولكنه أيضاً تأثر بوضوح بأنطولوجيا هايدغر إلى حدّ الرغبة في الدراسة تحت إشراف هذا الأخير في ألمانيا، وعلى الرغم من كون تلك الحقبة غير مستقرّة وشائكة في التاريخ الاجتماعي والسياسي الألمانيّ وسطوة النازية حينها في الحُكم.

ويمكن فهم اهتمام مالك الفلسفيّ بهيدغر من منظور تأملاته اللاحقة من باب ما يشير إليه تحت التعبير العربيّ المُصاغ: "الظاهريّة" (phenomenology)، وفي مكونات هذا الميل في المباحث التي وضعها كذلك باللغة العربية. نراه يشير في هذا الصدد إلى مسألة الكينونة والتحليلات الوجودية للحياة اليومية الدنيوية، ونجده يُقرّ في هذا السياق بأنّ فلسفة هايدغر لم تكن غريبة قطّ عن التوجّهات الفلسفية الخاصّة به. ولعلّه كان مُقدِّراً لمالك أن يقابل هايدغر فكرياً حتى قبل أن يُصادف كتابه دراسياً، أو أن يلقاه عينياً بعدها، أو أن يُنصت إليه حضورياً في مجالسه. وعلى الرغم من انغماس هايدغر ومالك في ممارسة العمل السياسيّ، كلّ في مسيرته الذاتية الخاصّة، وفي سياقها التاريخيّ والعينيّ والظرفي، وبما لها من تداعيات فكرية وعملائية تستحقّ التّمحيص النقديّ المُعمّق، إلّا أنّ ما أوردته في هذا الكتاب من شروحات وتحاليل اقتصرَ على التدقيق في الحيثيات الأنطولوجية لنظرتيهما إلى "الكينونة من حيث هي كينونة" (τὸ ὄν ἢ ὄν)، فيكون مبحثنا ههنا ميتافيزيقياً محضاً في عناصره التقنية وتوجّهاته الأكاديمية.

بل إنه عُنصر حاسم فلسفيًا. علاوة على ذلك، يختلف تفسير مالك فكر هايدغر عن الروايات التي أصبحت مألوفة لاحقًا في مسارات التعليقات التحليلية والنقدية السائدة حول ذلك الإرث الفلسفي المعاصر. تفسيرات مالك لها محمولات مشرقية ذات تطبع لبناني، وفيها توجهات مسيحية النزعة في أبعادها اللاهوتية وفي التدبر بمكونات ما بعد الطبيعة. وبالتالي فهي مختلفة في تفسيراتها باللغة الإنكليزية عن مناهج التأويلات الفلسفية الأميركية والبريطانية التي ظهرت بعدها. ويرتبط هذا الأمر بكيفية تعليق هايدغر نفسه على تفكيره عينه من خلال توجهاته في النقد الذاتي ضمن سرديات فلسفته، وعبر فتح سُبل جديدة للتفكير عنده.

كان لدى هايدغر علاقة دقيقة ومرهفة مع *Sein und Zeit*، ولكن تعقيداتها دفعته إلى إعادة تقييمه النقدي لها من باب إطلاق توجهات جديدة في تفكيره. ففي صيف العام ١٩٣٦ بدأ هايدغر مواجهته الذاتية الفلسفية مع مواطن نصّه التأسيسي، وبالتحديد في الوقت الذي شرع فيه بالعمل على مبحثه الأصعب: *Beiträge zur Philosophie* (مُساهمات للفلسفة). هذه التطورات البنيوية في تفكير هايدغر الأنطولوجي كانت تتكشف في الفترة التي كان مالك يدرّس فيها تحت إشرافه. وكانت البيئة الفلسفية في جامعة هارفارد في ذلك الوقت تميل نحو مناهج التحليل المنطقي والبرجماتية الأميركية، مع نُفورٍ ضمنيٍّ من فكر هايدغر وما يُمثّله فلسفيًا. ومثل هذا المزاج الفلسفي توافق مع رفض رودلف كارناب (Rudolf Carnap) أنطولوجيا هايدغر في دراسته عام ١٩٣٢: *Überwindung der Metaphysik durch Logische Analyse der Sprache* (فهر الميتافيزيقا من خلال التحليل المنطقي للغة). وقام كارناب بتصويب هجومه النقدي على محاضرة مفصلية لهايدغر من العام ١٩٢٩ في فرايبورغ، والتي حملت عنوان *Was Ist Metaphysik?* (ما الميتافيزيقا؟). وبالافتتان، قدّم كارناب تعبيرًا صارمًا لنزعة الرفض تجاه *Sein und Zeit* والتي بدأت تظهر في مذهب الفلسفة التحليلية (Analytic philosophy) في الحلقات الفلسفية البريطانية-الأميركية. وهذا الأمر يُبرز أوجه الخلافات الرئيسية في الفلسفة المعاصرة حول الحقيقة والمعنى في محاولة القضاء على الأنطولوجيا من خلال تحليل الخوارزميات اللغوية المثالية، والمُحدّدة منطقيًا، مع

ترجمته لمصطلحات هايدغر إلى اللغة الإنكليزية قبل كل هذه المحاولات بعقود من الزمن. وقام بصياغة عبارات *Sein und Zeit* قبل صدور أول ترجمة إنكليزية لهذا النصّ تحت العنوان *Being and Time* أو ما تُرجمَ كذلك لاحقاً عبر الفرنكوفونية إلى *Être et temps*. يُعزى أي ارتباك في ترجمة كتاب هايدغر إلى الأنماط الجديدة في التفكير الأنطولوجي المُحدث عنده. وقد اجتهد مالك في الترجمة والشروحات لنصّ *Sein und Zeit* في مراحل أبكر بكثير من كل المترجمين والشُرّاح الأوائل لفكر هايدغر. وكان مالك طليعياً في مسعاه من باب جلب هذا المسار الفكري إلى اللغة الإنكليزية والتي لم تكن هي بعينها لغته الأصليّة الأمّ. تفسير مالك نصّ *Sein und Zeit* له في ذلك أهميّة تاريخيّة ضمن حقل الدراسات حول هايدغر. وفي هذا دلائل على تقبّل فلسفي مبكر لتقل فكر هايدغر إلى اللغة الإنكليزية ومُقدّمة طليعيّة لإبراز *Sein und Zeit* بحسابه تحفة تأسيسيّة لما ظهر لاحقاً عبر جذور المدرسة الوجوديّة (existentialism)، ومذهب التأويل في المنهج الظواهريّ (phenomenological hermeneutics)، وابتداع أسلوب التفكيك (deconstruction).

تجدد الإشارة في هذا الصدد إلى الأهميّة المفصليّة لأنطولوجيا هايدغر في عشرينيّات القرن العشرين، وخاصة تطوّر فكره في فرايبورغ (Freiburg) وعبر مرحلة تدريسه في ماربورغ (Marburg)، وإلى وقت نشره *Sein und Zeit*. دراسة أعمال هايدغر في حقبة ثلاثينيات القرن المنصرم أقلّ وفرةً من تلك التي ركّزت على فترة العشرينيّات السابقة لها، وخصوصاً المرحلة التي استمرّت خلال بدايات الحرب العالمية الثانية. مسار هايدغر الفلسفي تداخل مع بعض أوجه نشاطه السياسي الوظيفيّ في العام ١٩٣٣. هنالك ندرة في أرشفة فكره في ذلك الوقت، وجزء ضئيل من التوثيق يعود إلى تلك الحقبة، سواء ما طُبع باللّغة الألمانيّة أو ما تُرجمَ لاحقاً إلى اللغتين الإنكليزيّة والفرنسيّة. التدبّر في طبائع فكر هايدغر الذي يعود إلى ثلاثينيّات القرن الماضي محفوف بصعوبات جمّة من منطلق التفسير والندرة في التوثيق. وعلى ضوء ذلك، فإن تدوين مالك فكر هايدغر من حقبة منتصف ثلاثينيّات القرن المنصرم ليس حدثاً عرضيّاً في هذا السياق،

نصّ مالك بشروحات تحليليّة في سياق تفسير وتأويل الفكر الأنطولوجي الحديث الذي ينبع من كتاب هايدغر *Sein und Zeit* ضمن تاريخ تَلَفُّفه في الدوائر الفلسفيّة الأكاديمية، مع الأخذ بعين الاعتبار سياق آثاره الغنيّة على مناهج الفكر عند مالك.

توافق نهج مالك مع مفاهيم هايدغر الأنطولوجيّة في الطريقة التي اتّبعها في تأويلاته وفي ترجمته للمصطلحات المُبتكَرة من اللّغة الألمانيّة إلى اللّغة الإنكليزية وتعليقاته عليها. تَلَفَّف مالك سمات أسلوب هايدغر الصعبة في الكتابة وفي صياغة الجُمَل الفلسفيّة المُحدّثة في اللّغة الألمانيّة، فضلاً عن كيفية ترجمتها بعد ذلك إلى اللّغة الإنكليزيّة، مع ما يحمله كلّ ذلك من معوقات جَمّة على مستوى المفاهيم وطرائق التعبير عنها لغويّاً. وقد أقدم مالك على ذلك من خلال فهمه جوهر وماهيّة علم الوجود عند هايدغر، والتطرّق إلى الأسس الجديدة في التفكير عبر أساليب غير معتادة في التعبير وفي وضع الافتراضات الفلسفيّة ومعالجة مُستلزماتها التحليليّة.

لقد أكّد كُُلُّ من جون مَكَارّي (John Macquarrie) وإدوارد روبنسون (Edward Robinson)، في مقدّمة ترجمتهما الإنكليزية كتاب هايدغر *Sein und Zeit* في عام ١٩٦٢ صعوبة النصّ حتى بالنسبة إلى القارئ الألماني، وكونه عَصِيّاً على محاولات ترجمته، وبخاصّة إلى اللّغة الإنكليزيّة، لدرجة أنه غالباً ما يُطلق عليه الحُكم -إلى يومنا هذا- أنه يكاد يكون "غير قابل للترجمة". وأضافوا أنّ عبارات هايدغر غير عاديّة وخارجة عمداً عن المألوف من باب الابتعاد النقديّ عن استخدام المصطلحات الفلسفيّة النابعة من الميتافيزيقا التقليديّة الكلاسيكيّة، ومن حيث إنه يَصُوغ مركّبات لغويّة مُستحدّثة. وقد ظهرت صعوبات مماثلة في الترجمة الإنكليزية من قبل رالف مانهايم (Ralph Manheim) في إصدار جامعة يال سنة ١٩٥٩ (Yale University Press) وفي طبعة جامعة أكسفورد (Oxford University Press). وتمّ التأكيد على هذه المصاعب أيضاً في ملاحظات جون ستامبُخ (Joan Stambaugh) في ترجمتها الإنكليزية لاحقاً في العام ١٩٩٦ عبر طبعة جامعة ولاية نيويورك (State University of New York Press)، والتي أعادت تنقيحها في إصدار جديد ومُصَحَّح عام ٢٠١٠. ولقد أنجز مالك

أطروحة مالك بذلك مبحثاً رائداً في الفلسفة يعود إلى أوائل القرن العشرين، ويُدلل على تَمَظُّهُر المفاهيم الفلسفيّة الحديثة ضمن سياق الاهتمامات الفكرية عند مُفكّر لبناني من مقام مالك، مع تلاقي هذا النهج عنده مع تعاليم اللاهوت المسيحي التي استهوتته في أبعادها الوجودية.

يظهر جلياً من خلال شروحات مالك وتعليقاته على حيثيات فلسفة هايدغر في *Sein und Zeit* أنها بمجمملها ريادة في ترجمتها من اللغة الألمانية إلى الإنكليزية للمصطلحات الأنطولوجية الجديدة حينها، ولتوقّعها -علاوةً على ذلك- العديد من التطوّرات اللاحقة في فكر هايدغر، وتحديدًا التوجّهات اللاهوتية لِرؤاد الشُّراح والمُعَلِّقين على ذلك الإرث الفلسفي، كما كان الحال على سبيل المثال مع المُفكّر اللاهوتي الألماني رُودلف بولتمان (Rudolf Bultmann). هناك أيضاً إشارات في أطروحة مالك تُدلل بأكبراً على العناصر الأخلاقية الكامنة في التحليل الوجودي للكينونة عند هايدغر، والتي تمّ التعامل معها في وقت لاحق من قبل العديد من الباحثين حول فكر هايدغر وتداعياته على الفضائل والمَنَاقِب، كما ورد ذلك فيما بعد في شكل نقديّ عند الفيلسوف إيمانويل ليفيناس (Emmanuel Levinas).

وَنَجِد في تعليقات مالك على هايدغر اكتشافاتٍ سَبَّاقَة في تصوير مفهوم العزم المُتَحَرِّر في الهيكلية الوجودية لما يُدلل عليه هايدغر بالمُسَمَّى: *Dasein* (أي "الكينونة ههنا" في هذا العالم الدنيويّ، *In-der-Welt-sein*)، وعلى المنوال الذي برَزَ لاحقاً في فلسفة جان-بول سارتر (Jean-Paul Sartre). وقد ظهرت هذه الدلالات المِفْصَلِيَّة بصفتها إمكاناتٍ مُزْدَهَرَة في النشاط الفلسفيّ لمالك بوصفه مُفكّرًا لبنانيًّا شابًّا ورائدًا في منتصف ثلاثينيات القرن العشرين، وذلك في إطار دراسته تحت إشراف كبار فلاسفة تلك الحقبة، سواء في الولايات المتحدة الأميركية أو في ألمانيا.

تحتوي دَفْناً هذا الكتاب ههنا على النسخة المُحَقَّقة من الجزء المُخَصَّص لفلسفة هايدغر من أطروحة مالك في الدكتوراه كما أنجزها عام ١٩٣٧ في جامعة هارفارد. وقد أرفقت تحقيقي

مَقْدَمَةٌ

أُكْمِلَ الْمُفَكِّرَ اللَّبْنَانِي شَارْلَ مَالِكِ (١٩٠٦-١٩٨٧) أطروحة الدكتوراه في الفلسفة في جامعة هارفارد (Harvard University) عام ١٩٣٧، وقدّمها تحت عنوان: *The Metaphysics of Time in the Philosophies of A. N. Whitehead and M. Heidegger* (ميتافيزيقا الزمن في فلسفات أ. ن. وايتهد و م. هايدغر). وقد اجتهد مالك في مباحثه في هذا السياق من خلال دراساته العليا في قسم الفلسفة في جامعة هارفارد، تحت إرشاد الفيلسوف البريطاني ألفريد نورث وايتهد (Alfred North Whitehead)، وعبر تتلمذه كذلك في ألمانيا خلال تلك الحقبة في الفترة الممتدة من ١٩٣٥ إلى ١٩٣٦ في جامعة فرايبورغ (Universität Freiburg) تحت إشراف الفيلسوف الألماني مارتن هايدغر (Martin Heidegger).

وعلى الرغم من أنّ فكر مارتن هايدغر كان معروفاً منذ عشرينيات القرن الماضي في الأقسام الرئيسية للفلسفة في الولايات المتحدة وبريطانيا، إلا أنّ الجزء المُخَصَّص لأنطولوجيا هايدغر الأساسية (*Fundamentalontologie*) ضمن أطروحة مالك شكّلَ بحدّ ذاته نقلةً نوعيّةً وفريدةً في تقديم فلسفة هايدغر والتعليق على مفاهيمها عبر شروحاتٍ وتعليقاتٍ وضعها مالك باللّغة الإنكليزيّة. والنصّ المُخَصَّص لأنطولوجيا هايدغر في أطروحة مالك يُنشر لأول مرة بين دفتيّ هذا الكتاب ههنا في نسخته المُحَقَّقة، ويشتمل على أقدم التفسيرات التحليليّة والتأويليّة باللّغة الإنكليزيّة حول كتاب هايدغر (*Sein und Zeit*) (الكينونة والزمن) والذي أُخْرِجَ باللّغة الألمانيّة في طبعته الأولى عام ١٩٢٧.

نصّ مالك يحمل أهميّة تاريخيّة في هذا السياق من ضمن حيزّ الدراسات حول فكر هايدغر، وله قيمة مُضافة لكونه جزءاً من أطروحة أوسع تحتوي كذلك على تحليل فريد لكتاب وايتهد (*Process and Reality*) (المنهج والواقع)، والذي نُشر في طبعته الأولى عام ١٩٢٩. تُشكّل

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