

NOMADEN UND SESSHAFTE

Sonderforschungsbereich Differenz und Integration
Wechselwirkungen zwischen nomadischen und sesshaften Lebensformen
in Zivilisationen der Alten Welt

Herausgegeben im Auftrag des SFB
von Jörg Gertel, Stefan Leder, Jürgen Paul und Bernhard Streck

BAND 18

WIESBADEN 2015
DR. LUDWIG REICHERT VERLAG

Nomad Military Power in Iran and Adjacent Areas in the Islamic Period

Edited by Kurt Franz
and Wolfgang Holzwarth

WIESBADEN 2015
DR. LUDWIG REICHERT VERLAG

Bukharan Armies and Uzbek Military Power, 1670–1870: Coping with the Legacy of a Nomadic Conquest

Wolfgang Holzwarth

This article inquires into the organisation of the military in the Khanate/Emirate of Bukhara over the long term, from the late seventeenth century up to the Russian conquest of Central Asia in the 1860s. In particular, it aims to trace the role of nomad and tribal forces in the overall military configuration of a Central Asian state, which was established by a nomadic conquest around 1500. The study draws on reports of European – mostly Russian – observers as well as on Central Asian chronicles and collections of administrative deeds and letters compiled by Bukharan scribes. An overview of the political processes and the transformations in the military sphere during the two hundred years in question reveals that the Uzbeks – descendants of former conquerors – could quite effectively resist the continuous efforts of the Bukharan rulers in order to centralise political power.

1. Introduction

The Uzbeks had been nomads when, under the leadership of Muḥammad Shaybānī Khān, they conquered and moved into Māwarānnahr from the Great Steppe in around 1500. Māwarānnahr, the core area of the newly established Uzbek Khanate of Bukhara, was a mixed agro-pastoral region including the vast agricultural oases of Bukhara and Samarqand, and large numbers of settled people. The conquered population, comprising both settled and nomadic people, may have numbered up to three or four million. The newcomers can be estimated at 200,000 to 400,000, including an army of 50,000 to 100,000. This was the last large-scale nomadic con-

This article was written under the auspices of the collaborative research centre ‘Difference and integration’ funded by the German Research Council (DFG). My special thanks are due to Jürgen Paul who introduced me to the study of nomadic traditions and the military, and commented on a first draft. I also gratefully acknowledge the help of James Carrier, Hale Decdeli-Holzwarth, Kurt Franz, Sigrid Kleinmichel, Azim Malikov, Nader Purnaḳcheband, Carol Rowe, Małgorzata Bi-czyk and Carsten Brown. Any remaining mistakes are mine.

quest in the history of Transoxiana. Sizeable parts of the conquered territories continued to be ruled by Chinggisid and Uzbek dynasties up to 1920.

How did the state and its army develop after the nomadic conquest?¹ How did nomadic rule over a sedentary domain affect the military and political power of the erstwhile nomadic conquerors and their descendants? For how long could they maintain their dominant political and military role?

Several studies have addressed these and related questions. Dickson, Berndt and Welsford have traced developments in political organisation in the sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries.² McChesney has pointed to the rising power of Uzbek chiefs during the seventeenth century, while Chekhovich has focused on the relation between these Uzbek chiefs and the Bukharan rulers in the eighteenth century.³ Von Kügelgen has analysed the downfall of the Chinggisids and the rise of the Uzbek Manghit dynasty in the mid-eighteenth century, giving special consideration to the problem of legitimation of rule posed by the ousting of the Chinggisid dynasty.⁴ Bregel has published a detailed study on the Bukharan administration around 1800 and several overviews of Bukharan history in the early modern period.⁵ Regarding the traditions going back to the erstwhile nomadic conquest, he points out that a decisive moment of transition occurred in the mid-nineteenth century, when the dynastic rulers built up a standing army independent of Uzbek military power. My own earlier contributions deal with political relations in the eighteenth century and with the administration of mobile tribal groups in the Emirate of Bukhara around 1900.⁶

Developments in the military field have been treated somewhat less extensively and systematically. Berndt has outlined general organisational features and the integration of firearm units in the second half of the sixteenth century.⁷ McChesney and Burton have also studied individual campaigns and military confrontations in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.⁸ Chekhovich and von Kügelgen refer to military organisation and the balance of power in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.⁹ Vyatkin has analysed the organisation of the Bukharan provincial

¹ Paul ("The State," 54) points to this understudied research topic, which is part of the wider theme of the development of nomadic statehood after the conquest of sedentary areas, outlined in Khanzhanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, 231–33, 261–63.

² Dickson ("Dynastic Theory") and Berndt (*Kampf um die Steppe*) have studied the political and military organisation in the sixteenth century, particularly with regard to the Chinggisid concept of the collective sovereignty of the ruling dynastic clan. Welsford (*Loyalty*) focuses on a dynastic change at the turn of the seventeenth century.

³ McChesney, "Amirs;" Chekhovich, "K istorii Uzbekistana;" ead., "O nekotorykh voprosakh."

⁴ Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*.

⁵ Bregel, *Administration*; id., "Bukhara;" id., "Mangits;" id., "Central Asia," *EIr*, 5:193–205

⁶ Holzwarth, "Uzbek State;" id., "Relations;" id., "Community Elders."

⁷ Berndt, "Organisation;" ead., *Kampf um die Steppe*.

⁸ McChesney, "Herat;" Burton, "Who Were the Almān?" See also Burton's detailed history of Bukhara from the mid-sixteenth to the turn of the eighteenth century (ead., *The Bukharans*).

⁹ Chekhovich, "K istorii Uzbekistana," 71–73, 78–79; Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 239–40, 353–58, 383–85.

army at the turn of the nineteenth century, while Troitskaya has dealt with military reforms in the mid-nineteenth century.¹⁰ Finally, Shukurillaev and Ziyaeva have presented overviews of the military history of Uzbek Central Asia.¹¹ A coherent study of the long aftermath of the nomadic conquest, particularly in the military field has not so far appeared. I shall try to undertake the task in this article, focusing on the Bukharan Khanate/Emirate and covering the two hundred years preceding the Russian conquest of Central Asia.

The military and social history of the Khanate/Emirate of Bukhara in the period under review, as will be shown, reveals an almost continuous – yet not always very successful – struggle on the part of the rulers to emancipate themselves from the original mainstay of their (military) power, the Uzbeks. The Uzbeks, as descendants of former conquerors, also claimed a fair share of political power and agricultural wealth and clung to the concept of a sharp division between the Uzbek military estate (*[abl-i] sipāh*) and the unarmed mass of the subject people (*fuqarā*) as a safeguard of legitimate social order.¹²

These claims and concepts, combined with persistent Uzbek military power, represent the legacy of a nomadic conquest that the rulers had to cope with in their attempts to build up independent sources of military power. As we cannot usually ascertain the extent to which any particular Uzbek tribe mentioned as a military actor by our sources, was actually nomadic or settled, I prefer to speak in this context of ‘Uzbek’, or ‘tribal’, rather than of ‘nomadic’ military power. Uzbek tribes, judging from nineteenth-century Bukharan and Russian sources, were hierarchically organised, with clearly identifiable senior clans, lineages and families. In case of the Manghits, the Uzbek tribe that supplied the rulers of Bukhara from the mid-eighteenth century, even clients and dependants of the ruling lineage were considered members of the tribe, even if with inferior status.¹³

This choice of terms is further suggested by my impression that sedentarisation does not seem to have significantly affected the military power of Uzbek tribes (see the note on ‘nomads and sedentarisation’ below). While it is hardly feasible to pinpoint transformation processes on a continuum from ‘nomadic’ to ‘sedentary’ in the period under consideration, it is still possible to observe the rulers’ attempts to increase their autonomy and to subject the traditional military estate to central control. Seen from this perspective, the Bukharan case is not fundamentally differ-

¹⁰ Vyatkin, “Karshinskii okrug;” Troitskaya, “Voennoe delo.”

¹¹ Shukurillaev, *Buxoro amirligida*; Ziyaeva, *O‘zbekistonda harbiy ish*. Unfortunately, Shukurillaev’s dissertation abstract is too sketchy, and Ziyaeva’s edited work jumps abruptly from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century.

¹² See Holzwarth, “The Uzbek State,” 327–30, 332, 334.

¹³ Holzwarth, “Community Elders,” 232–34. In view of the on-going debate about the validity of the term ‘tribe’ in Central Asia (Sneath, “Ayimag”), I should state that I do not use it here in an evolutionist or pejorative sense. Tribes, in the context of this paper, are not “primitive” predecessors, but integral parts of states. As long as we do not make the assumption that tribes are simple forms of social organisation, complex forms – with political stratification and elites – do not, in my view, conflict with the concept of tribe.

ent from developments in other early modern states that were not imbued with nomadic traditions.

Drawing on a variety of sources,¹⁴ I shall try to trace the steps and setbacks in the Bukharan rulers' endeavours to create their own military power base and to expand it at the expense of Uzbek military might. Reviewing developments in the two centuries that preceded the Russian conquest of Central Asia, the investigation will focus on the changing composition and organisation of the Bukharan armies over time. In general, we shall search our sources for information on certain traits of military configurations that may be relevant for an analysis of military power, with regard to considerations of loyalty as well as efficiency and costs, as proposed by Charles Tilly and adapted to a 'nomadic perspective' on the state and the military by Jürgen Paul.¹⁵ These traits are: social composition of the military forces, their availability, training and conduct in war, remuneration for military service as well as weaponry.

The study proceeds chronologically, dividing the whole period under review into seven phases, each highlighting new facets and aspects of a strikingly dynamic story and contest below the surface of apparently persisting traditional military institutions. Chapter 2 focuses an upsurge of Uzbek tribal power in the late seventeenth century; Chapters 3, 4 and 5 review developments in the eighteenth century – culminating in changes brought about by a confrontation with the empire of the Iranian warlord Nādir Shāh (Chapter 4); Chapters 6, 7 and 8 deal with military organisation and reforms under the first three Bukharan rulers in the nineteenth century down to the confrontation with the Russian army in the 1860s.

Before going into the details of these phases, some remarks on four aspects of the overall transformation are appropriate with a view to framing and informing the more detailed sequential close-ups within the wider historical and regional context. The first two notes below introduce general features and basic trends in the political and military organisation of the region. The third and fourth notes bring

¹⁴ Sources that can be drawn upon for Bukharan military history include accounts of the Bukharan military by foreign, mostly European, travellers. Following roughly the same pattern in their reports, they describe the strength of various army elements, weapons, methods of paying the army, conduct in war, etc. Taken together, these descriptions shed light on the army as it developed chronologically, often at intervals of just a few decades. The data they provide can serve as indicators – however crude – of continuity and change in the military sphere. Other sources are Bukharan chronicles as well as collections of letters, orders and documents, which, in the period under review, are almost all written in Persian. They offer a bewildering plethora of detail about the military campaigns and political strategies of central rulers, and on the movements of Uzbek chiefs and tribes. Bukharan sources are indispensable for checking, complementing, and interpreting the European travellers' reports. For an overview of travellers' accounts, see Lunin, *Istoriya Uzbekistana* and Kügelgen, "Bukhara." For an overview of relevant Bukharan sources, see Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 103–171.

¹⁵ Seen from the ruler's perspective, besides loyalty, it is efficiency and costs that are the most important variables in the relation between the military and the state (Paul, "The State," 45; id., "Perspectives nomades," 1083).

up the issues of sedentarisation and military challenges in the age of firearms and their possible impact on the overall process.

Chinggisid Statehood and Centralisation

Centralisation is generally conceived as a major trend in the transition from nomadic to sedentary forms of statehood. The Chinggisid style of political organisation, which the nomadic conquerors had installed in Māwarānnahr was characterised by fragmented sovereignty and decentralised rule, as male members of the ruling clan essentially shared political leadership, and were allocated appanages in different parts of the conquered territory.¹⁶

Chinggisid Bukhara, incidentally, endured for as long as the Mughal and Safavid empires, two of the classic ‘gunpowder empires’ of the Islamic world, which were more stable and more centralised than earlier empires, mostly – as has been argued by Hodgson – due to the employment of heavy firearms, expensive and efficient siege and field artillery.¹⁷

Regarding processes of centralisation, however, Chinggisid Bukhara had not undergone reforms comparable to those initiated by Shāh ‘Abbās I (1587–1629) in Safavid Iran. Whereas the latter created large units of musketeers, which were no longer recruited from their traditional military base, i.e. the Qızılbaş tribes, and became the new mainstay of Safavid military power,¹⁸ the Chinggisid Khans hardly ever commanded more than 500 slave guards equipped with firearms, and thus did not have at their disposal the military means to impose centralisation. Moreover in Safavid Iran, the traditional military elite was further disempowered by administrative reforms favouring royal ‘slaves’ – or royal ‘knaves’, as Röhrborn translates the term (sing. *ghulam*) – as provincial governors over Qızılbaş chiefs,¹⁹ while at roughly the same time in Chinggisid Bukhara, chiefs of the traditional military elite, the Uzbek tribes, were favoured as provincial governors over members of the Chinggisid dynasty.²⁰

Notionally, the (non-Uzbek) Chinggisid sovereigns represented and led the Uzbek tribal confederation, which, in turn, protected the ruler as a beehive does its

¹⁶ Dickson, “Dynastic Theory.” However, by the mid-sixteenth century the Khans were already seeking to rule in a more autocratic way, see Berndt, *Kampf um die Steppe*, 179–89, 277–82.

¹⁷ Hodgson, *Venture*, 3:17–27. Hodgson has not treated Chinggisid Bukhara, which can hardly be called a ‘gunpowder empire’, though it did employ some artillery.

¹⁸ The infantry musketeers (sing. *tufangchi*) were mainly drawn from the Iranian peasantry while the mounted infantry was made up of ‘slaves’ (mainly of Christian Caucasian origin). Together, the new formations numbered around 12,000 men (Röhrborn, “Regierung und Verwaltung,” 36; Mathee, “Firearms,” 621; Haneda, “Army,” 504–5. On the composition and developments of the Safavid military, see also Floor, *Safavid Government Institutions*, esp. 124–280.

¹⁹ Haneda, “La garde royale,” 53–57; Röhrborn, *Provinzen und Zentralgewalt*, 31–37, 51, 126.

²⁰ Administrative reforms comparable to those of Shāh ‘Abbās, with slaves replacing the chiefs of the traditional tribal military elite, were tried in Bukhara around 1700, when the rulers were not able to enforce them, and again from around 1800, when they succeeded.

queen, so to speak. In fact, the Chinggisid Khans had reason to doubt the loyalty of their tribal following, and Uzbek chiefs became more and more powerful military and political actors in the course of the seventeenth century.²¹ In the mid-eighteenth century Uzbek chiefs – in the case of Bukhara the Manghits – finally toppled the Chinggisid sovereigns and assumed supreme power.

Bukharan Armies, Professional Soldiers, Uzbek Military Power

Seen from the rulers' perspective, in hybrid agro-pastoral societies like Uzbek Central Asia, there were, as Jürgen Paul has indicated, generally two alternatives sources for military recruitment: nomadic forces and professional soldiers. A nomadic army, ideally, consists of the manpower of the entire tribe, and is remunerated with booty, whereas professional soldiers are salaried or rewarded with other kinds of regular income. In a distinctly pastoral context, considerations of efficiency, loyalty and cost make the creation of a professional salaried army unattractive. In mixed contexts, or transitional societies, however, professional armies are quite common.²²

Bukharan armies, in the period under review, often consisted of several structural components, resulting from various types of military recruitment and differences in the social embeddedness of military service. These components included freelance light cavalry fighting for booty,²³ as well as state-sponsored or maintained military forces, i.e. 'professional soldiers', if we apply Paul's minimal definition of the term. A professional soldiery in this broad sense is documented as early as the late sixteenth century.²⁴ A particular type of professional soldiery is represented by the ruler's permanent, standing armed forces. A 'standing army' ideally consists of regularly trained and salaried professional troops, who are garrisoned or otherwise spatially segregated, and constantly available.²⁵ In Bukhara, such troops appeared in very small numbers in the mid-eighteenth century and became more common in the mid-nineteenth century.

²¹ McChesney, "Amirs."

²² Paul, "The State," 53, 59.

²³ I adopt the term 'freelance light cavalry' from Murphey (*Ottoman Warfare*, 35), who reports that these forces, who offered their services to the state in exchange for the lion's share of the disposable war booty and were called 'raiders' (sing. *akıncı*), dominated the Ottoman military until the start of the sixteenth century.

²⁴ Berndt (*Kampf um die Steppe*, 234) refers to a muster of troops (*taḥqīq-i laşbkar*) in Jumāda II 986/August 1578, when the chief treasurer and secretary registered the names of 30,000 warriors of 'Abdallāh Khān's army (*sīpāh-i kbāşşa-yi ān ḥazrat*). It can be inferred that the Khan's army was allocated provisions from the supreme *dīvān*, as those warriors who fought under minor members of the Chinggisid dynasty (*salāṭin-i khurd*) and received their 'fodder rations' (*alūfa*) from them were not listed. On central control and accounting as a feature of sedentary states, see Paul "The State," 34, 51.

²⁵ Beatrice Manz proposed this definition in her oral contribution to the Conference "Nomads vs. Standing Armies in the Iranian World 1000–1800," Vienna, 5 December 2005.

During most of the period under review, however, Uzbek troops paid by the state treasury in the form of rations, grants or salaries made up the most numerous and common component of the Bukharan armies. We may call these troops a tribal army when they were recruited and operated under the command of their own tribal chiefs, or a provincial army when they were recruited and commanded by centrally appointed governors or military leaders. They were neither spatially segregated, nor permanently available but the ruler kept an eye on them and every year, in spring, summoned (elements of) them to a review at a shrine near the capital Bukhara. These troops were not regularly drilled, but trained as they grew up, participating in games of horsemanship organised by their own communities on social occasions and festivities, and learning by doing in cattle thefts and raiding parties. These warriors could also do without a military superstructure and act independently, usually in small warbands (see Chapter 2). A clue and prerequisite of this military potential was obviously horse-breeding and the availability of a large number of horses, “perhaps [the] most decisive military advantage” of nomadic groups in general.²⁶

Nomads and Sedentarisation

In the period under review, it appears that a considerable number of Uzbek groups retained a nomadic way of life. A mid-eighteenth-century Russian report notes that around the capital Bukhara “everywhere in the steppes, a nomadic people called ‘Uzbeks’, which subsists on animal husbandry, is living in tents.”²⁷ Around 1820, according to a rough estimate by a foreign traveller, there were one million nomads, including Uzbeks as well as other mobile groups, among a total population of two-and-a-half million in the Emirate of Bukhara.²⁸ At that time, a Bukharan author reports:

Around Bukhārā there are many nomads (sing. *hasham-nishīn*), such as Arabs, Turkmens, Uzbeks, Qaraqalpāqs, and Qunghrāts. ... In Miyānkāl and towards Samarqand, one can say, the nomads are face-to-face with the city-dweller (sing. *shahr-nishīn*). [On the way] from Bukhārā up to Samarqand, Jizzaq and Ūra-Tippa villages, towns and nomads are contiguous.²⁹

A Russian report confirms this information as it states that the Uzbeks of the Zarafshān valley “spend the summer in yurts and in the winter gather in towns and villages.”³⁰ For mobile groups living in close spatial and social proximity with agriculturalists and other sedentary people, as in early-nineteenth-century Bukhara,

²⁶ Khazanov, “The Eurasian Steppe Nomads,” 193.

²⁷ “Izvestiya o Bukharii,” 115.

²⁸ Meyendorff, *Voyage*, 197. At that time, the Emirate’s territory was much smaller than the area once conquered by the Shaybānīd Uzbeks.

²⁹ Bukhārī, *Tārīkh-i latīf*, 77, tr. 171–72. My above translation is based on the Persian text. On the term *hasham* for ‘nomad’, see Paul, “Terms for Nomads,” 446–54.

³⁰ Spasskii, “Noveishchee opisanie,” 305.

scholars have coined the terms ‘enclosed nomads’,³¹ or ‘cohabitants’,³² in order to distinguish them from the ‘excluded’ nomads or ‘nomadisers’ dwelling in the open Eurasian steppe. In the given ‘enclosed’ context, processes of sedentarisation have brought about multiple crossovers and intersections between mobile and settled forms of life, and highly complex mosaics of pastoral and agricultural pockets. All the Uzbek tribes mentioned in a sample of detailed nineteenth-century surveys of southern and eastern Bukhara included settled and mobile groups, with the general tendency that the more affluent strata were the most mobile.³³

The emic terminology for nomads may reflect these tendencies. Early modern Central Asian sources often refer to nomads in terms that had been in use in the Timurid period, such as *ṣahrā-nishīn*, *bādiya-nishīn* (Persian ‘steppe-dwellers’).³⁴ In eighteenth-century Bukharan chronicles, a new term for nomads appears that combines the Central Asian Turki words *īl*, ‘people, tribe’,³⁵ and *bāy*, ‘rich’. The chroniclers spell this either *īl-bāy* or *īl wa bāy*.³⁶ A Russian colonial officer posted in the Samarqand region around 1870 confirms the use of the word in the vernacular – he records the oral form *illyubai* – as a common term for “nomads” (*kochevniki*).³⁷

Since, as mentioned above, we generally have no means of determining the extent to which a particular Uzbek tribe referred to in our sources was leading a nomadic way of life at the given point in time, it is, in my opinion, more appropriate to speak of ‘Uzbek’ than of ‘nomadic’ military power in our context. As far as can be gathered, sedentarisation did not significantly reduce the military strength of Uzbek tribal forces. Thus, for instance, the Uzbek tribe of Kanīgās, one of the

³¹ Lattimore, “The Frontier in History,” 487. See also Rowton, “Enclosed Nomadism.”

³² Fletcher, “The Mongols,” 49–50.

³³ Holzwarth, “Community Elders,” 226–29.

³⁴ On terms for nomads in Persian sources of the Timurid period, see Paul, “Terms for Nomads.”

³⁵ The Bukharan ruler Amīr Ḥaydar uses the term in one of his letters, as he writes in Rajab 1231/May–June 1816 that “the time has come when the tribes (*īl*) are ascending to the summer pasture” (*waqt ba ḡaylaw bar-āmadan-i īl shuda ast*) (*Makātīb-i Amīr Sayyid Ḥaydar*, ms. Tashkent, Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan (hereafter: IOS), 1961/II, f. 288r. The letter uses sing. *īl* and pl. *īlāt* indiscriminately.

³⁶ In 1753/1740, an Iranian conqueror demanded military conscripts (*nawkar*) from “the sedentary population (*abl-i wilāyat*) and the nomads (*īl wa bāy*)” of Bukhara (Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhār al-aḥwāl*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 1936, f. 70v). In 1169/1755, a Bukharan ruler punished nomads of the Qungrāt (*īl-bāy-i ulūs-i Qungrāt*) – a group of a thousand families of flock-owners who used to spend the winter in yurts (sing. *khirgāb*) on pastures near the town of Khuzār, where they grazed their sheep (Karmīnagī, *Tuḥfa*, ms. St Petersburg, Institute of Oriental Manuscripts, Russian Academy of Sciences, (hereafter: IOM RAS), C-525, f. 245r; Karmīnagī, *Tuḥfa*, ms. Kazan, Federal University, Lobachevsky Library (hereafter: KFU), F-301 f. 174v). In 1182/1768–69, an Uzbek chief “sent his flock-owners and nomads (*mardum-i māldār wa īl-bāy-i khwud*)” to a specified place (Karmīnagī, *Tuḥfa*, ms. Kazan, KFU, F-301, f. 272v). The St Petersburg ms. does not cover events in that year, as its narrative ends in 1176/1762. On this source, see Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 106–11.

³⁷ Grebenkin, “Uzbeki,” 70–71, 101, 104. The meaning Budagov (*Slovar*, 1:203) provides for *īl-bāy*, “the common and the upper class of people,” does not match the Bukharan use of the term.

staunchest opponents of the Bukharan centre in the 1860s, comprised approximately 20,000–25,000 families, of whom 3,000 were leading a nomadic way of life.³⁸

Military Challenges in the Age of Firearms: Diverse Trajectories

Generalised explanatory frameworks that have been developed to explain advances in military technology and military innovation in the age of firearms can claim only limited validity in our context. A decline in nomadic military power after 1500 due to the rise of the ‘gunpowder empires’, as has been postulated by Canfield and Golden,³⁹ cannot be established, either in the wider region or in concrete encounters of the Bukharan army, till the mid-eighteenth century. Keeping in mind that one of the two last Asian empires that were expanding prior to the colonial era was a nomadic state, namely that of the Western Mongolian Oirats, or Jungars,⁴⁰ we can assume that the decisive shift in the balances of power did not occur until around 1750.

It is concrete military encounters and challenges, as well as the rulers’ decisions and actions, that shaped developments in the Bukharan military. Thus, as the Mughal army invaded and occupied Balkh in the mid-seventeenth century, Uzbek mounted archers employing hit-and-run tactics could wear down a huge ‘high-tech’ army fully equipped with advanced firearms and artillery (see Chapter 2). Up to the 1740s, the Bukharan army basically consisted of mounted archers with some light field artillery mounted on and fired from camels.⁴¹ Encounters with the army of Nādir Shāh, beginning in 1737, gave another twist to developments in the Bukharan army, which subsequently changed its structure and armament in line with

³⁸ Bekchurin, “Shakhrisabzskoe vladenie,” 86.

³⁹ Canfield (“Introduction”) and Golden (*Nomads*) have argued that nomadic peoples, who for centuries had dominated Inner and Central Asia due to their superior mobility, horsemanship and mastery of the bow, gradually lost their military advantage after 1500, as the spread of firearms and the increased mechanisation of warfare gave new advantages to the military prowess of sedentary populations. The stress, in my view, should be placed on “gradually.” See also Khazanov, “The Eurasian Steppe Nomads,” 202–3.

⁴⁰ Nomadic societies of the Great Steppe responded differently to the challenges of the “gunpowder” age. The Jungars made extensive use of small firearms and mobile artillery, and made every possible effort to keep pace with the latest innovations and to modernise their military with the help of European captives and advisors.

⁴¹ These were called *zanbūrak* (Persian ‘little bee’), and represent a peculiar synthesis between mobility and artillery warfare. Whereas horsemen could cover 80 to 120 km, and those with additional spare horses could even cover 200 km a day (Kushkumbaev, *Voennoe delo*, 94), the transport of heavy cannons may have taken weeks for the same distance in rough terrain. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries small cannons transported on camels were employed from the Ottoman Empire to the Indian subcontinent, Jungaria and China (Mathee, “Firearms,” *EIr*, 9:620–23; Perry, “Army,” *EIr*, 2:506; Khan, *Gunpowder*, 196–97). They were usually fired from the back of a kneeling animal (see Fig. 6: “Camel-cannon in Iran, 1812”), but could also be discharged at a trot. The latter practice is confirmed and demonstrated for the Ottoman army in 1680 (see Good, *Firearms*, 138–39).

the model of the Persian army under Nādir Shāh's rule, with multi-ethnic military components and firearms becoming key features (see Chapter 4).

From the mid-eighteenth century up to the Russian conquest in the 1860s, Bukhara was challenged not by superpowers and military innovations, but by nearby regional forces or enemies. While the army apparently reintegrated large numbers of Uzbek troops (see Chapter 5), the rulers sought to enhance their control over the provinces by appointing governors of Iranian slave origin who were also given military authority. Concomitantly, the rulers sought to enlarge the military units under their direct command, which were again mostly made up of non-Uzbeks (see Chapters 6 and 7).

In the mid-nineteenth century, in an attempt to reform the Bukharan military in line with the European model, the creation of a standing army of regularly trained, garrisoned and permanently available infantry and artillery troops marks, as Yuri Bregel has pointed out, a breakthrough on the path to a centralised state, as it allowed the ruler to subdue Uzbek tribal resistance.⁴² Nevertheless, these reforms did not enable Bukhara to withstand the ultimate challenge of the Russian army and – as will be argued – may even have been a hindrance (see Chapter 8).

2. Uzbek Forces and Non-Uzbek Auxiliaries

In the first phase under closer observation, we see an increase in the importance and assertion of Uzbek military power in the Khanate of Bukhara, with Uzbek chiefs becoming more and more influential and ambitious – a development that eventually caused the Chinggisid dynasty to rely extensively on non-Uzbek nomadic forces in their military campaigns.

The rising military and political importance of Uzbek tribal groups and chiefs can be traced back to the exposure of the military weakness of the Chinggisid dynasty and the actions of Uzbek tribal forces in a mid-seventeenth-century warfare, namely during the Mughal occupation of the southern part of the Khanate, in 1646–48.⁴³

The Mughal army had crossed the Hindukush with 50,000 mounted armoured troops and 10,000 foot-soldiers, along with war elephants and heavy artillery. When the Mughals took the city of Balkh, its ruler, Nadr Muḥammad Khān, fled in July 1646.⁴⁴ Subsequently, highly mobile Uzbek warbands started a guerrilla war,

⁴² Bregel, "Mangīts," *EI*², 2:418–19. Considering the rather short-lived nature of Bukharan military successes in the mid-nineteenth century (see Chapter 7), one could also argue that the decisive shift in the balance of power came only with Russian support for the Bukharan centre in the colonial period.

⁴³ McChesney, *Waqf*, 116.

⁴⁴ For a visual representation of a battle between Nadr Muḥammad Khān (left) and Mughal troops (right) in Shibarghān in July 1646 by the Indian painter Hūnhar, see Fig. 1. Stuart C. Welch has identified this sketch as a study for a miniature from the Emperor Shāh Jahān's *Pādshāh-nāma* of

and raided the regions of Balkh and Badakhshān from bases beyond the Amu Darya. Sometimes they operated on their own, and sometimes in support of ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Khān (r. 1645–81), a son and rival of the deposed ruler of Balkh.⁴⁵ Mughal sources call these warbands that exhausted the imperial army *alamāns*, using a Central Asian term for ‘raider’ or ‘raiding party’. The *alamāns* were, as Audrey Burton suggests, “seasonal fighters ..., who took booty instead of pay for their services and who only enrolled for short campaigns.”⁴⁶ The Mughal army was not able to stop these attacks, and in the end – for reasons of cost – withdrew from Balkh.

The successful guerrilla war had a lasting effect on the balance of power within the Khanate, which shifted from the Chinggisid dynasty to Uzbek chiefs. Chinggisid rulers, such as ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Khān, who was “being fought at the time by his alamans (Almān) who live in the mountains,”⁴⁷ came to be increasingly aware of the potentially unruly aspect of Uzbek military power, and had reasons to doubt the loyalty of the mainstay of their army. Considerations of loyalty and efficiency, it appears, led the Chinggisid rulers to employ non-Uzbek tribal auxiliaries instead of their putative Uzbek power base. A Muscovite envoy who travelled to Bukhara in 1669–71⁴⁸ had already reported this striking fact:

Boris tried to find out with his companions how strong the army people (*ratnye lyudi*) and the state treasury are in the countries of Bukhara, Balkh, and Khiva. In the Bukharan country army people are summoned from the Turkestanis and Karakalpaks and from the Kazaks up to 150,000 and more. The mounted Bukharan and Balkh army people are inexperienced and bad. In the Bukharan country the people that can be more relied on in battle are the Turkestan Kazaks and the Karakalpak princes subordinated to the king of Bukhara. Nearly 50,000 Karakalpaks and Kazaks are summoned. Only half of them are coming to support the Bukharan king, as the *uluses* are threatened by the Black Kalmyks [Jungars] who are near the Chinese towns.

And with the king of Balkh the more reliable army people are Katagan, Kalmyks,⁴⁹ and Turkmen; they nomadise in *uluses*. 20,000 of them are summoned. There are no foot soldiers and no trained [military] men in Bukhara and Balkh. Further, there are no cannons on gun carriages or carts. There are, though, very small cannons on camels.

In the state treasuries of their kings there are few cash assets; therefore all villages are registered (*rospisanyĭ*) as remunerations of the army people and all the servitors.

‘Abd al-Ḥamīd Lāhaurī, dated 1656–57 (Gahlin, *The Courts of India*, 35–36, plate 33; Fondation Custodia, Collection Frits Lugt, Paris).

⁴⁵ Burton, *Bukharans*, 255; Gommans, *Mughal Warfare*, 184–85.

⁴⁶ Burton, *Bukharans*, 176; ead., “Who Were the Almān?,” 259, quoting lexical meanings provided by various authorities: “robber;” “raid by brigands;” “people who take part in a raid with the intention of acquiring booty.”

⁴⁷ Reported in June 1677, by a Russian envoy to Bukhara (Burton, “Russian Slaves,” 361).

⁴⁸ For further information on this mission, see Burton, *Bukharans*, 291–98.

⁴⁹ Kalmyks, or Qalmāq in Muslim sources, cannot be identified as a pastoral group in Balkh or Bukhara at that time, but they appear in a list of tribal groups dated 1212/1798 (see Chapter 5, note 183).

For the kings they derive revenues from the mint and from customs duties; and at the end of the year, no money is left over from this revenue.⁵⁰

Boris Pazukhin points to an astonishingly high numbers of non-Uzbek forces and to a striking discrepancy between the armies the rulers fed and the troops they actually employed in battle. On the one hand, the rulers assigned the revenues of the villages to their own ‘army-people’, who obviously correspond to the *abl-i sipāh*, ‘army people’, a term Central Asian chroniclers use almost synonymously with ‘the Uzbeks’.⁵¹ On the other hand, the rulers seem to have preferred non-Uzbek auxiliaries from beyond their immediate realm to the army people of their own countries, as all the tribal forces, they actually employed in battle – except for the Qaṭaghān of Balkh – are non-Uzbek.

During inroads made by the Khwārazmian ruler Anūsha Khān in the 1680s, several Uzbek tribes based near Samarqand cooperated with the invader, whereas Qazaq auxiliaries from beyond the Syr Darya supported the Bukharan Khan.⁵²

Subhān-Qulī Khān (r. 1681–1702) also had to face unruly Uzbek military power in the second decade of his rule. For example in 1105/1694, a number of Uzbek chiefs (among them Yūz, Yābū and Qaṭaghān *amīrs*) demanded that the Khan should be delivered to them, or else sent to Mecca. When their demand was declined, they attacked the gates of the capital Bukhara.⁵³ “Now in this country,” the chronicler concludes, “the Uzbek shepherds and raiders (*chupān wa alamān*) consider themselves conquerors.”⁵⁴ Two years later, in 1108/1696, Subhān-Qulī Khān, attacked Balkh with “200,000 horsemen,” among them “Qazāqs, Qarāqalpāqs and foreign peoples (*tawāyif-i bīgāna*),” while the defender, Maḥmūd *biy* Qaṭaghān, sent Balūch and ‘Arab to drive off their horses and camels.⁵⁵ Uzbek chiefs based near the Uzbek-Qazaq frontier played a key role in recruiting Qazaq military support for the Bukharan rulers.⁵⁶

⁵⁰ Pazukhin and Pazukhin, *Nakaz*, 61 (my translation); cf. Burton, *Bukharans*, 297.

⁵¹ Late-seventeenth- and early-eighteenth-century Bukharan sources tend to treat the terms ‘Uzbek’ and ‘army’ (*sipāh*) as synonyms (Holzwarth, “Uzbek State,” 327–30, 334).

⁵² In 1681, when Khwārazmian troops attacked the city of Bukhara, the governor of Samarqand sent 6,000 auxiliaries from the Dasht-i Qīpchāq, Qazaqs and Qaraqalpaqs against him (Tirmizī, *Dastūr*, 115, tr. 85). On the context, see Burton, *Bukharans*, 326. When Anūsha Khān conquered Samarqand, in 1095/1684, Qirghiz and Qazaqs from Tashkent were mobilised as auxiliaries siding with the Bukharan Khan (Tirmizī, *Dastūr*, 178). The Russian translation (110) has “Qirghiz, Qaraqalpaqs and Qazaqs” instead. On the context, see Burton, *Bukharans*, 333–35.

⁵³ On the context, see Burton, *Bukharans*, 350–52. According to Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, ms. Oxford, Bodleian Library (hereafter: BOD), Ouseley 185, ff. 282v–283r, they were angered by the ruler’s close association with Būylāq *qūshbēgī*, a minister of Qalmāq slave origin, and Khwājam-Berdī *dādkhwāh* Qīpchāq, an Uzbek *amīr*.

⁵⁴ *Aknūn dar īn mulk ... chupān wa alamān-i ūzbak kbwud-rā az jumla-i musakkbkhir mīshumār-and* (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, ms. Oxford, BOD, Ouseley 185, f. 283v).

⁵⁵ Muḥammad Yūsuf Munshī, *Tazkīra-yi Muqīm-khānī*, 259–60, tr. 161–62. On Turkmen military power in Balkh, see *ibid.*, 261, tr. 163. On the context, see Burton, *Bukharans*, 355–58.

⁵⁶ In 1702, a leader of the Yūz tribe was proclaimed governor of Samarqand and commander-in-chief of the Bukharan army, precisely because of the prestige he enjoyed among the ‘warlike

As Pazukhin noted, all the villages were assigned for the payment of the army and other state servants. Bukharan chroniclers confirm that the ‘army people’ (*ahl-i sipāh*) were on the books of the fiscal administration. To the army people, in retrospect, things were settled conveniently in the last two decades of the seventeenth century:

The chiefs and the army people (*umarā wa lashkarī*) rested in the cradle of repose and were happy. ... Every year they carried off their soldiers’ pay and salaries (*‘alūfa wa marsūmāt*) from the treasury and the peasants.⁵⁷

The general and idealising statement at least confirms that those acknowledged as military personnel were entitled to pay from the treasury or to rights to the revenue of an assigned tract of land. No original registers have come down to us from that period.⁵⁸ It seems, though, that quite a lot of paperwork was involved. In the 1680s and 1690s, the staff of the revenue administration “in charge of the register and papers,”⁵⁹ issued cheques (*barāt*)⁶⁰ that entitled army personnel to (a share of) taxes from designated fiscal units. At times, *ad hoc* cheques were written in order to support troops on the march. When in 1692 peasants fled the province of Qarshī, leading to a decline in agriculture there, this was partly due to excesses in issuing such cheques, which overburdened the peasantry.⁶¹

An alternative way to provision the military was by raiding for booty, especially into Khurāsān. These raids seem to have been organised by Uzbek chiefs with the consent of the ruler. In the wake of the peace treaty with the Safavids in 1103/1692, Subhān-Qulī Khān ordered his *amīrs* to stop raiding Khurāsān.⁶² The non-Uzbek tribal auxiliaries, mentioned above, may also have fought in return for booty.

3. Slave Guards, Uzbek Cavalry, and Tribal Auxiliaries

In the first third of the eighteenth century the Bukharan rulers were challenged by low-tech tribal forces, rebel Uzbeks and their steppe allies. As Uzbek rebels, that is, sections of the Khanate’s tribal army, repeatedly attacked the city of Bukhara,

tribes’ beyond the Bukharan realm (Bukhārī, *‘Ubaydallāh-nāma*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 1532, ff. 20v, 28v).

⁵⁷ *Umarā wa lashkarī dar mahd-i asāyish qarār girifta, masrūr būdand wa ... ‘alūfa wa marsūmāt-i kbwudhā-rā bar sana az kbazīna wa ra’āyā mīburdand* (Bukhārī, *‘Ubaydallāh-nāma*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 1532, f. 6v).

⁵⁸ In a late-eighteenth-century blue-print (Badi‘ Diwān, *Majma‘*, see Chapter 5 below). For an original from the second half of the nineteenth century, see Chekhovich, *Dokumenty*, 209–17.

⁵⁹ *Khidmat-i daftar wa kāghaz*, Tirmizī, *Dastūr*, 160, tr. 103.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 104 (Russian tr.). The editor’s note no. 8 defines *barāt* as “a written mandate to a servitor who receives the right to collect taxes or provision from certain territories.”

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 134 (Russian tr.).

⁶² Burton, *Bukharans*, 344–48.

the Bukharan rulers defended themselves by using military manpower from within the capital and the palace.

A growing polarisation and tension between Uzbek and palace forces can be noted as early as the late seventeenth century,⁶³ but becomes more visible in the early eighteenth. At the same time, we can also discern a division in the way military innovations, in particular firearms, were integrated into the various sections of the military. Whereas Uzbek warriors, who had access to good horses, preferred to use traditional weaponry, such as the bow, lance and sabre, the palace forces employed firearms.

The Khan's personal retinue, generally speaking a 'slave palace guard', was composed of men of diverse ethnic backgrounds, significant numbers of them being Kalmyks and Russian who, or whose forefathers, had been captured in warfare by Muslim steppe peoples, and brought to Bukhara as slaves.⁶⁴ It remains unclear how far Iranian captives and slaves were integrated in the palace guard at that time.⁶⁵

An observer attached to the palace does not speak of 'slaves', but of the 'eunuchs, confidants and apprentice-servants' (*kbwāja-sarāyān wa mahramān wa shāgird-pīshagān*),⁶⁶ when he relates that, in 1123/1711, Uzbek insurgents overwhelmed and killed the Khan and then attacked and sacked his entourage.⁶⁷ Eunuchs held high administrative offices, such as that of chief vizier (*qūshbēgī*),⁶⁸ and were also in charge of firearm units of the palace guard, which in 1711 consisted of at least 100 musketeers (sing. *miltiqchī*) and 300 artilleryists (sing. *tūpchī*).⁶⁹ Ironically, they were defeated by the treason of palace confidants, who allowed a band

⁶³ For verses criticising the influence of eunuchs and slaves at Subhān-Qulī Khān's court by the Uzbek poet Turdī Farāghī, see his *Sheʼrlar*, 23–24.

⁶⁴ On slavery in Bukhara, which was not confined to the military-administrative realm under study here, see Fayziev, *Buxoro jamiyatida qullardan foydalanish*.

⁶⁵ Later in history, the term 'slave' (Persian *ghulam*; Turki *qul*) acquires a dual meaning. On the one hand, it remained a derogatory epithet for persons perceived to be of slave origin, even though they may have become freedmen. On the other hand, especially in the formula 'his (majesty's) slave' (*ghulamishān*), it came to refer to any loyal servitor of the ruler (Holzwarth, "Community Elders," 233, 243–44, 254–55).

⁶⁶ The 'confidants' (sing. *mahram*) were, in all likelihood, members of the palace guard; in 1820, a Bukharan palace guard was still called *mahram*. In Khwārazm, the Arabic term *mahram*, literally denoting a person who has access to his master's private rooms, had replaced the Turki term *ichkī*, 'inner one', which was more widely used in the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries (Munis and Agahi, *Firdaws*, 543, note 8 by Yuri Bregel). On the 'inner army' in pre-Mongol Khwārazm, which was at least partly made up of slave soldiers, see Paul, "The State," 43. In a Bukharan source written around 1800, *ichkī* still appears in the context of palace guards (Muḥammad Sharīf, *Tāj*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 9265, ff. 351r, 369v.) The 'apprentice-servants' (sing. *shāgird-pīsha*) may have been drawn from the non-Uzbek local population, as it is in that sense that the terms appears from the late eighteenth century (see Chapters 5, 6, 7).

⁶⁷ Bukhārī, *ʿUbaydallāh-nāma*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 1532, f. 246v, tr. 275.

⁶⁸ On *qūshbēgī*, 'chief of the [royal] camp', see Bregel, *Administration*, 8, 10–12; Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 76–77, 93–94.

⁶⁹ Bukhārī, *ʿUbaydallāh-nāma*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 1532, f. 209rv, tr. 233. Artillery may have included heavy muskets called *jazāyil* (ibid., f. 208v, tr. 232).

of forty men, armed with bows and daggers, to enter the citadel by climbing the wall. The overthrow did not lead to the abolition of the palace guard, but possibly checked its strength and numbers.⁷⁰

Beyond the city walls, the Uzbek chiefs were more powerful than the Chinggisid Khan. They had their own armies, whereas the Khan could not conduct military campaigns without their consent. These chiefs often paid no heed to the Khan's orders – or rather requests, as he could not force them – to join him in a campaign.⁷¹ In order to induce them, the ruler repeatedly sent gifts and cash advances to them.⁷²

Reasons that may account for the decline of central authority in the early eighteenth century are shrinking incomes from long-distance caravan trade, which could have generated political loyalty, and a change within the Khanate's political system, which increased competition between Uzbek chiefs.⁷³

The situation escalated when a rebel faction installed a Chinggisid counter-khan in Samarqand in December 1722, and called in Qazaq auxiliaries, who stayed in the region till 1729 and repeatedly raided the Bukhara oasis.⁷⁴ On the eve of this most serious challenge to the Bukharan ruler's authority, a Russian envoy, Florio Beneveni, who was in Bukhara from late 1721 to early 1725, provides the following report on the military:

In Bukharia there are no regular fortifications, apart from some small mud-built towns, with earthen walls (without bastions), where the Bukharans have no artillery, but only matchlock weapons (sing. *fitil'noe oruzhie*), and even those are not used everywhere, as they are sometimes available and sometimes not. The Uzbeks largely use the sabre, bow and lance. Only in the capital of Bukharia did the envoy see 14 field guns, which had been captured from the Mughals when they moved towards Bukha-

⁷⁰ Abū l-Fayz Khān's guard included Russians and Kalmyks (Qalmāq). These guards rarely exceeded 500 men (Burton, "Russian Slaves," 347). 'Ubaydallāh Khān had a court guard of 500 young men from all 'breeds' (*jawānān-i dargāh az har urūgh*) (Bukhārī, 'Ubaydallāb-nāma, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 1532, f. 22v; see Chekhovich, "O nekotorykh voprosakh," 88. Abū l-Ghāzī Khān, a seventeenth-century ruler of Khiva, had about 500 Qalmāq *ghulāms*, "whom he inherited from his father and who were with him day and night;" see Munis and Agahi, *Firdaws*, 582–84, note 381 by Yuri Bregel.

⁷¹ In Safar 1117/May–July 1705, for example, when the Bukharan ruler wanted to attack his rival in Balkh, the Uzbek forces he tried to mobilise simply did not turn up for the campaign at the fixed meeting point. (Teufel, "Quellenstudien," 287–88; Bukhārī, 'Ubaydallāb-nāma, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 1532, ff. 32a–34a, tr. 48–50).

⁷² Instances of buying loyalty are reported by Bukharan sources (Teufel, "Quellenstudien," 284, 290; Holzwarth, "Uzbek Central Asia," 192), as well as by Beneveni (quoted below). We cannot ascertain whether these advance payments to Uzbek chiefs were in line with an earlier established model of inducing tribal forces to participate in campaigns, or whether it developed as a novel practice in the early eighteenth century, when the (regular) Uzbek army people (*sipāb*) repeatedly complained about salary defaults. They expected to receive regular provisions and pay from the treasury or the peasantry, but often did not. One of the alleged reasons for this was bad book-keeping by non-Uzbek bureaucrats (Holzwarth, "Uzbek State," 327–28).

⁷³ See Holzwarth, "Uzbek Central Asia," 190–93.

⁷⁴ On these events and dates, see Holzwarth, "Uzbek Central Asia," 194–98.

ria. ... There are also two large cannons, one made of brass, the other of cast iron, and those were also captured from the Mughals, when the city of Andkhoy was taken. They are not used now and just lie on the ground, without gun carriages; indeed, there is not even anyone to operate them. When, in the year 1722, the Khan went out to battle against his present rival and contender Redzheb Khan whom hostile Uzbeks have elected Khan in Samarkand ..., he took one of these cannons, the big brass one. He put it in the charge of Khan Kuli, his former envoy to Russia, hoping that he might understand artillery affairs, as he had been to Russia. The skills of Khan Kuli subsequently caused the cannon to explode and kill one person. The Khan did not take this cannon with him in order to kill the enemy, but just to intimidate him with the deafening noise. In other cities there is, however, no artillery at all.

At the Khan's court the envoy saw 15 small cannons of cast iron, called zamburak ..., which are carried by camels on pedestals, like muskets on supporting stands (sing. *kavalet mushket*). They are fired from the camels, without any adjusting. ...

The capital Bukhara is a big city. The wall around it is built of clay and unfired bricks, and often the walls are crumbling. The city has 12 gates and numbers 15,000 homesteads. ... The court of the Khan is located on a high earthen mound, a castle with a high wall made of fired bricks. ...

Samarkand is also a big city, but nowadays half of it is evacuated and ruined, because of the Uzbek attacks.

Within the former and present Bukharan dominion we may number 23 cities, among them cities with considerable realms. ... And in other places, where Uzbeks nomadise, there are small fortifications (sing. *kurganchik*), also close to villages, so that the population of the area, when attacked can barricade themselves in there, and shoot with matchlock muskets and arrows from them. The cities mentioned above are mostly ruled by Uzbeks, in part acting autonomously, in part supportive. Sometimes they do not listen to the Bukharan Khan and do not pay attention to him. When he frequently gives [presents] to them, they listen to him; if not, they oppose him, and devastate and pillage whatever they can get hold of. ...

In Bukhara, there are 32 sections (sing. *stat'ya*) of Uzbeks,⁷⁵ which carry different names. From amongst them some 90,000 troops come together, and these are cavalry troops; they do not have infantry troops; and in addition, some 20,000 come together from the Turkmens. They fight in the same manner as the Kalmyks. In warfare, they do not wage pitched battles. Even if two units of small numbers engage, each side sends only part of the unit to the fray. If one side loses some tens or even a hundred in an action (which is which they call a great battle), they do not stand fast but save themselves by retreat. Since they have good horses at their disposal, the Uzbek weapons consist of sabre, arrows, and lance; as they cannot fire the matchlock musket (*ruzh'e fitil'noe*) on horseback, but fire it only from the ground with a rest. That is why, there are fork-rests [fastened to the barrel] on the top of the matchlock musket.

The present Bukharan Khan puts his greatest trust in his own personal court slaves (sing. *kholop*). He has some 350 Kalmyk slaves and some 150 *khanaizat*;⁷⁶ these are slaves that do have a Russian father and a Russian mother and are Muslims. Moreover,

⁷⁵ Central Asian sources on the concept of 32 (or else 92) Uzbek sections use the Persian terms *firqā* and *qism*, or the Turki *baw/boy*, 'part'. See Holzwarth, "The Uzbek State," 342–46.

⁷⁶ Persian *khāna-zād*, 'born in the family; the child of a slave' (Steingass, *Dictionary*, 445).

there are some Christian Russians at the border town mentioned [Chārjūy].⁷⁷ ... Likewise, the Khan keeps around 150 of those Kalmyk slaves in the garrison, in order to prevent the Uzbeks from seizing the town with a view to exacting tolls, which are gathered there from tradesmen on the way from Bukhara to Persia and from Persia to Bukhara, as well as from Uzbeks and Turkmens when they return from Persia with booty, slaves or goods that have been seized in attacks on caravans.⁷⁸

Beneveni's report, based on a prolonged stay and observation in Bukhara, fully confirms the information provided by Bukharan chroniclers, and adds interesting insights and perspectives. Regarding the balance of power, he estimates the Uzbek cavalry at 90,000 and the slave guards at 650 men. The Uzbek cavalry, in weaponry and manner of combat, reminded Beneveni of the Kalmyks on the Russian steppe border, who were nomadic mounted archers.⁷⁹

The usual weapons of Uzbek horsemen were sabres, bows and lances. For mounted troops, whose tactical strength lay in fast raids and retreats, the musket's most serious disadvantage was that it did not lend itself to swift equestrian manoeuvres, as the musketeers had to dismount and needed some minutes to load, prepare and light their weapon. According to Beneveni, muskets were predominantly used for attacking and defending fortresses. Fortresses and fortress warfare, as well as the number of firearms employed therein, seem to have increased in the early eighteenth century. In 1135/1723, a Bukharan provincial fortress, considered strong, had 700 muskets (*miltiq*) at its disposal.⁸⁰

Mounted archers could fight in mixed armies along with other branches of service, such as mounted musketeers.⁸¹ The Bukharan army mobilised against the Samarqand rebel faction in 1135/1723 was composed of Uzbek tribal forces (Manghit, Sarāy and Qaṭaghān), a body of Turkmens, "all the confidants (sing. *mabram*) of the palace" commanded by the chief-eunuch Khwāja Ulfat, and a small detachment led by a religious leader.⁸² The various methods of combat did not always combine well together in these mixed armies. For instance, when the Turkmens

⁷⁷ Described by Beneveni, *Poslannik*, 120 [point 3].

⁷⁸ Beneveni, *Poslannik*, 123–25.

⁷⁹ In 1712, the Kalmyk auxiliaries' way of fighting was described by a Russian governor of Siberia to a Chinese envoy: "When they are brought into action they readily draw their bows and fire their guns, if the enemy is at a distance; but if the enemy is near them, they think of nothing but running away. There is no vigour or steadiness in their operations. If by chance they are at any time victorious, the only object they aim at is plunder" (Tu-li-shin, *Narrative*, 183). In a conversation with Beneveni in April 1725, the Khan of Khiva pointed to his troops' similar methods of combat, contrasting them with the Russian army: "his soldiers were not used to the march, but all of them rode horses; they were not very obedient and only fought on the first or second assault, and, if they did not succeed in crushing the enemy, then they retreated without risking too much of their life" (Di Cosmo, "A Russian Envoy to Khiva," 102).

⁸⁰ Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 11, f. 91r, tr. 109.

⁸¹ For a visual representation of mounted musketeers in Qājār Iran, see Fig. 5.

⁸² Sayyid Naqīb Khwāja Muḥammad Ḥāshim (Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 11, ff. 92rv, 125rv, tr. 110–12).

horsemen wanted to perform a feigned retreat,⁸³ a classic manoeuvre of mounted archers, other sections of the army were also set in motion and started to flee.⁸⁴

The Samarqand rebel faction included the Uzbek tribes of Kanīgās, Baḥrīn, and Khiṭāy-Qīpchāq, who rallied round a Chinggisid counter-khan, and called in nomadic Qazaq auxiliaries. These Qazaq allies turned into an occupational force, pillaging the region between Samarqand and Bukhara for several years.⁸⁵ Only after the Samarqand counter-khan had died in 1728, did the Qazaq nomads return to the Great Steppe,⁸⁶ and Bukhara once again became capable of acting militarily.

When, around 1730, the Kokand ruler Raḥīm Beg attacked border provinces on the east, Bukhara confronted him with an army of Uzbek horsemen and Qal-māq palace guards.⁸⁷

Weaponry

Some visual representations illustrate the weaponry and methods of combat referred to above. Mughal and Iranian miniatures (Figs. 1, 3–4) depict Uzbek cavalry as mounted archers performing the ‘Parthian shot’, indicating their superb horsemanship.

A miniature (Fig. 4) in a sumptuous copy of a chronicle of Nādir Shāh’s court chronicle depicts the battle of Khānqāh in 1740,⁸⁸ where Uzbek and Turkmen horsemen confronted Nādir Shāh’s troops. The artist distinguishes between Uzbek (and Turkmen) light cavalry, wearing light armours and turbans, and the heavy cavalry, with heavy armour, helmets, long lances and sabres, in Nādir Shāh’s army. Besides lancers and swordsmen, artilleryists (with pointed caps) figure prominently in Nādir Shāh’s victorious army.⁸⁹

Written sources, as well as museum objects suggest that eighteenth-century Bukharan armies included at least some heavy cavalry. Beneveni, for example, documents the use of the lance by Uzbek cavalry in the 1720s. The Bukhara Citadel Museum keeps a set of arms of an ‘eighteenth-century Bukharan horseman’ that consists of shield, bow and long lance.⁹⁰ The Moser collection, at the Swiss Histor-

⁸³ “Which is called *dönük* in Turki, that is ‘retreat and renewed attack’ (*keib dar zabān-i turkī dung-uk gūyand, ya’ni bargard wa digar hamla*).”

⁸⁴ Ṭāli’, *Tārīkh*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 11, f. 126r; cf. tr. 112, where the Turki term is rendered as *dunguk*.

⁸⁵ See Holzwarth, “Uzbek Central Asia,” 194–98.

⁸⁶ Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhār*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 1936, ff. 107v–108r.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, ff. 48v–50v.

⁸⁸ See Fig. 4: “Battle of Khānqāh, Khwārazm (1153/1740).” Astarābādī, *Tārīkh-i jahāngushā-yi Nādirī*, ed. Barūmand, 357. The manuscript is dated Šafar 1171/October–November 1757. The style of painting points to the school of Muḥammad Zamān, who had studied in Italy.

⁸⁹ The camel-artilleryists in the background appear to fire large handheld guns, not camel-cannons (*zanbūrak*).

⁹⁰ See Kalter, *Usbekistan*, 181, fig. 335.

ical Museum in Bern, holds heavy armour and a helmet from Bukhara, which closely resembles that worn by the Iranian heavy cavalry.⁹¹

A few technical details regarding small firearms, particularly muskets, need to be addressed in order to interpret the information provided by our sources. Beneveni relates that Uzbek cavalymen rarely used matchlock muskets as they could not fire them on horseback. Niccolo Miner, Beneveni's valet, mentions two types of muskets used in Bukhara: "the 'serpentine musket' (*ruzh'e zbagrenoe*) owned by some and 'the common Tatar one'."⁹² The 'serpentine' refers to an S-shaped lever, protruding through a slot in the stock of the gun. It rotated on a central axis, and the upper end of the lever, i.e. the serpent's mouth, held the glowing match while the lower end served as trigger. Judging from Chardin's description, the 'serpentine matchlock' was the common type of musket in Iran in the 1670s.⁹³ Though this type has been classified as "a most primitive form" of the matchlock,⁹⁴ it represents an improvement as compared to even simpler types – which were still in use in the eighteenth century Qazaq steppe – as it allowed the musketeer to keep both hands on the gun while shooting, thereby improving his aim. More sophisticated than the 'serpentine musket' was the 'snapping matchlock' which added a spiral driven device (a snap or spring) to the ignition mechanism. This type of matchlock appears to have spread in Iran and India since the late seventeenth century, but – as far as I know – has not been documented for Central Asia, so far. Flintlock muskets, which have replaced matchlocks in European armies around 1710, spread in Iran since the 1750s, and in Bukhara since the 1840s.

If the 'serpentine musket' was considered an elite weapon in Bukhara in the 1720s, the 'common Tatar musket' probably had no trigger at all. Foreigners describe Bukharan and Qazaq muskets around 1770 as 'lockless' types, though it remains unclear whether they mean these muskets lacked a serpentine or lacked a snap. Falk reports that around 1770 the Bukharan army used muskets "with fuses, without locks,"⁹⁵ probably referring to the serpentine musket. At the same time,

⁹¹ Zeller and Rohrer, *Sammlung Moser*, table 89. The caption "Armour of a footsoldier in Bukhara" is misleading.

⁹² Beneveni, *Poslannik*, 85 (Miner's additional report, dated 15 April 1724). *Zbagra* denotes a 'long-eared handle for fastening the fuse at shooting; trigger' (Dal', *Slovar'*, 1:524), i.e. 'serpentine'.

⁹³ Mohebbi ("Firearms," *EIr*, 9:630) describes the mechanism: "A serpentine (which gripped the match between its two jaws) was lowered with a simple and not carefully filed trigger in order to thrust the glowing end of the match into the pan and fire the priming powder which the pan contained." Chardin's original, in my tentative English translation reads as follows: "They are not good at making springs or 'strickers' (*batteries*, 'triggers'?). Those they fit in their firearms are very different from ours in that they do not have a metal [lock] plate. The pan is firmly fixed to the barrel, forming a part of it. The serpentine is moved by a small, and poorly filed, iron lever which comes up from the inside of the musket" (Chardin, *Voyage*, 3:114). Cf. Elgood, *Firearms*, 120.

⁹⁴ Zygulski, "Oriental Firearms," 452.

⁹⁵ "Flinten (Moltek) mit Lunten, ohne Schlösser" (Falk, *Beyträge*, 3:497).

ordinary Qazaq muskets may even have lacked the serpentine.⁹⁶ Obviously, there was a wide technological gap between firearms used by Central Asian forces and potential adversaries around them. In 1740, Russian troops are reported to have shot ten times before their Qazaq enemies could prepare their muskets to fire once.⁹⁷ Visual representations of a military leader of the Qazaq Junior Horde in 1736,⁹⁸ and of a Middle Horde Qazaq around 1770,⁹⁹ depict a simple serpentine musket with a forked rest.¹⁰⁰

As long as the main challenge to the Bukharan rulers came mainly from low-tech Central Asian cavalry forces, their own small firearm and artillery formations seem to have been sufficient to make at least a psychological impact, as Beneveni relates. But once the Bukharan army was confronted with larger, more advanced and disciplined firearms units, such as those in Nādir Shāh's army it faced overwhelming fire-power.

4. The Challenge and Impact of Nādirid Iran

In the mid-eighteenth century, the Uzbek Manghit dynasty assumed power in the capital Bukhara. The rise of the Manghits was facilitated by the encounter with Nādir Shāh Afshār, the Turkmen general and Persian king (r. 1736–47), who, having defeated the Ottomans and sacked the capital of the Mughal Empire, subdued Bukhara in 1740. At that time, several thousand Uzbek horsemen were recruited into in Nādir Shāh's multi-ethnic army, amongst them the future Manghit ruler of Bukhara, who, upon the collapse of Nādir Shāh's empire, staged a coup d'état at home and reorganised the Bukharan army.

⁹⁶ On Qazaq muskets, Rychkov (*Tagebuch*, 342) reported: "Their [the Qazaq's] muskets have neither ignition pan nor cock; instead they have made a small hole throughout the barrel, there-at they put the burning fuse [of poplar barch] and thereby it goes off forthwith the minute." The memoirs of a Persian who had been captured by Qazaqs confirm this information: "The Kirgis [Qazaq] who got my musket was very much astonished about the attached lock. Kirgis [Qazaqs] fire with fuses and know nothing about locks" (Bergmann, *Schicksale*, 66–67).

⁹⁷ Kushkumbaev, *Voennoe delo*, 104.

⁹⁸ See Fig. 2 (right): "Qazaq warrior (1736)," by John Castle. John Castle's portrayal of an outstanding warrior of the Qazaq Junior Horde shows a matchlock muzzleloader with long barrel and a fork-rest. Castle depicts a simple ignition mechanism: a moveable curved lever with a lighted wick attached to its upper end. The legend identifies a) 'Eraly-Sultan', the son of Abū l-Khayr Khān; b) his Bukharan priest, or *ākhūn*, named 'Monsur'; and c) his tutor (*Hofmeister*), named 'Kuder Bator', fully armed.

⁹⁹ Falk, *Beyträge*, 3: appendix, table 37: "A Kirgis (Qazaq) of the Middle Horde."

¹⁰⁰ European collections of firearms tend to classify this type as "Turkestan musket". A representative example is in the Swiss Historical Museum, in Bern (Zeller and Rohrer, *Sammlung Mosev*, 280–81 [fig. no. 464, inv. no. M 723]: length: 152.9 cm; calibre: 18 mm; length of the fork: 55.7 cm; weight: 4.87 kg). Other examples are held in Polish and Danish collections (Zygulski, "Firearms," 454–55; Olufsen, *Bokhara*, 477; see also Valikhanov, "Vooruzhenie kirgiz," 467). All the muskets depicted are equipped with a serpentine.

Nādir Shāh's army was multi-ethnic, and organised in decimal units of 10, 50, 100, and 1000 with a corresponding command structure.¹⁰¹ It consisted of various tribal and provincial levies, and it grew as defeated enemies were required to provide contingents. Small firearms and artillery were predominantly used by recruits from the peasantry, or commoners (*ra'āyat*), whose numbers had significantly increased since the Safavid period.¹⁰² Disciplined units of musketeers and excellent field artillery, as well as the Shah's concern to keep his troops well paid, enabled his military success.¹⁰³ Nādir Shāh's logistic policy resembled that of the Ottomans: he moved with a huge camp, and planned for arsenals and stocks of provisions.¹⁰⁴

In autumn 1150/1737, Nādir Shāh's troops and Bukharan forces clashed twice near the town of Qarshī (south of Bukhara), once in a minor skirmish and once in a battle that demonstrated the efficiency and overwhelming impact of Iranian firearms. At the outset, Nādir Shāh's son Rizā-Qulī who had just conquered Balkh, crossed the Amu Darya in retaliation against cattle thefts, and defeated the Bukharan governor of Qarshī, who was a Manghit-Uzbek chief.¹⁰⁵ The larger battle occurred when the Bukharan Khan arrived on the scene with Uzbek, Kokand and Turkmen troops.¹⁰⁶

Both a Bukharan and an Iranian chronicler stress the crucial impact of Iranian gunpowder in the ensuing battle. The Bukharan chronicler relates that the fire and smoke of the enemy's camel-cannons and large muskets (*zambūrak wa jazāyir*) "eclipsed the world,"¹⁰⁷ causing the Kokand and Turkmen allies to flee, and the Uzbek troops to barricade themselves in the walled town.¹⁰⁸ The Iranian chronicler narrates that the battle, which at first had gone in favour of the Bukharan Khan, was decided by the cannons and camel-cannons (*tūp wa zambūrak*), which caused many casualties among the enemy and made them flee.¹⁰⁹ For a visual representation of this battle, see Fig. 3.¹¹⁰

¹⁰¹ With officers holding ranks such as "head of ten" (*dab-bāshī*), "head of fifty" (*pinjāb-bāshī*), "head of a hundred" (*yūz-bāshī*) and "head of a thousand" (*mīn-bāshī*) (Arunova, *Gosudarstvo*, 138).

¹⁰² Arunova, *Gosudarstvo*, 130–31; Lambton, "Resurgence," 124; Perry, "Army," *EIr*, 2:506.

¹⁰³ Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, 276.

¹⁰⁴ On the well developed management of military affairs and logistics in the Ottoman Empire, see Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare*, esp. 63–103.

¹⁰⁵ Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, 126, 163–66; Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhār*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 1936, ff. 51rv. This governor, Muḥammad Ḥakīm *atāliq*, was the highest-ranking Uzbek chief in the Khanate.

¹⁰⁶ *Lashkar-i qūqānī, turkmān wa ūzbakiyya* (Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhār*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 1936, ff. 54v–55r). Cf. Marwī, *Ālam-ārā-yi Nādirī*, ed. Riyāhī, 589–95; Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, 163–65; Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 238–40.

¹⁰⁷ Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhār*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 1936, f. 56v. *Jazāyir* were "heavy muskets with wide bores" (Hanway, *Account*, 252), weighing 18 kg and more (Arunova, *Godudarstvo*, 132), and fired from a rest.

¹⁰⁸ Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhār*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 1936, ff. 57r–58r.

¹⁰⁹ Marwī, *Ālam-ārā-yi Nādirī*, ed. Riyāhī, 595–96.

¹¹⁰ Fig. 3: "Battle of Qarshī (1150/1737)." Courtesy of the Institute of Oriental Manuscripts, Russian Academy of Sciences, St Petersburg. The miniature appears in the second volume of the

The experience of the battle of Qarshī may have influenced the Bukharan Khan's decision to bow to Nādir Shāh without offering military resistance,¹¹¹ in August 1740, when the latter crossed the Amu Darya at Chārjūy, aiming to subdue Bukhara. Nādir Shāh insisted on riding to the capital and being officially recognised as its ruler.¹¹² He also exacted war contributions for his army: 10,000 *man* of wheat, 10,000 sheep, and 130,000 rupees in cash – according to a Bukharan source. In addition, he demanded 10,000 horsemen from the cities and districts of Bukhara.¹¹³

Having appointed the Bukharan ruler Abū l-Fayz Khān as his viceroy,¹¹⁴ Nādir Shāh marched on Khiva, where he defeated the Khwārazmian army, consisting of Uzbek and Turkmen troops, in two battles and conquered the cities of Khānqāh and Khiva.¹¹⁵

The Iranian interlude was a turning point in Bukharan history. It facilitated several years of military training and experience for Uzbek contingents and commanders in Nādir Shāh's army, and ultimately paved the way for the downfall of Chinggisid dynastic rule and the rise of an Uzbek tribal dynasty, the Manghits.

The Bukharan Uzbek troops in Nādir Shāh's army were led by the would-be ruler of Bukhara, Muḥammad Raḥīm,¹¹⁶ a son of the Khanate's paramount Uzbek chief, Muḥammad Ḥākīm Manghit. In March 1744, when an English merchant, Jonas Hanway, saw the camp, Nādir Shāh's army consisted of nearly 200,000 men – among them 50,000 Afghans, 20,000 Afshar-Turkmen, and 6,000 Uzbeks from Khiva, Bukhara and Samarqand, as well as units without explicit ethnic affiliation, such as 40,000 'infantry' (called 'Kara-Kushun', i.e. *qarā-qushūn*) and 12,000 *jazā-yirchī*, mounted infantry equipped with heavy muskets.¹¹⁷ Regarding the arms of the Uzbek contingents, Hanway observed:

unique manuscript of Muḥammad Kāzīm Marwī's *Ālam-ārā-yi Nādirī* (also called *Kitāb-i Nādirī*) on f. 115r, which corresponds to p. 595 in Riyāhī's edition.

¹¹¹ Nādir Shāh's court chronicler and a Bukharan author report that Abū l-Fayz Khān submitted peacefully (Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, 185 ff.; Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhār*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 1936, ff. 61r–63r). Marwī narrates that the Khan confronted the invaders but gave in when they fired their guns and camel-guns (Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, 187, Marwī, *Ālam-ārā-yi Nādirī*, ed. Riyāhī, 786–93, esp. 791).

¹¹² In the sermon at Friday prayers (*khutba*) and the mint (*sikka*). For a silver coin minted in the name of Nādir Shāh in 1153/1740 in Bukhara, see Davidovich, *Istoriya monetnogo dela*, 161.

¹¹³ Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhār*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 1936, f. 70v. The estimates for the Bukharan Uzbek contingent vary greatly, from 1,200 (Falk, *Beyträge*, 3:496) up to 30,000 (Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, 187; Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 243).

¹¹⁴ In October 1740, Nādir Shāh re-installed Abū l-Fayz Khān as ruler by conferring upon him the title *shāh*, along with a robe and a crown (Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, 187–89).

¹¹⁵ Bregel, *Historical Atlas*, 58. See Fig. 4: "Battle of Khānqāh, Khwārazm (1153/1740)."

¹¹⁶ Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhār*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 1936, ff. 70v–71r.

¹¹⁷ Hanway, *Account*, 1:251–52.

The greatest part of their regular forces carry a musquet and a sabre; but the Ousbegs, and several others in the army, are not so well provided; some having a spear, or a battle-axe, others a bow and arrow, others a single pistol; but all of them wear sabres.¹¹⁸

Nādirid armed forces intervened in Bukhara when a rebellion of Uzbek chiefs that had erupted in 1157/1744-5,¹¹⁹ after the death of the aforementioned Manghit chief and paramount Uzbek *amīr* Muḥammad Ḥākīm *atālīq*, threatened to get out of control. In spring 1158/1745 rebels led by a chief of the Uzbek tribe of Kḥiṭāy, ‘Ibādallāh *biy*, even attacked and pillaged the outskirts of the capital city.¹²⁰

Nādir Shāh sent multi-ethnic deployment forces – including Afghan, Iranian, Ottoman, Caucasian and Uzbek units – under the command of a Persian general and Muḥammad Raḥīm Manghit, whom he had meanwhile also promoted to the rank of a general and endowed with the title of *kbān*.¹²¹ Muḥammad Raḥīm defeated the rebel Uzbek faction and was still in Bukhara when Nādir Shāh died and his empire crumbled. Using his military assets, the general staged a coup against the Chinggisid Khan and seized supreme power in Bukhara.¹²²

The new ruler of Bukhara was thus qualified with training and experience in one of the most successful and top-ranking military enterprises of his time.

The Nādirid Military Heritage of the First Manghit Ruler

Upon Nādir Shāh’s death in June 1747, Muḥammad Raḥīm immediately deposed and killed the Chinggisid Khan. Two months later, he forced the Iranian general Biḥbūd Khān and his troops to withdraw from Bukhara, and to leave their artillery (*tūpkhāna*) and armoury (*qūrkhāna*) behind.¹²³ In addition, Sunni Muslim units, such as Afghans, Ottomans, and Caucasians, left the Qızılbaş camp and joined Muḥammad Raḥīm’s forces.¹²⁴ A Greek eyewitness reports that a body of 500 Af-

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 1:253.

¹¹⁹ Karmīnagī, *Tuhfa*, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, C-525, f. 317v; ms. Kazan, KFU, F-301, f. 241v.

¹²⁰ Karmīnagī, *Tuhfa*, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, C-525, ff. 60v–61r.; Marwī, ‘*Ālam-ārā-yi Nādirī*’, ed. Riyāhī, 1101; cf. Chekhovich, “K istorii Uzbekistana,” 74; Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 237).

¹²¹ Meaning ‘general’ – and not ‘(Chinggisid) sovereign’ – in the Iranian context.

¹²² Actually, he became *de facto* ruler and had himself proclaimed as Khan in Chinggisid fashion only in 1170/1756. On Chinggisid shadow-khans in the early Manghit period, see Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 69–77, 281. Cf. Bregel, *Historical Atlas*, map 30; Karmīnagī, *Tuhfa*, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, C-525, f. 318v. A case resembling the rise of Muḥammad Raḥīm Manghit is provided by Ahmad Shāh Durrānī, another general who had served Nādir Shāh; after the latter’s death he left the Persian camp with 4,000 Afghan and Qızılbaş troops, with whom he took over the eastern part of Nādir Shāh’s empire, and founded the state that came to be known as Afghanistan (Singh, *Ahmad Shah*, 29–30; Perry, “Army,” *EI*, 2:506–8).

¹²³ Marwī, ‘*Ālam-ārā-yi Nādirī*’, ed. Riyāhī, 1126–27.

¹²⁴ Karmīnagī, *Tuhfa*, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, C-525, f. 130v; Marwī, ‘*Ālam-ārā-yi Nādirī*’, ed. Riyāhī, 1119–22.

ghans was crucial in Muḥammad Raḥīm's takeover.¹²⁵ Bukharan authors point to the influence of Nādir Shāh's military model on Muḥammad Raḥīm. One of them calls Muḥammad Raḥīm a "second Nādir," as he commanded an army of Uzbek, Qalmāq, Afghan and Ottoman troops with strong artillery.¹²⁶ According to another, Muḥammad Raḥīm imitated Nādir Shāh in struggling to subdue the ninety-two Uzbek tribes in such a way that they could not resist.¹²⁷

The experience Muḥammad Raḥīm had acquired in Nādir Shāh's army informed new trends in the Bukharan military, particularly the emergence of decimally organised multi-ethnic army units.

When Muḥammad Raḥīm reviewed his troops in 1161/1748 – appointing commanders for each unit – 12,000 horsemen, armed with sabres, lances, and muskets, were registered on the payrolls. These troops were essentially provided by the Manghits, that is, by the ruler's own tribe.¹²⁸ Another army unit – a thousand men according to one source – consisted of various non-Uzbek groups, such as Afghans, Lazgīs¹²⁹ and Ottomans, who had left the Qızılbaş army.¹³⁰ It appears that this unit employed numerous firearms, including muskets (sing. *tufang*), large muskets (sing. *jazāyir*), 'line-breakers' (*şaff-shikan*), and cannons (*tūp*), which were transported on carts for inspection.¹³¹ Descriptions of Muḥammad Raḥīm's military campaigns mention Ottoman harquebusiers (*jazāyirchīyān-i rūmī*)¹³² and Afghan and Persian musketeers.¹³³

The emergence of a decimal military organisation in early Manghit Bukhara is indicated by references to an Afghan unit of a thousand, commanded by Jum'a-Qul *mīng-bāshī* in the early 1750s,¹³⁴ and to a unit of a thousand harquebusiers (*bazāra-yi jazāyirchī*).¹³⁵ In Rabi II 1166 (February 1753), when the ruler ordered

¹²⁵ Grigor'ev, "Pokazanie," appendix, 15–16.

¹²⁶ Muḥammad Sharīf, *Tāj*, ms. Tashkent, 9265, f. 286r.

¹²⁷ Chechovich, "K istorii Uzbekistana," 75 quoting a Tashkent manuscript of Muḥammad Ya'qūb's *Gulshan al-mulūk* (IOS, 1507, f. 135), which I have not seen.

¹²⁸ *Zubdat wa madār-i in lashkar-i pāygiṛdār il-i maṅṅitiyya ya'nī urūgh-i khāṣṣ-i amīr-i shawkat-ikhtiṣāṣ būd* (Karmīnagī, *Tuhfa*, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, C-525, ff. 130v–131r; Muḥammad Sharīf, *Tāj*, ms. Tashkent, 9265, f. 280r).

¹²⁹ 'Georgians', in general Caucasians from the area south of Darband.

¹³⁰ *Az junūd-i mutafarriqa-yi afghān wa lazgī wa 'usmānī kih az mu'askar-i qızılbaş judā shuda ... būdand* (Karmīnagī, *Tuhfa*, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, C-525, f. 130r). Muḥammad Sharīf (*Tāj*, ms. Tashkent, 9265, f. 280r) adds that they numbered one thousand.

¹³¹ Karmīnagī, *Tuhfa*, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, C-525, ff. 130v–131r; Muḥammad Sharīf, *Tāj*, ms. Tashkent, 9265, f. 280r.

¹³² The *jazāyirchīs*, 'harquebusiers' were generally mounted for mobility (Perry, "Army," *EIr*, 2:506).

¹³³ *Tufangdārān-i afghān wa 'arab-i 'ajam* (Karmīnagī, *Tuhfa*, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, C-525, 175v).

¹³⁴ *Jum'a-Qul mīng-bāshī bā bazāra-yi afghān* (ibid., ff. 228r, 257v). Though the decimal system was part of Chinggis Khan's army organisation, no trace of it was left in Bukhara under the last Chinggisid dynasty, i.e. the Ashtarkhānids.

¹³⁵ In April 1757, Qilich *tūpchī-bāshī* was appointed its commander (*sardār-i bazāra-yi jazāyirchī*) and received the province of Qarākūl as a 'reward' (*juldū*) (ibid., f. 270r).

an inspection and muster (*kūruk wa shumār-i bītik*) of the ‘salary-seeking troops’ (*sipāh-i mawājib-khwāh*), he let them to pass in units of “a thousand, a hundred, and ten with their commanders.”¹³⁶ In the following autumn, 1,000 new tents were distributed to the army. Each tent accommodated ten persons.¹³⁷ We can assume that units of ten, who received their own tents, and units of a hundred, were grouped together in the camp,¹³⁸ and that the army totalled around 10,000 men. Incidentally, an army of 10,000 soldiers divided into decimal units is exactly what our best European authority reports for the 1770s (see below). Towards the end of Muḥammad Raḥīm’s rule, the decimal organisation seems to have been extended, at least symbolically, to non-Manghit Uzbek tribal forces. Thus, in July 1757, after a successful campaign into Ḥiṣār, 4,000 armed men of the Uzbek tribe of Yūz and “other dwellers of the pastures of the province of Ḥiṣār,” led by their chiefs, paraded in front of the ruler, who appointed *mīng-bāshīs*, *yūz-bāshīs*, and *dab-bāshīs* for them.¹³⁹

With its re-formed military force, the Bukharan capital gradually regained control of its hinterland. Muḥammad Raḥīm led many campaigns against Uzbek tribes in the Miyānkāl region between the capital and Samarqand, which he was ultimately able to subdue, and against the “nomadic Kanīgās tribe” in the region of Shahr-i Sabz,¹⁴⁰ which he was not able to hold.

Even if, in the long run, the Bukharan army did not develop into a true copy of the Nādirid forces, its impact was strong enough to open the military to groups of people who hitherto had not been regularly employed in it. Initially, these were Afghans, Ottomans and Georgians (‘Lazgi’) who had served in Nādir Shāh’s army. Georgians could probably not have served in Chinggisid Bukhara beyond the strictly limited sphere of the slave guard, but Russian captives, as will be shown below, along with Central Asian Arabs and Turkmen, came to be soldiers in the army of the early Manghit rulers. The conscription of individuals with highly diverse ethnic and social background into an overarching military structure was a novelty in early modern Uzbek Central Asia. Obviously the Iranian tradition of multi-ethnic armies served as a template for a new kind of soldiery in Uzbek Central Asia that emerged as a social category distinct from both the traditional military estate and the ruler’s slave guard. The new type of soldier came to be called *nawkar*, literally ‘(military) servant’. We shall come back to this term below.

¹³⁶ *Lashkar-i nuṣrat-aṣar az hāzara wa sada wa daha bā umarā-yi ishān khail-khail az nazr-i imtīhān guzarānīd* (ibid., f. 206v).

¹³⁷ Ibid., f. 225v.

¹³⁸ For a contemporary sketch of regularly arranged tents in Nādir Shāh’s camp, see Axworthy, *Sword of Persia*, 242. Hanway, *Account*, 1:245–48, was struck by the general regularity with which the tents were arranged.

¹³⁹ *Īlāt-i Yūz wa ghaira kih sākin-i charāgāb-i wilāyat-i Ḥiṣār-and* (Karmīnagī, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, C-525, ff. 279v).

¹⁴⁰ *Īl wa ulūs-i bādiya-nishīn-i Kanikās* (ibid., f. 200v).

The Soldiery under the Second Manghit Ruler

After the death of Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān, a widespread revolt once more challenged the Bukharan centre. The succeeding Manghit ruler, Muḥammad Dāniyāl *atālīq* (r. 1759–85), again subdued the outlying provinces, relying on technological advantage as well as on a scorched earth policy.

In Rajab 1172/March 1759, in his first military actions as ruler, Dāniyāl *atālīq* fought with “the old troops, the Manghit army, and the people of city of Bukhara,”¹⁴¹ against 10,000 horsemen, which military leaders (*sarān-i sipāh*) and chiefs (*a’yān*) of the Yūz, Kanīgās, Burqūt, Yettī-Urūgh, Sarāy and Qungrāt had led to the capital, ostensibly to participate in the previous ruler’s funeral.¹⁴² The ‘old troops’ were palace guards and firearm units, commanded by Dawlat *qūshbēgī* and Jum’a-Qul *tūqsāba*, who had been loyal servants of the ruler’s predecessor.

The relevant Bukharan court chronicle, which covers only the first ten years of Amīr Dāniyāl’s rule, i.e. 1172–82/1759–69, often refers to siege warfare with artillery (*tūp*, *zambūrak*) and catapults. Up to 1176/1762, the artillery was commanded by Qilich *tūpchī-bāshī*, who had been one of Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān’s loyal servants (see the section above). On several occasions, Qilich *tūpchī-bāshī* also commanded small firearms detachments, at one time purportedly made up of nearly 4,000 musketeers.¹⁴³ These musketeers were mounted. When Qilich *tūpchī-bāshī* began a siege, he ordered his musketeer unit to dismount.¹⁴⁴ The chronicler only makes a distinction between infantry and cavalry in the context of siege warfare.¹⁴⁵ It appears that Qilich *tūpchī-bāshī* and his firearms units moved with the royal army (*mawkib-i humāyūn*).¹⁴⁶ The firearms units, particularly the artillery, seem to have been recruited from non-Uzbeks. The ethnic background of Qilich *tūpchī-bāshī* is unclear, but we know that one of his successors was a converted Russian captive.¹⁴⁷ There is mention of artillery ‘apprentice-servants’ (*shāgird-pīsha*), a term that around 1710 designated a section of the palace guard and in nineteenth-century contexts is used for soldiers recruited from non-Uzbek sections of the population.

The court chronicler often refers to military units of a hundred and a thousand, and in one case specifies that a group of a thousand horsemen consisted of Afghans, Qalmāqs and Uzbeks.¹⁴⁸ Though the chronicler does use the word *sipāh* in a

¹⁴¹ *Lashkar-i qadīm wa sipāh-i manghitiyya wa mardum-i bukhārī* (ibid., f. 323r).

¹⁴² Ibid., f. 320r.

¹⁴³ *Sipāh-i tufangdār* (ibid., f. 328a).

¹⁴⁴ *Jamā’at-i tufangchī piyāda shawad* (ibid., f. 337b).

¹⁴⁵ *Piyāda wa suwār* (ibid., f. 345a).

¹⁴⁶ On this term in Shaybānid chronicles, see Berndt, “Organisation,” 79; Paul, “The State,” 44.

¹⁴⁷ Andreĭ Rodikov, who had lived in Bukhara since 1780. See Yakovlev, “Russkii topchi-bashi.”

¹⁴⁸ Karmīnagī, *Tuhfa*, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, C-525, f. 333v.



Fig. 1 Battle of Shibarghān (1056/1646). Hūnhar, study for an illuminated *Pādshāh-nāma*
© Fondation Custodia, Collection Frits Lugt, Paris, inv. no. 1989-T.5



Fig. 2 Qazaq warrior (1736). John Castle, “Journal von der Anno 1736 aus Orenburg ... vollbrachten Reise.” In *Materialien zu der Russischen Geschichte seit dem Tode Kaisers Peter des Großen*, pt. 2, 1730–41, appendix, pl. 1. Riga, 1784.
Courtesy Göttingen State and University Library



Fig. 3 Battle of Qarshī (1150/1737). Muḥammad Kāzīm Marwī, *Ālam-ārā-yi Nādirī*, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, D-430, vol. 2: f. 115r
 © Institute of Oriental Manuscripts, St Petersburg

آویز آمد غازیان موک طغفشان با شماره اقدس جلور بحقیقت انزوه کا در ایگه کشته نجایت با
 و بمقابل بزوال جهانداری انطاغی نصر از پیش برده شده جمعی از پیش از اسلحه شمشیر ز روزه و بیار یا سا کرد
 و بقیه آنجا امت که در حال ایشان با خبری بود و دل قلعه کشته از چهار راه فرار دشمن نصرت نمودن ایشان



Fig. 4 Battle of Khānqāh, Khwārazm (1153/1740). Mahdī Khān Astarābādī, *Tārīkh-i jahāngushā-yi Nādirī*. Facsimile of an illustrated manuscript of 1171/1757, edited by ‘Abd al-‘Alī Adīb Barūmand, 357. Tehran, 1370 h.sh./1991



Fig. 5 Mounted musketeers in Iran (1812). Gaspard Drouville, *Voyage en Perse: Atlas ou Collection de ... dessins lithographiés par A. Orlovsky*, fig. 45. St Petersburg, 1820.
Courtesy Darmstadt State and University Library



Fig. 6 Camel-cannon in Iran (1812). Gaspard Drouville, *Voyage en Perse: Atlas ou Collection de ... dessins lithographiés par A. Orlovsky*, fig. 52. St Petersburg, 1820.
Courtesy Darmstadt State and University Library



Fig. 7 Military exercises of *sarbāz* units supervised by Nāyib ‘Abd al-Šamad Khān (1844). Joseph Wolff, *Narrative of a Mission to Bokhara, in the Years 1843–1845*. 2nd ed., vol. 2. London, 1845. Lithographic plate after drawing by Wolff’s companion, Mirza Abdul Wahab. Courtesy Göttingen State and University Library

broad sense for any kind of armed forces, he tends to employ it more consistently to refer to tribal and provincial troops.¹⁴⁹

Soon after the Bukharan chronicle's record of events comes to an end, a series of three European accounts of the Bukharan army takes up the story. In the following, essential parts of these accounts will be quoted, analysed, and compared with the view presented by the Bukharan source.

The first European to offer a detailed description of the Bukharan army in the Manghit period is Johann Falk. He took notes from conversations with Bukharan traders and other widely travelled people, whom he met in 1771–72 in Siberian towns. Johann Georgi edited these notes after Falk's death. The following observations may refer to 1770, since another piece of information on Bukhara describes the Khan's palace in that year.

Their regular militia consists of infantry (Bukharan *naukari charish*)¹⁵⁰ of volunteer Arabs and Turkmens. It is divided into regiments of 1,000 men, whose commander is called *meng bashi* [*mīng-bāshī*], the captains *yusbashi* [*yūz-bāshī*], and the sergeant [in charge] of ten men *dabl bashi* [*dab-bāshī*]. The head of the artillery is called *top bashi* [**tūpchī-bāshī*] and the artilleryists *topshi* [*tūpchī*]. The company flags are called *tu* [*tūgb*], the regiment flag *bareck* [*bayraq*], a drum *nagura* [*naqqāra*], etc. Their cavalry consists of Uzbeks living there, who are like the Russian Cossacks born soldiers who provide their own weapons and mounts. ... All their troops are dressed in nightgowns (*kballat* [*khalāt*]) of various colours, but differ by pointed caps, also of various colours. Their weapons consist of small iron cannons (*top*), few and bad, carried on camels, and badly served; muskets (*moltek* [*miltiq*]) with fuses, without locks, mostly introduced under the previous Khan Mamraim, who had two gunsmiths, of whom the Kazaks captured one; sabres (*shawshir* [*shamshir*]), lances (*noisa* [*nāyiza*]), bows (*kaman*) and arrows (*tir*) in quivers (*ludak*), and daggers (*kinshal* [Russian *kinzhal*]) too. The guard (*pas bau* [*pāsbān*]) drawn from the infantry is resplendent with halberds and battle-axes (*arballa* [Turki *āy-bālta*]). Imagine a regiment of people dressed haphazardly, bearing such different weapons, without training, under a general who in peacetime is the prime minister (*atalyk* [*atālīq*]).

In time of war, there are general summonings. The strongest fortification is a wall of unfired bricks, a dry ditch and an earth embankment."¹⁵¹

Filipp Efremov, a Russian sergeant who was taken captive by Qazaqs in 1773 and sold to Bukhara, served in the Bukharan army from 1774 to 1780. When he had learned the language, his owner, Muḥammad Dāniyāl *atālīq* (the ruler of Bukhara)

¹⁴⁹ In the case of the province of Qarākūl, he also makes a distinction between *sipāh* and *qarā-chīrīk* forces (Karmīnagī, *Tubfa*, ms. Kazan, KFU, F-301, f. 269v). On *qarā-chīrīk* / *qara-chīrīk* see below, Chapter 6.

¹⁵⁰ "Naukari Tscharisch." They were probably mounted infantry. This is the first appearance of the term *nawkar*, '(military) servant, soldier' in a European report on the Bukharan army. 'Tscharisch' ('charish' in English transcription) may refer to 'army, auxiliary forces' – Turki *chīrīk* / *chevīk* (Budagov, *Slovar*, 1:475), Persian *charīk* (Steingass, *Dictionary*, 392). Another possible reading of the term 'charish' is 'the calling' (Turki *chaghrish* / *jaqirish*) [of volunteers to the army].

¹⁵¹ Falk, *Beyträge*, 3:497–98.

made him a commander of ten.¹⁵² Later, Efremov was promoted to command a hundred. The hundred men under his command were of various ethnic groups, among them 20 Russians. Ultimately, he managed to escape and return home via India. Efremov, who had participated in campaigns against Samarqand and Khiva, provides us with a first-hand account of the Bukharan army.

How many troops in total and which weaponry, remuneration and equipment: In the whole Bukharan territory, around 10,000 are assembled, and in large part, the troops among them are [composed] of different peoples. Captains (*kaptan* [*yuz-bashi*])¹⁵³ receive: a cash salary of 20 gold coins or 60 roubles, and land instead of grain, on *Naurus*, that is on New Year, carmine caftans, silken belts, and warm caps embroidered with silk. Sergeants (sing. *serzhant* [*pindzhab-bashi*]): three and a half gold coins, or ten roubles 50 kopecks, in grain: six and a half *batman* [*bātman*] of wheat and six and a half *batman* of millet (*zhugara*),¹⁵⁴ half-carmine¹⁵⁵ caftans and caps. Corporals (*kapral* [*dah-bashi*]): two and a half gold coins, or seven roubles 50 kopecks, in grain: four and a half *batman* of wheat and four and a half *batman* of millet, woollen caftans, and sometimes also [cotton] robes (sing. *khalat*) due to the shortage of wool. Common soldiers (sing. *ryadovoi*): four *batman* of wheat and four *batman* of millet, a *batman* weighting eight *pud*,¹⁵⁶ cash salary: two gold coins, or six roubles; caps wrapped with gauze.

All the troops are cavalry, there is no infantry, they have muskets with fuses (*ruzh'ya s fitilyami*), sabres, and to a large extent lances and bows.

To the chief ranks (*glavnye starshina*) land, from which they receive a high income, is given instead of salaries in cash and grain; in addition, according to their rank, they are given silken robes with golden and silver floral decorations on three festivals, namely *Naurus*, *Kurvan*, and *Gulisurkb*.¹⁵⁷

On war: If any of the neighbours acts in a hostile manner, then the *atalyk* [Dāniyāl] marches all the troops out and, when they are approaching the hostile city, he orders them to fire all the cannons and mortars; where they are not used to it, the sheer noise is [so] frightening to them that they submit and pay tribute to the *atalyk*. If, however, they cannot be overawed that way, he orders his troops to graze the horses on the sown grain, burn down the grass, and devastate the whole area; the next summer he returns. In that manner, all the cities there have come under the rule of Bukhara.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵² Efremov, *Desyatiletnee stranstvovanie*, 15–24. As Efremov's glossary of Bukharan terms indicates, he had learned the Bukharan dialect of Persian.

¹⁵³ I have added the Bukharan equivalents of Russian terms, as they appear in Efremov's glossary of the Bukharan language (*ibid.*, 194–225).

¹⁵⁴ [*D*] *zhugara*, 'sorghum', is said to have been used as fodder and bread grain.

¹⁵⁵ Russian *polukarmazinnyy*, 'half-carmine', may be a pale shade of the blazing carmine red, produced with a reduced amount of the expensive dye.

¹⁵⁶ 1 *pud* = 16.38 kg. 1 *bātman* ('load') = 131.04 kg. In total, roughly one metric ton (8 × 131.04 kg = 1,048 kg) of cereals.

¹⁵⁷ *Gul-i surkb* is a spring festival ('tulip fair').

¹⁵⁸ Efremov, *Desyatiletnee stranstvovanie*, 70–74.

Towards the end of Amīr Dāniyāl's rule, Mendiya Bekchurin, a member of a Russian diplomatic mission to Bukhara,¹⁵⁹ wrote a short account of the Bukharan army in 1781. Bekchurin saw 5,000 armed foot soldiers (*peshoe vojško*) lining the streets of the capital as he rode to the citadel,¹⁶⁰ and heard that, in total, Bukhara kept an army of 40,000 men.

For that number [40,000] a salary (*zhalovan'e*) as well as clothing is provided by the court of the Khan. The majority of them are horsemen. From among them, some 3,000 men, chosen from various captives, are with the Khan and *atalyk*.¹⁶¹

The foreign observers' accounts allow us to discern the new type of professional soldiery serving in units transcending ethnic boundaries and undermining traditional military domains and estates. They also point to an emerging military labour market as a new form of conscription. The formation of a 'regular' army, distinct from both Uzbek military power and slave guards, significantly enlarged the social scope of the military and, at the same time, the cash salaries paid to the new soldiery attracted recruits from a variety of ethnic groups.

The accounts presented by Falk and Efremov stress the multi-ethnic background of the soldiery, serving in units structured by abstract – decimal – principles of organisation with a pronounced overarching esprit de corps expressed by a set of military paraphernalia. Both Falk and Efremov report the use of the term *nawkar*¹⁶² to refer to soldiers serving in regular army units. Efremov does so in his glossary of the Bukharan language, where he translates *nokar* as 'soldier' (*saldat*) and distinguishes it from *batur*, 'warrior' (*vojn*).¹⁶³ In earlier sources we rarely encounter the term *nawkar* in this abstract sense, and Dāniyāl *atāliq*'s chronicler does not use it when describing military events and affairs. As Efremov specifies that soldiers were paid annually in cash and kind, and only chief commanders were assigned landed income, we can assume that common soldiery received their salaries directly from the treasury. The salaries paid to the soldiers obviously came to play a role in the individual survival strategies of potential recruits, as one of Falk's informants suggested with regard to the Bukharan Arabs: "Though sheepbreeding is their main concern, many of them are hardworking tillers of the soil, and the lazy and poor volunteer as soldiers."¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁹ Bekchurin, translator for a Russian mission to Bukhara, stayed in the city for two weeks in February 1781.

¹⁶⁰ Zhukovskii, "Posol'stvo Bekchurina," 297.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 301–2.

¹⁶² Originally a Mongolian word for 'comrade, free warrior in the retinue of a Khan', its connotation shifted to 'retainer, servant' in the sedentary context of the Iranian world (Németh, "Wanderungen," Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente*, 1:521–26). Within the scope of this study, the term first appears – in the sense of 'registered soldiers' – in a Bukharan chronicle written in the early 1720s. The chronicler uses the term *nawkariyya* for "those soldiers (*asākir*) whose names have been registered in the books" (Tāli', *Tārīkh*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 11, ff. 46v–47r).

¹⁶³ See Efremov, *Desyatiletnee stranstvovanie*, 203.

¹⁶⁴ Falk, *Beyträge*, 3:515.

Thus, the Bukharan army had come to comprise captured, hired and ‘born’ soldiers who, at least in one reported instance, served in a single operational unit, as the Kalmyk, Afghan and Uzbek horsemen mentioned by the chronicler. The overall proportion of these social groups in the Bukharan military cannot be ascertained, however. Falk’s and, more particularly, Efremov’s accounts depict ethnically heterogeneous units of soldiers (*nawkar*) as the core of the Bukharan army,¹⁶⁵ but do not hint at the size of other army categories. Falk draws a distinction between the volunteers of the ‘regular’ infantry and the ‘born’ soldiers of the Uzbek cavalry, who kept their own weapons and mounts.¹⁶⁶ Efremov describes troops of only one kind, consisting of salaried soldiers, including Russians, totalling 10,000 men. Bekchurin refers to a ‘salaried army’ of nearly 40,000 men, including a guard of 3,000 captives.

As the army could hardly have grown from 10,000 to 40,000 men within the one year between Efremov’s flight from and Bekchurin’s arrival in Bukhara, different ways of gathering information and different conceptions of ‘the army’ must account for the huge difference in the figures. Efremov’s estimate of 10,000 army soldiers is based on participant observation in various campaigns. Bekchurin’s high estimate of the total salaried army must refer to Uzbek cavalry in general, which Falk’s report does not quantify, and Efremov does not mention as a separate category. We do not know whether or how Uzbek cavalry were actually salaried under the rule of Dāniyāl *atāliq*.

5. ‘Champions of Faith’ on the Payrolls?

Shāh Murād (r. 1785–1800) led numerous raids and campaigns beyond the Amu Darya, attracting large numbers of Uzbek horsemen and booty hunters to his camp, many of whom were ultimately incorporated into the rather small-scale Bukharan army that had emerged under the first two Manghit rulers. Though not fully documented in every aspect, the overall process involved: first, a reassertion of the old concept of the ‘Uzbek army’, which Bekchurin’s report had already heralded, and second, the integration of Uzbek cavalry – from tribes other than the Manghits – into the regular army. Booty and the redistribution of the ruler’s share of it – a fifth according to Muslim law – provided *ad hoc* rewards and bonuses for these warriors, who ultimately came to be registered on the payrolls, if they had not been so all along.

¹⁶⁵ For a general theory, in my view too bold and comprehensive, on the institution of military service (*nawkarī*) and the military labour market in Indian history since the late sixteenth century, which is applicable for eighteenth-century Central Asia, see Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput, and Sepoy*, esp. 193–96.

¹⁶⁶ “The Uzbeks relate to the Bukharans as the Cossacks to the Russians, i.e. they are the same people, having the same religion, but have special political and domestic constitutions, and, like the Cossacks, provide military service instead of taxes” (Falk, *Beyträge*, 3:514).

Shortly after becoming ruler of Bukhara, Shāh Murād started a series of raids into the region of Marw, at that time a province of Qājār Iran with a Persian Shiite majority. Around 1786–88, the Bukharan forces conquered the heavily fortified town by destroying a dam and cutting off the city's water supply. The conquest of Marw opened the way for raids and campaigns into Khurāsān, and significantly increased the number of Shiite Persians in Bukhara, as 7,000 to 17,000, or even 30,000, Iranian families were deported there.¹⁶⁷

In a letter to the Ottoman Sultan, Shāh Murād assesses his relations with Uzbek tribes roughly at the time of the conquest of Marw. The Bukharan ruler states that he is surrounded by unruly Uzbek tribes, three or four of them being particularly rebellious, and continues:

As there is no order and unifying bond (*intizām wa rābiṭa*) in the tribe mentioned (i.e. *ūzbakiyya tāyīfasī*, 'the Uzbeks'), they would probably follow my order to fight the enemy and to plunder the enemy's wealth. But should I tell [them]: 'Do not interfere in the affairs of others, do not seize the belongings of others, or give what you have seized', they won't agree.¹⁶⁸

Similar considerations may have guided Shāh Murād's policy to win over the allegiance of Uzbek tribal forces by inviting them to loot enemy territory, in particular in religiously endorsed raids into Shiite Iranian borderlands. After his conquest of Marw, the Bukharan ruler led annual Islamic border raids (sing. *ghazā*) into Khurāsān; sometimes up to 30,000 warriors, or 'champions of faith' (sing. *ghāzī*), joined him.¹⁶⁹ A Greek observer who travelled through Bukhara in 1790 reports:

The supreme ruler of Bukhara ... is just a mullah, who because of his piety has great influence there. In order to be able to rapidly campaign against any enemy, he obliges the people to keep themselves ready to follow suit. In that manner, he frequently campaigns, either against Balkh,¹⁷⁰ where he takes no more than 5,000 to 6,000 troops along, or against Mashhad, the [Iranian] province bordering on Bukhara. All the spoils of war are distributed among the troops, who afterwards go home until the next campaign.¹⁷¹

Shāh Murād's religious appeal obviously enhanced his authority among his military followers, as did the booty that fell into their hands. Muḥammad Ya'qūb, a soldier who may have served under him, depicts Shāh Murād's wars for booty as

¹⁶⁷ Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 78; Noelle-Karimi, *Pearl*, 271.

¹⁶⁸ Saray, *Rus İggali Devrinde*, 24 (Turkish tr.), 153 (transcript), appendix EK-II (facsimile) of a letter received at the Ottoman court through the Bukharan envoy Muḥammad Bādi' on 1 Shawwāl 1203 (25 June 1789). The Bukharan ruler here diplomatically declines an Ottoman call to join in a war (*jihād*) against Russia.

¹⁶⁹ Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 78, 353–54; Malcolm, *History*, 2:261.

¹⁷⁰ Balkh had a predominantly Sunni population, which could not legitimately be enslaved like the Shiite Iranians. On Shāh Murād's campaigns into the formerly Uzbek province of Balkh, which had come under Afghan hegemony in the second half of the eighteenth century, see Lee, *The 'Ancient Supremacy'*, 92–102; Noelle, *State and Tribe*, 71–75.

¹⁷¹ Khrisanf, *O stranakh*, 8.

an unconventional solution to a rather common problem, namely how to pay the army.

Shāh Murād knew little about accounting loads [of rations?], wheat and cash sums. The revenue collectors were wealthy and the army people (*abl-i sipāb*) were crying out for generous treatment (*dād-dihish*) since he had many horsemen, and what he gave (*dādan-i ū*) did not suffice them. For that reason people complained. However, his mind was much concerned with gratification (*in‘ām*) for the soldiers. He thought, if I were to conquer the city of Mashhad, and distribute the gold coins of the [shrine of] Hazrat-i Imām [Rizā] to the troops [*lashkarī*], the people would be content and happy with me.¹⁷²

In all likelihood, Muḥammad Ya‘qūb is referring to Uzbek cavalry when he reports on under-salaried army personnel.¹⁷³ They faced a two-fold problem: The revenue administration misappropriated extracted resources, and the military budget was too small for the large number of horsemen. The additional income from the ruler’s share of the booty – a fifth – probably allowed Shāh Murād to pay his troops more regularly. Khrisanf reports, in a statement dated 1805, that Shāh Murād’s army consisted of “60.000 horsemen in times peace,” and that the soldiers were given “only guerdon and forage.”¹⁷⁴ John Malcolm, British envoy to Iran in the early eighteenth century, even claims that tax and booty revenues enabled Shāh Murād to grant his soldiers a regular allowance in cash, apparently five gold coins a year, thereby abolishing the “feudal usage” of paying or rewarding Uzbek chiefs for their military service, and that of their adherents.¹⁷⁵ Malcolm’s account of Shāh Murād’s military reforms should be used with caution.¹⁷⁶ Given the information about army salaries in the 1770s, we cannot endorse the view that a regular pay for soldiers was a novelty introduced by Shāh Murād. However, bearing in mind Falk’s distinction between ‘hired’ and ‘born’ soldiers, the former being mercenaries of various ethnic groups, the latter Uzbek horsemen rewarded with tax exemptions, there may be a point that deserves further investigation.¹⁷⁷ Moreover, the centralisation of military recruitment and mobilisation, which can be observed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (see below), supports the view

¹⁷² Muḥammad Ya‘qūb, *Risāla*, f. 27v. See Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 78, 354–55, 369, and 150–57 (on Muḥammad Ya‘qūb and his *Risāla* concluded in 1246/1830-1).

¹⁷³ Muḥammad Ya‘qūb’s notes on Shāh Murād’s campaigns do not allow us to identify specific components of the army. He refers once to the “Uzbek army” (*lashkar-i ūzbak*) and once to the provincial “army of Chārjūy” (*lashkar-i Chārjūy*) (Muḥammad Ya‘qūb, *Risāla*, f. 7rv).

¹⁷⁴ Khrisanf, “Poyasneniya,” 11.

¹⁷⁵ Malcolm (*History*, 2:250) does not identify his source here.

¹⁷⁶ As the two main manuscript sources Malcolm refers to have so far not been identified (Bregel, *Administration*, 17–18, note 65).

¹⁷⁷ Malcolm (*History*, 2:249–50) points to reforms of taxation and military recruitment, and also to possible interrelations between the two. As for fiscal reforms, Shāh Murād is said to have made even his soldiers liable to pay *zakāt*, which in an agro-pastoral context can be understood as ‘herd tax’ (*zakāt-i sawāyim*). Bukharan rulers in the 1750s and 1760s were already claiming herd tax from subdued Uzbek tribes, as well as military contingents, but some privileged groups, such as the Manghits, may have been exempted from that tax.

that recruitment through Uzbek chiefs was declining under Shāh Murād. Whether troops were recruited by tribal chiefs or directly by the political centre would obviously affect their loyalty.

To sum up, Shāh Murād's wars for booty, coupled with his religious appeal, may have led to the personal attachment of large numbers of Uzbek warriors and their incorporation into a more stable military framework. This process is indicated by the changing meaning of the term 'champion of faith' (*ghāzī*); in Shāh Murād's reign the *ghāzī*, being a volunteer participant in Islamic border raids, became a salaried soldier on the army books.

A manual of the Bukharan fiscal administration,¹⁷⁸ composed in 1212/1798, suggests that 'champion of faith' (*ghāzī*) had become a payroll category by the end of Shāh Murād's rule – corresponding to the rank of 'outstanding warriors' (*bahādūr*) in other periods.¹⁷⁹ Most of the chancery's tasks this manual describes refer to the design of tax inventories for agricultural land irrigated by extensive channels in the Bukhara oasis. The revenue officials and clerks are instructed first to register the taxed agricultural land on each level of administration, and then to turn to the 'expenditure' side.

Underneath the total revenue (*jam'*) of each province and each village, one must write the name of the 'champion of faith' (*ghāzī*) to whom the grain and the cash is to be delivered. The registered 'champion of faith' (*ghāzī-yi maktūb*) should be written along with his tribe (*urūgh*); if he is a dependant, along with [the name of] his chief (*matbū'*); if he is an officer ('*amaldār*'), along with the name of his office. The method of assignment (*tariqa-i tarwjiha*) is as follows: First one writes the name of the 'gatherer' of those allowed a soldier's pay (*ism-i iḥrāz-i muwazzafin-rā*), such as the name of a commander of several soldiers (*amīr-i ba'zī 'asākīr*), along with the name of his office and tribe ('*amal wa urūgh*').¹⁸⁰

The restoration or improvement of army book-keeping may have been an achievement of the later years of Shāh Murād, who originally, as we have seen, was said not to be well informed about the particulars of army book-keeping. The fact that the instructors had predominantly Uzbek 'champions of faith' and command-

¹⁷⁸ Badī'-Dīwān, *Majma' al-arqām*. On the author, Mīrzā Badī'-Dīwān, who held the highest post in the Bukharan fiscal administration (*wazīr-i dīwān-i a'lā*) and was in charge of "the books of assessment of receipts and disbursement of the treasury," see Bregel, *Administration*, 1–6, 36.

¹⁷⁹ Mīr Ḥusayn Mīrī, one of Shāh Murād's sons who had participated in several Islamic border raids, received the official rank of *ghāzī* in the late 1790s (Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 136, quoting Mīrī, *Makhāzin al-taqwā*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 51, f. 140v).

¹⁸⁰ Badī'-Dīwān, *Majma' al-arqām*, ff. 14v–15r, tr. 37. A nineteenth-century register, called "list of assignments on public revenues for tribal soldiers" (*rūy-i khaṭṭ-i tankehwāh-i nawkarān-i il*) from the district of Yangī-Qurghān closely follows the model described above. In this case, the revenues of a village of the province of Karmīna are assigned to soldiers who are enrolled by name, rank (in most cases they held the lowest rank, *bahādūr*), which had been conferred on them by a letter of appointment) and (though not always) tribal affiliation. Whenever the last was stated, the beneficiaries belonged to the tribe of Karayt; see Chekhovich, *Dokumenty*, 209–17, no. 50. On tribal soldiers (sing. *nawkar-i il*), see also Sukhareva, *Bukhara*, 17–18. On revenue assignments in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Bukhara, see Turaev, *Regesty*.

ers in mind is shown by a long list of 52 optional categories to be inserted under 'tribe' (*ūrūgh*),¹⁸¹ but not all these names refer to Uzbek tribes; non-Uzbek groups, such as Turkmen and Qalmāqs, as well as the non-tribal category of *shāgird-pīsha*,¹⁸² are also mentioned.¹⁸³ The multi-ethnic character of the army is hardly visible, however, as the non-Uzbeks appear to be integrated into one or other of the two wings (right and left) of the traditional Uzbek army.¹⁸⁴

The Russian envoy T.S. Burnashev, who visited Bukhara from late 1794 to spring 1795, confirms most features of the army as described by Falk and Efremov – in particular the decimal organisation, the soldier's pay, and the military paraphernalia – but clearly gives a different account of the ethnic composition and the size of the Bukharan army.

The Bukharan army consists of Uzbeks. There is no infantry there, but only cavalry. In total, the army numbers 60,000. It is divided into regiments and platoons. A regiment is led by a *Toksaba* and consists of a thousand men. In a platoon there is the commander of a hundred (*yuz-bashi*), the commander of fifty (*pandzho-bashi*), the commander of ten (*da-bashi*) and a hundred ordinary soldiers. Each regiment has its banner, made of silken cloth embroidered with flowers and other images in silk; each company is identified by its sign. In each regiment, there are trumpets, kettledrums, horns and drums, which produce a peculiar type of music. A soldier's clothing does not differ from the ordinary dress of the population, and the weapons consist of sabres, muskets, lances and bows, but rarely does he have all these weapons together. Some wear coats of mail and some protect themselves with shields of iron or of layers of leather sewn together.

A common soldier receives two *tilla* (*tillā*, around twelve roubles) in pay and seven *batman* (around 56 *pud*)¹⁸⁵ of wheat and some additional bonuses in times of war. In times of war, every common soldier has to have enough provisions to suffice for the whole campaign. These are carried on camels or on special horses, different from the war horses of which each soldier has two.

The chief command of the whole army is held by the ruler himself or one of his chief officers, whom he appoints. At the beginning of the year 1795, in a campaign against the Persians, the sixteen-year-old son [Amīr Ḥaydar] of *Shamrat Bek* [Shāh Murād] commanded the army of 15,000 men.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸¹ The term appears in both spellings (*urūgh* and *ūrūgh*) in the short passage quoted above.

¹⁸² The term already appears in the early eighteenth century, when, as shown above, the *shāgird-pīshas* were a section of the palace-guard. In the nineteenth century, *shāgird-pīsha* denoted a non-Uzbek section within the general Bukharan army.

¹⁸³ Among the groups employed in the Bukharan military at that time, but not listed here, are Bukharan Arabs, Afghans, and Russian and Iranian captives.

¹⁸⁴ The various 'tribes' were associated to the two 'wings' of the army as follows: On the right were the Manghit, Kīnakas, Karayt, Dūrmān, Qungrāt, Kḥiṭāy, Qīpchāq, Ūtārchī, Turkmān, Arlāt, Kiyat, Qirghiz, Qalān, Ūyshūn, Jūblājī, Qārī, Mughūl, Ḥāfīz, Ūglān, Tīlād. On the left were the Qataghān, Sarāy, Yābū, Bahrīn, Jalāyir, Qānglī, Yūz, Mīng, Naymān, Qārliq, Burqūt, Ārghūn, Qūshchī, Ūghlān, Qalmāq, Fūlādchī, Qīrq, Alchin, Majār, Chīnbāy, Badāy, As, Chībūrgḥān, Kīlchī, Tama, Misīt, Tātār, Ūyghūr, Baghlān, Īlach, Tanghut, and *shāgird-pīsha*.

¹⁸⁵ In total c. 917 kg. 1 *pud* = 16.38 kg.

¹⁸⁶ Burnashev, "Puteshestvie do g. Bukhary," 100–4.

The high number of 60,000 men is confirmed by another estimate of Shāh Murād's troops.¹⁸⁷ This is roughly within the range of Bekchurin's estimate (40,000), but stands in sharp contrast to Efremov's figure (10,000). Had the notion of 'the army' changed? Had what were considered 'general levies' around 1770 come to be perceived as 'regular army' by the 1790s? Burnashev's report suggests that, in the popular conception of the Bukharan army, the Uzbek forces had come to the fore again, but now within an organisational grid that had been developed in the second half of the eighteenth century. The rising numbers obviously also reflect the gradual incorporation of Uzbek tribal forces into a more regular army structure. At any rate, the fact that a governor of Miyānkāl alone, in 1213/1798–9, commanded more than 8,000 soldiers (*narwkar*),¹⁸⁸ nearly the size of the whole (regular) army in the 1770s, confirms a noteworthy expansion of the armed forces.

6. The Army in the Early Nineteenth Century

After the death of Shāh Murād, the Bukharan raids into Khurāsān abated. In the west, Bukhara became exposed to attacks and raids from Khwārazm. When a Bukharan army of 30,000 Uzbeks marched against Khwārazm in about 1805, the Khwārazmian forces consisted of 12,000 men from various Turkmen and Uzbek tribes.¹⁸⁹ From about 1810, Amīr Ḥaydar (r. 1800–26) held back the warlike Bukharan Uzbeks from retaliating independently in vendettas with the Khwārazmians.¹⁹⁰ In the east, the Bukharan military was mostly engaged in conflicts with Uzbek tribes, such as the Kḥiṭāy-Qīpchāq in Miyānkāl and the Kanīgās in Shahr-i Sabz.

The rule of Amīr Ḥaydar is well documented. We have the general assessments of two foreign observers and several collections of royal letters, which provide us with information on routine military and administrative affairs. Among the latter, a set of letters sent by the Bukharan ruler to the governor of Qarshī in the years 1215–17/1800–03,¹⁹¹ is particularly relevant.

The available sources reveal several features of the Bukharan military which – perhaps due to lack of information – are hardly discernable during the reign of his father and predecessor: first, a focus of military activity on fortresses inside Bukharan territory; second, an almost equal rate of mobilisation of regular and irregular forces for temporary service in these fortresses; and third, an increasing number of non-Uzbeks in command positions.

¹⁸⁷ Malcolm, *History*, 2:261.

¹⁸⁸ Among them 5,000 men of Naqīb Khwāja, as well as the troops of the governors of Karmīna, Khaṭīrchī and Nūratā (Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 137, quoting Mirī, *Makhāzin al-taqwā*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 51, f. 244rv).

¹⁸⁹ Bukhārī, *Tārīkh-i laṭīf*, 72–73, tr. 161, 163.

¹⁹⁰ Meyendorff, *Voyage*, 195.

¹⁹¹ *Maktūbāt-i Amīr Ḥaydar*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 5412. See Vyatkin, "Karshinskiĭ okrug."

General Assessments by Foreign Observers

Mīr ‘Izzatallāh, an Indian Muslim in British service, travelled through Samarqand and Bukhara in spring 1813 on his way from Yarkand to Kabul.¹⁹² His notes about the Bukharan army are scattered in various sections of his travelogue:

The greatest among them [the Central Asian rulers] is the king of Bukhara, Amīr Ḥaydar, and his army, including soldiers (*nawkar*) and tribal levies (*iljārī*),¹⁹³ may consist of nearly 100,000.¹⁹⁴

The people of this region [Central Asia] have not seen a war of the great [powers] for nearly a hundred years, and by warfare (*kār-i sipāhgarī*) they understand nothing but assault and pillage (*tākhṭ u tāz*). Their common weapon is the lance. The musket they may also have is [just] a [simple] matchlock, without [sophisticated technical] fittings.¹⁹⁵ ... There is no storehouse or workshop for cannons. In the citadel of Bukhara, very good cannons are scattered on the ground like stones.¹⁹⁶

It is apparently well-known among the noblemen close to the king that the king’s army (*fawj*) numbers 80,000 horsemen. Among the common people, they say that there are more than 100,000 horsemen. God knows. However many troops there are under the king of Bukhara, they all get cash in gold. And from among them, around 10,000 horsemen are stationed in Samarqand, as many in Marw-i Shāhjahān and others in the city of Bukhara proper, and in other places. Inventories of the troops (*sipāh*) enrolled by the Khan, as well as of the shape, colour and mark of the horse they keep, are always ready to hand.¹⁹⁷

Georg von Meyendorff, a German Baltic aristocrat, travelled in the country as a secretary to a Russian diplomatic mission in the winter of 1820–21. Meyendorff perceived the Bukharan military as a domain of the Uzbeks, “a warlike people, always ready to fight.”¹⁹⁸ Among the Bukharan troops, which were entirely cavalry, he makes a distinction between a ‘permanent army’ of 25,000 ‘salaried men’, and a ‘feudal’ militia of 60,000 men, “who rally round the flag only when there is a general call-up.”¹⁹⁹ There was also a palace guard, which fell into two classes: the ‘cas-

¹⁹² On him, see Szuppe, “En quête de chevaux.”

¹⁹³ *Sipāh-ash ma’a nawkar wa iljārī* (Turki, lit. ‘summons of the tribe’).

¹⁹⁴ ‘Izzatallāh, *Ma’āsīr*, ms. London, British Library (hereafter BL), Or. 2009, f. 63v.

¹⁹⁵ *Bandūq ham dāshta bāshand, tūra-dār wa bī qawā’id ast* (ibid., f. 64v). For Urdu *toya-dār bandūq*, ‘a matchlock’, see Platts, *Dictionary of Urdu*, 342.

¹⁹⁶ ‘Izzatallāh, *Ma’āsīr*, ms. London, BL, Or. 2009, f. 64v.

¹⁹⁷ *Kāghazāt-i siyāha-yi sipāh ba qaid-i khān wa khaṭṭ wa rang wa nishān-i asp pīsh-i kbwud nigāh dāshta, hamīsha mawjūdāt miḡīrand* (‘Izzatallāh, *Ma’āsīr*, ms. London, BL, Or. 2009, ff. 69rv).

¹⁹⁸ “La force militaire réside essentiellement dans les Ouzbeks, peuple guerrier, toujours prêt à combattre” (Meyendorff, *Voyage*, 273, cf. 194–95).

¹⁹⁹ “La force armée ne consiste qu’en cavalerie; qui est composée ou de feudataires ou des hommes soldées” (ibid., 270). Meyendorff repeats elsewhere (ibid., 267) that the militia provided by the fief-holders served only when there was a general call-up. “L’entretien de l’armée est le principal objet de dépense; car, ainsi qu’en Turquie, il [the Khan] a des troupes soldées, et ceux qui tiennent les fiefs ne servent, comme formant la milice, que lorsque le khan fait un appel géné-

sabardar' [*kbāṣṣa-bardār*], consisting of 500 men, and the 'mahram' [*mahram*], consisting of 220 men of officer rank.²⁰⁰

The *kbāṣṣa-bardār* were 'bearers of royal, or special, weapons'. They were armed with large muskets belonging to the the royal arsenal (*miltiq-i kalān-i kbāṣṣagī*), as Amīr Ḥaydar indicated when he ordered the governor of Qarshī to seize and return such a weapon, which a certain *kbāṣṣa-bardār* had taken with him from Bukhara to the province of Qarshī.²⁰¹

All of Meyendorff's additional information refers to the permanent army. Bukharan soldiers were called "sipahi" or "cara-alaman."²⁰² They fought with matchlock muskets (sing. *fusil à mèche*), long lances and curved sabres. Some wore a short coat of mail and an iron helmet and carried a round shield of buffalo leather. The artillery, commanded by a Russian,²⁰³ consisted of some ten Persian cannons, three or four of them on gun carriages. Every year, the ruler inspected a contingent of his troops at a shrine, the shrine of Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband, near his capital.

Only half of the permanent army actually accompanied the ruler on his campaigns, while the other half were in Ūra-Tippa, Jizzāq, Samarqand, Qarākūl, Qarshī, towns with the strong 'garrisons', and some other, unspecified places in order to defend the frontiers. Meyendorff mentions nine military ranks: four of them indicate a decimal organisation with units of ten, a hundred, five hundred, and a thousand men. Others are traditional Bukharan state ranks. An apparently new title is "kourghan-beghi ou général de brigade," which literally translates as 'chief of fortress' and bears witness to the growing importance of fortresses – "garnisons" in Meyendorff's wording.

Salaries were paid partly in cash and partly in kind. A common soldier annually received the equivalent of six gold coins (*tillā*), one in cash "for hay" – obviously a rendering of the term *alūfa* – and the rest in kind: five *bātman* each of wheat and of millet.²⁰⁴ The "cassabardar" (*kbāṣṣa-bardār*) palace guards received double pay.

ral." Meyendorff's perception of the Bukharan state and military seems to have been influenced by descriptions of the Ottoman Empire.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 260.

²⁰¹ *Maktūbāt-i Amīr Ḥaydar*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 5412, f. 7rv). In 1880, large 'falconet muskets' weighing more than 20 kg, which had to be operated by two persons, were the standard and distinctive weapon of the *kbāṣṣa-bardār* (Arandarenko, "Bukharskie voiska," 359). Cf. *kbāṣ[s]-bardār*, "A soldier whose arms are furnished by his employer; a servant who in a great man's retinue carries a firelock" (Steingass, *Dictionary*, 439).

²⁰² Meyendorff, *Voyage*, 271.

²⁰³ On him, see Yakovlev, "Russkii topchi-bashi."

²⁰⁴ Meyendorff, *Voyage*, 271. The salaries were slightly below the average level in the late eighteenth century, when a common soldier received two gold coins plus four *bātman* each of wheat and of millet (Efremov for the 1770s), or two gold coins plus seven *bātman* of wheat (Burnashev for 1781). In 1770, one gold coin (*tillā*) could buy three *bātman* of wheat, or three and a half *bātman* of barley, or five *bātman* of millet (Falk, *Beiträge*, 3:515).

Military Organisation at the Provincial Level

The Bukharan documents present Uzbek tribal forces not as the subjects, but as the objects of military decision-making.

The collection of letters sent by Amīr Ḥaydar to the governor of the province of Qarshī, on average two letters a week, in the first three years of his rule, 1800–3, documents the ruler's keen interest in managing military affairs. The ruler usually orders the mobilisation of specific troops for various tasks, or the conscription and remuneration of military personnel.

Qarshī was a stronghold of the Manghit dynasty, and the home of the Manghit tribe, which in the early eighteenth century numbered 12,000 households.²⁰⁵ The province of Qarshī supplied at least 3,000 troops of all descriptions, the largest component being Uzbek tribal contingents, with the Manghit contingent alone ranging from 1,400 to 1,600 men at different times. Smaller contingents were supplied by non-Uzbek tribes, by certain districts, and by the 'common people' (*fuqarā*) living in and around the city of Qarshī.²⁰⁶

Tribal and territorial contingents were the most common source of military strength in the province of Qarshī in 1800–3. The tribal contingents in particular were subdivided into 'soldiers' (sing. *nawkar*) and militia (*qara-chīrīk*), literally the 'mass army' or 'common army'.²⁰⁷ The numbers of soldiers and militiamen to be supplied for these contingents by the various military-administrative entities were often changed, even during the few years covered by the letters sent to the governor of Qarshī. The basis for such changes is not clear in these letters. However, Amīr Ḥaydar's correspondence with governors of other provinces reveals that the numbers were adjusted on the basis of a population census (*qara-andāz*).²⁰⁸ When complaints about the unfair distribution of *qara-chīrīk* obligations in the province of Karmīna reached the Emir, he ordered that a new quota be fixed based on an updated household count.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁵ Holzwarth, "Community Elders," 232–33.

²⁰⁶ The 'common people' referred to may have been mostly Tajiks, as in 1825 the permanent resident (non-mobile) population of the town of Qarshī was consisting in the largest portions of Tajiks (Holzwarth, "Community Elders," 226).

²⁰⁷ Also called *qara-lashkar* (*Maktūbāt-i Amīr Ḥaydar*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 5412, f. 62v). The letters mention a range of minor categories, such as *āq-ūyli*, Turki '(someone) with a white yurt', and *alamān* (see below); *ghāzī* does not appear. On the term *āq-ūyli* see Munis and Agahi, *Firdaws*, 641, note 963 and 644, note 1003 by Yuri Bregel.

²⁰⁸ *Makātīb-i Amīr Sayyid Ḥaydar*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 1961/II, f. 213v, letter no. 568 dated Rabī' II/May–June 1808.

²⁰⁹ In this rather exceptional case, a contingent of 500 *qarā-chīrīk* was provided partly by 'commoners' and partly by 'tribal people' (*fuqarā wa ilāt*) (*Makātīb-i Amīr Sayyid Ḥaydar*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 1961/II, f. 209r, letter no. 554 dated Muḥarram 1223/March 1808; see also Fitrat, "Tri dokumenta," 79.

Contingents of Soldiery and Militia

The two military status groups to which the letters to the governor of Qarshī most often refer, namely ‘soldiery’ (*nawkar*) and ‘militia’ (*qara-chīrīk*), correspond to those mentioned by foreign observers, such as ‘soldiery’ (*nawkar*) and ‘summons of the tribe’ (*iljāri*) in ‘Izzatallāh, or ‘permanent army’ and ‘militia’ in Meyendorff, but the difference between them, in particular with regard to their availability and frequency of mobilisation, is not so clear-cut.

In mobilising troops in the province of Qarshī, Amīr Ḥaydar does not usually call them up for campaigns into enemy territory, but rather for sentry (*ilghār*)²¹⁰ duty in various fortresses (sing. *qurghān*, *qal'a*), spread throughout the country but mostly along the borders. Thus, for example, the ruler would order the governor of Qarshī to dispatch two named officers, each with a hundred soldiers (*nawkar*), to Yangī-Qurghān,²¹¹ where the two officers should stay for a tour of 20 days.²¹² Both soldiers (*nawkar*) and militiamen (*qara-chīrīk*) were summoned for routine tours of sentry duty in fortresses and outposts, as shown in the following order:

The tribe of Sarāy (*qabīla-yi Sarāy*) is responsible for standing guard (*ilghār*) at Shēr-ābād. Ask Dūst Bēk *biy* if [more] sentries are needed, and send one, two or three hundred *nawkar* and *qara-chīrīk* of the Sarāy as sentries.²¹³

Soldiers and militia, or regular and irregular contingents, differed mainly with regard to equipment and payment.

The names of the soldiers (*nawkar*) were on the payrolls, which the governor had to prepare, but there is no hint that militiamen (*qara-chīrīk*) were individually registered. The soldiery was subdivided in ‘lancers’ (sing. *nāyiza-dast*) and ‘musketeers’ (Turki sing. *mīrgān*), usually serving in specialised units of a hundred. Amongst the soldiers of the Manghit tribe of Qarshī (*nawkariyya-yi Manghit-i Qarshī*),²¹⁴ there were roughly equal numbers of lancers and musketeers.²¹⁵ The equipment of the militia (*qara-chīrīk*) are not specified in Amīr Ḥaydar’s letters, except for a case when they were ordered to serve with shovels and axes if military equipment (*yarāq*) was not available.²¹⁶ Occasional references to ‘soldier-horses’

²¹⁰ In nineteenth-century Bukharan texts, Turki *ilghār*, literally ‘avant-garde’, usually denotes a sentry, i.e. temporary staff of a forepost or fortress. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries *ilghār* usually denoted ‘a rapid campaign’ or ‘light cavalry’ (Pavet de Courteille, *Dictionnaire*, 131–32).

²¹¹ Located in the region of Miyānkāl (between Bukhara and Samarqand), Yangī-Qurghān was a stronghold of the Uzbek tribe of Kھیāy-Qīpchāq.

²¹² *Maktūbāt-i Amīr Ḥaydar*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 5412, f. 89vr.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, f. 112v.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 8r.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, ff. 3rv, 8r, 96rv.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 100v.

(sing. *asp-i nawkari*) suggest that the soldiery was provided with state-owned horses, whereas the militia served with their own.²¹⁷

Soldiers received regular payments and allowances. Amīr Ḥaydar's letters show great variations in levels of pay and modes of payment, or settling of accounts – far greater variations than the general foreign assessments indicate. Generally, those entitled to regular salaries fell into two main categories, 'ration eaters' (sing. *alūfa-khwār*) and 'landowners' (sing. *zamīndār*),²¹⁸ or – in another set of letters – those 'eating rations' (*alūfa mīkhwurdagī*) and those 'eating income from assigned land' (*tankhwāh mīkhwurdagī*).²¹⁹ In another set of correspondence, Amīr Ḥaydar repeatedly states that he has "assigned income-land for his [an individual officer's] rations" in such-and-such an administrative village (*mawza*'),²²⁰ and orders the fiscal authorities to register the transaction. Thus, the revenues due to the state were assigned directly to the beneficiary. Consequently, the newly appointed 'tankhwāh eaters' knew which plot of land was supposed to provide their annual salary.

Whereas in the 1770s, as Efremov reports, only high-ranking officers had land assigned to them as the source of their income, in the first decade of the nineteenth century common soldiers, at least in the province of Qarshī, were also rewarded in this way, although on a lower scale. In the most basic cases, the beneficiary was entitled to the taxes due from the land tilled by himself or by his relatives.²²¹

Now and then, the ruler instructed the governor to design *ad hoc* registers and payrolls.²²² Sometimes these instructions include minute details of the levels of pay of various ranks of soldiers, and point to fine distinctions at the lower end of the scale. Once, the governor of Qarshī had to prepare a payroll (*daftar, tūmār*) for 900 Manghit soldiers (*nawkar*) and write their names below the names of ninety officers (*amaldār*) personally appointed by the ruler.²²³ In reward for their services, the governor had to assign (the revenue of) six units²²⁴ of agricultural land to top-ranking officers, four units to middle-ranking officers, three units to the 'heads of ten' (sing. *dah-bashī*) newly appointed and dispatched by the ruler himself, and two-and-a-half units to the old 'heads of ten'. Common musketeers (*mūrgān*) and

²¹⁷ Vyatkin, "Karshinskii okrug," 15. Whether the state also provided the soldiers with weapons, as Vyatkin states, cannot be ascertained.

²¹⁸ *Maktūbāt-i Amīr Ḥaydar*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 5412, f. 129v.

²¹⁹ Abduraimov, *Voprosy*, 22–23, quoting Amīr Ḥaydar's letters to Sayyid Aḥmad Khwāja, doc. no. 692).

²²⁰ *Dar wajh-i 'alūfa-yi ū tankhwāh ta'īn farmūdīm* (Şifatgul, *Pazhūbishī*, 475, 479).

²²¹ *Maktūbāt-i Amīr Ḥaydar*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 5412, f. 96v.

²²² These instructions might be general, such as "to distribute the *kharāj*" of a province among the *nawkars* (Dzhuraeva, "Voprosy gosudarstvennosti," 74, quoting a letter to the governor of Panjshanbe, dated 1241/1825-6).

²²³ *Maktūbāt-i Amīr Ḥaydar*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 5412, f. 127r–130r.

²²⁴ In this case, agricultural land was measured in units of (plough) 'oxen' (*gāw*), which can be understood as 'half a plough of land'. In areas with more extensive irrigation systems, such as in Central Bukhara and around Qarshī, ploughland was quantified in *tanāb*, an abstract surface measure of c. 0.5 hectares.

‘stabbing’, i.e. experienced, lancers should receive two units, but *qara-alamān* lancers only one.²²⁵

Another listing of Manghit soldiers again puts the ‘common’ lancer (*qara-alamān-i nayza-dast*) at the lowest grade, one grade below an ‘accomplished young man’ (*jawān-i durust*), and two grades below an ‘outstanding warrior’ (*bahādur*).²²⁶ The appearance of *qara-alamān*²²⁷ among the wage-earning troops, even if at the very bottom of the hierarchy, is puzzling, as up to the mid-eighteenth century, the *alamān* were usually known as raiders and associated with unruly elements.²²⁸ When and how they became salaried soldiers, is unclear, though the integration of freelance ‘champions of faith’ into the regular army in the late eighteenth century provides a plausible context. At any rate, by around 1800–3, the *qara-alamāns* are already clearly distinguished from the militia (*qara-chīrīk*),²²⁹ and in 1820–21, as Meyendorff records, *alamān* meant a ‘common soldier’ in the regular army.²³⁰

Militiamen (*qara-chīrīk*), as depicted in Amīr Ḥaydar’s letters, were rewarded sporadically. At least in some cases, they received cash support when they served. A source of these payments was a surcharge cash tax or war contribution called *ju’l* (Arabic ‘pay’) imposed on the tribal groups that provided the militiamen. Originally, *ju’l* denoted “an extraordinary tax, raised at times of holy war (*jihād*), when the treasury is empty.”²³¹ In the days of Amīr Ḥaydar, *ju’l* was routinely assessed and raised in gold coins.²³² Lists survive indicating the amount in gold coins to be paid by various tribal groups, either *ad-hoc* or annually. In one case, Amīr Ḥaydar tells a governor that he is mobilising for a military campaign and has drawn up a list (*pāygir*) of war tax (*ju’l*), soldiers (*nawkar*) and militiamen (*qara-chīrīk*) to be recruited from a certain community (*jamā’at-i Kiyīkchī*) and handed over to specifically appointed officers.²³³

²²⁵ *Ba nayza-dast ādamī khalāndaḡī dū gāw wa ba qara-alamān-i nayza-dast yak gāw bidihid* (*Maktūbāt-i Amīr Ḥaydar*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 5412, f. 129r).

²²⁶ *Maktūbāt-i Amīr Ḥaydar*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 5412, f. 96v.

²²⁷ Amīr Ḥaydar’s letters rarely employ this term; cf. Vyatkin, “Karshinskii okrug,” 16–17; Semenov, “Ocherk pozemel’no-podatnogo ustroïstva,” 14.

²²⁸ See above, Chapter 2, note 47. In 1163/1750, the chronicler was still referring to “the *alamān* of the commoners” (*alamān-i awbāsh*) as rebellious forces who had to be checked by the army (*sipāh*) (Karmīnagī, *Tuhfa*, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, C-525, ff. 168v–169r).

²²⁹ Amīr Ḥaydar makes a distinction between the two terms when he specifies: “Furthermore, take 25 persons from the *nawkars* of the Sarāy, and 110 from the *qara-chīrīk* of the Sarāy, under the command of Allāh-Nazar *qarāwulbēgī*. The 25 *nawkar* of the Sarāy may be *alamān*” (*Maktūbāt-i Amīr Ḥaydar*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 5412, f. 23r).

²³⁰ It remained a standard term for soldier up to the early twentieth century. For its use in an official document, see Urunbaev et al., *Katalog*, doc. no. 112).

²³¹ Vyatkin, “Karshinskii okrug,” 23, note 1. As far as I know, the term first appears in Bukharan sources around 1800.

²³² However, *ju’l* was not exclusively dispersed to militiamen, nor was every deployment of militiamen financed by it. For a number of documents dealing with *ju’l* and *qara-chīrīk*, see Fitrat, “Tri dokumenta,” 77–79; Semenov, “Ocherk pozemel’no-podatnogo ustroïstva,” 26.

²³³ Fitrat, “Tri dokumenta,” 78–79.

Enforcement of Central Power in the Provincial Army

Compared with the situation up to the mid-eighteenth century, when Uzbek tribal forces in the Bukharan army mostly operated under their own chiefs, Amīr Ḥaydar's letters depict a provincial army that was designed to leave no room for autonomous military action by Uzbek tribes. This was partly achieved by positioning tools of central military power in the provinces, and partly by favouring highly complex units under centrally appointed commanders in specific mobilisations.

Amīr Ḥaydar's letters to the governor of Qarshī refer rather frequently to two other military groups which, although operating in the province, seem to be specially attached to the centre: *shāgird-pīsha* and *khāṣṣa-bardār*.

The latter group was probably an extension of an elite palace guard operating in the province. As mentioned above, the *khāṣṣa-bardār* were armed with large muskets. Their overall number in Bukhara seems to have risen from 500 in 1820–21,²³⁴ to 4,000 in 1832, when the 'khusa burdar' – described as mounted infantry armed with matchlocks – were supposedly all Tajiks, recruited in small contingents from numerous districts in Bukhara.²³⁵

The 'apprentice-servants' (sing. *shāgird-pīsha*) were another – and around 1800 more common – non-tribal component of the provincial army. They were not attached to specific contingents, but were at the disposal of high ranking officers.²³⁶ We have already encountered *shāgird-pīsha* as a section of the palace guard, and as an ethnic, decidedly non-tribal, payroll category in the eighteenth century (see Chapter 5). In the nineteenth century, both the military and the ethnic connotations of the term become more evident. In 1832, the "Shagird Peshu" were described as "regular cavalry" drawn from "mixed tribes of Bokhara" and directly attached to the Emir, in total 2,000 men.²³⁷

Amīr Ḥaydar devoted considerable attention to the composition of socially mixed active units, specifying the numbers to be drawn from different contingents and branches of arms to be blended into composite regiments, as in his call for troops from Qarshī and Khuzār for sentry duty in Marw. These troops were to include 150 Manghits (70 *nawkar*, 60 *qara-chīrīk*, and 20 *bāy-bacha*),²³⁸ 135 Sarāy (25 *nawkar* and 110 *qara-chīrīk*), and smaller – also specified – numbers of *qara-chīrīk* from other tribes, such as 'Arab, Ūz, Qūshchī, Qaṭaghān, Arlāt, Qarliq, Kḥiṭāy and Dūrman. In addition, various specified numbers of *shāgird-pīsha* and

²³⁴ Meyendorff, *Voyage*, 260.

²³⁵ Burnes, *Travels*, 2:374.

²³⁶ Vyatkin, "Karshinskii okrug," 15–16; Abduraimov, *Voprosy*, 54.

²³⁷ Burnes, *Travels*, 2:374. Khanykov (*Opisanie*, 185), for his part, saw "Shakird-Pishya" as the totality of the Bukharan non-Uzbek lower classes, namely the population of humble origin, comprising Tajiks and people of Iranian origin, as opposed to Uzbeks with tribal affiliations.

²³⁸ *bāy-bacha*, 'rich boy, son of a rich man', also appears as a category of military manpower in other letters of Amīr Ḥaydar (Fitrat, "Tri dokumenta," 77–79), as well as in Kokand documents of the 1870s. The latter describe *bāy-bachas* as rich young men with good horses and skills in equestrian sports (Troitskaya, "Neskol'ko dokumentov," 140–45).

khāṣṣa-bardār were to be attached to the sentry force. The commander who was to march this very heterogenous unit for sentry duty to Marw was personally nominated and sent by the ruler.²³⁹ Even in a minor matter, such as sending a detachment of 100 sentries to the border post of Karkī, Amīr Ḥaydar specifies how the unit should be composed and that it should be sent to its destination under the command of a trusted *shāgird-pīsha*.²⁴⁰

In general, the close-up glimpse provided by government papers reveals that the various Uzbek tribal contingents were embedded in the operational framework of a non-tribal provincial army under tight control from the centre.

Non-Uzbeks as Chief Ministers and Provincial Governors

Military affairs in Bukhara around 1800 can hardly be understood without considering the rising importance of non-Uzbek courtiers and freedmen, mostly of Iranian descent. They had no independent power-base, owed allegiance solely to the ruler and acted as his executives in the centre and in the provinces. In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, there were already slave guards, and slave administrators, but their realm of activity rarely extended beyond the palace and the capital, and the traditional Uzbek military elite jealously checked their influence at the court.

Under Shāh Murād and his successor, courtiers and freedmen began to play a more visible role in the provinces and thereby also in the military command. Two of Amīr Ḥaydar's governors may illustrate the point: Muḥammad Ḥakīm *biy*, the governor of Qarshī, to whom many of the above mentioned royal letters were addressed, and Dawlat *biy*. Apparently, neither belonged to the traditional Uzbek military elite. Both held the rank of *biy* – which had previously been reserved for Uzbek chiefs.²⁴¹ The royal certificate appointing Dawlat to the rank of *biy* and the post of *hākīm* (of Qarshī), which can be dated to the late 1790s,²⁴² puts the Uzbek elite in their place quite bluntly:

We have presented the honourable Dawlat *dīwānbēgī* with the office and post (*amal wa ūrūn*) of 'chief' (*biy*). All the Manqīts, Qungrāts, Sarāy, Aymāqs and others besides the mentioned tribes (*ilāt*) should acknowledge the above mentioned [person] as their chief and governor (*hākīm*) and treat him with due respect. If the mentioned chief observes lawless and unruly behaviour of the said tribes (*ilāt*), he should imprison, pun-

²³⁹ *Maktūbāt-i Amīr Ḥaydar*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 5412, f. 23r.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, f. 102rv.

²⁴¹ 'Izzatallāh, *Ma'āshir*, ms. London, BL, Or. 2009, f. 83r. For a 'classical' *biy* certificate issued to an Uzbek chief, see *Maktūbāt wa yarliqāt*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 300, ff. 74r–75r.

²⁴² Contextual evidence suggests that Shāh Murād decided to rule the province of Qarshī through a slave when his own son, Amīr Ḥaydar, rebelled there. In a letter published by Kūgelgen ("Sufmeister," 314), Shāh Murād informed Dawlat *dīwānbēgī* about military successes in the province of Qarshī, while the city of Qarshī was still held by his rebel son. On these events, see Muḥammad Ya'qūb, *Gulshan al-mulūk*, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, C-1141, ff. 167v–168r.

ish and chastise them. This was written because the Uzbeks fear the king or else they fear the [king's] slave (*ghulam*).²⁴³

A second letter of appointment, confers upon Dawlat *biy ināq* the rank of a 'grand vizier' (*kull-i qūshbēgī*) of the capital along with the governorship of Qarākūl and the command over the army of that province.²⁴⁴ The two royal certificates suggest a career path leading through the ranks of 'councillor' (*dīwānbēgī*), 'chief' (*biy*), and 'confidant' (*ināq*) to that of the 'grand vizier'. In one of the first years of Amīr Ḥaydar's reign, Dawlat *biy qūshbēgī* (alias 'Dawlat the slave', or 'Dawlat *qūshbēgī* of the king's slaves') received the governorship of Samarqand, which he held until at least 1821.²⁴⁵

Muḥammad Ḥakīm *biy*, whose father Ūtkūr *qūshbēgī* had already been a high-ranking official, was also of non-Uzbek (*shāgird-pīsha*) lineage – and according to 'Izzatallāh and Meyendorff even of slave origin. When the Indian traveller met "Ḥakīm *biy*" in May 1813, the latter was regarded as chief of all the slaves in the ruler's service; he acted as a vizier and was considered to be specially distinguished by holding the rank of *biy*, which was generally restricted to Uzbeks.²⁴⁶ In 1215/1800-1, Muḥammad Ḥakīm *biy* had been appointed governor of Qarshī and of the Turkmen towns (on the bank of the Amu Darya).²⁴⁷ Some further steps in Muḥammad Ḥakīm's official career can be traced through royal certificates and letters: they include the posts and ranks of *dīwānbēgī* ('treasurer', from 1215/1800), *mih-tar* ('revenue official', from 1217/1802, and *dīwān-i sarkārī* ('court treasurer', in 1218/1803-4, while he continued to serve as governor of Qarshī), *ināq* ('confidant', after his transfer from Qarshī in 1218/1803-4).²⁴⁸ Finally, in 1220/1805-6, upon

²⁴³ *Zīrā kib ūzbakiyya az pādshāh mūtarsand wa yā az ghulam mūtarsand (Maktūbāt wa yarliqāt*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 300, f. 75v).

²⁴⁴ Şifatgul, *Pazhūhishī*, 498–99 (no. 113). The date is not stated. Meyendorff (*Voyage*, 260) translates *ināq* as 'privy councillor'. In 1813, 'vizier' (*qūshbēgī*), in particular 'grand vizier' (*qūshbēgī-yi kull*) was the highest of the 'posts of slaves' (*manāşib-i ghulamān*) in Bukhara ('Izzatallāh, *Ma'āsīr*, ms. London, BL, Or. 2009, f. 83r). The collection of custom duties and tolls had been one of his responsibilities (Meyendorff, *Voyage*, 269). The *qūshbēgī*'s military role as chief of the royal guard and household troops is best described in their letters of appointment.

²⁴⁵ Bukhārī (*Tārīkh-i laţīf*, 70, tr. 157) adds that he was of Işfahānī origin. 'Izzatallāh (*Ma'āsīr*, ms. London, BL, Or. 2009, f. 67v) calls him Dawlat *qūshbēgī az ghulamān-i pādshāh*. Muḥammad Ya'qūb (*Risāla*, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, C-1934, ff. 11r, 25v) calls him *ghulam* Dawlat, and Dawlat *qūshbēgī ghulam*.

²⁴⁶ 'Izzatallāh, *Ma'āsīr*, ms. London, BL, Or. 2009, ff. 75r, 83r; Meyendorff, *Voyage*, 255. Andreas Wilde, whose forthcoming book deals with Manghit Bukhara, has kindly informed me that his sources suggest that Muḥammad Ḥakīm *biy* was an Uzbek *amīr*, and this possibility cannot be excluded. Even Muḥammad Ya'qūb, who is quite emphatic about matters of origin, does not refer to Muḥammad Ḥakīm as a 'slave' (*ghulam*). He, however, ranks him among the *shāgird-pīsha*, a decidedly non-Uzbek ethnic category (see below, note 262).

²⁴⁷ *Hukūmat-i Qarshī wa qashāt-i tarākimma*, as Kāshgharī (*Āthār al-futūb*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 753, f. 197v) reports. He was governor of Qarshī from 1800 to 1803.

²⁴⁸ See the abridged (and undated) royal diplomas published by Şifatgul, *Pazhūhishī*, 490 (no. 106), 497–98 (no. 112), 501 (no. 115). The (tentative) dates have been gathered from epithets used in Amīr Ḥaydar's correspondence with Muḥammad Ḥakīm.

the death of his father,²⁴⁹ he was promoted to the post of ‘grand vizier’, i.e. *qūshbēgī-yi kull*,²⁵⁰ of the capital and province of Bukhara, and given command of all the household troops, the Qalmāqs, the ‘harquebusiers’ (*khāṣṣa-bardār*), the ‘non-Uzbek cavalry’ (*shāgird-pīsha*) and the artillerymen (*bandagān-i tūpchī*).²⁵¹ His letter of appointment entitled him to receive the *zakāt*, as well as half the title (*‘ushr*) (of Bukhara province).²⁵² Thus, well endowed with resources, the chief administrator was in charge of a wide range of troops under central command.

At the same time, more and more provincial governorships previously held by Uzbek *amīrs* or princes of the ruling dynasty, were given to slaves and freedmen. In 1813, slaves governed at least four provinces, if we include the central region. ‘Izzatallāh mentions eight outlying provinces and identifies the governors of six. Three of them were *ghulāms*. Dawlat *biy* held Samarqand, while two brothers of Muḥammad Ḥakīm *biy* held the provinces of Qarākūl and Jizzāq. Two provinces were held by cousins of the ruler, and one by an Afghan.²⁵³

Staffing provincial key positions, which were closely linked to military affairs, with the king’s personal retainers seriously affected the balance of power between the centre and the Uzbek chiefs.

The great uprising of the Uzbek tribe of Khiṭāy-Qīpchāq in Miyānkāl that lasted from 1821 to 1825 was partially caused by frictions arising from this trend, and by the highhandedness of a representative of the new type of slave-governor. A member of the Bukharan army and actor on the scene relates that the revolt of

²⁴⁹ Muḥammad Ḥakīm’s father, Muḥammad Ūtkūr *biy* b. Shāh Muḥammad, had been appointed ‘vizier’ (*wazīr*, *qūshbēgī*) after his predecessor, a certain ‘Kīnjarū *ghulām*’, died in 1203/1784–5 (Muḥammad Ya’qūb, *Risāla*, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, C-1934, f. 25b). Amīr Ḥaydar reconfirmed him as *qūshbēgī* (*manṣab-i wikālat-i kull*) and thus “brought him closer to himself than all the other courtiers (*muqarrabān wa ināqān-i darbār*)” (Bregel, *Administration*, 4, 11). This formulation, in my view, suggests that Muḥammad Ḥakīm’s father was one of the ruler’s courtiers and personal retainers. A certain Shāh Muḥammad *tūpchī-bāshī* was in command of a firearms unit of 1,000 musketeers and harquebusiers (*jazāyir-andāzān*) in the army of the first Manghit ruler (Karmīnagī, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, C-525, ff. 114r, 212v), but we do not know whether he was the father of the above-mentioned Muḥammad Ūtkūr. If this is the same man, he was probably a soldier in Nādir Shāh’s multi-ethnic army who had remained in Bukhara, and not a captive. This would explain why he and his descendants were not be stylised as ‘slaves’ (*ghulām*).

²⁵⁰ Šifatgul, *Pazhūbishī*, 490, no. 106: *Ḥukm-i intiṣāb-i Muḥammad Ḥakīm biy ināq ba manṣab-i wizārat, kih mabnā-yi qūshbēgī-yi kull ast*. On the date, see Muḥammad Ya’qūb, *Risāla*, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, C-1934, f. 11v.

²⁵¹ *Ba dār al-khilāfat wa wilāyat-i Bukhārā-yi sharīf ma’a qūr-bāshīgī-yi maḥramiyya wa Qalmāq wa khaṣṣa-bardār wa shāgird-pīsha wa bandagān-i tūpchī*. (Šifatgul, *Pazhūbishī*, 490). The term *qūr-bāshī*, here, is best understood as a contraction of *qūrchī-bāshī*, ‘head of the body guard’. This post is documented in about 1800 (Bregel, *Administration*, 25), *qūrchīs*, ‘body guards’, already appear in the 1680s (Tirmizī, *Dastūr*, 131, tr. 91, 197 note 62. Literally, *qūr-bāshī* means ‘keeper of the arsenal’.

²⁵² He also received the town of Narazm and its dependencies, which his father had held as *tankhwāb*.

²⁵³ ‘Izzatallāh, *Ma’āsīr*, ms. London, BL, Or. 2009, ff. 67v–68r.

the Khiṭāy-Qīpchāq was provoked by Ayāz *ghulām*,²⁵⁴ the governor of Katta-Qurghān, when he forced the Khiṭāy-Qīpchāq nobility to follow orders when it was his, and their turn, to provide *qara-chirik* as sentries for a three-month tour of duty at the outpost in Marw. The tribal elite (*dawlatmandān-i ilāt*) had previously been excused from service on payment of a cash fee or by sending third persons. Now, the governor forced them to serve under his military command, as the Khiṭāy and Qīpchāq were his subjects (*fuqarā*).²⁵⁵ By exerting his authority over the Uzbek tribal elite, the slave governor fundamentally challenged the traditional social order and self-image of the Uzbek military class (*sipāh*) as rulers over non-Uzbek commoners (*fuqarā*).

The uprising of the Khiṭāy and Qīpchāq was a serious challenge to the Emirate, as it occurred in the central part of the Zarafshān valley.

Warfare

Foreign observers' stylised descriptions of Bukharan warfare and reports of Bukharan wars by local observers do not always match. Foreign observers generally noted two basic features of Bukharan warfare: a preference for skirmishes and fast retreats over prolonged battles, and a lack of capacity (and aspiration) to undertake long-lasting campaigns. As Meyendorff puts it:

They make war without discipline, as partisans, mounted on very fine horses. The bravest riders advance detached, like the riders on the flank of our armies. Partial fights take place, and are followed by general attacks and grand cavalry charges. These battles end quickly because the horses are so fast that they greatly facilitate the flight of whichever party is defeated. As the campaigns take place without stores, in poor areas, when they last three weeks, they appear rather long to these hordes, for whom wars are really nothing but excursions.²⁵⁶

The five-year war that broke out just after Meyendorff left Bukhara, by which the Bukharan centre subdued the rebellion of the Khiṭāy-Qīpchāq (and other tribes supporting them), was different. It was a protracted war of attrition. For several years, the Bukharan army undertook three campaigns a year into rebel territory, which was studded with small fortresses. Siege warfare, cannonades and the razing of fortresses ultimately forced the rebels to give up. In Bukhara, the long drawn-

²⁵⁴ Alias Ayāz *biy* Irānī (*Zafarmāma*, 78). Ayāz survived the rebellion, and may be identical with Ayāz *tūqsāba*, a slave of the royal court (*ghulām-i darbār-i 'ālī*), who was appointed district prefect (*amlākdār*) of the *tūmān* of Kharqānrūd on 21 Jumada II 1241/31 January 1826 (*Inshā'*, ms. Dushanbe, Academy of Sciences of Tajikistan, Institute of Oriental Studies, 646-2, pp. 181-82 [ff. 91v-92r]). Ayāz *biy* and Muḥammad Ḥakīm *biy qūshbēgī* were instrumental in prince Naṣrallāh's seizure of the capital city in 1827.

²⁵⁵ Muḥammad Ya'qūb, *Risāla*, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, C-1934, f. 14rv; cf. Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 377-78.

²⁵⁶ Meyendorff, *Voyage*, 273.

out military effort was expensive, and led to price increases and famine.²⁵⁷ This war decisively turned the tide in the balance of power between the centre and the Uzbek tribes, but Uzbek forces and Uzbek chiefs continued to be active militarily, both beyond and within the Bukharan army.

The two-month war of succession in 1827, as described by a participant and an anonymous chronicler,²⁵⁸ saw Uzbek forces operating in kinship-based units, with shifting alliances and military camps quickly fluctuating in size.

Following Amīr Ḥaydar's death in October 1826, two of his sons ruled one after the other for a few months. In early 1827, a third son, prince Naṣrallāh, rebelled against his brother, Amīr ʿUmar. As he marched on the capital, the governors along the route came with all the various Uzbek tribes and clans to welcome him and pay him allegiance.²⁵⁹ Moreover, "all the Uzbeks" (*tamām-i ūzbakiyya*) whom his brother had sent against him joined his forces when "the soldiers of Bukhara from each tribe and clan, troop after troop, tribe after tribe, took the opportunity and deserted from the Bukharan army."²⁶⁰

More troops arrived "from the steppe" and from military outposts along the Amu Darya. When prince Naṣrallāh started to lay siege to the capital on 18 Sha'bān 1242/17 March 1827, nearly 40,000 horsemen were assembled in camp, but only 2,000 remained in late April, for the siege was unsuccessful and the Uzbeks left the field and returned to their homes.²⁶¹

The defenders of the capital were led by a Manghit chief (*sarkarda*) and several non-Uzbek (*shāgird-pīsha*) commanders, among them Muḥammad Ḥakīm *qūshbēgī* and Ayāz *biy* with 400 slaves.²⁶² During the siege, daily fighting and cannonades from both sides caused many casualties. Finally, a group of the defenders, among them the Manghit chief and two prominent court insiders, Muḥammad

²⁵⁷ Muḥammad Ya'qūb, *Risāla*, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, C-1934, ff. 16v–18v; Grebenkin "Uzbeki," 56. See also Ivanov, *Vosstanie kitaï-kipchakov*. Amīr Ḥaydar resorted to taking loans and cutting salaries (sing. *wazīfa*). During five years of war, Manghit officers received 30 to 100 *tanga* [c. 1.5 to 6 *ṭillā*] a year, according to their rank. At the end of Amīr Ḥaydar's reign, each officer was receiving only one gold coin a year (Muḥammad Ya'qūb, *Risāla*, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, C-1934, ff. 28v–29r; cf. Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 369).

²⁵⁸ Muḥammad Ya'qūb, *Risāla*, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, C-1934, ff. 20v–21r; *Zafarnāma*, 76.

²⁵⁹ *Bā 'ashhāyir wa qabāyil wa ūlūs-i ūzbakiyya gurūh gurūh istiḡbāl namūda, sharaf-i rikāb-būsī-yi shāhib-qirānī musharraf gardīda* (*Zafarnāma*, 75–76).

²⁶⁰ *Alamāniyya-yi Bukhārā ... az bar il wa ūrūq fawj fawj qabīla qabīla az lashkār-i Bukhārā judā shuda* (*Zafarnāma*, 76).

²⁶¹ Muḥammad Ya'qūb, *Risāla*, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, C-1934, ff. 20v–21r.

²⁶² Among the *shāgird-pīsha* were Muḥammad Ḥakīm *qūshbēgī*, 'Iṣmatallāh *biy* Qalmāq (with 200 Qalmāqs), Ishān Khwāja "with his brothers," Akram Beg with 200 Afghans, and Ayāz *biy* with 400 slaves (Muḥammad Ya'qūb, *Risāla*, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, C-1934, ff. 20v–21r). Among the non-Uzbek defenders of the capital were also Dünmas *biy* Khidrēli with 500 Turkmen – Burnes (*Travels*, 2:374) lists them as tribal contingents of the Bukharan army – and a body of men led by Ṭarāghī (alias Ṭughān) Khān Qazāq (*Zafarnāma*, 78). The anonymous author of the *Zafarnāma* calls the defenders of the city collectively "the inner army" (*sipāb-i andarūnī*).

Ḥakīm *qūshbēgī* and Ayāz *biy* (*ghulām*), delivered the city to the attackers by opening a gate.²⁶³

7. Modernisation of the Military

Under Amīr Naṣrallāh's rule (r. 1827–60) a new breeze of modernisation blew through the Bukharan army, with the establishment of European-type infantry and artillery corps. These military reforms, initiated in the second half of the 1830s, have been pointed to as a turning point in the history of Bukhara,²⁶⁴ as the new standing army enabled the ruler to crush all tribal uprisings and weakened the Uzbek chieftains. However, if we take the autonomy of the tribe of Kanīgās based in Shahr-i Sabz as a litmus test for Uzbek tribal power, these reforms were less effective than they appear at first sight.

In the early 1830s, the Bukharan army was described by two foreign observers already mentioned above: Alexander Burnes, a British envoy, came to Bukhara in 1832, and Jean-Jacques Pierre Desmaisons, a French scholar in Russian service, saw Bukhara in the guise of a Muslim merchant in 1833–34.²⁶⁵

General Assessments of the Pre-Reform Bukharan Army in the Early 1830s

Burnes draws a distinction between 24,000 regular troops and 50,000 militiamen. The former were on the books and paid, and referred to as “duftur” (i.e. *daftar*), or ‘registered’ troops.²⁶⁶ The latter were called “eeljaree” (i.e. *iljārī*), literally ‘summons of the tribe’, and received no pay, even when called upon to serve.

Among the regular troops, there were 20,000 cavalry and 4,000 foot soldiers with 41 cannons. The cavalry had few firearms and usually fought with swords and lances. The foot soldiers, actually mounted infantry, were armed with matchlocks and called “khusa burdar” (i.e. *khāṣṣa-bardār*).²⁶⁷

Burnes meticulously notes the various ethnic and tribal groups that made up the registered army. Taken together, the identifiable Uzbek tribal groups supplied roughly two-thirds of the regular cavalry, with individual contingents ranging from 300, supplied by the Qaṭaghān, up to 2,000 provided by the Mīng and by the

²⁶³ Muḥammad Ya‘qūb, *Risāla*, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, C-1934, f. 21r; *Zafarnāma*, 78–79. According to Muḥammad Ya‘qūb, several commanders of the defence were killed in the ensuing fighting on the capital's main street, and at least 70 prominent men were executed after the takeover. Compared with this testimony, the account of Shams Bukhārī (*Bayān*, ed. Grigor'ev, 62, tr. 27), written down in 1274/1859, seems exaggerated when it states that each and every soldier (*sipāhī*) of the city forces – altogether 7–8,000 men – was killed.

²⁶⁴ Bregel, “Bukhara,” 195.

²⁶⁵ On him, see Poujol, “Desmaisons,” *EIr*, 7:331.

²⁶⁶ Burnes, *Travels*, 2:372. Low-ranking soldiers received eight measures (each equal to 256 lbs – a total of 928 kg) of grain a year. Chiefs were assigned land.

²⁶⁷ Burnes, *Travels*, 2:371–73.

Yābū.²⁶⁸ Further contingents were provided by groups whose relation to the Uzbeks in nineteenth-century Bukhara cannot be fully established, such as “Kalmyks,” Turkmen, Arabs,²⁶⁹ Qaraqalpaq, and Hazāra, who each contributed a contingent ranging from 300 to 1,000.

A decidedly non-Uzbek contingent of ‘regular cavalry’ were 2,000 “Persians,” subdivided into Marwī and Zūrābādī.²⁷⁰ In addition, there were 2,000 regular cavalrymen called *shāgird-pīsha*, who were drawn from “mixed tribes of Bokhara” and were directly attached to the Emir. The mounted infantry, called *khāṣṣa-bardār*, was entirely composed of Tajiks, while the artillery was manned and commanded by Russian slaves.²⁷¹

The tribal militia (*īljārī*) of 50,000, who were hardly ever mobilised, included 10,000 men from Balkh, and could, if necessary, be increased with Turkmen militia.

Desmairs heard of 19,000 hired soldiers (sing. *naemnyi soldat*), all cavalry and mostly Uzbeks. They were armed with lances or matchlock muskets (*fītil’nye ruzh’ye*). Some had armour consisting of a coat of mail, and very rarely an iron helmet or a small shield. The Uzbeks at that time no longer used bows and arrows.

As Desmairs saw it, the paid troops consisted of provincial – not primarily tribal – contingents. Bukhara supplied by far the largest contingent, namely 12,000 men, Samarqand and Qarshī provided 2,500 each, and Qarākūl and Maymana 1,000 each, while 3,000 to 4,000 “troops maintained by some Uzbek chiefs, but belonging to the crown” added to the regular army.²⁷² Two-thirds of the salaried soldiery served as sentries in border fortifications and towns.²⁷³ Hence, in a campaign against Shahr-i Sabz, the Bukharan ruler could hardly mobilise more than 5,000 regular troops. Common soldiers, called “alman” (i.e. *alamān*), received the equivalent of 150 roubles [c. 7–8 *tillā*] a year either in cash or in kind (wheat, millet, straw) to live on and to use as provisions during campaigns. At the annual review, each soldier received in addition 10 *tanga* (c. 8 roubles, or half a Bukharan gold coin),²⁷⁴ clothes and a turban. Bukharan soldiers at that time rarely kept their own

²⁶⁸ Ibid., 2:374. The table usually adds the names of the districts from which the various contingents were drawn, as well as the names of their military chiefs. Surprisingly, the Manghits are not mentioned among the 17 Uzbek tribes that provided regular military contingents.

²⁶⁹ Turkmen and Arab volunteers in the Bukharan army had already been noted in the 1770s (see above, Chapter 4).

²⁷⁰ Zūrābād (today Zirotod) is a settlement close to the city of Bukhara, populated by *Irānīs*.

²⁷¹ Burnes, *Travels*, 2:373–75.

²⁷² *Voška, soderzhashchiesya nekotorymi uzbekskimi vel’mozhami, no prinadlezhashchimi korone* (Demezov, *Zapiski*, 71). Desmairs treats these tribal contingents as salaried soldiery.

²⁷³ The province of Bukhara kept its own forces in Jizzāq, Bālā-Qurghān, Nūratā, etc., the provincial troops of Qarshī in Khwāja Jūybār, Karkī etc., and those of Qarākūl in Chārjūy, etc.

²⁷⁴ The exchange rate of 10 *tanga* to 8 roubles shows that Desmairs calculated in rouble notes. Around 1820, a Bukharan *tillā* (equal to 21 silver *tanga*) was exchanged for 16 paper roubles (Meyendorff, *Voyage*, 212). The silver rouble was of higher value; usually, four silver roubles bought a Bukharan *tillā*.

horses, as it was expensive to maintain them, especially in towns and cities.²⁷⁵ Instead, the soldiers were given horses to use on specific campaigns.

As for irregular forces, Desmaisons mentions 18,000 militiamen of the nomadic Turkmen tribes who lived along the river Amu Darya and recognised the supremacy of Bukhara. They were expected to respond to the Emir's call when there was a general call-up, and served with their own weapons and provisions. Almost all the Turkmen had their own horse, but they had far fewer muskets than the Uzbeks. In fact, only 5,000 Turkmen militiamen joined the above-mentioned campaign against Shahr-i Sabz, and they quit after three weeks due to lack of provisions.²⁷⁶

Alexander Burnes and Pierre Desmaisons characterise the Uzbek way of combat in similar ways. Describing the performance of Uzbek cavalry in the regular Bukharan army, Burnes comments: "Their manner of fighting wants spirit and courage; they vociferate loudly, and the fate of the advanced guard decides the contest. They are a superior description of irregular cavalry, but poor soldiers."²⁷⁷ Desmaisons notes that "the Uzbek troops fight undisciplined." "It is, of course, easy," he adds, "to summon to the army people who live in the steppe, where perhaps they acknowledge the authority of their chief, but it is not that easy to bring them under military order and force them to march." As the army moved without supplies, the soldiers went home as soon they had used up their provisions; Bukharan army campaigns rarely lasted longer than a month, and "resembled hasty tours in enemy territory."²⁷⁸

New Military Formations

European observers were generally predisposed to perceive Bukharan warfare through the lens of a radically different approach to military organisation and warfare that had emerged in Europe, including Russia, since the seventeenth century: foot soldiers, trained in endless drills, were organised in military units that moved and acted as one body on the battlefield.²⁷⁹

Around 1800, in the wake of the Napoleonic conquest of Egypt, the Western model started to spread rapidly in the East. New infantry corps, equipped and regularly trained in European style, were established in the Ottoman Empire and Iran in an attempt to keep up with advanced Western military technology and strategy. In Iran in 1807, the French general Gardane was engaged to train the new order (*nizām-i jadīd*) forces, a corps of infantry.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁵ In the Bukharan capital, where increasing numbers of cavalymen were living, in spring 1813, fodder (fresh clover) for a horse cost half a *tanga* a day ('Izzatallāh, *Ma'āsīr*, ms. London, BL, Or. 2009, f. 75v), or one gold coin for 40 days. On Uzbek *spāhīs* in the capital, see Sukhareva, *Bukhara*, 132–33, 146–47.

²⁷⁶ Demezson, *Zapiski*, 71–73.

²⁷⁷ Burnes, *Travels*, 2:372.

²⁷⁸ McNeill, "The Age of Gunpowder Empires," 115–18.

²⁷⁹ Demezson, *Zapiski*, 72.

²⁸⁰ Martin, *The Qajar Pact*, 134.

The new infantry forces came to be known as *sarbāz*, ‘those risking the head’. They were drilled to fight in the European style: to move and fight in close formation, to fire in a disciplined way, to obey without question, and to die if necessary. Through military advisors and soldiers of fortune, the new type of infantry eventually found its way from Iran to Bukhara. Amīr Naṣrallāh created a new infantry corps on the advice of the Persian ‘Abd al-Ṣamad Tabrīzī, who had previously served in Qājār Iran, in British India and in Afghanistan before he came to Bukhara in around 1835–37.²⁸¹ As an artillery expert, military advisor and commander-in-chief of the new formation army, he gained great influence at the Bukharan court, until he was arrested in 1845.²⁸² For a while, a certain ‘Ulu-bek *toksaba*’ of unknown origin held the command, before it was taken over by another military expert from Qājār Iran, Shāhrukh Khān, a former governor of Astarābād, who was still in charge of the Bukharan *sarbāz* in 1859.²⁸³

The new infantry corps was made up for the most part of Persian captives, as well as some Russian captives. Bukharans also joined the ranks of the *sarbāz* as volunteers.²⁸⁴ The *sarbāz* regiments were accoutred, uniformed, trained and garrisoned in a novel European style. The infantry troops, who reached the battlefield in carts, were armed with a flintlock rifle with bayonet,²⁸⁵ a sabre and two pistols each. They wore red jackets, white pantaloons and Persian caps. The *sarbāz* artillerymen wore different uniforms. The new formation troops were garrisoned (with their families) beyond the Bukhara city walls, in a new suburb called Sarbāzkhāna (‘garrison’), where some 800 houses were built around a central square.²⁸⁶ The *sarbāz* infantry and artillery were regularly drilled in the ‘Garden of the *nāyib*’ (see Fig. 7).

In 1841–42, the Russian envoy Nikolaï Khanykov noted that the new “regular infantry” consisted of 1,000 men armed with flintlocks.²⁸⁷ In 1260/1844, according to the Persian envoy ‘Abbās-Qulī Khān, the new regiments numbered 1,000 *sarbāz* and 200 artillerymen (sing. *tūpchī*).²⁸⁸

²⁸¹ Khanykov, *Opisanie*, 231–32; *Safarnāma*, 66; Troitskaya, “Voennoe delo,” 212 (this article is based on accounts of former Russian slaves gathered in 1859). Wolff (*A Mission*, 4th ed., 234, 245–46).

²⁸² Troitskaya, “Voennoe delo,” 217. A lithographic plate published in the second edition of Wolff’s travelogue (*A Mission*, 1845) depicts ‘Abd al-Ṣamad at the Bukharan court.

²⁸³ Galkin, “O voennykh silakh,” 235.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 216, 238.

²⁸⁵ Equipping the new units with flintlocks – literally ‘muskets with locks’, (*ruzbeĭ s zamkami*) – proved difficult, as not enough could be collected in Bukhara to arm to whole unit. It took a year to produce the required number of flintlocks under the supervision of foreign gunsmiths in Bukhara (Troitskaya, “Voennoe delo,” 213).

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 213.

²⁸⁷ Literally ‘firearms with cocks’ (*ognestrel’noe oruzhie s kurkami*). Apart from the infantry, only a few Uzbek *grandees* possessed these flintlocks (Khanykov, *Opisanie*, 181).

²⁸⁸ *Safarnāma*, 66. The author of this work has been identified by Nik Nafs, *Zentralasien*, 90–92. See also Noelle-Karimi, “Qājār Envoys,” 439–42.

The old-style regular Bukharan army, whose common soldiers were now called *alamāns*,²⁸⁹ fought with somewhat outdated weapons and armoury, such as matchlocks supported on rests, helmets, collars and shields.²⁹⁰ The Emir's governors provided these soldiers with horses and equipment.²⁹¹ In 1844, the Persian envoy estimated the "salaried army" (*qushūn-i mawājib*) at 20,000 men, including the 1,200 *sarbāz* and new formation artilleryists.²⁹² In addition, there were 2,400 men in provincial contingents from Shahr-i Sabz (600 men), Shibarghān, Balkh, Maymana, Andkhūy, Sar-i Pūl and Dihnav [a town in Ḥiṣār]. These distant provinces, the envoy remarked, "sometimes send them and sometimes not."²⁹³

The new-style regiments were successfully deployed in 1840–42 in wars against the Khanate of Kokand.²⁹⁴ The cannonades fired by 300 *sarbāz* were decisive in capturing Pashāghar, an advance post of Kokand near Jizzāq, in 1840.²⁹⁵ There, the *sarbāz* operated together with Uzbek and non-Uzbek detachments. The latter were under the command of Muḥammad Sharīf *tūpchī-bāshī*, and included *khāṣṣa-bardār*, Afghan, Īrānī and Zūrābādī (-Īrānī) units.²⁹⁶ Subsequently, the number of the *sarbāz* troops was increased,²⁹⁷ and the new regiments were decisive in the capture of a number of fortresses on the Kokand border by spreading terror among the enemy. "In those regions," the Iranian envoy noted, "they have never seen cannons, new formation infantry (*sarbāz-khāna*) and the storming of fortresses (*qal'a-gīrī*), and their hearts were filled with fear."²⁹⁸

²⁸⁹ Khanykov, *Opisanie*, 184–85; *Safarnāma*, 71.

²⁹⁰ Khanykov, *Opisanie*, 181, 184–85.

²⁹¹ Twice a year, the payrolls were updated: names of deceased soldiers were slashed and applicants enlisted for the vacancies. At these times, soldiers also reported lost horses and weapons to their commanders. Up to 40,000 men could be mobilised in time of war, a third of them fully equipped, the rest very badly armed or without any weapons (Khanykov, *Opisanie*, 180–1). In September 1841, a member of the Khanykov mission was invited to inspect 5,000 auxiliaries from Ḥiṣār who had joined in a campaign against Kokand. He actually saw far fewer men, armed with long lances, sabres and some matchlock muskets (Lehmann, *Reise*, 164).

²⁹² Thus, the number of the 'old-fashioned' salaried troops seems to have remained relatively stable in the decade from 1834 to 1844.

²⁹³ *Safarnāma*, 66.

²⁹⁴ Sāmī (*Tuhfa*, 135) relates that 'Abd al-Ṣamad's troops had participated in an earlier campaign against Shahr-i Sabz. As they were unable to force the town to surrender within a month, the siege was lifted.

²⁹⁵ Khanykov, *Opisanie*, 234.

²⁹⁶ Most troops (12,000 men) were from Samarqand and neighbouring regions, and their commanders (see *Zafarnāma*, 120–25) were, as far as we can identify them, Uzbek *amīrs*. In pushing forward the entrenchments towards the fort's moat, the *sarbāz* closely cooperated with the mounted infantry (*jamā'at-i khāṣṣa-bardār*) (*Zafarnāma*, 125). Khanykov (*Opisanie*, 234) erroneously claims that the *sarbāz* were attached to an army otherwise wholly made up of Uzbeks, and underlines that they were jealous of the *sarbāz*' success. Ḥakīm Khān (*Muntakhab al-tawārikh*, 2:530) reports that the Uzbeks applauded the *sarbāz* and artillery.

²⁹⁷ Troitskaya, "Voennoe delo," 212.

²⁹⁸ *Safarnāma*, 66.

In autumn 1841, 1,000 *sarbāz* with eleven cannons and two mortars participated in the capture of Zamīn and Khujand.²⁹⁹ In April 1842, when they stormed the enemy's capital, Kokand, the new formation regiments achieved their most outstanding success.³⁰⁰ After a few months, however, a popular uprising drove them out of Kokand, and the battlefield reverted to the contested frontier between the two realms. Responding to the challenge of military innovations in Bukhara, the Khanate of Kokand started to build up its own new formation infantry.

Despite their initial successes in dozens of campaigns, the Bukharan *sarbāz* forces could also not establish firm control over Shahr-i Sabz, the stronghold of the chiefs of the Uzbek tribe of Kanīgās in the hilly area south of Samarqand. The four major towns of Shahr-i Sabz were surrounded by a single defence wall and moat. Flooding the deployment area in front of the wall as a defensive measure to prevent artillery from moving up close, and cutting off the defenders' water supply became important elements in siege warfare.³⁰¹ Even when, as in 1849 and 1855, the Bukharan army was able to storm the defence fortifications, it could not maintain control over the area in the long term.³⁰²

Discipline and efficiency in using firearms and in fortress warfare characterised the new regiments. In campaigns, they usually served to protect the artillery but they also undertook assaults.³⁰³ Since they did not campaign independently, their movements were hampered by the general features of the Bukharan army. As it moved without supplies, campaigns lasted no longer than forty days, by which time the army personnel had used up their provisions and dispersed, saying "the campaign has grown old" (*safar pīr shud*). Attempts to take fortresses did not last longer than a few days either – at most seven – and were called off if the fortress continued to resist.³⁰⁴

Non-Uzbek 'Army People' (sipāhī)

Nikolaï Khanykov relates that Amīr Naṣrallāh established the *sarbāz* regiments despite the protests of the traditional military class, the "sipai" (i.e. *sipāhī*), whom he brutally massacred and forced to flee. In fact, the Russian envoy names only two officers who were executed: Muḥammad Ḥakīm *qūshbēgī* (in late 1837) and Ayāz

²⁹⁹ Along with 30,000 Uzbeks, according to Khanykov (*Opisanie*, 235).

³⁰⁰ *Safarnāma*, 67; *Zafarnāma*, 167–90.

³⁰¹ Troitskaya, "Voennoe delo," 217.

³⁰² Some time before 1266/1849–50, 5000 Bukharan soldiers (*nawkar*) were posted in the conquered territory (*Zafarnāma*, 229). After 1855, when the *sarbāz* reconquered Shahr-i Sabz (Troitskaya, "Voennoe delo," 216), the area remained under Bukharan domination till 1860 (Schiewek, "À propos," 190).

³⁰³ Troitskaya, "Voennoe delo," 216. In assaults, such as the storming of Kokand in 1842 and Shamatān (Shahr-i Sabz) in 1855, they lost nearly half of their men.

³⁰⁴ *Safarnāma*, 66.

biy tūpchī-bāshī (in spring 1840).³⁰⁵ At least the latter was of Iranian origin. Both were pillars of the palace forces, namely the commander-in-chief of the ruler's household forces, and his deputy, the commander of the artillery.³⁰⁶

By classifying these commanders as *sipāhī* – now rather ‘army personnel’ than ‘army people’ – Khanykov reveals a new understanding of the term. In the eighteenth century, especially the first half, the term had almost exclusively referred to Uzbeks,³⁰⁷ but in nineteenth-century usage it came to include non-Uzbek groups, too.³⁰⁸ Khanykov charts the new understanding of *sipāhī* in a sketch of Bukharan society, where he identifies three groups of social classes: The “first two estates” were made up of *sayyids* and *khojas*, i.e. saintly lineages. The second two were *urūghdār*,³⁰⁹ i.e. Uzbeks with tribal affiliations, and *shāgird-pīsha*,³¹⁰ i.e. people of humble origins. The third class consisted of clerics or mullahs. Each of the two classes in the second group, and the third class, were, in turn, divided into two sections, namely “the *sipai*, who serve and the *fukara*, who do not.”³¹¹ Uzbek tribal affiliation had clearly ceased to be a marker of military competence and prerequisite of service, and ‘army personnel’ could be recruited from non-Uzbek commoners, too.

As the army had turned into a multi-ethnic enterprise, the old concept of the military as an exclusively Uzbek domain was adjusted in line with the social reality. A large-scale shake-up of the elite under Amīr Naṣrallāh, who reportedly replaced commanders and officers (*sarkarda wa ‘amaldārān*) who had served his father with “people of mean descent,”³¹² may have accelerated the fading away of traditional social distinctions. And, the emergence of new military forces commanded by an Iranian newcomer may have further ironed out the distinction between Uzbek and non-Uzbek ‘army personnel’ (*sipāhī*).

Arminius Vámbéry, a Hungarian scholar who travelled to Bukhara in 1863 disguised as a dervish, confirms the new and comprehensive use of the term *sipāhī*. He learned that all the country's military and civil authorities were categorised into

³⁰⁵ Khanykov, *Opisanie*, 229–30. Mass killings of *sipāhīs* in the late 1830s or early 1840s are not confirmed elsewhere.

³⁰⁶ Their field of competence largely overlapped with that of ‘Abd al-Ṣamad Khān, the new rising star in the Bukharan military, whose intrigues caused the downfall of Muḥammad Ḥakīm *biy qūshbēgī* – his former patron. See Wolff, *A Mission*, 4th ed., 234–35; *Safarnāma*, 66.

³⁰⁷ Holzwarth, “Uzbek State,” 327–28, 334.

³⁰⁸ It is in this inclusive sense that Muḥammad Ya‘qūb (*Risāla*) and the anonymous author of the *Zafarnāma* use the term *sipāhī*.

³⁰⁹ Khanykov (*Opisanie*, 182) defines “Urug-Dar” as “all Uzbeks and especially, as its name ‘having a tribe’ shows, those whose ancestors have been constantly in the service of the Bukharan khans.”

³¹⁰ Khanykov defines “Shakyrd-Pishya” as “all Tajiks, all immigrant Persians, freed slaves, and in general people of lower estate” (ibid., 182).

³¹¹ Ibid., 182–83.

³¹² Shams Bukhārī, *Bayān*, ed. Grigor’ev, 67, tr. 31. Shams Bukhārī was personally affected, however, not as an Uzbek warrior but as a member of a *khoja* (*khwāja*) family that had served the Manghit rulers as scribes (ibid., Grigor’ev’s introduction, 3).

three groups: the great, the middle, and the lower *sipāhīs*, according to their position on the twelve-rung ladder of Bukharan state ranks. Vámbéry reports that the top groups were principally restricted to the Uzbek nobility, but were actually also accessible to non-Uzbek freedmen.³¹³ The Uzbeks still retained their self-image as the ruling and military class of Bukhara. “However,” Vámbéry adds, “the higher officers are only rarely chosen from among them.”³¹⁴

8. The Encounter with the Russian Army

At the time of the Russian conquest, as we have seen, European-style infantry regiments had been introduced in Bukhara. The *sarbāz* troops were drilled for a kind of warfare that would ultimately allow the strategist and commander-in-chief to move the various military units around the battlefield like pawns on a chessboard. Meanwhile, the bulk of the army remained unaffected by these military reforms.

Towards the end of Amīr Naṣrallāh’s rule, in 1858–59, the *sarbāz* infantry was estimated at 2,500 men, and the Bukharan cavalry at 40,000 men.³¹⁵ The infantry was garrisoned on the outskirts of the capital, and commanded by the Persian immigrant Shāhrukh Khān. He organised daily drills in handling rifles and marching. The artillerists were similarly garrisoned and trained. The artillery park consisted of 80 cannon. Provincial governors – Russian sources refer to them as “bek” – supplied cavalry contingents, organised in units of 500, partly armed with lances and sabres, and partly with matchlock muskets supported by fork-rests.³¹⁶

In 1863, Vámbéry learned that the Bukharan army totalled 40,000, at the utmost 60,000, mostly provincial contingents from Qarshī and Bukhara. He doubted the high numbers, as only 30,000 men had participated in a campaign against Kokand, and the Emir had to hire additional troops at great expense.³¹⁷

Amīr Muẓaffar (r. 1860–85) is said to have increased the number of *sarbāz* forces in the first years of his rule.³¹⁸ Thus, on the eve of Russia’s military advance into Central Asia, the Bukharan rulers had built up a growing core of a European-type standing army, while old-style salaried provincial troops continued to play a significant role in the overall military strength. The latter were still largely made up

³¹³ “According to the rule, for the first two classes only Urukdar, i.e. people of family, should be taken, ... but since time immemorial also Persians, former slaves, have been honoured with that” (Vámbéry, *Reise*, 297).

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 293.

³¹⁵ Information provided by freed Russian slaves, returning from Bukhara in 1858–59, who had served in the Bukharan army, recorded by the Orenburg general staff (Galkin, “O voennykh silakh,” 212, 228).

³¹⁶ In one case, 350 men were armed with lances and 150 with muskets (*ibid.*, 228–29).

³¹⁷ Vámbéry, *Reise*, 299.

³¹⁸ Arandarenko (“Bukharskie voiska,” 346) reports that the number of infantry (i.e. *sarbāz*) rose to 6,000 between 1860 and 1865. A Russian document of 1868 reports an increase of *sarbāz* forces from 1,500 in mid-1866 to 6,000 in 1868 (Bababekov, *Istochnikovedenie*, 175).

of Uzbeks, though on the command level non-Uzbeks had come to play an important role. The various structural components of the army had effectively cooperated in dozens of campaigns since 1840. How did they cope with the challenge of a European enemy? A closer look at the very first military encounter between the Russian and the Bukharan armies, namely the battle of Irjar on the banks of the Syr Darya, may serve as a case.

The First Bukharan–Russian Battle

In May 1866, a large Bukharan army composed of *sarbāz* forces, mounted infantry, provincial contingents and auxiliaries challenged a small Russian detachment on the left bank of the Syr Darya and was utterly defeated.³¹⁹ The most detailed account of the battle is provided by the Russian general Romanovskii,³²⁰ who describes the Bukharan forces as follows:

This army consisted of *sarbazes*, mounted infantry,³²¹ artillery and contingents gathered by the governors (*beks*) of Samarkand, Ura-Tyube and other [provinces], and of Kazakhs (*kirgizy*) who nomadise in Bukharan territory. The *sarbazes* and the [mounted] infantry, all very correctly armed, numbered around 5,000, the artillery 21 cannons (among them several battery ordnance larger than ours). As for the contingents and the Kazakhs, they were not fewer than 35,000.³²²

The Russian commander, in contrast to Central Asian reports (see below), depicts the Bukharan army as offering fierce resistance. In the following, I shall present a condensed version of Romanovskii's report, paying special attention to the actions of the Bukharan cavalry with a view to tracing its performance in the battle. Relevant terms and phrases of Romanovskii's account will be quoted verbatim.

The Bukharan cavalry (*konnitsa*), according to Romanovskii, first attacked in the morning, when the Russian troops moved to a place *c.* 20 *verst* from the Emir's camp. At noon, the general reports, "masses of mounted enemies" attacked, whereupon the Russians opened artillery fire, which they did not stop till the end of the battle. In the afternoon, "masses of Bukharan horsemen" commanded by the governor ("bek") of Samarqand (i.e. Shēr 'Alī *ināq*) – the Bukharan advance guard – pushed against the Russians. The Russian troops moved on and reached a place near the Bukharan camp, where they came under heavy artillery fire. The shelling was fast and sustained for an hour but, as the Bukharan artillerists had not properly calculated the distance, they did not cause any damage. Meanwhile, Russian artillery and gun fire did not stop the attacks of "Bukharan horsemen." When these assaults abated, the Russian infantry stormed the Bukharan entrenchments and artil-

³¹⁹ Bokiev (*Zavoevanie*, 65–71) provides a condensed account of these events.

³²⁰ General Romanovskii's report from camp Irdzar (Irjar) dated 11 May 1866 (23 May 1866 of the Gregorian calendar), in Serebrennikov, *Sbornik materialov*, 21/1:215–23; cf. Terent'ev, *Istoriya zavoevanniya* 1:344.

³²¹ The Russian term is *konnnye strel'ky*, literally 'mounted marksmen'.

³²² Serebrennikov, *Sbornik materialov*, 21/1:216.

lery positions, and the Russian cavalry threw back “the fresh masses of horsemen and foot-soldiers that began to gather before them.” But now the Bukharan troops fled in complete disorder, pursued by Cossacks. In just one cavalry battle, the Bukharans suffered more than a thousand casualties.³²³

The fact that a small Russian detachment defeated the great Bukharan army profoundly shocked the Central Asian public. Central Asian accounts of the battle differ markedly from Romanovskii’s report, as they downplay the commitment of the Bukharan forces and bring to the fore the shameful retreat from the battlefield. Central Asian authors and observers tend to focus on the question “Who is to blame for the humiliating flight?” and to utilise the description of the battle to expose general weaknesses in pre-colonial Bukharan society.³²⁴

A Kokandian author puts the blame on the Manghits’ lack of military capability. The Bukharan Emir, he relates, stayed in his camp and ordered ‘Alī-Yār (Allāh-Yār) *bēk* Manghit, Ya‘qūb *biy ghulām*, Shēr ‘Alī *ghulām* and other commanders to march the army against the Russians. The Bukharan army moved to the battlefield, and “arranged the cannons and muskets (*tūp u tufang*) in front of the lines awaiting the infidels like the wall of Alexander.” But when the Russians attacked and fired, the Manghits fled stricken by fear and panic.³²⁵ Having observed the scene through field-glasses, the Emir also fled and left his beaten army on the battlefield.

Bukharan historiographers such as Aḥmad Dānish and ‘Abd al-‘Azīm Sāmī mainly blame the madrasa students and mullahs for calling for a *jihād* and *ghazā* against the Christians without considering the Russians’ military strength.³²⁶ Dānish further extends his criticisms to include general deficits in the Bukharan military, including the employment of freedmen in command positions. Sāmī, on the other hand, tries to explain the disaster as being caused by the inexperience and hot-bloodedness of Uzbek warriors and the enemy’s unexpected numerical strength. At first, Sāmī narrates, (only) 2,000 Russians confronted the 30,000 men of the Bukharan army. The Uzbeks (*mardum-i uzbekiyya*), who had no previous experience of European enemies, immediately approached their lines and “attacked

³²³ Ibid., 21/1:218–21 (paraphrased).

³²⁴ The impact of the clash with the Russian superpower on the rise of social criticism and reformist programmes in Central Asia has been widely discussed, and will not be treated here. On intellectual debates in Russian dominated Bukhara, see Wennberg, *On the Edge*.

³²⁵ ‘Iwāz Muḥammad, *Tārīkh*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 9455, f. 332v. For many years, ‘Iwāz Muḥammad says, “the Manghits had not seen war. By soft manners, they have turned power into easy living (*muft-khwāra*). Neither they, nor their fathers, nor their grandfathers had seen heavy fighting.”

³²⁶ Dānish, *Risāla*, 43–50 (written around 1895–97); Sāmī, *Tuḥfa*, 182–88 (written in 1317–19/1899–1901). Dānish mentions a whole range of other causes that led to the defeat, among them the inauspicious role played by commanders of slave origin, and deficiencies in logistics and military organisation. Gross (“Historical Memory”) has shown the impact of the Russian-Bukharan war on Sāmī’s later historiographical work, where he asks the reader to forgive him for not presenting details of this shameful event (see Sāmī, *Tārīkh*, 62).

and shot with their muskets,³²⁷ whereupon the enemy stood fast and fired cannons on the hot-tempered attackers. When the Russian rear-guard – “no less than thirty thousand” [!] – arrived, the mullahs started to flee. The army commander ‘Abd al-Karīm *biy dīwānbēgī* retreated to the camp and advised the Emir to flee. Though the vizier Muḥammad Shukūr *biy ināq* promised to stay, the *dīwānbēgī* fled, and “all the ‘tribal’ and ‘non-tribal’ soldiers followed.”³²⁸ The disloyalty of his army forced the Emir to flee himself.³²⁹

When ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, an Uzbek of the tribe of Yūz, who had himself participated in the battle as a Bukharan *nawkar*, reported these events to a Russian writer, he referred to jealousies between chiefs of Uzbek and Iranian origin. The Emir had conferred the high command of his army on Allāh-Yār *dīwānbēgī* Manghit, the governor (*bek*) of Ūra-Tippa. Below him, Shēr ‘Alī *ināq*, Ya‘qūb *ināq* and Shukūr *ināq*, led the troops. They were Iranians, descendants of slaves, and very unpopular among the Uzbek chiefs under them. Even the Manghit officers Toqtamish *bek* and Fāzil *dādkhwāb* expressed their resentment at the high positions held by these men, whom they still considered as slaves. They decided to retreat without fighting when the Russian army appeared, and so they did. Only the hated army of the slave-commanders and inexperienced Bukharan troops remained. The Emir fled when he learned that the best part of his army was gone.³³⁰

By focusing on the possible reasons for the Bukharan army’s flight from the battlefield, all the various Central Asian accounts reviewed above seem to implicitly dismiss the traditional Central Asian method of warfare and to endorse the European concept of battle strategy.

A Failed Military Modernisation Project?

Though the Central Asian accounts of the Bukharan army’s defeat at Irjar vary, they consistently point to premature flight and desertion as the army’s particular weakness and flaw. This comes as a surprise, as earlier descriptions of Central Asian warfare had repeatedly pointed to a characteristic tendency engage in skirmishes and to stop fighting and retreat from the battlefield after suffering a few casualties (by European standards).³³¹ The tactics of hit-and-run, or “hit twice and turn around,”³³² had been the strength of raiding parties, and also a feature of Bukharan warfare.

³²⁷ Sāmī, *Tuhfa*, 185.

³²⁸ *Nawkarīyya-i ilāt wa sipāh-i khāk*. *Sipāh-i khāk*, ‘army of the soil’, may denote non-tribal provincial contingents. When the Emir had set out for war, *mujāhidīn* “from each province (*wilāyat*) and tribe (*īl wa ulūs*)” had joined him. (Sāmī, *Tuhfa*, 184).

³²⁹ Sāmī, *Tuhfa*, 183–87.

³³⁰ Lykoshin, “Irdzharskoe srazhenie.”

³³¹ As mentioned above (Chapter 3, note 80; Chapter 6, section “Warfare”), Bukharan armies relying on Uzbek forces usually stopped fighting after taking a few casualties.

³³² “Ikki deng ütschde döng’, d.h. versuche zweimal, aber kehr das dritte mal um” (Vámbéry, *Reisen*, 255).

The Emir had chosen to confront the Russian troops in a pitched battle, relying on his ‘new formation’ corps, and the new battle strategy associated with them.

The Bukharan strategists, or at least their contemporary Central Asian chroniclers, seem to have expected the old-style cavalry troops to act in much the same way as the *sarbāz* units, even though these provincial and tribal forces had not undergone the same training, but had learned their craft by participating in equestrian contests, raids and skirmishes. The appointment of confidants of Iranian slave origin to middle-ranking positions was obviously aimed at building a rigid chain of command that would overcome the structural indiscipline of the old-style cavalry troops, and make it possible to move them around the battlefield in liaison with the new forces. Initially, this plan worked well, as is shown by the case of Shēr ‘Alī *ināq*, the “slave” governor of Samarqand, commanding the “masses of Bukharan horsemen” in the Bukharan advance guard, but it failed when, upon suffering heavy casualties and in a desperate situation, the cavalry retreated.

The idea of confronting Russian troops in pitched battles runs through all the military operations of the Bukharan army in 1866–68.³³³ During these years, the only example of prolonged and rather successful guerrilla warfare is that of a Qazaq war party led by Şiddīq, the son of Kenesary (Kīnasarī *tūra*). They operated on the fringes of the Qızıl-Qūm, and repeatedly attacked the Russian lines of communication. Using similar tactics, Uzbek tribal guerrillas had expelled the Mughal army from Balkh in the mid-seventeenth century. Perhaps the Bukharan army had simply become too modern to make use of the military advantages of tribal warfare in the age of the Russian conquest. Yet, within a more confined geographical context, the *sarbāz* regiments became quite an important military tool in the conquest and subjugation of eastern regions of Bukhara after 1868.

9. Conclusion

The military history of the Khanate/Emirate of Bukhara in the period under review reflects an almost continuous struggle on the part of the rulers to emancipate themselves from the original mainstay of their power, the Uzbeks, who – as descendants of former conquerors – claimed a share of power and agricultural wealth. In coping with the legacy of a nomadic conquest, the Bukharan rulers tried to gradually expand alternative and independent sources of power, which were allegedly more reliable, more efficient and less costly.

Traditionally, the rulers had two basic options in this struggle. The first, to employ non-Uzbek tribal auxiliaries, was widely implemented in the late seventeenth century. It could hardly have reduced army costs, as “all the villages” were still assigned to Uzbek ‘army people’ and the ruler’s treasury was practically empty. The second option was to employ a slave guard, through which rulers tried to

³³³ On these events, see Malikov, “Russian Conquest,” and Morrison, *Samarkand*, 21–23.

secure their hold on the capital city and some outposts, and counter the power of the Uzbek chiefs. The first option involved the temporary large-scale mobilisation of low-tech military, i.e. mounted archers. The second was a small-scale but high-tech enterprise, as the slave guard was specialised in firearms, including artillery. The strength of the rulers' guard was subjected to the jealous vigilance of Uzbek chiefs. It may be an old Chinggisid tradition or considerations of costs that led to these guards hardly ever numbering more than 500 men.

In the early eighteenth century, the conflict over the distribution of the Khanate's wealth and resources between the ruler and the Uzbek 'army people' escalated, as Uzbek chiefs charged the ruler large advance payments in gold to mobilise their tribal forces for him,³³⁴ and the ruler's slave guard had to hold a customs duty outpost in order to safeguard state revenues. At that same time, an unpleasant experience with Qazaq auxiliaries who were ostensibly fighting for a Samarqand rebel faction but were actually pursuing their own agenda, highlighted the limitations and risks brought about by the employment of non-Uzbek auxiliaries.

The rulers' limited set of military options was extended in the mid-eighteenth century, when the Nādirid army stood as a new model of military organisation: a specialised multi-ethnic paid soldiery,³³⁵ instead of an armed people, tribal auxiliaries, and slave guards. The early Manghit rulers tried to copy this model and, by the 1770s, the copy resembled the original quite closely. In these years, the Bukharan army was apparently reduced to a rather small body of soldiers (*nawkar*), and the common soldiers became dissociated from the land.

In late eighteenth century, a new turn in Bukharan military history brought armed Uzbeks back into the Bukharan army with the undertaking of large-scale Islamic border raids into Shiite Iran. These wars for booty and honour attracted large numbers of 'champions of faith' (*ghāzī*) to the ruler's camp. At first, they were merely freelance warriors fighting for spoils, but attempts were subsequently made to transform and routinise their military status by registering them for permanent provisioning. When the raids into Iran abated, the *ghāzīs* vanished from the payrolls, while another group – or perhaps the same kind of group but with a name that had fewer religious connotations – appeared, which had previously also been noted as participants in raiding parties and tribal levies, namely the *alamān*. With the integration of freelance fighters – under whatever name – into the payrolls, the army grew numerically – and costs increased. Rising costs, in turn, compelled the rulers to resort to raising extra taxes and taking out loans, and to reducing the soldiers' pay.

During the first three decades of the nineteenth century, the Bukharan army witnessed two parallel processes of change: first, the growing importance of slaves

³³⁴ We do not know whether cash payments before the campaign had been the practice in Bukhara before the eighteenth century.

³³⁵ By the time Nādir Shāh conquered Bukhara, his military machine was running smoothly, as it was powered by the silver treasure of the Mughals that had come into Nādir Shāh's hands with the conquest of Delhi.

and freedmen in command of provincial troops, which trigger the most serious Uzbek uprising in the nineteenth century, i.e. the Khiṭāy-Qıpchāq revolt in the 1820s, and, second, a decline in the periphery's share in the army as a whole and in the concomitant growth of armed forces reporting directly to the centre (palace). The creation of new infantry units can be seen as an extension of the latter. Both these trends contributed to moving the balance of power towards the centre.

The establishment of the infantry regiments aggravated the financial burden, as expensive flintlock muskets had to be procured, and the *sarbāz* were paid entirely in cash. A chronic shortage in the Bukharan state coffers forced the treasury to sell goods in the market in order to pay the salaries of civil and military personnel, and to finance military campaigns through loans and surtaxes (*ju'l*).³³⁶

By creating an independent military base strong enough to deal with tribal uprisings in their domains, the Bukharan rulers were able to withstand the most serious rebellion in the centre of their territory, but – despite extensive campaigning – they could not subdue the semi-independent Uzbek chiefdoms on the periphery, such as Shahr-i Sabz and Ūra-Tippa, under sustained Bukharan Manghit rule.

If they aimed at forming an army strong enough to deal with European armed forces, the Bukharan rulers utterly failed. On the eve of Russia's military advance into Central Asia, the Bukharan rulers had built up just a nucleus of a European-style standing army, while provincial troops, largely made up of Uzbeks, were still very much part of their overall military strength. Though only a small segment of the army had been trained to fight in a disciplined 'European' manner, the Bukharan army repeatedly – and to no avail – tried to confront the Russian conquerors in pitched battle. In their endeavour to modernise and Europeanise the army, the Bukharan strategists had obviously forgotten the advantages of guerrilla warfare.

The years of the Russian–Bukharan wars (1866–68) saw a sudden upsurge by Uzbek tribal forces, which emerged as a third actor in regional politics, beside the Bukharan centre and the Russian army. Within this context, Uzbek chiefs tried to reclaim their former power by changing alliances. When Amīr Muẓaffar capitulated and ceded Samarqand to the Russians, one of his sons rebelled in alliance with a number of Uzbek chiefs. For a short moment of history, when the chiefs of the Uzbek tribes of Kanīgās, Sarāy, Qungrāt and others proclaimed the rebel prince the legitimate ruler of Bukhara in Shahr-i Sabz, Uzbek tribal politics seemed to work as they had in the early eighteenth century. However, the peace treaty between the Emir and the Russians further limited the scope for independent manoeuvre by tribal forces. In 1869, Russian troops stormed the rebel stronghold, Shahr-i Sabz, and handed it over to the Emir, who had found ultimate support against Uzbek military power. Subsequently, he conquered other semi-independent territories in eastern Bukhara, which had hitherto been controlled by various Uzbek groups. The protracted contest for power between the Uzbeks and the Bukharan rulers was thus finally settled as they both came under Russian domination.

³³⁶ *Safarnāma*, 41, 64–65.

Appendix:
Structural Components of Bukharan Armed Forces

Year	Palace forces		Army		Auxiliaries
	Slaves	Volunteers	Regular, 'on the books'	Irregular	
1670–75	Muscovite military slaves (in Balkh)		100,000 'army people', cavalry		50,000 Qazaqs and Qarā-qalpāqs
1700–11		<i>Qalmāq</i> and Russian guard; 100 musketeers (<i>miltiqchī</i>); 300 artillery-men (<i>tūpchī</i>); Eunuchs, confidants and 'apprentice-servants' (<i>khwāja-sarāyān wa mahramān wa shāgird-pīshagān</i>)		'the army' (<i>sipāh</i>), Uzbeks	Qazaqs, Qarā-qalpaqs, and other forces of the Dasht-i Qipchāq
1722–25	500 Kalmyk and 180 Russian slaves in Bukhara and Chārjūy		90,000 Uzbek cavalry		20,000 Turkmens
1737	3,000 <i>Qalmāq</i> slaves, known as 'golden bridle' (<i>āltin jilaw</i>)				
1740–47			Uzbek soldiers (<i>nawkar</i>) in Nādir Shāh's multi-ethnic army		
1748		unit of 1,000 Afghans, Lazgī and Ot-tomans, firearms	12,000 horsemen, mostly Manghit		
1759		4,000 musketeers (<i>sipāhī-yi tufang</i>) serving under Qilich <i>tūpchī-bāshī</i>)			
1760		unit of 1,000 Afghan, <i>Qalmāq</i> and Uzbek horsemen			

Year	Palace forces		Army		Auxiliaries
	Slaves	Volunteers	Regular, 'on the books'	Irregular	
1761		(non-Uzbek) 'artillery apprentices' (<i>shāgird-pīsha-yi tūpkhāna</i>)			
1762			army (<i>sipāh</i>)	militia (<i>qarā-chīrīk</i>)	
1770		soldiers (<i>nawkar</i>): volunteer Turkmens and Arabs, infantry		Uzbek horsemen providing military service instead of tax	
1774–80		10,000 soldiers (<i>nawkar</i>) of various origin, cavalry			
1781	guard of 3,000 captives of various origin		40,000 salaried troops including the guard, mostly cavalry		
1795			60,000 cavalry		
1800–3		non-Uzbek guards in the provincial army (<i>shāgird-pīsha</i> , <i>khāṣṣa-bardār</i>)	soldiers (<i>nawkar</i>), with 'common warrior' (<i>qarā-alamān</i>) as lowest rank	militiamen (<i>qarā-chīrīk</i>)	
1805–6		<i>Qalmāq</i> slaves (<i>mahramiya-yi Qalmāq</i>), <i>khāṣṣa-bardār</i> , <i>shāgird-pīsha</i> and artillerymen (<i>bandagān-i tūpchī</i>) under the prime minister's command			
1813			army (<i>sipāh</i>) of 80–100,000, with soldiers (<i>nawkar</i>) and militia (<i>īljārī</i>)		
1820–1	Palace guard: 500 <i>khāṣṣa-bardār</i> , 220 <i>mabram</i> (slaves?)		25,000 permanent army (salaried men)	60,000 irregulars (‘feudal militia’)	

Year	Palace forces		Army		Auxiliaries
	Slaves	Volunteers	Regular, 'on the books'	Irregular	
1827	<i>Shāgird-pīsha</i> , including 400 slaves (<i>ghulām</i>), 200 <i>Qalmāqs</i> , 200 Afghans		40,000 in a single campaign for a short time		500 Turkmens; Qazaqs
1832	Russian slaves, artillerymen	4,000 <i>kbāssa-bardār</i> (Tajiks, mounted infantry), reckoned as unit of the regular army	20,000 regular cavalry (provincial and tribal contingents); two thirds Uzbeks, 2,000 "Persians", 2,000 <i>shāgird-pīsha</i> ("mixed tribes of Bokhara")	50,000 militiamen	
1833–34			19,000 'salaried soldiers' (mostly Uzbeks); 12,000 provincial contingents, 3–4,000 troops paid by Uzbek chiefs		18,000 militiamen (Turkmen)
1841–42	1,000 <i>sarbāz</i> , infantry, and 200 artillerymen (mostly Russian and Persian slaves)		40,000, only one third fully equipped		5,000 poorly armed auxiliaries from Hīṣār
1844	1,200 <i>sarbāz</i> , both infantry and artillerymen		'salaried army' of 20,000, including the <i>sarbāz</i>		2,400 auxiliaries from distant provinces
1858–59	2,500 <i>sarbāz</i> , infantry		40,000 cavalry; contingents provided by provincial governors		
1863			40–60,000, mostly provincial contingents from Bukhara and Qarshī		
1866	5,000 <i>sarbāz</i> and mounted infantry (<i>kbāssa-bardār</i>)		35,000 cavalry, Bukharan contingents and Qazaāq militia		

Sources by years:

- 1670–75 Pazuḵhin, *Nakaz*, 61; Burton, *Bukharans*, 297; Burton, “Russian slaves,” 361
 1700–11 Bukhārī, *‘Ubaydallāh-nāma*, ms. Tashkent, 1532, ff. 209r, 213v, 226r, 246v
 1722–25 Beneveni, *Poslannik*, 124–25
 1737 Marwī, *‘Ālam-ārā-yi Nādirī*, ed. Riyāhī, 595
 1740–47 Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhār*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 1936, f. 70v. Estimates range from 1,200 to 30,000, see note 113.
 1748 Karmīnagī, *Tuḥfa*, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, C-525, ff. 130r–131r; Muḥammad Sharīf, *Tāj*, ms. Tashkent, 9265, f. 280r
 1759 Karmīnagī, *Tuḥfa*, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, C-525, f. 328v
 1760 *Ibid.*, f. 333r
 1761 *Ibid.*, f. 341r
 1762 Karmīnagī, *Tuḥfa*, ms. Kazan, KFU, F-301, f. 269v
 1770 Falk, *Beyträge*, 3:497–98
 1774–80 Efremov, *Desyatiletnee stranstsvovanie*, 70
 1781 Zhukovskii, “Posol’stvo Bekchurina,” 297
 1795 Burnashev, “Puteshestvie,” 100
 1800–3 *Maktūbāt-i Amīr Haydar*, ms. Tashkent, IOS, 5412, passim
 1805–6 Şifatgul, *Pazhūhishī*, 490
 1813 ‘Izzatallāh, *Ma’āsīr*, ms. London, BL, Or. 2009, f. 63v.
 1820–21 Meyendorff, *Voyage*, 260, 267, 270–71
 1827 Muḥammad Ya‘qūb, *Risāla*, ms. St Petersburg, IOM RAS, C-1934, ff. 20v–21r.
 1832 Burnes, *Tavels*, 2:37–74
 1833–34 Demezov, *Zapiski*, 71
 1841–42 Khanykov, *Opisanie*, 181; Lehmann, *Reise*, 164
 1844 *Safarnāma*, 66
 1858–59 Galkin, “O voennykh silakh,” 212, 228
 1863 Vámbéry, *Reise*, 299
 1866 Serebrennikov, *Sbornik materialov*, 21/1:216

Abbreviations Used in this Paper

BL	British Library, London
BnF	Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris
BOD	Bodleian Library, Oxford
IOM RAS	Institute of Oriental Manuscripts, Russian Academy of Sciences, St Petersburg
IOS	Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan, Tashkent
KFU	Kazan Federal University, Lobachevsky Library

Bibliography

- Abduraimov, M.A. *Voprosy feodal'nogo zemlevladieniya i feodal'noi renty v pis'makh Ėmira Khaīdara*. Tashkent, 1961.
 Arandarenko, Georgii A. “Bukharskie voiska v 1880 g.” *Voennyi Sbornik* 24/9 (1881): 341–67.
 Arunova, M.R. and K.Z. Ashrafyan. *Gosudarstvo Nadir-shakha Afshara*. Moscow, 1958.

- Astarābādī, Mīrzā Mahdī Khān. *Tārīkh-i jabāngushā-yi nādīrī*. Edited by Sayyid ‘Abdallāh Anwār. Tehran, 1341 h.sh./1962. — Facsimile of an illustrated manuscript of 1171/1757. Edited by ‘Abd al-‘Alī Adīb Barūmand. Tehran, 1370 h.sh./1991.
- Axworthy, Michael. *Sword of Persia: Nader Shah, from Tribal Warrior to Conquering Tyrant*. London, 2006.
- Bababekov, Khaïdarbek N. et al. *Istochnikovedenie istorii Uzbekistana: Khrestomatiya*. Tashkent, 2005.
- Badī‘-Dīwān, Mīrzā. *Majma‘ al-arqām*. Facsimile, edited and translated by Aida B. Vil’danova. Moscow, 1981.
- Balkhī, Khwājām-Qulī Beg. *Tārīkh-i Qipchāq-khānī*. Ms. Oxford, Bodleian Library, Ouseley no. 185.
- Bekchurin, I. “Shahrisabzskoe vladenie po rasskazam Dzhura-beka i Baba-beka.” In *Materialy dlya statistiki Turkestarskogo kraya*, edited by N.A. Maev, 2:84–92. St Petersburg, 1873.
- Beneveni, Florio. *Poslannik Petra I na Vostoke: Posol’stvo Florio Beneveni v Persiyu i Bukharu v 1718–1725 godakh*, edited by N.A. Khalfin and V.G. Volovnikov. Moscow, 1986.
- Bergmann, Benjamin. *Schicksale des Persers Waßilij Michailow unter den Kalmüken, Kirgisen und Chiwensern*. Riga, 1804.
- Berndt, Ulrike. “Organisation eines Feldzugs nach einer mittelasiatischen Quelle.” In *Nomaden und Sesshafte. Fragen, Methoden, Ergebnisse*, edited by Thomas Herzog and Wolfgang Holzwarth, 2:77–91. Orientwissenschaftliche Hefte 15; Mitteilungen des SFB Differenz und Integration 4/2. Halle, 2004.
- Berndt, Ulrike. *Kampf um die Steppe: Weidegebiete als Basis politischer Macht im Mitteleasien des 16. Jhs.* PhD thesis. Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, 2008. <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:4-12207> (accessed 17 May 2014).
- Bokiev, O.B. *Zavoevanie i prisoedinenie severnogo Tadzhikistana, Pamira i Gornogo Badakhshana k Rossii*. Dushanbe, 1994.
- Bregel, Yuri. “Bukhara, Khanate of.” In *Encyclopedia of Asian History*, edited by Ainslie T. Embree, 1: 194–95. New York, 1988.
- . “Turko-Mongol Influences in Central Asia.” *Turko-Persia in Historical Perspective*, edited by Robert L. Canfield, 53–77. Cambridge, 1991.
- . “Mangīts.” In *EP²*, 6:418–19. Leiden; London, 1991.
- . “Central Asia. vii. In the 12th–13th/18th–19th Centuries.” In *EIR*, 5:193–205. Costa Mesa, Calif., 1992.
- . *The Administration of Bukhara under the Manghīts and some Tashkent Manuscripts*. Papers on Inner Asia 34. Bloomington, Ind., 2000.
- . *An Historical Atlas of Central Asia*. Handbook of Oriental Studies, sect. 8, vol. 9. Leiden, 2003.
- Budagov, Lazar Z. *Sravitel’nyĭ slovar’ turetsko-tatarskikh narechiĭ*. 2 vols. St Petersburg, 1869–71. (Repr. Moscow, 1960.)
- Bukhārī, ‘Abd al-Karīm. *Histoire de l’Asie Centrale: Afghanistan, Boukhara, Khiva, Khoqand depuis les dernières années du règne de Nadir Chah, 1153, jusqu’en 1233 de l’Hégire, 1740–1818 A.D.* [*Tārīkh-i laṭīf-i Afghān wa Kabūl wa Bukhārā wa Khīwa wa Khūqand*]. Edited and translated by Charles Schefer. Publications de l’École des langues orientales vivantes, série 1, 1–2. Paris, 1876. (Repr. Amsterdam, 1970.)

- Bukhārī, Mīr Muḥammad Amīn. *‘Ubaydallāh-nāma*. Ms. Tashkent, Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan, inv. no. 1532. — Translation by Aleksandr A. Semenov. *Ubaīdulla-name*. Tashkent, 1957.
- Burnashev, T.S. “Puteshestvie ot Sibirskoī linii do g. Bukhary v 1794g. i obratno v 1795g.” *Sibirskii Vestnik* 1/2–3 (1818): 37–110.
- Burnes, Alexander. *Travels into Bokhara: Being the Account of a Journey from India to Cabool, Tartary and Persia, ... Performed ... in the Years 1831, 1832, and 1833*. 3 vols. London, 1834. (Repr. New Delhi, 1992.)
- Burton, Audrey. “Who Were the Almān?” In *Konferenzakten ESCAS IV, Bamberg 8.–12. Oktober 1991*, edited by Ingeborg Baldauf and Michael Friederich, 257–61. Islamkundliche Untersuchungen 185. Berlin, 1994.
- . *The Bukharans: A Dynastic, Diplomatic and Commercial History, 1550–1702*. Richmond, Surrey, 1997.
- . “Russian Slaves in Seventeenth-Century Bukhara.” In *Post-Soviet Central Asia*, edited by Touraj Atabaki and John O’Kane, 345–65. London, 1998.
- Canfield, Robert L. “Introduction: The Turko-Persian Tradition.” In *Turko-Persia in Historical Perspective*, edited by Robert L. Canfield, 1–34. Cambridge, 1991.
- Castle, John. “Journal von der Anno 1736 aus Orenburg zu dem Abul Geier Chan der Kirgis-Caysack Tartarischen Horda vollbrachten Reise.” In *Materialien zu der Russischen Geschichte seit dem Tode Peters des Großen*, pt. 2, 1739–1741, appendix. Riga, 1784.
- Chardin, Jean. *Voyages Du Chevalier Chardin En Perse Et Autres Lieux De L’Orient*. 4 vols. Amsterdam, 1735.
- Chekhovich, Ol’ga D. *Dokumenty k istorii agrarnykh otnoshenii v bukharском khanstve*, vol. 1, *Akty feodal’noi sobstvennosti na zemlyu XVII–XIX vv.*, edited by O.D. Chekhovich and A.K. Arends. Tashkent, 1954.
- . “K istorii Uzbekistana v XVIII v.” *Trudy Instituta Vostokovedeniya* [Tashkent] 3 (1954): 43–82.
- . “O nekotorykh voprosakh istorii Srednei Azii XVIII–XIX vekov.” *Voprosy istorii* 3 (1956): 84–95.
- Dal’, Vladimir Ivanovich. *Tolkovyi slovar’ zhivogo velikorusskogo yazyka*. 4 vols. Moscow, 1956.
- Dānīsh, Aḥmad Makhdūm. *Risāla yā mukhtaṣarī az tāriḥ-i salṭanat-i khānadān-i Manghitiyya*. Edited by ‘Abd al-Ghanī Mīrzāyif. Stalinabad, 1960.
- Davidovich, E.A. *Istoriya monetnogo dela Srednei Azii XVII–XVIII vv. (Zoloty e serebryannye monety Dzhaniidov)*. Dushanbe, 1964.
- Demezov (Desmaisons), Petr. I. and Ivan V. Vitkevich. *Zapiski o Bukharskom khanstve (Otcheti P.I. Demezov i I.V. Vitkevicha)*. Edited by V.G. Volovnikov and N. A. Khalfin. Moscow, 1983.
- Di Cosmo, Nicola. “A Russian Envoy to Khiva: The Italian Diary of Florio Beneveni.” In *Proceedings of the XXVIII Permanent International Altaistic Conference (Vienna, 8–14 July, 1985)*, edited by Giovanni Stary, 73–114. Wiesbaden, 1989.
- Dickson, Martin B. “Uzbek Dynastic Theory in the Sixteenth Century.” In *Trudy XXV mezhdunarodnogo kongressa vostokovedov (Moskva 9–16 avgusta 1960)*, edited by B.G. Gafurov, I. S. Braginskii and A. A. Guber, 3:208–17. Moscow, 1963.
- Doerfer, Gerhard. *Türkische und mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen*, vol. 1, *Mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen*. Wiesbaden, 1963.

- Drouville, Gaspard. *Voyage en Perse, pendant les années 1812 et 1813, contenant des détails peu connus sur les mœurs, usages, coutumes et cérémonies religieuses des Persans; ainsi que sur leur état militaire*. 2 vols. St Petersburg, 1819. — *Voyage en Perse: Atlas ou Collection de 40 dessins lithographiés par A. Orlovski*. St Petersburg, 1820.
- Dzhuraeva, Galiba A. “Voprosy gosudarstvennosti v pis'makh Ėmira Khaǰdara.” *Obschestvennye nauki v Uzbekistane* 4 (2003): 72–77.
- Efremov, Filipp S. *Rossiiskogo unter'-ofitsera Efremova, ... desyatiletnee stranstvovanie i priklyucheniya v Bukharii, Khive, Persii i Indii, vozvrashchenie ottuda cherez Angliyu v Rossiyu, pisannoe im samim*. St Petersburg, 1786. — *Devyatiletnee stranstvovanie*. Edited by Ė. Murzaev. Moscow, 1952.
- Elgood, Robert. *Firearms of the Islamic World in the Tareq Rajab Museum, Kuwait*. London, 1995.
- Falk, Johann Peter. *Beyträge zur topographischen Kenntniß des Rußischen Reichs*. Edited by Johann Georgi. 3 vols. St Petersburg, 1785–86.
- Fayziev, Turg'un. *Buxoro feodal jamiyatida qullardan foydalanishga doir hujjatlar (XIX asr)*. Tashkent, 1990.
- Fitrat, A.R. “Tri dokumenta po agrarnomu voprosu v Srednej Azii.” *Zapiski Instituta Vostokovedeniya Akademii Nauk SSSR* 2 (1933): 69–87.
- Fletcher, J.K. “The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives.” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 46/1 (1986): 11–50.
- Floor, Willem. *Safavid Government Institutions*. Costa Mesa, Calif., 2001.
- Gahlin, Sven. *The Courts of India: Indian Miniatures from the Collection of the Fondation Custodia, Paris*. Zwolle, 1991.
- Galkin, Mikhail N. “O voennykh silah bukharskogo ėmira (1857–58 gg.).” In id., *Ėtnograficheskie i istoricheskie materialy po Srednej Azii i Orenburgskomu krayu*, 210–42. St Petersburg, 1869.
- Golden, Peter B. *Nomads and Sedentary Societies in Medieval Eurasia*. Essays on Global and Comparative History. Washington, DC, 1998.
- Gommans, Jos J. *Mughal Warfare: Indian Frontiers and High Roads to Empire, 1500–1700*. London, 2002.
- Grebenkin, A.D. “Uzbeki.” In *Russkii Turkestan: Sbornik izdannyi po povodu politechnicheskoi vystavki*, vol. 2, edited by Nikolai A. Maev and V.N. Trotskii, 51–109. Moscow, 1872.
- Grigor'ev, Nikolaĭ. [“Pokazanie Grigor'eva 1752g.”] In Vladimir V. Vel'yaminov-Zernov, *Istoricheskie izvestiya o kirgiz-kaisakakh i snosheniyakh Rossii s Sredneyu Aziyu so vremeni konchiny Abul-Khair-khana (1748–1765)*. Appendix: 8–32. Ufa, 1853.
- Gross, Jo-Ann. “Historical Memory, Cultural Identity, and Change: Mirza 'Abd al-'Aziz Sami's Representation of the Russian Conquest of Bukhara.” In *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700–1917*, edited by Daniel R. Brower and Edward Lazzarini, 203–26. Bloomington, Ind., 1997.
- Ĥakīm Khān, Muḥammad. *Muntakhab al-tawārikh*. Edited by Yayoi Kawahara and Koichi Haneda. 2 vols. Tokyo, 2006–9.
- Haneda, Masashi. “L'évolution de la garde royale des Safavides.” *Moyen Orient et Océan Indien* 1 (1984): 41–64.
- . “Army. iii. Safavid Period.” In *EIr*, 2:503–6. London, 1987.
- Hanway, Jonas. *An Historical Account of the British Trade over the Caspian Sea, with a Journal of Travels from London through Russia into Persia, and back again through Russia, Germany and Holland*. 4 vols. London, 1753.

- Hodgson, Marshall G.S. *The Venture of Islam*, vol. 3, *The Gunpowder Empires and Modern Times*. Chicago, 1974.
- Holzwarth, Wolfgang. “Relations between Uzbek Central Asia, the Great Steppe and Iran, 1700–1750.” In *Shifts and Drifts in Nomad-Sedentary Relations*, edited by Stefan Leder and Bernhard Streck, 179–215. Nomaden und Sesshafte 2. Wiesbaden, 2005.
- . “The Uzbek State as Reflected in Eighteenth Century Bukharan Sources.” *Asiatische Studien* 60 (2006): 321–53.
- . “Community Elders and State Agents: *Īlbēgīs* in the Emirate of Bukhara around 1900.” *Eurasian Studies* 11(2011): 213–62.
- Inshāʾ*. Ms. Dushanbe, Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences of Tajikistan, inv. no. 646-2.
- Ivanov, Pavel P. *Vosstanie kitaĭ-kipchakov v Bukharskom kĥanstve 1821–1825 gg. Istochniki i opyt ikh issledovaniya*. Trudy Instituta Vostokovedeniya 28. Moscow, 1937.
- ʿIwāz Muḥammad b. Mullā Rūzī-Muḥammad Šūfī ʿAṭṭār. *Tārīkh-i jahān-numāyī*. Ms. Tashkent, Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan, inv. no. 9455.
- “Izvestiya o Bukharii.” In *Mesyatseslov istoricheskū i geograficheskū na 1779 god*, 113–26. St Petersburg, 1779.
- ʿIzzatallāh, Mīr. *Maʿāsir-i ʿIzzatallāh* [also *Aḥwāl-i safar-i Bukhārā*]. Ms. London, British Library, Or. 2009.
- Kalter, Johannes (ed.). *Erben der Seidenstraße – Usbekistan*. Stuttgart, 1995.
- Karminagī, Muḥammad Wafā. *Tuḥfat al-khānī*. Ms. St Petersburg, Institute of Oriental Manuscripts, Russian Academy of Sciences, C-525. — *Tuḥfat al-khānī*. Ms. Kazan, Federal University, Lobachevsky Library, F-301.
- Kāshgharī, Zayn al-Dīn Muḥammad Amīn Ṣadr. *Āthār al-futūḥ*. Ms. Tashkent, Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan, inv. no. 753.
- Khan, Iqūdar Alam. *Gunpowder and Firearms: Warfare in Medieval India*. New Delhi, 2004.
- Khanykov, Nikolāi V. *Opisanie Bukharskogo kĥanstva*. St Petersburg, 1843. — Translation by Clement de Bode. Khanikoff, N. *Bokhara: Its Amir and Its People*. London, 1845.
- Khazanov, Anatoly. *Nomads and the Outside World*. 2nd ed. Madison, WI, 1994.
- . “The Eurasian Steppe Nomads in World Military History.” In *Nomad Aristocrats in a World of Empires*, edited by Jürgen Paul, 187–206. Wiesbaden, 2013.
- Khrisanf, Mitropolit Novopatrasskiĭ. “O stranakh Sredneĭ Azii, poseshchennykh im v 1790 godakh.” Edited by Vasilii V. Grigorʼev. *Chteniya v imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiĭskikh pri Moskovskom Universitete* (1861,1): 1–28.
- . “Poyasneniya na voprosy preosvyashennogo Khrisanfa, iz puteshestviya ego izvlechennye.” Edited by Dmitrii Kobeko. In *XXV let 1859–1884: Sbornik, izdannyy Komitetom Obshchestva dlya posobiya nuzhdayushchimsya literatoram i uchenym*, 5–14. St Petersburg, 1884.
- Kolff, Dirk. *Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy: The Ethnohistory of the Military Labour Market in Hindustan, 1450–1850*. Cambridge, 1990.
- Kügelgen, Anke von. “Buchara im Urteil europäischer Reisender des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts.” In *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries*, vol. 1, edited by Michael Kemper, Anke von Kügelgen, Dmitriy Yermakov, 415–30. Islamkundliche Untersuchungen 200. Berlin, 1996.
- . “Sufimeister und Herrscher im Zwiegespräch: Die Schreiben des Faḍl Aḥmad aus Peschawar an Amīr Ḥaydar in Buchara.” In *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central*

- Asia*, vol. 3, *Arabic, Persian and Turkic Manuscripts (15th–19th Centuries)*, edited by Anke von Kügelgen, Ashirbek Muminov Michael Kemper, 219–351. Islamkundliche Untersuchungen 233. Berlin, 2000.
- . *Die Legitimierung der mittelasiatischen Mangitendynastie in den Werken ihrer Historiker (18.–19. Jahrhundert)*. Beirut Texts and Studies 86; Türkische Welten 9. Beirut, 2002.
- Kushkumbaev, Aybolat K. *Voennoe delo kazakhov v XVII–XVIII vekakh*. Almaty, 2001.
- Lambton, Ann K.S. "Tribal Resurgence and the Decline of the Bureaucracy in Eighteenth Century Persia." In *Studies on Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, edited by Thomas Naff and Roger Owen, 108–29 and 377–82 (notes). Carbondale, IL, 1977.
- Lattimore, Owen. "The Frontier in History." In id., *Studies in Frontier History*, 469–91. Paris 1962.
- Lee, Jonathan L. *The 'Ancient Supremacy': Bukhara, Afghanistan and the Battle for Balkh, 1753–1901*. Leiden, 1996.
- Lehmann, Alexander. *Alexander Lehmann's Reise nach Buchara und Samarkand in den Jahren 1841 und 1842*. Edited by Gregor von Helmersen. St Petersburg, 1852. (Repr. Osnabrück, 1969.)
- Lockhart, Laurence. *Nadir Shah: A Critical Study Based Mainly upon Contemporary Sources*. London, 1938. (Repr. Lahore, 1976.)
- Lunin, B.V. (ed.). *Istoriya Uzbekistana v istochnikakh: Izvestiya puteshestvennikov, geografov i uchbenykh XVI–pervoi poloviny XIX v.* Tashkent, 1988.
- Lykoshin, N.S. "Irdzharskoe srazhenie." *Turkestankie Vedomosti* 1907, no. 147. (Available in *Turkestanskiĭ Sbornik*, 442: 28–31. Electronic resource. Tashkent, 2009.)
- Lyushkevich, F.D. "Ėtnograficheskaya gruppa Ironi." In *Sredneaziatskiĭ ėtnograficheskii sbornik*, vol. 3, *Zanyatiya i byt narodov Srednei Azii*, edited by N.A. Kislyakov, 36–71. Leningrad, 1971.
- Maktūbāt wa manshūrāt*. Ms. St Petersburg, Institute of Oriental manuscripts, Russian Academy of Sciences, A-212.
- Maktūbāt wa yarliqāt*. Ms. Tashkent, Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan, inv. no. 300.
- Maktūbāt-i Amīr Haydar ba Muḥammad Hākīm Biy*. Ms. Tashkent, Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan, inv. no. 5412.
- Makātib-i Amīr Sayyid Haydar Bahādūr Khān [ba Sayyid Aḥmad Khwāja]*. Ms. Tashkent, Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan, inv. no. 1961/II.
- Malcolm, John. *The History of Persia from the Most Early Period to the Present Time: Containing an Account of the Religion, Government, Usages, and Character of the Inhabitants of that Kingdom*. 2 vols. London, 1815.
- Malikov, Azim. "The Russian Conquest of the Bukharan Emirate: Military and Diplomatic Aspects." *Central Asian Survey* 33 (2014): 180–198.
- Martin, Vanessa. *The Qajar Pact: Bargaining, Protest and the State in Nineteenth-Century Persia*. London, 2005.
- Marwī, Muḥammad Kāzim. *Nāme-yi Ālamārā-yi Nādirī*. Facsimile, edited by Nikolai D. Miklukho-Maklai, indices by G.V. Shitov. 3 vols. Moscow, 1960–66. — *Ālam-ārā-yi Nādirī*. Edited by Muḥammad Amīn Riyāḥī. 3 vols. Tehran, 1354 h.sh. [1985–86].
- Matthee, Rudi. "Unwalled Cities and Restless Nomads: Firearms and Artillery in Safavid Iran." In *Safavid Persia*, edited by Charles Melville, 389–416. London, 1996.
- . "Firearms. i. History." In *EIr*, 9:619–28. New York, 1999.

- McChesney, Robert D. “The Amirs of Muslim Central Asia in the XVIIth Century.” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 26 (1983): 33–70.
- . *Waqf in Central Asia: Four Hundred Years in the History of a Muslim Shrine, 1480–1889*. Princeton, NJ, 1991.
- . “The Conquest of Herat 995-6/1587-8: Sources for the Study of Şafavid/Qizilbāsh-Shibanid/Ūzbek Relations.” In *Études Safavides*, edited by Jean Calmard, 69–107. Paris, 1993.
- McNeill, William H. “The Age of Gunpowder Empires, 1450–1800.” In *Islamic and European Expansion: The Forging of a Global Order*, edited by Michael Adas, 103–139. Philadelphia, 1993.
- Meyendorff, George de. *Voyage d’Orenbourg à Boukhara, fait en 1820, à travers les steppes qui s’étendent à l’est de la mer d’Aral et au-delà de l’ancien Jaxartes*. Paris, 1826.
- Mīrī, Mīr Ḥusayn. *Makhbāzin al-taqwā*. Ms. Tashkent, Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan, inv. no. 51.
- Mohebbi, Parviz. “Firearms. ii. Production of Cannons and Muskets.” In *EIR*, 9:628–31. New York, 1999.
- Muḥammad Amīn b. Mullā Nūr Muḥammad. *Mazhār al-abḥwāl*. Ms. Tashkent, Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan, inv. no. 1936.
- Muḥammad Sharīf, *Tāj al-tawārīkh*. Ms. Tashkent, Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan, inv. no. 9265.
- Muḥammad Ya‘qūb, *Gulshan al-mulūk*. Ms. Tashkent, Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan, inv. no. 1507.
- Muḥammad Ya‘qūb b. Muḥammad Dāniyāl. *Risāla*. Ms. St Petersburg, Institute of Oriental Manuscripts, Russian Academy of Sciences, C-1934.
- Muḥammad Yūsuf Munshī. *Tazkīra-yi Muqīm-khānī*. Edited by Firishta Şarrāfān. Tehran, 1380 h.sh. [2001–2]. — Translation by Aleksandr A. Semenov. *Mukim-khanskaya istoriya*. Tashkent, 1956.
- Munis, Shir Muhammad Mirab, and Muhammad Riza Mirab Agahi. *Firdaws al-iqbāl: History of Khorezm*. Transl. from Chagatay and annotated by Yuri Bregel. Leiden, 1999.
- Murphey, Rhoads. *Ottoman Warfare 1500–1700*. New Brunswick, NJ, 1999.
- Németh, J. “Wanderungen des mongolischen Wortes *nökür* ‘Genosse’.” *Acta Orientalia* 3 (1953): 1–23.
- Nik Nafs, Caroline. *Zentralasien im Spiegel eines iranischen Reiseberichts aus dem 19. Jahrhundert*. Unpublished MA thesis. Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg, 2006.
- Noelle, Christine. *State and Tribe in Nineteenth Century Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan (1826–1863)*. Richmond, Surrey, 1997.
- Noelle-Karimi, Christine. “‘Different in All Respects’: Bukhara and Khiva as Viewed by Kāḡār Envoys.” In *Şehrâyîn: Die Welt der Osmanen, die Osmanen in der Welt; Wahrnehmungen, Begegnungen und Abgrenzungen; Festschrift Hans Georg Majer*, edited by Yavuz Köse, 435–46. Wiesbaden, 2012.
- . *The Pearl in Its Midst: Herat and the Mapping of Khurasan (15th–19th centuries)*. Denkschriften der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse 463; Veröffentlichungen zur Iranistik 74. Vienna, 2014.
- Olufsen, Ole. *The Emir of Bokhara and His Country: Journey and Studies in Bokhara*. Copenhagen, 1911.

- Paul, Jürgen. "The State and the Military: A Nomadic Perspective." In *Militär und Staatlichkeit*, edited by Irene Schneider, 25–68. Orientwissenschaftliche Hefte 12/2003; Mitteilungen des SFB 'Differenz und Integration' 5. Halle, 2003.
- . "Perspectives nomades: État et structures militaires." *Annales: Histoire, sciences sociales* 59 (2004): 1069–93.
- . "Terms for Nomads in Medieval Persian Historiography." *Asiatische Studien* 40 (2006): 437–57.
- Pavet de Courteille, Abel. *Dictionnaire turk-oriental, destiné à faciliter la lecture des ouvrages de Baber, d'Aboul-Gazi ... et d'autres ouvrages en langues touraniennes*. Paris, 1870. (Repr. Amsterdam, 1972.)
- Pazukhin, Boris, and Semen Pazukhin. *Nakaz Borisu i Semenu Pazukhinym poslannym v Bukharu, Balxh i Yurgench*. Edited by A.N. Truvorov. Russkaya istoricheskaya biblioteka 15. St Petersburg, 1894.
- Perry, V.R. "Army. iv. Afšār and Zand (ca. 1142–1205/1730–1790)." In *EIr*, 2:506–8. London, 1987.
- Platts, John T. *Dictionary of Urdū, Classical Hindī*. London, 1911. (Repr. Lahore, 1994.)
- Poujol, Catherine. "Desmaisons, Jean-Jacques-Pierre (or Petr Ivanovich Demezou)." In *EIr*, 7:331. London; Costa Mesa, Calif., 1996.
- Röhrborn, Klaus. *Provinzen und Zentralgewalt Persiens im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert*. Berlin, 1966.
- . "Regierung und Verwaltung Irans unter den Safawiden." In *Regierung und Verwaltung des Vorderen Orients in islamischer Zeit*, 1:17–50. Handbuch der Orientalistik, sect. 1, vol. 6/5/1. Leiden, 1979.
- Rowton, Michael B. "Enclosed Nomadism." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 17 (1974): 1–30.
- Rychkov, Nikolaï. *Herrn Nikolaus Rytschkow kaiserl. russischen Capitains Tagebuch über seine Reise durch verschiedene Provinzen des russischen Reichs in den Jahren 1769, 1770, und 1771*. Translated by Christian Heinrich Hase. Riga, 1774. [First published as *Zhurnal ili dnevnaya zapiski puteshestviya kapitana Rychkova*. 2 vols. St Petersburg, 1770–72].
- Safarnāma-yi Bukhārā: 'Asr-i Muḥammad Shāh Qājār, 1259 tā 1260 hijra-yi qamarī*. Edited by Ḥusayn Zamānī. Tehran, 1373 h.sh. [1994–95].
- Sāmī, Mīrzā 'Abd al-'Azīm, *Tuḥfa-yi shāhī*. Edited by Nādīra Jalālī. Tehran, 1388 h.sh./2010 [written in 1317–1319/1899–1901].
- . *Tārīkh-i salāṭīn-i manghūtiyya (Istoriya Mangytskikh Gosudareĭ)*. Edited and translated by L.M. Epifanova. Moscow, 1962 [composed in 1324/1906–7].
- Saray, Mehmet. *Rus işğali devrinde Osmanlı Devleti ile Türkistan hanlıkları arasındaki siyasi münasebetler (1775–1875)*. Türk Tarih Kurumu yayınlarından, 7. seri, 158. Ankara, 1994.
- Schiewek, Eckart. "À propos des exilés de Boukhara et de Kokand à Shahr-i Sabz." *Cahiers d'Asie Centrale* 5–6 (1998): 181–97.
- Semenov, A.A. "Ocherk pozemel'no-podatnogo i nalogovogo ustroĭstva b. Bukharskogo khanstva." *Trudy Sredne-Aziatskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta*, series 2, Orientalia 1 (1929): 1–54.
- Serebrennikov, A.G. (ed.). *Sbornik materialov dlya istorii zavoevaniya Turkestanskogo kraya*. 22 vols. Tashkent, 1914–16.
- Shams Bukhārī, Mīrzā. *O nekotorykh sobytiyakh v Bukhare, Khokande i Kashgare: Zapiski Mirzy Shemsa Bukhari/Bayān-i ba'z-i ḥawādiṣāt-i Bukhārā wa Khūqand wa*

- Kāshghar*. Edited and translated by Vasilii V. Grigor'ev. *Uchenyiia zapiski, izdavaem-ia Imperatorskim Kazanskim universitete* 1861/1:1–9; 1861/2:140–69.
- Shukurillaev, Yunus A. *Buxoro amirligida qo'shin va harbiy ish (1756–1920 yillar)*. Dissertation abstract (avtoreferat). Mirzo Ulug'bek National University, Tashkent, 2006.
- Şifatgul, Mansūr. *Pazhūbishī dar bāra-yi maktūbāt-i tārikhī-yi fārsī-yi Īrān wa Māwarā'annahr*. *Studia Culturae Islamicae* 82; MEIS Series 2. Tokyo, 2006.
- Singh, Ganda. *Ahmad Shah Durrani: Father of Modern Afghanistan*. Bombay, 1959.
- Sneath, David. “Ayimag, uymaq and baylik: Re-examining Notions of the Nomadic Tribe and State.” In *Nomad Aristocrats in a World of Empires*, edited by Jürgen Paul, 161–185. Wiesbaden, 2013.
- Spasskiĭ, Grigorii. “Noveishchee opisanie Velikoĭ Bukharii. 4, Zhiteli Bukharii: Ikh promyshlennost' i trgovlya.” *Aziyatskiĭ vestnik* 1/5 (1825): 304–11.
- Steingass, Francis J. *A Comprehensive Persian-English Dictionary*. 8th impr. London, 1998.
- Sukhareva, Olga A. *Bukhara XIX–nachalo XX v. (Pozdnefeodal'nyi gorod i ego nasele-nie)*. Moscow, 1966.
- Szuppe, Maria. “En quête de chevaux turkmènes: Le journal de voyage de Mir 'Izzatullāh de Delhi à Boukhara en 1812–1813.” *Cahiers d'Asie Centrale* 1–2 (1996): 91–111.
- Ṭālī', Abd al-Rahmān. *Tārikh-i Abū l-Faiẓ Khān*. Ms. Tashkent, Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan, inv. no. 11. — Translation by Aleksandr A. Semenov. *Istoriya Abulfeiz-khana*. Tashkent, 1959.
- Terent'ev, Mikhail A. *Istoriya zavoevanniya Srednei Azii: S kartami i planami*. 4 vols. St Petersburg, 1906 [vol. 4: maps].
- Termezi [Tirmizī], Khodzha Samandar. *Dastur al-muluk (“Nazidanie gosudaryam”)*. Facsimile, edited and translated by M.A. Salakhedinova. Moscow, 1971.
- Teufel, Franz. “Quellenstudien zur neueren Geschichte der Chanate.” *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 38 (1884): 235–376.
- Troitskaya, A.A. “Voennoe delo v Bukhare v pervoi polovine XIX veka.” *Trudy Akademii Nauk Tadzhikskoi SSR* 17 (1953): 211–17.
- Troitskaya, A.L. “Neskol'ko dokumentov po voennomu delo iz arkhiva kokandskikh khanov XIX veka.” *Vostochnyi Sbornik* 3 (1972): 138–48.
- Tu-li-shin. *Narrative of the Chinese Embassy to the Khan of the Tourgouth Tartars in the years 1712, 13, 14 & 15*. Translated by George Thomas Staunton. London, 1821. (Repr. Arlington, Va., 1976.)
- Turaev, Kh. *Regesty aktovo istorii feodal'nogo instituta tankha v zapadnoi Bukhare (vto-roya polovina XIX – nachalo XX vv.)*. Tashkent, 1991.
- Turdi [Turdī Farāghī]. *She'rlar*. Edited by A.H. Hayitmetov. Tashkent, 1971.
- Urunbaev, A., G. Dzhuraeva and S. Gulomov. *Katalog sredneaziatskikh zhalovannykh gramot iz fonda Instituta Vostokovedeniya im. Abu Raikhana Beruni Akademii Nauk Respubliki Uzbekistan*. *Orientwissenschaftliche Hefte* 23; *Mitteilungen des SFB 'Differenz und Integration'* 10. Halle; Tashkent, 2007.
- Valikhanov, Chokan. “Vooruzhenie kirgiz v drevnie vremena i ikh voennye dospekhi.” In *Sobranie sochinenii v pyati tomakh*, 1:463–68. Alma-Ata, 1961.
- Vámbery, Hermann. *Reise in Mittelasien von Teheran über die Turkmanische Wüste an der Ostküste des Kaspischen Meeres nach Chiwa, Bochara und Samarkand, ausgeführt im Jahr 1863*. Leipzig, 1865.

- Vyatkin, V.L. "Karshinskiĭ okrug, organizatsiya v nem voĭska i sobytiya v period 1215 – 1217 (1800–1803 godov)." *Izvestiya Sredne-Aziatskogo otdela gosudarstvennogo ruskogo geograficheskogo obshchestva* 18 (1928): 7–26.
- Welsford, Thomas. *Four Types of Loyalty in Early Modern Central Asia: The Tūqāy-Tīmūriid Takeover of Greater Mā Warā al-Nabr, 1598 – 1605*. Leiden, 2013.
- Wennberg, Franz. *On the Edge: The Concept of Progress in Bukhara during the Rule of the Later Manghits*. Studia Iranica Upsaliensia 22. Uppsala, 2013.
- Wilde, Andreas. *What is beyond the River? Power, Authority and Social Order in Transoxania (18th–19th Centuries)*. PhD thesis, University of Bamberg, forthcoming.
- Wolff, Joseph. *Narrative of a Mission to Bokhara, in the Years 1843–1845*. 2 vols. 2nd ed. London, 1845 [illustrated]. — *Narrative of a Mission to Bokhara, in the Years 1843–1845*. 4th ed. London, 1846.
- Wood, William A. *The Sariat Turkmens of Merv and the Khanate of Khiva in the Early Nineteenth Century*. Unpublished PhD thesis. Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind., 1998.
- Yakovlev, Pavel'. "Russkiĭ kapral topchi-bashi u Bukharskogo khana." *Otechestvennye zapiski* 11 (1822): 366–69.
- Zafarnāma-yi khusrawī: Sharḥ-i ḥukmrawāyī-i Sayyid Amīr Naṣrallāh Bahādur Sultān (1242–1277 h.q.)*. Edited by Manūchīhr Sutūda. Tehran, 1377 h.sh./1999.
- Zeller, Rudolph and Ernst F. Rohrer. *Die Orientalische Sammlung Henri Moser-Charlottenfels: Beschreibender Katalog der Waffensammlung*. Bern, 1955.
- Zhukovskii, S.V. "K istorii snosheniya Rossii s Bukharoi i Khivoi kontsa XVIII veka (Posol'stvo perevodchika Bekchurina v Bukharu v 1781 godu)." In *Vostochnyi Sbornik: Izdanie obshchestva russkikh orientalistov*, 2:273–340. Petrograd, 1916.
- Ziyaeva, Dono H. (ed.). *O'zbekistonda harbiy ish tarikhidan: Qadimgi davrdan hozirgacha*. Tashkent, 2012.
- Zygulski, Z. "Oriental and Levantine Firearms." *Pollard's History of Firearms*, edited by Claude Blair, 425–62. New York, 1983.