

## **Political Culture in Turkey: Connections Among Attitudes Toward Democracy, the Military and Islam**

MARK TESSLER and EBRU ALTINOGLU

Against the background of Turkey's continuing but unconsolidated democratic transition, this article examines the nature and determinants of attitudes toward democracy held by ordinary Turkish citizens. Using data from the World Values Survey conducted in Turkey in 1997, it seeks to contribute to a growing body of literature concerned with the relationship between political culture and democratization. Although this relationship has not been fully explicated, the authors share the view of those scholars who believe that the existence of democratic attitudes and values among a country's population is no less important than are democratic institutions and procedures for advancing and eventually consolidating a democratic transition. Accordingly, the study seeks to shed light on the following interrelated questions: To what extent does the Turkish population hold attitudes supportive of democracy? What are the most important determinants of popular support for democracy; what factors account for any observed variance in relevant political attitudes? What is the relationship between attitudes toward the military and attitudes toward democracy and governance? What is the relationship between personal religious attachments and attitudes toward democracy and governance?

The importance of a democratic political culture has been noted by many scholars and documented in a growing number of empirical studies. For example, research in Latin America shows that an important factor contributing to democratic survivability 'revolves around changes in political attitudes, toward a greater valorization of democracy'.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, a recent analysis of survey data from Taiwan and Korea concludes that a 'crucial dimension [in the consolidation of democracy] involves sustained, internalized belief in and commitment to the legitimacy of democracy among the citizenry at large'.<sup>2</sup> Linz and Stepan thus contend that 'a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion, even in the midst of major economic problems and deep dissatisfaction with incumbents, holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life'.<sup>3</sup> And again, according to Przeworski, 'democracy becomes

Mark Tessler is Samuel J. Eldersveld Collegiate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, USA. Ebru Altinoglu is a doctoral student in political science at the University of Michigan.

Democratization, Vol.11, No.1, February 2004, pp.22-51  
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

the only game in town when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions, when all losers want to do this again with the same institutions under which they have just lost'.<sup>4</sup>

The importance of political culture has similarly been emphasized by Turkish scholars, including Esmer, who coordinated the 1997 World Values Survey in Turkey. Like others, Esmer calls attention to the need to examine the normative orientations of ordinary citizens in order to understand fully the nature and functioning of a political system. He also contends that definitions of political culture should not be limited to beliefs and values. He asserts, convincingly, that political attitudes are an equally important component of political culture.<sup>5</sup>

### **Turkey's Experience with Democracy**

Turkey has regularly held free and competitive elections since 1946. During this period, the number and influences of political parties has changed frequently. The country has had a two-party political system at some times and a multi-party system at others. Electoral politics has at times been dominated by highly ideological rival parties. Following the most recent election, parties range across the ideological spectrum from centre-left to extreme-right. Party competition and electoral politics are only part of the story, however. Turkish politics has also been marked by a number of military interventions.

In the elections of 1950, the right-right Democratic Party (DP) defeated the Republican People's Party (RPP), which had been established by Kemal Atatürk and thus represented the Turkish revolution. Partisan competition was interrupted by a military coup in 1960, however. A new constitution was promulgated the following year, and one of its most important provisions was the establishment of a National Security Council (NSC). Composed of senior military leaders, as well as top government officials, the NSC is an extra-political institution. It is not accountable to elected policy-makers; even though some of its members have been elected to their positions in the government, the NSC is essentially an instrument through which the military can exert political influence or even intervene in the political process when it judges government actions to be injurious to the national interest.<sup>6</sup>

With the resumption of electoral politics, competition between the DP and the RPP gave way to a multi-party system in the 1960s. Then, in the 1970s, following a military ultimatum in 1971, the political landscape began to change with the emergence of two new parties: the pro-Islamic National Order Party (NOP) and the ultra-nationalist National Action Party (NAP). In 1980, the military again intervened, claiming that coalition

instability and political unrest required it to act in order to safeguard democracy. The military ruled until 1983, at which time it permitted new legislative elections. It also modified the electoral code, requiring that a party receive at least ten per cent of the national vote to be represented in parliament, thereby diminishing the prospects for small extremist movements.

The Motherland Party (MP) of Turgut Özal captured an absolute majority of the seats in parliament in the 1983 elections, but fragmentation and polarized multi-partyism re-emerged in the elections of 1987. In the elections of 1991 and 1995, support for centrist parties diminished as voters increasingly displayed a preference for either the pro-Islamic Welfare Party (WP), a descendant of the NOP and later reformed as the Virtue Party, or the highly nationalistic NAP. Indeed, the WP became the dominant party after the 1995 elections and established a coalition with the True Path Party (TPP) of Tansu Çiller. Some scholars consider these developments a turning point in Turkish politics.<sup>7</sup>

Once again, however, the military concluded that there was a threat to democracy, this time in the form of the WP's pro-Islamic policies. In February 1997, demands by the NSC forced the resignation of WP leader and then-Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, after which a new coalition government was formed under NSC supervision. In 1998, in response to an ultimatum from military leaders, the cabinet adopted measures designed to limit the influence of Islamic parties and movements.

As a result of these measures, a new political configuration emerged following the election of 1999. As Çarkoglu notes, the election was marked by the 'poor showing of the centre-right Motherland Party and True Path Party'.<sup>8</sup> Similarly, the Virtue Party lost influence, coming in third behind the left of centre Democratic Left Party and the National Action Party of the extreme right.<sup>9</sup> The latter two parties thus became the dominant members of the government coalition, which also included the Motherland Party. Accordingly, as summarized by Çarkoglu, at the end of the 1990s much of the electorate remained at or around centrist positions on a left-right continuum, a majority was nonetheless situated at least somewhat to the right of centre, and at least 15 per cent of the electorate placed itself at the extreme right of the ideological spectrum.<sup>10</sup>

Early elections in November 2002 brought important changes, however. All three parties in the governing coalition, as well as centre-right TPP, then in opposition, failed to meet the ten per cent threshold for representation in parliament. These parties were punished by voters for failing to make progress in the fight against poverty and corruption, and in response some of their leaders resigned and or retired from political life. Only two parties surpassed the ten per cent threshold: the Justice and Development Party

(JDP) led by R. Tayyip Erdogan, which obtained 34 per cent of the vote and won the right to form a government; and the Republican People's Party (RPP) led by Deniz Baykal, which received 19 per cent of the vote and became the opposition. The origins of the JDP are in the Virtue Party; and while the party describes itself as a 'conservative democratic' movement and rejects the label 'Islamist', its impressive electoral victory led some to wonder whether the emerging political configuration would assign a more central role to Islam.

Despite its history of competitive elections, Turkey does not appear to be a consolidated democracy.<sup>11</sup> It should probably be placed in the category of countries that possess some but not all of the characteristics of democratic political systems. Such countries have been variously described as 'unconsolidated', 'incomplete', or 'electoral' democracies.<sup>12</sup> A Turkish political scientist recently described his country's political system as a 'delegative democracy'.<sup>13</sup> These and other assessments point to a number of factors that compromise Turkish democracy, including human rights violations, political corruption and the prohibition of some political parties.

At the same time, this does not mean that democracy in Turkey is destined to remain unconsolidated. Heper and Güney write, for example, that neither political Islam nor military rule is likely to predominate in the long run. Rather, they predict, sooner or later, and possibly sooner, the military's 'occasional indirect presence will be replaced by consolidated democracy'.<sup>14</sup> The accuracy of this prediction will be known in the years ahead. For the present, it is only possible to identify and assess the factors on which will depend the future of Turkey's democratic transition. Three such considerations, and the interrelationships among them, are of particular concern to the present inquiry.

### Research Concerns

The question of most immediate relevance to the present study concerns the degree to which Turkey possesses a democratic political culture. As noted above, many scholars consider the existence of pro-democracy attitudes among a majority of the population to be a necessary condition for democratic consolidation. Inglehart writes, for example, that 'democracy is not attained simply by making institutional changes through elite-level manoeuvring. Its survival depends also on the values and beliefs of ordinary citizens'.<sup>15</sup> As summarized by Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer, 'a new democratic regime can become established only as and when there is a popular consensus favouring a democratic culture'.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, unless and until it can be established that a significant proportion of Turkey's citizens

possess attitudes and values supportive of democracy, the country's democratic transition should be considered incomplete. Indeed, even the continuation of this transition remains uncertain.

A second important consideration is the military's involvement in political life. More specifically, are the prospects for democratic consolidation either advanced or retarded by the military's recurring intervention? Most students of democratization consider political involvement by the military to be an obstacle, calling attention to the problem of 'privileged enclaves' and 'extra-political authority'. For example, Linz and Stepan observe that

in many cases ... in which free and contested elections have been held, the government resulting from elections ... lacks the *de jure* as well as *de facto* power to determine policy in many significant areas because the executive, legislative, and judicial powers are still decisively constrained by an interlocking set of 'reserve domains,' military 'prerogatives,' or 'authoritarian enclaves'.<sup>17</sup>

Observers of present-day Turkey give particular attention in this connection to the issue of 'military prerogatives'. On the one hand, they note that there have indeed been frequent military interventions, thwarting the will of the electorate, restricting political freedoms and, on occasion, resulting in human rights abuses. According to a recent analysis, the Turkish military enjoys superior political status: 'it has placed itself above the restrictions, scrutiny, and public criticism that apply to all other sectors of society, placing it virtually above the state'.<sup>18</sup> On the other, the military's involvement in political affairs is sanctioned by the constitution and in this sense is not extra-legal. Further, the contribution of the military to safeguarding secular democracy has been emphasized by both Turkish and American scholars.<sup>19</sup> Equally important, there appears to be broad popular approval of the military. Public opinion polls consistently report that ordinary citizens have more confidence in the military than in any other political institution, suggesting that it may not be perceived as contravening the will of the people and protecting its own interests rather than those of the nation.<sup>20</sup>

Third, questions have been raised about the compatibility of Islam and democracy. Some allege that Islamic political parties are inherently anti-democratic and suggest that popular support for these parties reflects an anti-democratic impulse. Others argue more generally that the religion tends to produce a mind-set hostile to democracy among ordinary Muslims. Whereas democracy requires openness, competition, pluralism, and tolerance of diversity, Islam, they argue, encourages intellectual conformity and an uncritical acceptance of authority. Equally important, Islam is said to

be anti-democratic because it vests sovereignty in God, who is the sole source of political authority and from whose divine law must come all regulations governing the community of believers. As expressed by Kedourie, 'the notion of popular sovereignty as the foundation of governmental legitimacy, the idea of representation, or elections, of popular suffrage, of political institutions being regulated by laws laid down by a parliamentary assembly, of these laws being guarded and upheld by an independent judiciary, the ideas of the secularity of the state, of society being composed of a multitude of self-activating groups and associations – all of these are profoundly alien to the Muslim political tradition'.<sup>21</sup>

At the same time, many others reject the suggestion that Islam is an enemy in the struggle for democracy. They note that Islam has many facets and tendencies, making unidimensional characterizations of the religion highly suspect.<sup>22</sup> They also point out that openness, tolerance, and progressive innovation are well represented among the religion's traditions.<sup>23</sup> Indeed, there are even expressions of support for democracy by some Islamist theorists.<sup>24</sup>

Similarly divergent analyses are offered by students of Islam and politics in Turkey. While many regard the Welfare Party and its successors as a threat to the country's secular democracy, others note that behind its radical rhetoric the party has showed the same kind of flexibility and pragmatism displayed by other political parties.<sup>25</sup> Further, while research suggests that religiosity is a very strong predictor of party preference among Turkish voters,<sup>26</sup> there is also evidence that Welfare Party voters include many citizens who, while religious, have no desire to see an Islamic state established in their country.<sup>27</sup> Thus, the impact of Islamic attachments on the attitudes toward governance held by ordinary Turkish Muslims remains an open question.

These concerns inform the present study, which, as noted, seeks to shed light on the nature and determinants of the attitudes relating to democracy held by ordinary Turkish citizens. The analysis to follow gives special attention to the influence on these attitudes of views about the military and personal religious attachments

### **Data, Variables and Measures**

The analysis to follow uses data from the World Values Survey conducted in Turkey in 1997. The Turkish survey, which is based on a national random sample of 1907 respondents, was carried out by a team of scholars at Bogaçi University in Istanbul.

*Dependent Variables*

Dimensions of political culture relating to democracy are the dependent variables in this study, with conceptual and operational definitions informed by prior research on democratization. According to one study, relevant orientations include both generalized support for democratic political forms and the embrace of specific democratic values, such as respect for political competition and tolerance of diverse political ideas.<sup>28</sup> Thus, as summarized in another empirical investigation, a democratic citizen is one who 'believes in individual liberty and is politically tolerant, has a certain distrust of political authority but at the same time is trusting of fellow citizens, is obedient but nonetheless willing to assert rights against the state, and views the state as constrained by legality'.<sup>29</sup>

Esmer offers a similar assessment, writing that a person who has democratic values is an individual who trusts others and participates, who is liberal and tolerant, who compromises, who is moderate and non-extremist, and who criticizes legal authority but does not totally reject it.<sup>30</sup> In addition, however, Esmer observes that it is important to examine the relationships among these attitudes and values, which will shed light not only on levels of support but also on the meaning that citizens attach to democracy. More specifically, he suggests that many people may express a preference for democratic political forms at the same time that they hold attitudes and values that are inconsistent with a democratic political culture.<sup>31</sup> This point has also been made in studies of the new democracies in Eastern Europe and elsewhere.<sup>32</sup> Thus, it is important to identify and examine the relationship among empirically distinct clusters of pro-democracy attitudes.

Factor analysis has been employed to select items measuring the dependent variables and other variables. For the dependent variables, those items in the interview schedule that appear to be tapping attitudes and values pertaining to democracy are included in the analysis and, following rotation, the items with the highest factor loadings are selected and then combined to form additive indices.

Used in this way, factor analysis has a number of important advantages.<sup>33</sup> First, it provides an objective basis for selecting the items used to measure the dependent variable. While selection is of course limited by the composition of the interview schedule, factor analysis identifies those items that are most closely associated with whatever conceptual property or properties characterize the collection of items that ask about democratic institutions and values. Second, factor analysis constitutes a scaling technique and offers evidence of reliability and validity. High loadings on a common factor indicate reproducibility, and hence reliability. They also indicate unidimensionality, meaning that the items measure a common

conceptual property, which is a basis for inferring validity. Third, factor analysis identifies empirically distinct clusters of items, which not only addresses concerns of measurement but also helps to clarify the conceptual locus of various normative orientations. In this case, factor analysis will demonstrate whether items pertaining to democracy are or are not indicators of a single conceptual dimension, and if the latter it will shed light on the character of each distinct dimension.

Here two independent clusters of items emerge from the analysis, and in both cases two different items have particularly high loadings on one and only one factor. This is shown in Table 1, which also presents the bivariate correlations among these items. As with the factor loadings, the coefficients show that the two items in each cluster are strongly intercorrelated but that neither is strongly correlated with either item in the other cluster. The four items selected in this manner are shown below.

TABLE 1  
CORRELATION AND FACTOR ANALYSES OF ATTITUDES AND  
VALUES RELATING TO DEMOCRACY

Democratic system	V157 Democracy: better	V165 Government: Society vs Individual	V159 Government: Order vs freedom	V106
<b>Correlations</b>				
Democratic system				
Pearson correlation	1.000	0.424	-0.075	-0.077
Sig. (2-tailed)		0.000	0.002	0.001
N	1775	1684	1747	1752
Democracy: better				
Pearson correlation	0.424	1.000	-0.045	-0.020
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	-	0.061	0.418
N	1684	1720	1692	1701
Government: Society vs individual				
Pearson correlation	-0.075	-0.045	1.000	0.226
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.002	0.061	-	0.000
N	1747	1692	1844	1806
Government: Order vs freedom				
Pearson correlation	-0.077	-0.020	0.226	1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.001	0.418	0.000	-
N	1752	1701	1806	1851
<b>Factor analysis</b>				
Rotated component matrix				
Component 1	0.85	0.84	-0.02	-0.04
Component 2	0.02	-0.08	0.78	0.78



V157. I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Coded according to the evaluation of a democratic political system.

V163. Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government. Do you: Agree Strongly, Agree, Disagree, Disagree Strongly?

V106. If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important: Maintaining order in the nation, Giving people more say in important government decisions, Fighting rising prices, Protecting freedom of speech? Coded according to whether or not respondent chose Giving people more say in important government decisions or Protecting freedom of speech.

V159. If you had to choose, which would you say is the most important responsibility of government: To maintain order in society, To respect freedom of the individual? Coded according to whether or not respondent chose: To respect freedom of the individual.

As shown in Table 1, the first two of these items, V157 and V163, are strongly intercorrelated and have high loadings on a common factor. Similarly, the next two, V106 and V159, are also strongly intercorrelated and have high loadings on a common factor. V157 and V163 measure level of support for democracy and, as noted, they have been combined to form an additive index. V106 and V159 measure importance attached to political liberty, and they, too, have been combined to form an additive index. The two indices, support for democracy and importance attached to political freedom, are treated as dependent variables in the analysis to follow. It is noteworthy, as discussed above, that past research on cultural aspects of democratization calls attention to both of the conceptual dimensions that these indices appear to measure. Their importance has been demonstrated in studies carried out in the new democracies of Eastern Europe,<sup>34</sup> and their statistical independence has also been shown in a cross-national analysis of World Values Survey data from seventeen countries.<sup>35</sup> A similar pattern, based on survey data from several Arab countries, has also been reported by one of the authors of the present study.<sup>36</sup>

Table 2 presents percentage distributions for each index, showing that there is considerable variance on both variables. At the same time, the two distributions are skewed in different directions. While there is fairly widespread popular support for democracy, at least in the abstract, a much smaller proportion of individuals attaches importance to political freedom

## POLITICAL CULTURE IN TURKEY

31

TABLE 2  
LEVELS OF SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY AND IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO  
POLITICAL FREEDOM

	Support for democracy	Importance of political freedom
High	53.4 per cent	16.6 per cent
Somewhat high	33.1 per cent	35.9 per cent
Low	13.5 per cent	47.5 per cent

TABLE 3  
PER CENT IN EACH CATEGORY OF TYPOLOGY BASED ON SUPPORT FOR  
DEMOCRACY AND IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO POLITICAL FREEDOM

Support for democracy	Importance of political freedom	
	Lesser	Greater
Lesser	25.4	21.2
Greater	22.2	17.2

and, to that extent, possesses a normative orientation conducive to democracy.

In addition to treating each index as a separate dependent variable, the two measures have been combined to form a two-dimensional typology. This will be treated as a third dependent variable. Table 3 presents this typology by cross-tabulating dichotomized measures of support for democracy and the importance of political freedom. The table indicates, as expected given the patterns shown in Tables 1 and 2, that respondents are no more likely to be either high or low on both indices than to be high on one and low on the other. Rather, with each index dichotomized so as to give categories of relatively equal size, the proportion of respondents in each of the typology's four categories is also approximately equal.

#### *Independent Variables*

Three conceptually distinct categories of independent variables are examined in an effort to account for variance in attitudes and values relating to democracy. The selection of independent variables has been guided both by considerations of availability, meaning the items included on the World Values Survey interview schedule, and by prior research on democratization. Although findings from prior research are neither comprehensive nor entirely consistent, these studies offer insights not only about which factors are likely to have explanatory power but also about the direction of significant variable relationships.<sup>37</sup> In cases where a variable refers to a normative or behavioural orientation that is measured by a multi-

item index, items have been selected using the same factor analytic procedures discussed in connection with the dependent variables.

The first category of independent variables deals with personal status. It includes education, age, sex, and a measure of personal well-being. The later is an additive index composed of intercorrelated items that ask about financial satisfaction, general life satisfaction, and income. Based on past research, it is expected, other things being equal, that support for democracy and attachment to democratic values will be higher and more widespread among individuals who are better educated, younger, male, and characterized by higher levels of personal well-being and life satisfaction.

A second category deals with cultural and normative orientations. It includes a measure of religiosity in the form of an additive index based on six highly intercorrelated items from the interview schedule: self-assessed religiosity, belief in God, importance of God, belief in life after death, belief in the soul, and taking comfort in religion. This measure is of particular interest given questions that have been raised about the influence of Islamic attachments on attitudes toward governance and democracy. Other independent variables in this category include individualism, measured by two intercorrelated items that ask about the importance of emphasizing independence and imagination in child-rearing; a five-item measure of traditionalism, which includes questions about the importance of traditional values pertaining to family life and a preference for continuity over change in other areas; and social tolerance, which is measured following Esmer<sup>38</sup> by a willingness to have people of a different race or religion as neighbours. The items used to measure all of these variables are given in Appendix 1.

It is expected, other things being equal, that support for democracy and attachment to democratic values will be higher and more widespread among individuals who are higher on the measures of individualism and social tolerance and lower on the measure of traditionalism. Expectations regarding religiosity are less clear; while some scholars posit an inverse relationship between strong Islamic attachments and pro-democracy attitudes, this has not been documented by empirical research among ordinary citizens in Muslim societies.<sup>39</sup>

The final category of independent variables deals with political experiences and assessments. Of particular note is an index measuring confidence in the military and other institutions of order. Once again guided by Esmer's analysis of the World Values Survey data, this index is composed of three highly intercorrelated items: one asks about confidence in the military, another about confidence in the police, and a third about confidence in the legal system. Other independent variables in this category are trust in ordinary citizens, rather than a preference for either a strong political leader or technocratic leadership; an evaluation of government

performance at the time of the survey; confidence in the institutional structure of the political system at the time of the survey; and a three-item measure of political attentiveness based on expressed political interest, frequency of discussing politics, and the importance attached to political affairs. Again, the questions used create multi-item indices are presented in the appendix.

Based on past research, it is expected, other things being equal, that support for democracy and attachment to democratic values will be higher and more widespread among individuals who have higher levels of trust in ordinary citizens, more positive assessments of the government, more confidence in the institutional structure of the political system, and higher levels of political attentiveness. Expectations are less clear with respect to confidence in the military and other institutions of order. While the non-democratic character of these institutions suggests an inverse relationship, this may not be the case since the military presents itself as the guardian of democracy.

In addition to identifying the relative importance of specific independent variables in accounting for variance on the dependent variables, the analysis to follow will also shed light on the relative explanatory power of *categories* of independent variables. More specifically, it will help to determine the degree to which attitudes and values related to democracy are influenced by demographic characteristics, normative orientations, and/or political experiences and assessments. This, in turn, will contribute to a fuller understanding of the way that particular political attitudes are acquired and of the factors likely to promote or retard the emergence of a democratic political culture.

As noted, factor analysis has been used to select and validate the items used to construct indices measuring these independent variables. In cases where appropriate, a response of 'don't know' has been coded as the midpoint along an agree-disagree or important-unimportant continuum. This has been done to maximize the number of useable responses. Factor analyses have been run both with and without this recoding, and no item used to construct an index was recoded in this way if to do so significantly altered the pattern of factor loadings. In fact, however, this very rarely occurred.

### **Analysis and Findings**

Regression analysis has been used to assess the relationship between these independent variables and the two one-dimensional dependent variables described above. Ordinal logit has been employed for this purpose since there is no standard unit of measurement and, accordingly, the categories of

each dependent variable are ordinal rather than interval. Table 4 presents the results of an analysis in which the support for democracy index is the dependent variable, and Table 5 presents the results of an analysis in which the importance attached to political liberty index is the dependent variable. In addition, logistical regression has been used to examine the relationship between the independent variables and the third dependent variable, the two-dimensional typology based on support for democracy and importance attached to political liberty taken together. Separate logistical regressions are run for each of the four categories of this typology, which were shown in Table 3. The results are presented in Tables 6–9.

In one important case, that of religiosity, approximately 20 per cent of the respondents did not answer at least one question in the six-item index. Mean substitution was employed in this instance, and two assessments were performed to make sure this did not introduce distortions. First, regressions were run both with and without the cases for which mean substitution was employed. The results were identical. Second, when the cases for which mean substitution was employed were included in the regressions, a with/without mean substitution dummy variable was added as an additional control.

#### *Support for Democracy*

Table 4 presents the results of an analysis in which the support for democracy index is the dependent variable. Four models, each involving a different set or combination of independent variables, are examined in an effort to account for variance on the dependent variable. The first model includes only independent variables pertaining to personal status. As expected, support for democracy is higher among individuals who are better educated and male. Contrary to the expectations, however, older individuals are more likely than younger individuals to support democracy. Further, although a positive relationship between personal well being and support for democracy had been expected, regression results indicate that this variable has no effect on the dependent variable.

The second models deals with cultural and normative orientations. While at least some scholars argue that support for democracy will be higher and more widespread among individuals who are less religious, Table 4 indicates that religiosity has no effect on support for democracy. The table also shows, contrary to expectations, that individualism is unrelated to support for democracy. On the other hand, consistent with expectations, both lower levels of traditionalism and higher levels of social tolerance are related to support democracy to a statistically significant degree.

The third model examines the impact of political experiences and assessments. As expected, support for democracy is higher among

## POLITICAL CULTURE IN TURKEY

35

individuals who have higher levels of trust in ordinary citizens, as opposed to a strong leader or government technocrats, and also among individuals who are more politically attentive. Alternatively, contrary to expectations, support for democracy is higher among individuals who have an unfavourable view of government performance. Finally, confidence in the institutional structure of the political system has no effect on support for democracy, whereas confidence in the institutions of order, which includes the military, the police, and the legal system, is positively related support democracy.

Model 4 includes all the categories of independent variables. It shows only one change in the relationships that are statistically significant; evaluation of government performance loses the significant relationship to the dependent variable observed in Model 2. Given that all other significant relationships remain unchanged, it is possible to conclude both that almost none of the relationships observed in Models 1–3 are spurious and that all

TABLE 4  
SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Personal status				
Education	0.2040 (0.021)***			0.1225 (0.024)***
Personal well-being	0.0125 (0.009)			0.0136 (0.009)
Sex (men)	0.1898 (0.087)*			0.2502 (0.095)**
Age	0.0189 (0.003)***			0.0148 (0.003)***
Cultural and normative orientations				
Religiosity		0.0014 (0.021)		0.0245 (0.024)
Individualism		0.1195 (0.064)		0.0636 (0.070)
Traditionalism		-0.0638 (0.023)**		-0.0723 (0.026)**
Social tolerance		0.3781 (0.055)***		0.2699 (0.062)***
Political experiences and assessments				
Confidence in institutional structure of political system			-0.0196 (0.012)	-0.0114 (0.013)
Confidence in institutions of order			0.0494 (0.018)**	0.1023 (0.020)***
Trust in ordinary citizens			0.1962 (0.021)***	0.1763 (0.023)***
Political attentiveness			0.1985 (0.030)***	0.1226 (0.035)***
Government performance			-0.0577 (0.023)*	-0.0247 (0.026)
Number of observations	1783	1733	1827	1627

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

three categories of independent variables are important in accounting for variance on the dependent variable. Specifically, then, support for democracy is higher among individuals who are male, older, and better-educated; who are higher in social tolerance and lower in traditionalism; and who are higher in political attentiveness, higher in trust in ordinary citizens, and higher in confidence in the country's institutions of order.

Two points deserve additional comment in view of the character of the Turkish case. First, the fact that religiosity is not significantly related to support for democracy lends support to those who take the view that democracy and Islam are not incompatible. This is notable given debates about the influence of Islam on political culture. In addition, however, several cautions are in order. On the one hand, with its long tradition of secularism, findings from Turkey may not be indicative of trends in other Muslim countries. On the other, the pro-Islamic Welfare Party was in power at the time the survey was conducted, being the senior partner in a coalition with the centre-right True Path Party, and this raises the possibility of a temporal conditionality that also limits the generalizability of findings from the present study.

Second, while it may appear anomalous that support for democracy is associated with confidence in such institutions of order as the military and the police, which themselves are not democratic, this, too, reflects a particularity of the Turkish case. The military played a critical role in establishing the Turkish Republic, and since that time it has considered itself the guardian of democratic governance. As discussed earlier, the military has frequently intervened in political life, asserting that it was doing so to ensure the survival of Turkish democracy. The military's role and intention in this connection are also noted by several scholars. Özbudun writes, for example that 'the soldiers' intention on each [military intervention] was a "moderating coup" rather than the creation of a lasting bureaucratic-authoritarian regime'.<sup>40</sup> Some believe the military acts on behalf of a certain political class, however, and that its involvement in political life, whatever the intention, is an obstacle to democratic consolidation. The present study suggests that this view may not be widespread among ordinary citizens, however, since greater support for democracy is associated with greater confidence in the military and other institutions of order.

#### *Importance of Political Liberty*

Table 5 presents the regressions in which importance attached to political liberty is the dependent variable. Model 1, with demographic characteristics as independent variables, shows a pattern similar in most respects to the one observed in Table 4. Consistent with expectations, importance attached to

political liberty is higher among male and better-educated individuals. Also as in Table 4, but in contrast to expectations, personal well being has no effect on the importance attached to political liberty. The relationship between age and the dependent variable is different, however. Younger age is related to a statistically significant degree to attaching greater importance to liberty, whereas Table 4 showed that older age was associated with support for democracy.

In Model 2, all of the cultural and normative orientations treated as independent variables are statistically significant at the 0.001 level of confidence. In accordance with expectations, the importance attached to liberty is higher and more widespread among citizens who have higher ratings on the measures of individualism and social tolerance and lower ratings on the measure of traditionalism. Religiosity is also inversely related to the dependent variable. The finding with respect to religiosity deserves special note because it differs from that reported in Table 4 and supports a different position in debates about the compatibility of democracy and Islam. While the overall conclusion about the influence of Islamic attachments on pro-democracy attitudes thus remains ambiguous, one implication of the present analysis is that the impact of religiosity may vary from one dimension of political culture to another.

Political experiences and assessments are the independent variables in Model 3. It shows that individuals who are less content with the present government, who are more attentive to politics, or who have lower levels of confidence in institutions of order are more likely to attach importance to political liberty. Relationships involving trust in ordinary citizens and confidence in the institutional structure of the political system are not statistically significant. It is notable that the relationship between confidence in institutions of order and importance attached to political liberty is inverse, in contrast to the finding when support for democracy was the dependent variable. This suggests that while the military may be regarded by much of the public as guardian of a political system that is to at least some degree democratic, those citizens among whom democratic values are most pronounced actually have a less favourable opinion of the military.

When all variables are included, in Model 4, education and individualism cease to be related to the dependent variable to a statistically significant degree. All other relationships remain significant, although the level of confidence associated with social tolerance declines. Thus, with spurious relationships eliminated, the data show that attachment to political liberty is higher among individuals who are male, younger, less religious, less traditional, more attentive to politics, higher in social tolerance, have an unfavourable assessment of the government, and have less confidence in institutions of order.



TABLE 5  
IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO POLITICAL LIBERTY

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Personal status</b>				
Education	0.1822 (0.022)***			0.0259 (0.026)
Personal Well-being	-0.0037 (0.009)			0.0073 (0.010)
Sex (men)	0.2376 (0.092)**			0.2831 (0.102)**
Age	-0.0208 (0.003)***			-0.0232 (0.004)***
<b>Cultural and normative orientations</b>				
Religiosity		-0.1697 (0.025)***		-0.1155 (0.027)***
Individualism		0.2941 (0.078)***		0.1210 (0.082)
Traditionalism		-0.1745 (0.027)***		-0.1258 (0.029)***
Social tolerance		0.2937 (0.060)***		0.1459 (0.069)*
<b>Political experiences and assessments</b>				
Confidence in institutional structure of political system			-0.0202 (0.013)	0.0007 (0.015)
Confidence in institutions of order			-0.1632 (0.020)***	-0.0948 (0.022)***
Trust in ordinary citizens			0.0446 (0.023)	0.0373 (0.025)
Political attentiveness			0.1561 (0.030)**	0.1214 (0.034)***
Government performance			-0.1362 (0.026)***	-0.1187 (0.030)***
Number of observations	1764	1714	1801	1607

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

Given the nature of the Turkish case, it is noteworthy that both religiosity and confidence in institutions of order are related to the dependent variable with a high level of statistical confidence. Religiosity was not related to support for democracy, as shown in Table 4. Since it is inversely related to attachment to liberty, however, it may be that religiosity among Muslims, at least in Turkey, does discourage the emergence of at least some values associated with democracy. Taking findings from Tables 4 and 5 together, as a proposition for future research, it may be that Islamic attachments have an impact on some dimensions of political culture but not others so far as democracy is concerned.

The inverse relationship between confidence in institutions of order and attachment to political liberty is instructive in view of the anomaly noted in the discussion of Table 4: that support for democracy is associated with confidence in political institutions that themselves are not democratic. But while confidence in institutions of order tends to increase support for a pattern of governance on whose behalf the military has frequently intervened, Table 5 suggests that it tends to *decrease* support for the more

fundamental norms of political culture that are necessary for democracy to mature. Democratic consolidation, in other words, depends in the final analysis on a supportive political culture, not on military intervention, and those who possess political values conducive to democracy are more likely than others to see a contradiction in relying on anti-democratic institutions to ensure democracy's survival.

#### *Democracy and Political Liberty*

A single model including all independent variables has been run for each of the four categories associated with the third dependent variable, which is a two-dimensional typology based on support for democracy and importance attached to political liberty taken together. These are shown in Tables 6–9. Table 6 presents the results of an analysis in which the category of lesser support for democracy and lesser importance attached to political liberty is the dependent variable. Respondents in this category may be labelled 'non-democrats.' As shown in Table 3, with the cutting points employed they constitute 25.4 per cent of the sample. Table 6 shows that individuals in this category are more likely to a statistically significant degree to be less well-educated, female, lower in personal well-being, higher in religiosity, higher in traditionalism, lower in political attentiveness, and more trusting of strong leaders and government technocrats than ordinary citizens.

TABLE 6  
LOGIT RESULTS FOR THE CATEGORY OF LESSER SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY  
AND LESSER IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO POLITICAL LIBERTY

Personal status	
Education	-0.1053 (0.034)**
Personal well-being	-0.0246 (0.012)*
Sex(men)	-0.5735 (0.127)***
Age	0.0059 (0.004)
Cultural and normative orientations	
Religiosity	0.1358 (0.053)*
Individualism	-0.0549 (0.107)
Traditionalism	0.0752 (0.039)*
Social tolerance	-0.1410 (0.084)
Political experiences and assessments	
Confidence in institutional structure of political system	0.0120 (0.018)
Confidence in institutions of order	0.0206 (0.027)
Trust in ordinary citizens	-0.1649 (0.030)***
Political attentiveness	-0.1474 (0.043)***
Government performance	0.0589 (0.035)
Constant	-1.8134 (1.15)
Number of observations	1595

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

\*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001.

This profile suggests that non-democrats are apolitical, with little interest in public affairs and a restricted political horizon. Less well educated and higher in both religiosity and traditionalism, they very probably have a limited social horizon as well. They are also disproportionately likely to be economically disadvantaged, as suggested by their lower levels of personal well-being. Apparently, then, as expected, non-democrats tend to be found outside in the more modern, dynamic, affluent, and outward-looking sectors of Turkish society. Individuals in this category possess few of the attitudes and values conducive to democracy, nor even confidence in the political capability of ordinary citizens like themselves. They are apparently content to stand apart from the political process and leave direction of their society to a strong leader or government technocrats.

Table 7 presents the results of an analysis in which the category of greater support for democracy and lesser importance attached to political liberty is the dependent variable. Respondents in this category appear to support the prevailing political order and may be described as politically satisfied. As shown in Table 3, they constitute 22.2 per cent of the sample. Table 7 shows that individuals in this category are more likely to a statistically significant degree to be better-educated, older, and religious and also to have confidence in institutions of order more trust in ordinary citizens than in strong political leaders or government technocrats, and a positive assessment of government performance.

Older and better educated, these individuals are probably the most established and secure of the population categories examined. Accordingly, as their satisfaction with the status quo also suggests, they appear to be among those who benefit most from prevailing political and social arrangements. This is reflected in their confidence in institutions of order and positive assessment of government performance. Against this background, it is possible that they identify good government, and hence democracy, with the present regime, regardless of the degree to which it has undemocratic as well as democratic characteristics. They are not hostile to democracy, as indicated by their greater trust in ordinary citizens than in strong political leaders or government technocrats. They are not true democrats, however, but rather appear to be establishment-oriented political conservatives. They may be social conservatives as well, a possibility suggested by their higher levels of religiosity.

Table 8 presents the results of an analysis in which the category of lesser support for democracy and greater importance attached to political liberty is the dependent variable. These men and women, who constitute 21.2 per cent of the sample, appear to represent a segment of the country's youth that is alienated from the political system. Individuals in this category are more

TABLE 7

LOGIT RESULTS FOR THE CATEGORY OF GREATER SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY  
AND LESSER IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO POLITICAL LIBERTY

Personal status	
Education	0.0777 (0.034)*
Personal well-being	0.0141 (0.013)
Sex(men)	0.2048 (0.130)
Age	0.0213 (0.004)***
Cultural and normative orientations	
Religiosity	0.0799 (0.038)*
Individualism	-0.0597 (0.112)
Traditionalism	0.0733 (0.039)
Social tolerance	-0.0648 (0.083)
Political experiences and assessments	
Confidence in institutional structure of political system	-0.0219 (0.017)
Confidence in institutions of order	0.0979 (0.028)***
Trust in ordinary citizens	0.1107 (0.032)***
Political attentiveness	0.0107 (0.043)
Government performance	0.1005 (0.035)**
Constant	-6.9483 (1.04)***
Number of observations	1595

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

\*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001.

likely to a statistically significant degree to be younger, less religious, and have lower levels of confidence both in institutions of order and in ordinary citizens. Their profile may be characterized as 'anti-establishment'.

Although these young men and women attach importance to political liberty, this may be more of a protest against those in power than a genuine expression of democratic values. This interpretation is suggested by their low confidence in institutions of order, which claim to be, and are, guardians of the status quo. It is also suggested by their low trust in political bodies elected by ordinary citizens. Indeed, their greater trust in a strong leader or government technocrats suggests potential receptivity to anti-establishment, and very possibly anti-democratic, movements that promise radical change. That these individuals tend to be less religious suggests an alienation that may be social as well as political. They apparently lack the strong religious attachments that might compensate for their estrangement from the prevailing political order.

Table 9 treats the category of greater support for democracy and greater importance attached to political liberty as the dependent variable. Respondents in this category, who constitute 31.2 per cent of the sample, may be described as 'true democrats', They favour democracy and also

TABLE 8

LOGIT RESULTS FOR THE CATEGORY OF LESSER SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY  
AND GREATER IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO POLITICAL LIBERTY

Personal status	
Education	-0.0612 (0.034)
Personal well-being	-0.0037 (0.013)
Sex (men)	0.1458 (0.129)
Age	-0.0250 (0.005)***
Cultural and normative orientations	
Religiosity	-0.0703 (0.031)*
Individualism	-0.0046 (0.102)
Traditionalism	0.0313 (0.038)
Social tolerance	-0.0975 (0.088)
Political experiences and assessments	
Confidence in institutional structure of political system	0.0133 (0.018)
Confidence in institutions of order	-0.1250 (0.026)***
Trust in ordinary citizens	-0.0941 (0.029)**
Political attentiveness	-0.0016 (0.043)
Government performance	0.0070 (0.037)
Constant	2.4007 (0.891)**
Number of observations	1595

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

\*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001.

TABLE 9

LOGIT RESULTS FOR THE CATEGORY OF GREATER SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY  
AND GREATER IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO POLITICAL LIBERTY

Personal Status	
Education	0.0536 (0.030)
Personal well-being	0.0116 (0.012)
Sex(men)	0.2404 (0.120)*
Age	-0.0083 (0.004)
Cultural and normative orientations	
Religiosity	-0.0183 (0.030)
Individualism	0.0469 (0.093)
Traditionalism	-0.1257 (0.033)***
Social tolerance	0.3700 (0.084)***
Political experiences and assessments	
Confidence in institutional structure of political system	-0.0094 (0.017)
Confidence in institutions of order	0.0318 (0.025)
Trust in ordinary citizens	0.1197 (0.030)***
Political attentiveness	0.1166 (0.041)**
Government performance	-0.1573 (0.037)***
Constant	-1.2797 (0.829)
Number of observations	1595

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

\*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001.

posses at least some of the political values necessary for successful democratization. Table 9 shows that these individuals are more likely to be male, politically attentive, lower on the measure of traditionalism, higher on the measures of social tolerance and trust in ordinary citizens, and have an unfavourable assessment of the government performance.

True democrats appear to be progressive, open-minded, forward-looking, and politically conscious individuals. Tolerant of diversity and lower in traditionalism, they look to the future rather than the past. They are also politically engaged, being attentive to politics, impatient with the present regime, and desirous of a political system that is genuinely accountable to ordinary citizens. Their attitudes and values are consistent with expectations based on prior research on democratization. They conform to the model of a 'democratic citizen,' whose presence in substantial numbers is probably necessary for the maintenance and eventual consolidation of democratic transitions.

### Conclusion

Against the background of Turkey's continuing but unconsolidated democratic transition, the present study examines the nature and determinants of attitudes toward democracy held by ordinary Turkish citizens. Four interrelated questions have been of particular concern:

- To what extent does the Turkish population hold attitudes supportive of democracy?
- What are the most important determinants of popular support for democracy; what factors account for any observed variance in relevant political attitudes?
- What is the relationship between attitudes toward the military and attitudes toward democracy and governance?
- What is the relationship between personal religious attachments and attitudes toward democracy and governance?

Two attitudinal dimensions relating to democracy have been identified and each has been measured with a two-item additive index. On one of these, support for democracy as a political system, pro-democracy attitudes are held by a substantial proportion of ordinary men and women. Specifically, 53.4 per cent of those interviewed have a high rating on this index. The distribution of ratings on the second index is quite different, however. This index measures importance attached to political liberty, and in this case only 16.6 per cent of the respondents express strongly pro-democracy attitudes. The two dimensions have also been considered in

combination, and 31.2 per cent of those interviewed have high or at least fairly high ratings on both measures and are classified as 'true democrats'. This latter figure is not an absolute measure, however; it is rather somewhat inflated since it is based on a typology formed by combining two dichotomized indices.

These findings suggest that attitudes conducive to democracy and democratization are held by a relatively limited number of Turkish men and women, and that, accordingly, an appropriate political culture probably does not yet exist to the extent necessary for democratic consolidation. A majority of Turkish citizens do express support for democracy as a political system but, as discussed, at least some these individuals are probably expressing satisfaction with the status quo rather than a genuine commitment to democracy. Even more important, both the limited importance attached to political liberty and the fact that importance attached to political liberty is not related to support for democracy suggests that Turkey does not at present possess a democratic political culture.

Findings about the determinants of pro-democracy attitudes not only help to account for variance, they also shed light on prospects for the emergence and expansion of a democratic political culture in the future. Significantly, and consistent with the preceding assessment, there are important differences, as well as some similarities, between the determinants of support for democracy and the determinants of importance attached to political liberty. The similarities include male gender, higher social tolerance, lower traditionalism, and greater attentiveness to politics. This suggests that experiences which promote a favourable predisposition toward social change and diversity tend to encourage pro-democracy attitudes, and that such attitudes are thus likely to become more widespread with the acceleration of modernization and social change.

Differences in the two sets of determinants are equally instructive. Variance in support for democracy is associated with older age, higher education, and greater confidence in the country's institutions of order, whereas variance in importance attached to political liberty is associated with younger age, less religiosity, an unfavourable assessment of government performance, and less confidence in institutions of order. Both profiles suggest that social circumstances are of critical importance. Individuals who are more established and in a relatively favourable position, who benefit from the status quo, in other words, are more likely to express support for democracy. Alternatively those who more likely to attach importance to political liberty are young people with unfavourable views of both the modern and traditional sociopolitical system. They are youthful protesters who do not have confidence in institutions of order and

judge government performance harshly. At the same time, they are not strongly connected to either religion or traditional society.

These interpretations, if correct, suggest that political attitudes are strongly influenced by social status and perceived self-interest, and that to some extent attitudes toward democracy and liberty are thus a proxy for support or opposition to the existing political system. Accordingly, there are limits to the inferences about political culture that can be drawn when attitudes toward democracy and political liberty are considered separately. These two political orientations have also been examined in combination, however, making it possible to identify determinants of support for democracy *and* importance attached to political liberty, to investigate factors that separate 'true democrats' from other citizens.

The profile of true democrats is consistent with expectations. These individuals possess the kinds of values associated with a democratic political culture, being politically attentive and higher on the measures of social tolerance and trust in ordinary citizens. They are also critical of the present quasi-democratic regime, having an unfavourable assessment of government performance. Finally, significantly, they are lower in traditionalism, suggesting that the expansion of modernization and development may increase their numbers in the future.

The data also shed light on the two remaining issues that are of interest in the Turkish case: the significance for democracy of attitudes toward the military and of religious attachments. Confidence in the military, associated with confidence in institutions of order more generally, tends to encourage support for democracy and discourage attaching importance to political liberty. These findings may say as much about attitudes toward the prevailing political system as they do about democracy, however, since views about the military do not have an impact on the political orientations of true democrats but rather on the orientations of those who possess some pro-democracy attitudes but not others. The military is committed to the present political order, regardless of the degree to which that order is or is not democratic, and it apparently inspires confidence among those who benefit from the status quo and is judged critically by those who are less established and secure.

This suggests that the anomaly of an anti-democratic institution presenting itself as the guardian of democracy may neither trouble most Turkish citizens nor be taken especially seriously. True democrats have neither a more favourable view of the military because of its espoused commitment to democracy nor a less favourable view because of its anti-democratic character. Rather, whether justified or not, the common view seems to be that the military acts to preserve a quasi-democratic status quo, and it is by this standard, rather than by the implications for democratic



consolidation, that the military and other institutions of order tend to be judged.

With respect to religion, it does not appear that strong Islamic attachments discourage the emergence of pro-democracy attitudes. With other factors held constant, religiosity is inversely related to importance attached to political liberty. However, as noted, this may be more a reflection of youthful alienation than an indication that religiosity fosters anti-democratic attitudes. Religiosity is not associated with support for democracy and, most important, religious individuals are no less likely than others to be true democrats.

These findings tend to support those who challenge the proposition that Islam is hostile to democracy. Admittedly, the present study's location in space and time raises questions about the generalisability of its conclusions. On the one hand, a strong tradition of secularism suggests that findings based on the Turkish cases may not shed light on other Muslim societies. On the other, the survey was conducted a time when the pro-Islamic Welfare Party led the governing coalition, raising the possibility that the relationship between religiosity and democratic attitudes may depend on the nature of the regime in power. Nevertheless, religiosity among Turkish Muslims is not strongly and consistently associated with anti-democratic attitudes, and similar results reported in other recent investigations lend confidence to the conclusion that Islam and democracy are not incompatible.<sup>41</sup>

In sum, findings from the present investigation indicate that Turkey does not at present possess a broadly based democratic culture and leave unanswered questions about the prospects for its emergence in the future. The low traditionalism of true democrats suggests that an intensification of social change and development might help to promote democratic values. The extent and rapidity of this intensification is unknown, however, and it is also significant that pro-democracy attitudes are no more prominent among younger and better-educated individuals than among others. Thus, neither the expansion of education nor generational change is likely, by itself, to increase the proportion of ordinary citizens who hold the political orientations necessary for democratic consolidation. Against this background, with no serious obstacles provided by Islam but with military's interventions on behalf of democracy having little impact on the political attitudes of ordinary men and women, the best guess is that Turkey's democratic transition will continue at an uneven pace and remain unconsolidated for the foreseeable future.

## NOTES

1. Scott Mainwaring, 'Democratic Survivability in Latin America', in Howard Handelman and Mark Tessler (eds), *Democracy and Its Limits: Lessons from Asia, Latin America and the Middle East* (Notre Dame, IL: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), p.45.
2. Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond and Doh Chull Shin, 'Halting Progress in Korea and Taiwan,' *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.12, No.1 (2001), p.122.
3. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, 'Toward Consolidated Democracies', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.7, No.2 (1996), p.16.
4. Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.26.
5. Yılmaz Esmer, Devrim, Evrim, Statüko: Türkiye'de Sosyal, Siyasal, Ekonomik Değerler [Revolution, Evolution and Status-Quo: Social, Political and Economic Values in Turkey] (Istanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 1999), pp.28-9.
6. Metin Heper and Aylin Güney, 'The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish Experience', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol.26, No.4 (2000), p.637.
7. Ali Çarkoğlu, 'Religiosity and Public Policy Evaluations in Turkey', unpublished manuscript, 2001, p.2.
8. Çarkoğlu, p.4.
9. Heper and Güney, p.639.
10. Çarkoğlu, p.4.
11. Paul Kubicek, 'The Earthquake, Europe, and Prospects for Political Change in Turkey', *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol.5, No.2 (2001) <<http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/meria/>>.
12. Larry Diamond, 'Is the Third Wave Over', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.7, No.3 (1996), pp.20-37.
13. Ergün Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), pp.151-4.
14. Heper and Güney, p.650.
15. Ronald Inglehart, 'Culture and Democracy' in Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel Huntington (eds), *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), p.96.
16. Richard Rose, William Mishler and Christian Haerpfer, *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p.96.
17. Linz and Stepan, pp.14-15.
18. Jeremy Salt, 'Turkey's Military 'Democracy'', *Current History*, Vol. 98, No.625 (1999), p.72.
19. Heper and Güney, pp.636-7; Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, 'The State, Politics and the Military in Turkey', *Comparative Politics*, Vol.16, No.1 (1983), pp.17-33.
20. Esmer, p.43.
21. Elie Kedourie, *Democracy and Arab Political Culture* (London: Frank Cass, 1994), pp.5-6; also Bernard Lewis, *The Shaping of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Oxford, 1994), pp.54-6; Y. Choueiri, 'The Political Discourse of Contemporary Islamist Movements', in Abdel Salem Sidahmed and Anoushiravam Ehteshami (eds), *Islamic Fundamentalism* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996).
22. Fred Halliday, *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), p.116; John Esposito and James Piscatori, 'Democratization and Islam', *Middle East Journal*, Vol.45, No.3 (1991), pp.427-40.
23. John Esposito and John Voll, *Islam and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi, 'Islam and Democracy: The Limits of the Western Model', *Journal of Democracy*, No.7, No.2 (1996), pp.81-5; Fatima Mernissi, *Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1992).
24. Shukri Abed, 'Islam and Democracy', in David Garnham and Mark Tessler (eds), *Democracy, War, and Peace in the Middle East* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995), pp.128-128. [AU?]
25. Ergun Özbudun, 'Turkey: How Far from Consolidation?', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.7, No.3 (1996), p.134; Heper and Güney, p.639.

26. Çarkoglu, p.4; Ali Çarkoglu and Binnaz Toprak, *Türkiye'de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset* [Religion, Society and Politics in Turkey] (Istanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2000).
27. Özbudun, 'Turkey', p.134.
28. Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer, p.98.
29. James Gibson, 'The Resilience of Mass Support for Democratic Institutions and Processes in the Nascent Russian and Ukrainian Democracies', in V. Tismaneanu (ed.), *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), p.55.
30. Esmer 1999, p.85.
31. Ibid., p.79.
32. Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer, p.98.
33. Alberto Marradi, 'Factor Analysis as an Aid in the Formulation and Refinement of Empirically Useful Concepts', in Edgar F. Borgatta and David J. Jackson (ed.), *Factor Analysis and Measurement in Sociological Research* (London: Sage, 1981), pp.17–18.
34. Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer, p.98.
35. Robert Rohrschneider, 'Explaining Citizen's Views about Civil Liberties across the Globe: The Micro and Macro-Level Sources of Political Intolerance', paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 2001.
36. Mark Tessler, 'Do Islamic Orientations Influence Attitudes Toward Democracy in the Arab World: Evidence from the World Values Survey in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria', *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* (Spring 2003) [AU?].
37. Mark Tessler, 'Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious Orientations on Attitudes Toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries', *Comparative Politics*, Vol.34, No.3 (2002), pp.337–54; Chu, Diamond and Shin, pp.122–36; Pamela Waldron-Moore, 'Eastern Europe at the Crossroads of Democratic Transition', *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol.32, No.1 (1999), pp.32–62; Robert Marzes and Hermann Thiel, 'Consolidation and Public Opinion in South Africa', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.9, No.1 (1998), pp.95–110; Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer; Dan Ottemoeller, 'Popular Perceptions of Democracy: Elections and Attitudes in Uganda', *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol.31, No.1 (1998), pp.98–124; Doh Chull Shin and Huoyan Shyu, 'Political Ambivalence in South Korea and Taiwan', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.8, No.3 (1997), pp.109–24; Marta Lagos, 'Latin America's Smiling Mask', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.8, No.3 (1997), pp.125–34.
38. Esmer, p.86.
39. Tessler, 'Islam and Democracy'; idem., 'Do Islamic Orientations Influence Attitudes'.
40. Özbudun, 'Turkey', pp.123; also Clement Henry Dodd, *The Crisis of Turkish Democracy* (Hull: Eothen Press, 1983) p.1.
41. Tessler, 'Islam and Democracy'; idem., 'Do Islamic Orientations Influence Attitudes'.

## APPENDIX 1

## INDICES MEASURING INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

**Personal Status***Education*

V217. What is the highest educational level that you have attained? Code based on a 1-10 scale from low to high.

*Personal Well-being*

V64. How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? If 1 means you are completely dissatisfied on this scale, and 10 means you are completely satisfied, where would you put your satisfaction with your household's financial situation?

## POLITICAL CULTURE IN TURKEY

49

V65. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Please use this card to help with your answer. Code based on a 1-10 scale, with 1 being completely dissatisfied.

V227. Here is a scale of incomes. We would like to know in what group your household belongs, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. Just give the letter of the group your household falls into, before taxes and other deductions. Code based on a 1-10 scale, with 1 being the lowest.

**Cultural and Normative Orientations***Religiosity*

V182. Independently of whether you go to church (mosque) or not, would you say you are a religious person, not a religious person, a convinced atheist?

Which, if any, of the following do you believe in? Code based on a 1-3 scale, with 1 being Yes, 3 being No, and 'Don't Know' coded as 2.

V183. Do you believe in God?

V184. Do you believe in life after death?

V185. Do you believe people have a soul?

V190. How important is God in your life? Code based on a 1-3 scale, with 1 being least important (original 1-10 scale: 1-3=1, 4-7=2, 8-9=3).

V191. Do you find that you get comfort and strength from religion? Code based on a 1-3 scale, with 1 being Yes, 3 being No, and 'Don't Know' coded as 2.

*Individualism*

Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Coded according to whether respondent did or did not mention a particular quality.

V 15. Independence

V 18. Imagination

*Traditionalism*

V12. With which of these two statements do you tend to agree?

A. Regardless of the qualities and faults of one's parents, one must always love and respect them  
B. One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by their behaviour and attitudes

Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Coded according to whether respondent did or did not mention a particular quality.

V14. Good manners

For each of the following pairs of statements, please tell me which one comes closest to your own views:

V47. (1) We should emphasize tradition more than high technology

(2) We should emphasize high technology more than tradition.

I'm going to read a list of various changes in our way of life that might take place in the near

future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen, whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or you don't mind?

- V114. Greater respect for authority
- V115. More emphasis on family life

#### *Social Tolerance*

On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours? Code based on whether or not respondent mentioned the following groups.

- V52. People of a different race
- V56. Christians

### **Political Experiences and Assessments**

#### *Confidence in the Political System*

I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in it: a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or none at all?

- V142. The government in Ankara
- V143. Political parties
- V144. Parliament
- V145. The Civil service

#### *Confidence in Institutions of Order*

I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in it: a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or none at all?

- V136. The armed forces
- V137. The legal system
- V141. The police

#### *Trust in Ordinary Citizens*

I am going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing this country?

- V154. Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.
- V155. Having experts, not the government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country.

#### *Political Attentiveness*

Please say, for each of the following, how important it is in your life. Would you say it is very important, rather important, not very important, or not at all important?

- V7. Politics

V37. When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?

V117. How interested would you say you are in politics? Are you very interested, somewhat interested, not very interested, not at all interested?

POLITICAL CULTURE IN TURKEY

51

*Government Performance*

V152. People have different views about the system governing this country. Here is a scale for rating how well things are going: 1 means very bad and 5 means very good. Where on this scale would you put the political system as it is today?

V165. How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are handling the country's affairs? Would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, no opinion, fairly dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?

Manuscript accepted for publication November 2002.

Proof